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Constructing the Architectonics and Formulating the Articulation of 
Islamic Governance: A Discursive Attempt in Islamic Epistemology 
 
Maszlee Malik 
 
Abstract: 
 
International institutions have promoted a „good governance‟ agenda as an archetypal model 
to achieve development for underdeveloped and developing countries. However, closer 
scrutiny can trace the root of this agenda back to the hegemonic nature of modernity that 
proposes a specific meta-narrative upon others, as part of Eurocentrism. Many, however, have 
criticized this Eurocentric paradigm, since the non-Western communities with their own 
constructed version of „good‟ in governance have also proven their ability to develop and 
prosper in the present or in the past. Thus, the cultural and value-laden nature of such 
vernacular concepts provides the rationale for the existence and practice of other paradigms.  
In line with this argument, Islam, with its long history of governance and richness of its 
values can be considered as another alternative, which should be thoroughly examined to 
disclose and depict its conceptualization and paradigm of „good governance‟. 
 
The aim of this research, thus, is to explore and analyze the Islamic axioms, foundation 
principles and values underpinning the field of governance in an attempt to construct the 
architectonics of a new systemic and dynamic theory and formulate the articulation of 
„Islamic governance‟. This discursive and abstract, rather than being an empirical exercise, 
assumes to produce a „good governance‟ framework within its own formulation through a 
value-shaped dynamic model according to maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah (higher objective of 
SharÊÑah) by going beyond the narrow remit of classical and contemporary discussions 
produced on the topic, which propose a certain institutional model of governance based on the 
classical juristic (fiqh) method.  In this new dynamic paradigm, a discourse-oriented approach 
is taken to establish the philosophical foundation of the model by deriving it from Islamic 
ontology, which is then articulated using the Islamic epistemological sources to develop and 
formulate the discursive foundations of this new theoretical framework. A deductive method 
is applied to the ontological sources and epistemological principles to explain the 
architectonics of this new theory, which are represented by the constructed axioms, which 
later help to articulate the working mechanism of the proposed „Islamic good governance‟ 
framework through a specifically formulated typology to function as an alternative 
conceptualization of „good governance‟. 
 
This study, through an exclusive analytical discursive approach, finds that Islam as one of the 
major religions in the contemporary world with the claim of promising the underpinning 
principles and philosophical foundations of worldly affairs and institutions through a micro 
method of producing homoIslamicus could contribute towards development of societies by 
establishing a unique model of governance from its explicit ontological worldview through a 
directed descriptive epistemology. Thus, the research on governance in this study does not 
only focus on the positivistic materialist components such as institutions or mechanisms or 
growth per se, but it encompasses the value-laden holistic nature of human life in accordance 
with the Islamic worldview as an important contribution. In doing so, it formulates the „good 
governance‟ in Islam in relation to the conceptualized „iÍsÉnÊ social capital‟, which 
constitutes the main thrust of the constructed model.  Nonetheless, this generative (non-
cumulative) paradigm of looking into the governance issue should be viewed as an 
incomplete certainty as production of the continuous ijtihÉd (reasoning) progression will 
continue to reveal ways through which its working mechanism can be expanded along with 
potential developments in its philosophical formation. 
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Chapter One 
PROLEGOMENA 
 
“There are other nations, among them are sinners also 
There are modest people and arrogant ones also 
Among them are slothful, indolent as well as clever people 
There are also hundreds who are disguised with Thy name 
Thy graces descend on the other people‟s abodes 
Lightning strikes only the poor Muslims‟ abodes 
 
The idols in temples say „The Muslims are gone‟ 
They are glad that the Ka‟bah‟s sentinels are gone 
From the world‟s stage the Khudi singers are gone 
They, with the Quran in their armpits, are gone. 
Infidelity is mocking, hast Thou some feeling or not? 
Dost Thou have any regard for Thy own Tawhid or not? 
 
Now the world is the lover of others 
For us it is only an imaginary world 
We have departed, others have taken over the world 
Do not complain now that the world has become devoid of Tawhid 
We live with the object of spreading Thy fame in the world 
Can the wine cup exist if the cup bearer does not live?” 
 
Allama Iqbal, Shikwah (1911) 
 
1.1. OVERTURE 
In his controversial poem „Shikwah‟, Allama Iqbal of Lahore lodged his complaint to 
God (Khoda) about the poor conditions of Muslim nations of the time. In his reply to 
the complaint in the form of a supposed answer he would receive from God, Iqbal (in 
God‟s words) repudiated the Shikwah by asking the Muslims to look at their own 
wrongdoings which had led to those conditions. In reflecting on the poetic wisdom, 
and considering the state of the Muslim ummah (nation) we can see that nearly a 
century later, despite some changes having taken place in the Geopolitics of the 
independent Muslim countries, the majority of them have still not achieved a proper 
standard of „development‟. Underdevelopment, corruption, famine in some cases, 
lack of education, a non-sustainable environment, dictatorships and other socio-
political and economical calamities are synonymous with and have plagued the 
Muslim ummah.  
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The available statistics and literature depict that most human rights, life quality and 
development, governance and transparency or accountability indices show that 
Muslim countries always score the lowest (Chapra, 2008: 156-162). On the other 
hand, most of the corruption indices, rights abuse, power abuse and the like indicate 
that these countries have the highest scores.  International studies demonstrate that 
only 13 countries, which constitute less than 23%, of the 57 member-countries of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) are democracies (see: 
„www.Electionworld.org‟ for its 2002 report). Of the remaining 44 undemocratic 
countries, 31 are pseudo-democracies, five are absolute monarchies, three are 
dictatorships and five are in transition. Although the concept of democracy is 
understood in these countries it is mostly relegated to the structure or mechanism of 
democracy in the sense of electoral system and superficial democratic structures for 
the altering of power without the real meaning of democratic institutions that ensure 
all aspects of freedom to the citizen (Siddique, 2000). In most cases, the same regime 
continues to rule for the control of resources and the manipulation of power which 
they regain continuously with the help of draconian laws and which curb people‟s 
freedom, especially the freedom of media and expression (Nasr, 1995). The lack of 
freedom in Muslim countries is quite apparent in the data rendered by the „Freedom 
of Press 2008‟ report by Freedom House, in which only one Muslim country (Mali) 
has been categorised as free, while 17 others are listed as partly free, and the 
remaining 40 are not free.
1
  
The powerful control of regimes over the media and the absence of feasible 
accountability processes and transparency contribute to poor governance in Muslim 
countries. Regimes become infallible and resistant to any criticism of the policies 
they produce. Any country operating under such a climate will ultimately find itself 
immersed in corruption and will witness the marginalisation of the majority of its 
mainly poor citizens. A myriad of empirical studies have proven that corruption and 
poor governance, which are the results of lack of freedom, have a substantial adverse 
effect on development (Kauffman et al. 1999). The correlation between corruption 
and lack of freedom in Muslim countries is clearly seen in the „Corruption Perception 
Index‟ for the year 2008 (prepared by the Berlin-based Transparency International), 
                                                 
1
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop08/FOTP2008_WorldRankings.pdf. (Retrieved on 18th 
July 2009) 
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which lists 133 countries with a score ranging from 10 (least corrupt) to zero (most 
corrupt); a score of 5 on this index indicates a borderline country. Only six Muslim 
countries are above this borderline with scores ranging from 5.1 to 6.5, while 44 
countries fall below it
2
.  
The effect of corruption on the economic growth of the Muslim countries can also be 
clearly identified from their Gross National Product (GNP). Even though the total 
population of the 57 Muslim countries is approximately 1.194 million (Kettani, 2010) 
and constitutes a little over 21% of the world population of approximately 6.827 
million
3
, their total Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted GNP is only USD 7,882 
billion
4
 which is only (7.3%) of the world PPP adjusted GNP of USD 57,937 billion 
(IMF, 2010). Only four Muslim countries, all of which happen to be oil producing 
countries, are included the high-income category (HIC) and only six in the upper-
middle income (UMC) category. Eighteen fall into the low-middle-income category 
(LMC) and 29 fall into the low-income category (LIC) (World Bank, 2004: 251). 
In terms of social development, the standard of education in the Muslim countries, 
which is another indicator for development apart from economic growth, also gives 
an adverse indication of the situation in those countries. Education, which received 
high priority in the early history of Islam and which was one of the causes of the rise 
of the Muslim people, has not received the due importance it is associated with from 
government budgets. Expenditure on arms and the survival of the regime and 
bureaucratic surplus enjoy higher priority in budgeting over people‟s education, 
which in most of these countries is dependent on international aid. According to the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) (2005: 13) report for the year 2005, the average 
adult illiteracy rate in Muslim countries was 32% in 2002. This means that around 
426 million people are illiterate and unable to contribute to development according to 
their full potential.  As evidence of this, the total number of universities in all the 
Muslim countries is only 600 whereas in the US alone there are 1,975 universities, or 
more than three times as many, when its population is less than one-fourth (Chapra, 
2008). Comparing the quality of those 600 universities to the 1,975 of the US would 
                                                 
2
 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008. (Retrieved on 19th July 
2009) 
3
 http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/popclockworld.html (retrieved from US consensus bureau website 
on 1st June 2010) 
4
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2001.html (retrieved from CIA, 
The World Fact book on 1
st
 June 2010) 
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provide another negative indication of the underdevelopment of the Muslim 
countries. 
According to human, social and economic indicators, most countries in the Middle 
East are performing badly in terms of development. The Millennium Development 
Goals Report for the Arab Region (MDGR) issued by the UN Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia in 2005 states that “31.5 percent of people in the 
Middle East and North Africa subsist on less than $2 per day; moreover, 23.6 percent 
of them lack basic health and education services and a decent standard of living”. 
Furthermore, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) issued the 2002 
Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) which states that three major challenges 
to socioeconomic growth in the Arab nations are: the repression of women‟s 
empowerment, insufficient competent professionals/technocrats relative to income 
and the overall lack of freedom. AHDR mentions that the growing number of 
illiterate people in Arab countries (mostly women) also contributes to developmental 
issues in those regions (Abdel Samad, 2008). 
Nevertheless, a contemporary remedy proposed for the above problems by the 
international financial institutions as part of the Breton Woods process was „good 
governance‟. The „good governance‟ phenomenon was first introduced as a panacea 
for underdevelopment and poverty in the early 1980s as part of the Washington 
Consensus process, and was proposed as a remedy for many other problems and 
challenges. Since the World Bank‟s report on Sub-Saharan Africa in 1989, the term 
„good governance‟ has become a consensus-agreed programme to tackle the 
developmentalist problems, not only in Muslim countries but also in other 
underdeveloped countries all over the world. Consequently, since the early 1990s, the 
topic of „good governance‟ has attracted the attention of many researchers, politicians 
and economists.  This research focuses on the concept through Islamic ontology and 
episteme.  
1.2. GOOD GOVERNANCE AS THE FOCAL ISSUE  
Governance is both a very new and very old subject in political science. It marks a 
return to the conception of political study organized around key words like 
constitution, government, polity, politics and other related themes. It has also been 
Chapter One: Prolegomena 
 5 
used to describe decision-making processes and ensuing implementation, frequently 
being associated merely with government and public administration. However, recent 
developments in Western democracies have shaped a new discourse of governance 
and aroused interest in the detailed knowledge of mechanisms and actors of 
governance. As a result, there have been attempts at measuring the quality of 
governance and – last but not least – reforms of the public sector have been directly 
or indirectly influenced by these “reinvented” concepts of governance. At present, 
governance predominantly refers to the co-ordination of social systems, public-
private relations, increasing reliance on informal authority (Pierre and Peters, 2000).  
„Good Governance‟ agenda as introduced by Bretton Woods‟ institutions according 
to the Washington Consensus is a result of conventional developmental theories, and 
represents the contemporary kernel of truth on how to develop (Mehmet, 1997: 127; 
Van Dok, 1999: 11). It was promoted within the spirit of neo-liberal discourse during 
the 1990s, as the major prerequisite of development according to its proponents, and, 
in a way, articulated the ideas of „The End of History‟ thesis developed by Fukayama 
(1992) in a rather Hegelian understanding. Equally, it also refers to a political regime 
based on a liberal-democratic polity model, which protects human and civil rights, 
combined with component, non-corrupt and accountable public administration 
(Blunt, 1995; Leftwich, 1993; Neumayer, 2003). In the same way, „good governance‟ 
is defined as any system in any country which has the elements of: (all parties) 
participation, consensus oriented (policies), accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, fairness and inclusiveness, and rule of 
law (World Bank, 1992; UNDP, 1997). Accordingly, the term would also imply to 
the sets of rules (system) governing the actions of individuals and organizations 
(society) and the negotiations of differences between them that could only be 
crystallized through proper institutions (Van Dok, 1999). 
Despite its aspirations to determine the ideal way of developing, „good governance‟ 
as a policy imperative has also received criticism from various parties. As an agenda 
promoted by developed Western countries to underdeveloped or developing countries 
(Third World), „good governance‟ has been perceived by some as an expansion of 
neo-liberalism hegemony (Leftwich, 1993; Moore, 1993; Burnell, 1994; Tetzlaff, 
1995; Mehmet, 1997: 126; Pagden, 1998; Jreisat, 2004; Kothari, 2005); while some 
have viewed it as neo-colonialism by developed countries (Tetzlaff, 1995; Moore, 
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1996; Pagden, 1998; Anghie, 2000), and some believe it to be a part of a Western 
project to undermine the „other‟ way of life (Mehmet, 1997; Anghie, 2000). By the 
same token, some accuse the agenda as being part of „developmental supremacy‟ of 
developed countries over the Third World (Escobar, 1995; Mehmet, 1997; Rahnema, 
1997). On the other hand, many researchers have launched their criticism of the 
concept from its technical failure based on the empirical results of its operations in 
Latin America, African countries and the Balkans (George and Sabelli, 1994: 142-61; 
CAFOD, 1998; Goldstein, 2000; Stewart, 2000; El-Said, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002). 
A deconstruction of the critiques and the concept itself, however, lead to the root of 
the problem, as the concept can be located within the Eurocentric worldview. Neo-
liberal agenda, neo-colonialism, Western values and developmentalist domination all 
refer to one main source: enlightenment originated Western modernity‟s conception 
of the other by influence on the ideological, political and economic discourse of 
governance and development with the objective of coercing them to embrace its own 
ideals. Eurocentrism, thus, as coined by many, is rooted strongly in the very realm of 
modernity (Mehmet, 1997; Mazrui, 2001; Schech and Haggis, 2000: xii). In other 
words, liberal values, as the core foundation of the „good governance‟ reform agenda, 
is accused of being another product of modernity, which was the zenith of 
achievement of post-Enlightenment Europe. 
1.3. IDENTIFYING THE GAPS  
The post-Enlightenment occidental world has imposed itself as the centre of the 
future life of the human species. Enlightenment, as a landmark of „modern‟ 
civilisation, should not only be defined as a period of time, but should also be 
understood as “a set of interconnected ideas, values, principles and facts which 
provide both an image of the natural and social world, and a way of thinking about 
it” (Hamilton, 1992:21), and hence as a project. This „modernity‟ discourse proves 
that religions and beliefs are the major impediment to human development and 
progress. Instead, reason and science have the ability to change and improve the 
nature and social condition of human beings. This concept is believed to have 
awakened the Western people from their dependency on metaphysics in searching for 
the well-being of life (Hamilton, 1992; Porter, 1990). At the same time, science has 
allowed humans to determine their life, control nature instead of being controlled by 
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it and make her more productive to serve the purpose of their lives through the 
invention of machinery through utilitarianism, which would abolish drudgery, and 
free humans from illness and famine (Shanin, 1997). Religion and superstition, upon 
which people were once heavily depended to face those calamities, were now being 
denied and cursed for their failure and irrationality.  Thus, rationality was seen to 
prevail against the irrational traditions and religious ways of doing things and it was 
expected that a convergence should take place in a hierarchical order to lead all the 
uncivilized and underdeveloped, namely un-modernity projects, towards the Western 
ideals. 
The whole process of transformation, as a ramification of Enlightenment in Western 
terms, leans towards a generic term of „modernity‟ (Porter, 2001; Wegner, 1994). 
This modernity, which represents „Western civilisation and culture‟, is glorified as 
the model of absolute truth and value, hence the „universal model of progress and 
development‟ (Bennett, 2005: 25). Modernity as a project can be summarised in a 
number of specific central ideas such as: 
a) „Reason or rationality‟ as the way of organising knowledge;  
b) „Empiricism‟ as the only way to determine the validity of any idea solely 
through empirical facts as a result of experiments and scientific explorations;  
c) „Scientific‟ knowledge as the only key to expand all human knowledge;  
d) Scientific knowledge bearing „universalism‟ reason and science to produce 
general principles and laws to be applied to all situations;  
e) This will lead to „progress‟ by improving the nature and social conditions of 
human beings;   
f) The progress must preserve the principle of „individualism‟ through the 
eradication of any domination of the authority over individuals.  
g) In order to safeguard those principles, „secularism‟ as a worldview must 
dominate the realm of knowledge and structures to replace traditional 
religious authority;  
h) This will entail „toleration‟ as the major theme of humanity and modern life;  
i) The concept of  „uniformity of human nature‟, which teaches the concept of 
equality amongst the human race according to their rights;  
j) All the concepts can only be implemented with the existence of a viable 
„freedom‟ in individuals‟ lives with the absence of any barriers for one‟s 
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belief, trade, communication, social interaction, sexuality, ownership of 
property and voicing opinions and thoughts.  
k) All societies are expected to converge towards the West‟s modernity project 
in a hierarchical manner.  (Hamilton, 1992:21-2; Porter, 2001) 
Hence, the issue of governance as a Western model is strongly derived from and 
rooted in this worldview. This paradigm promotes that the meta-narrative or meta-
theory of this Western worldview can explain the world. Modernisation is presented 
as „the rational‟ and „the universal‟ social project to be achieved by the irrational, 
passive and „non-modern‟ others (Hall, 1992: 312-13; Porter, 2001). European 
culture, lifestyles, systems and knowledge as the main image of the „West‟ and 
„modernity‟ has been put at the centre of human life in modern times (Roberts, 1985; 
Mann, 1988; Hall, 1992). This Eurocentrism, which represents Western civilisation, 
in such a manner, has been declared as the „end‟ to world history (Fukuyama, 1992). 
Accordingly, Western discourses of governance, deeply rooted in this worldview, 
neglect the elements of culture and values, which are considered as inadequate with 
the „universal‟ barometer of modernity and development. The critics of „good 
governance‟ describe the situation as a „new-colonialism‟ agenda imposed by liberal, 
Western-dominated international institutions. It represents the „hegemony of 
Eurocentric culture‟, which is characterized by the larger picture of economic 
stratification, military inequality, a disproportionate emphasis on European 
ideologies, the proliferation of Western-derived systems of education, consumerism 
and life style (Mazrui, 2001). In fact, modernity as a political and intellectual project, 
has a long tradition of dominating, excluding and misunderstanding the non-West. 
This stance seems to imply that modernisation is not merely a structural 
transformation but also a practice based on discursive formations such as, e.g., the 
culture, knowledge and economic and political superiority of the West. Western 
values and beliefs were imposed and forced upon others, specifically the Third World 
as a means of saving them from their underdevelopment and backwardness (Schech 
and Haggis, 2000: xii). 
In the same manner, within the framework of the „good governance‟ agenda, 
„governance‟ is „good‟ if it suits the philosophy designed mainly by the Bretton 
Woods institutions according to the values they believe in. Those values might not 
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suit the nature of some underdeveloped societies or states to improve their 
performance in social, political and economical fields. Some reports suggest that 
certain programmes imposed on those countries not only worsened their situation but 
also resulted in new problems (George and Sabelli, 1994: 142-61). Lack of 
„indigenity‟ and culture characteristics in tackling underdevelopment issues has been 
identified amongst the lacunae within current good governance projection by other 
outstanding researchers and international reports (Hofstede, 1993; UNDP, 1994; 
Blunt, 1995; Dwivedi, 2001 and 2002; Schech and Haggis, 2002). Hence, an 
exploration of the panacea based on the values of the society is justified for its 
possible potential to cure the aforesaid situation.  
As per the argument of the critics, the post-modernity world demands a fresh look 
into the narratives of different civilisations, cultures and ideologies rather than 
imposed meta-narratives of modernity. Hence, explorations of religion and faith to 
develop an alternative notion of „good governance‟ from „other‟s‟ worldview is also 
necessary. Much could be learned from cultures, religions and faiths in the realm of 
governance studies from the phenomenological perspective. These elements give the 
human race a „sacred canopy‟ against the threat of the lack of meaning (anomie) of 
the world and accordingly will lead the society to appreciate the innate 
precariousness of the nomos (meaningful order) (Berger, 1967: 28). As an example, 
the relation between Islamic values and the issue of governance that is the product of 
the worldview has a great deal of historical experience that is worth exploring. The 
same can be applied to the rich Confucianism-oriented Chinese culture and 
philosophy derived from the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. Similarly, the 
Dharma-based Indian values articulated from Kautilya and Ashoka wisdoms 
regarding political and administrational affairs are another invaluable source by 
which to enhance the ideal. The list goes on to include other cultures and faiths 
(Harris, 1990; Sen, 1998; Frederickson, 2002; Inayatullah & Boxwell, 2003: 14; 
Dellios, 2005). 
1.4. MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH 
In post-modern times there has been much empirical evidence to indicate that 
religions and faiths also play a pro-active role in the field of civil society but more 
importantly in the development of societies, which is a major factor in political 
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economic life for the development of a country, as well its governance (Gaush-Pasha, 
2005). For example, Hofstede‟s studies (1984 and 1991) provide rationale as to why 
cultural and traditional differences should be appreciated for effective management.  
The richness of human civilisations should never be neglected due to the deluge of 
Eurocentrism. Values, morals and wisdom produced by the „others‟ through their 
cognitive rationality together with the Western cognitive rationality are the colours 
that will render the universe more positive and joyful. It is these elements that will 
bring a new aspect to the way studies on governance should be conducted. However, 
the failure to appreciate their role in forming comprehensive ideals for governance 
will turn the discourse of governance into a monotonous authoritarian paradigm in 
viewing human life, which is the case in its origin and proposal. 
After establishing that such concepts, including the Eurocentric concept, are not 
value-free, religion as a form of ethical doctrine could potentially provide the 
„internal good‟ for development through its doctrines on social cohesion, mutual co-
operation and virtue-based community. In practice, the process of development is not 
an axiological neutral human activity, but like other activities it is impregnated with 
values and ethics (Cortina, 2007). In consequence, apart from mainstream liberal 
economic ethics (i.e. efficiency, competitiveness, economic growth, human rights, 
etc.) there are other traditional, culturally-constructed and religious ethics that are 
worth incorporating into the discourse in order to respond to the realities of each 
society for it to reach an acceptable and efficient solution for itself. It is through this 
premise that the Aristotelian concept of praxis is worth employing to explain how 
ethics and tradition can encourage a society to cooperate to attain the telos (the 
internal goods)
5
.  
Stiglitz (1998) argues that cultural values should be preserved due to their essential 
function as a cohesive force for development at a time when many other values are 
weakening. Rationally, culture and values that enhance both human and social capital 
will generate public order through the production of good citizens who live in mutual 
                                                 
5
 By applying MacIntyre‟s Aristotelian insight into the role of tradition in human life, Cortina (2007: 5-
6) concludes that traditional bond can motivate the work of development by motivating the society to 
attain the internal goods within certain ethical and moral frameworks through the cultivation of virtues 
by different social agents according to certain models facilitated by political, economic, and citizens‟ 
institutions based on specific philosophical foundation. With such a framework, she claims that people 
are not means for other ends, but are valuable in them.  
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cooperation and mutual assistance, transcending conflicts that mount up to establish 
social stability (James Coleman, 1990; Kenneth Newton, 1997). Casson (1993) 
points out that culture as „collective subjectivity‟ will enhance efficiency through 
good behaviour, integrity, honesty, trust and cooperation that will have a great impact 
on economic performance. In the same way, Throsby (2001) suggests that culture 
will provide objectives for group development through certain worldviews, values 
and beliefs, and it will also affect economic efficiency by affecting behaviour, 
innovation, group dynamics and decision-making processes. 
It is according to this reason that UNESCO (1997) suggested in its 29
th
 General 
Conference Report that culture (if it is being strengthened and supported) could be an 
enormous potential key element, as a social capital, in the struggle against poverty. 
The same concern was voiced by the then President of the World Bank, James 
Wolfensohn, (Kliksberg, 2000: 12) who emphasised the essentiality the 
independency of growth and social development and further suggests that: “Without 
parallel social development there will be no satisfactory economic development”. 
While on another occasion, the President of the World Bank also stressed the 
significance of social development through social justice and equality to complement 
the institutional and structural reform for political economic growth and human 
prosperity. Social capital and culture, thus, are key components of these interactions 
(Kliksberg, 2000: 12).  It should be noted that these differences also highlight the 
distinction between „economic growth and development‟. 
Recent global religious uprisings in many areas have demanded a restructuring of 
faiths and values in the fields from which they were once banished (Casanova, 1994; 
Berger, 1999; Falk, 2001). As a result, exploration of the possibility of incorporating 
culture or religion specifically into the public sphere is no longer taboo. However, 
this new uprising, or what is termed by Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2010) as the 
return of God or „God is back‟, emerges in a different form from that it took during 
the pre-Enlightenment periods. This global phenomenon is represented by the re-
appearance of religions in the form of ethics, values and many other functioning 
forms rather than the previous institutional structure. This new form of religion 
usurps the realm of politics, economy, education, international affairs and 
governance without diminishing the existing structures. Religions from this new 
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perspective are no longer mere beliefs in miraculous rescue from above (deus ex 
machina) but rather a vehicle for human betterment (Falk, 2001: 32). 
Similarly, various researchers have dedicated their studies to the new role that 
religions can play in development (Haynes, 2007; Khan and Bashar, 2008). Many 
empirical studies have been undertaken on these topics and most of them indicate 
that religions, through faith-based or faith-inspired organisations and movements, 
have not contributed significantly to development. Amongst their outstanding 
contributions, those often quoted by many researchers have mainly tackled poverty, 
improved education, provided welfare services to the community, enhanced 
humanitarian works, and encouraged political participation in the struggle against 
corruption and misadministration (Gutiérrez, 1988; Akhtar, 1991; Casanova, 1994; 
Rowland, 1999; Phongphit, 1988; Gillingham, 2005; Marshall, 2005: 8-12; Bayat, 
2007; Harrigan and El-Said, 2009; Deneulin, 2009). Therefore, the appreciation of 
values derived from other civilisations, faiths or cultures must be accompanied by an 
investigation of their meaning and origin. Furthermore, such endeavour necessitates a 
deep scrutiny of the worldview that determines how governance should be 
interpreted and conducted.  
1.5. ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE  
Likewise, the present evolving good governance paradigm Eurocentricity despite it 
sharing outcomes which can be seen to “universalistic”, can be seen through the 
deconstruction of the agenda from its anti-religious / anti-cultural ethos that underpin 
its discourse by neglecting any indigenous factors for development. Furthermore, the 
current discourse of development as proposed by the good governance project is 
solely measured by materialistic achievement through growth and the perceived 
„universalistic‟ values per se, without allowing any room for other‟s interpretations to 
fairly defining the development. The role of religious ethos, as will be discussed in 
this research will prove that cultural matters do matters in development, and thus the 
need for an independent discourse, particularly for Muslim. For such reason, this 
research will be developed in replying to the need for a separate and unique paradigm 
for good governance for Muslim societies needs. This aim will be the central working 
hypothesis of this research. 
It is according to this rationale that the quest for Islamic governance, as another 
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attempt to explore „cultural-based‟ governance through the endogenising framework, 
is justified. Islam, as a belief system and a way of life as perceived by Muslims, in 
some relative manner is unable to fit within the rather narrow framework of the post-
Enlightenment concept of religion
6
. The element of ideology might accommodate 
some characteristics of Islamic teaching but this still does not fully incorporate the 
comprehensive meaning of Islam as perceived and acknowledged by Muslims. As 
Iqbal (2008) suggested, the essence of Islam comprises the matter of faith, feeling, 
and intellectual, doctrinal, philosophical and other spheres of human life. 
Furthermore, the studies of Islamic orientation in various fields, such as Islamic 
banking and finance, Islamic economics, Islamic education, Islamic management, 
Islamic administrative development, Islamic political theories, etc are not new. In 
spite of this, the Islamic contribution to the field of good governance (macro 
governance) has yet to be explored.  
The common perception of Islamic governance is a dark image of a non-democratic 
and autocratic system, or a dictatorship with iron claws, or the governance of the 
cleric elite with the infringement of people‟s freedom under the banner of religion. 
All of these elements (which unfortunately resemble the reality in some 
contemporary Muslim countries) are known and accepted as major impediments to 
development. Moreover, current representations of Muslim reality by most of the 
regimes simply add more fuel to the stereotyping by Western sceptics of the presence 
of religion in the political sphere. The amalgam of religion and governance according 
to this paradigm indicates taking a step backward to the Dark Ages when injustice 
dominated human life under the shade of the Church and God‟s word. Such a 
conception was not only echoed by people like Weber (2003 [1958]), but also 
                                                 
6
 Religion is translated as „al-dÊn‟ in Arabic. The term connotes two different definitions due to its 
usage and context. The general definition for „al-din‟ refers to the way of life and all manners that 
relate to conducts from both ritual-spiritual aspects and the secular. This comprehensive meaning of 
„al-dÊn‟ was acknowledged by al-Shatibi through his saying: “(al-dÊn as the way of conduct) is but an 
act of worship that encompasses rituals („ibÉdÉt), customs („ÉdÉt) and human relation (mu‟ÉmalÉt)”, 
and his remarks on another occasion, “All the human conducts that are recognized by the SharÊ‟ah is 
but an act of worship”. Such a wide scope for the meaning of „al-din‟ comprises every action and 
conduct of humans which will find its general and moral guidance in al-Quran and sunnah (Prophet 
Muhammad‟s traditions), implicitly and explicitly. While the specific meaning of „al-dÊn‟ refers to the 
„ritual-spiritual context‟ which the Muslim scholars define „al-umur al-dÊniyyah al-ta‟abuddiyyah‟ and 
does not involve any other human conduct such as economics, politics, education, culture and etc. (al-
Uthmani, 2009: 86-105). In our discussion, the main concern will focus on the general meaning of „al-
dÊn‟ as the way of life as perceived and believed in strongly by many Muslims. It is from such a 
worldview that the epistemological issues regarding the subject of governance can be explored and 
derived. 
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became a major trend in explaining the incompatibility between Islam and the 
modern liberal world (Toynbee, 1935; Hitti, 1958; Hodgson, 1977; Baeck, 1994 and 
Lewis, 1995).  
In responding to the sceptics, Maxime Rodinson‟s (1973) characterization of Islam as 
an ideologie mobilisatrice, that is, an ideology that facilitates social and political 
mobilization might be a good answer. As Rodinson articulated in his widely-known 
piece, Islam is not only compatible with capitalism, but it has its own inner 
foundational aim to drive Muslims toward development. A similar assertion on the 
compatibility between Islamic doctrine of economy and capitalism, which will 
eventually lead to social change and economic development, can also be found in 
Turner (1984). In the same vein, Chapra (2008: 846) also challenges the claims of the 
cynics by applying Ibn Khaldun‟s theory of rise and fall of civilisation. According to 
this theory, Islam has activated all the developmental factors in a positive discretion 
through a multidisciplinary approach to development. The approach encompasses all-
important socio-economic and political variables, including the sovereign or political 
authority, beliefs and rules of behaviour (Shari‟ah), people, wealth or stock of 
resources, development, and justice, in a circular and interdependent manner.  
Ibn Khaldun (Rosenthal, 1967: 19) concludes that the rise and fall of civilizations is 
closely dependent on the well-being or misery of the people. Therefore the fall of any 
civilisation (as well as the current underdevelopment climate in Muslim countries) is 
not only dependent on economic variables but is also derived from the combined 
roles of moral, institutional, psychological, political, social and demographic factors 
(Chapra, 2008: 840). As a remedy, Ibn Khaldun proposes the activation of Islamic 
creed, spirituality and horizontal-vertical moral values to contribute to the moral and 
material uplifting of individuals, which is the central factor behind the rise or fall of 
civilisations and countries. 
However, totally denying the theory of the sceptics as might be argued by some 
apologists will never shed any new light on the subject, nor will totally accepting it. 
To maintain an objectivity of research, we have to admit that Islamic texts could be 
manipulated (or are being manipulated) by some who might wish to legitimise 
undemocratic governance. Hence, a fresh way of exploring and at the same time 
revealing the new dimension of governance from Islamic epistemology, by taking 
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into account human experience and justice and fairness factors, is essential. Thus, a 
new ijtihÉd (reasoning) in dealing with the subject is absolutely mandatory. 
Humanistic governance based on the preservation of the dignity of human beings, 
which has been the focal point in Islamic tenets, the inviolability of life, and 
responsible freedom should be explored and promoted as another alternative voice of 
current modernity hegemony.  
In sum, if economic and policy-oriented issues are all but value-laden, it is therefore 
rational that an Islamic conception of „governance‟ should be developed to fit into its 
own vision.  This, as explained above, could increase the efficiency of development 
efforts in the Muslim world by directly appealing to people‟s values.  This suggestion 
assumes that the developmentalist failures in the Muslim world are perhaps partially 
due to the imposed developmentalist agendas which are not rooted in the aspirational 
worldview of the people whose lives are expected to be affected for the better. 
1.6. AIMS OF THE RESEARCH  
The aim of this research, thus, is to explore and analyse the Islamic axioms, 
foundation principles and values underpinning the field of governance in an attempt 
to construct the architectonics of a new systemic and dynamic theory and formulate 
the articulation of „Islamic governance‟, in the hope of discovering a remedy for the 
cases of „bad governance‟ and underdevelopment in Muslim countries. Rationally, 
religion that predominantly became the centre of Muslim life could probably play an 
efficient role in overcoming such problems. In fact, the long history of Muslim 
politics has proven that Islamic values managed to bring about efficiency of 
governance and administration in certain periods of time. Despite the universal and 
common meanings of those values, Muslims value them more according to their own 
terms and meanings. The persona-religiousus (Ibrahim, 1996) tendency within the 
heart of most Muslim individuals would provide a ground for the implementation of 
those ideals.   
However, to present an „out-of-the-box‟ proposal which differs from the mainstream 
analysis, advocacy and action for major social change is indeed a kind of paradigm 
shift. Paradigm shift stipulates a critical deconstructive method of representing the 
proposal of an exploration of new dimensions and activities that crosscut subjects and 
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contexts. These dimensions and activities, however, should emerge primarily with a 
certain worldview to give a strong foundation on which they will interact with the 
reality. The foundation should be able to produce certain specific principles for the 
new paradigm rooted strongly in its epistemology. It is from those principles that a 
new approach will be developed as an articulation of their ideals. 
The formulation of the foundation should be based firmly on Islamic tenet, which al-
Faruqi (1992) termed tawÍÊd. TawÍÊd is considered as a priori, and believed to 
explain the „truth‟. It is from this a priori „truth‟ that the reality of life and the world 
are explained. This worldview illuminates the ideal of Islam and conceptualises an 
epistemological paradigm from which Muslims derive their knowledge. Accordingly, 
the attempt to explore Islamic ideals to fit as an alternative means to the conventional 
governance set-up must embark from this starting point. Therefore, a new method is 
to be formulated to crystallize Islamic principles of governance by constructing a 
new alternative within the magnitude of value-laden, ontology-determined 
epistemology. It is expected that this new approach must transcend the current 
(nature-matter) materialistic monism of governance by replacing the ends of its 
process with transcendental values, and by making humans as a starting point of the 
subject and not as mere commodities. Furthermore, it must fit into the framework of 
comprehensive contemporary usage of „good‟ governance from the ontological-
determined Islamic epistemology through deductive method. 
As far as the term epistemology is concerned, the exploration also involves Islamic 
traditions and previous contributions to the subject, but without literal transcriptions. 
They will only represent the ongoing, creative attempt to comprehend the paradigm 
implicit in different Islamic texts and phenomena. On the other hand, due to the new 
nature of the recent description of „governance‟, a new distinctive approach that 
advocates modern political economic issues should apply modern socio-economic 
analysis with new presupposition established from Islamic epistemology 
(Choudhury, 1992, 1995, 1999, etc). This kind of approach suggests that theoretical 
foundation of Islamic Political Economy should emanate from the complete 
substitution of the neo-classical idea of replacement and its later variations by the 
„Principle of Universal Complementarity‟ (Choudhury 1994). This approach is 
essential to this research which looks at the Islamic ontological-determined 
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epistemological role on ethico-economic and political systems with governance as its 
grand subsystem as a new emerging theory. 
Finally, this research aims to explore the principles of governance within Islamic 
discourse through the epistemological sources of Islam, namely the Qur‟an, the 
Prophet Muhammad‟s traditions (Sunnah), the pious Caliphs‟ experiences and the 
maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah.  It adopts the framework of modern good governance theories 
and applications to explore the ideal concepts and principles of governance within the 
Islamic epistemology. The concepts of Islamic governance should be understood 
from the political and economic ethos that could emerge from the aforementioned 
sources. This aim confirms al-Badawi‟s assertion (2002: 21) that an ideal civilisation 
requires divine guidance to give it a firm foundation, an incentive and a framework, 
which gives progress a sense of direction and an ethical orientation. Accordingly, the 
exploration of values from Islamic sources and history will be applied in the field of 
governance. Instead of dealing with the forms and structures, this thesis will derive 
the core principles of governance from Islamic epistemological sources.  
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
In attempting to construct something which is not new but requires a new dimension 
in looking into it, we are reminded of the words of Milan Kundera (1986). In his 
L‟Art du roman, Kundera comments: “To write, means for the poet to crush the wall 
behind which something that „was always there‟”. In this respect, the task of a 
researcher is no different from the poet‟s. The most challenging task is to discover 
what „was always there‟ and to represent it from a holistic view with a new 
interpretation. In dealing with such a situation, an inductive research strategy is the 
best means of achieving such a goal. With it a researcher is just like a poet, 
uncovering, in ever-new situations, facts previously hidden.  
Discursive analysis is the major method of data collection of this thesis since the 
research is mainly theoretical and discursive in nature. This method, as part of the 
qualitative research methodology, is used to identify specific characteristics in textual 
messages (Morris, 1994). Similarly, textual analysis as an additional research method 
is needed to critically analyse the text as part of the deconstruction of discourse. This 
textual analysis method has been employed by humanities researchers to “describe 
and interpret the characteristics of a recorded or visual message” within certain text 
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(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 225).  In the same way, this method is also essential to 
describe the content, structure, and functions of messages contained in texts. The 
„purpose‟ as described by Hirsch (1967), is to ascertain the meaning intended by the 
producer of a text.  
The inductive method is presented as an architectural scheme for the reconstruction 
of the processes of gaining reliable scientific knowledge needed in this research. This 
method combines the explorations of „context of discovery‟ with the efforts of 
presenting the results or „context of justification‟. It combines the heuristic and the 
inductive side of knowledge production. The heuristic side is represented by the 
creative methods to find hypotheses to create axiomatic systems. The inductive side 
consists of the production of grounded theory. This combination leads to a clear 
hierarchy: the heuristic side provides the basic propositions from which the deduction 
begins. It is used to make deductions possible. 
In developing the model of Islamic governance as a concept, this study maintains the 
exploratory and formulative approach. Hence, the ontological issues are emphasized 
to develop its epistemology in order to establish an ideal Islamic model of 
governance theory. This approach contradicts the mainstream positivist 
methodological frameworks such as classical empiricism or empirical realism, which 
are described by Bhaskar (2008 [1975]) as an epistemic fallacy. Ontology (tawÍÊd) is 
a priori for Muslims‟ acts as an imago mundi for the theory developed in this thesis. 
In tandem, the ontology and epistemology of Islamic governance helps to further 
formulate an axiomatic framework for the model. The developed axioms present a 
philosophical foundation for the aforesaid model. Consequently, to enable the 
articulation of those axioms thus bringing them into reality, a framework is 
considered necessary to complete the big picture of the grounded theory.  
As for this thesis, this inquiry will be under the comprehensive worldview of 
„Islamic‟ ontology (TawÍÊdic reality). Islamic epistemology, which is the result of 
this inquiry, will enable us to provide the foundations for liberatory philosophy that 
will bring a new dimension to the investigation of „Islamic governance‟ as an 
alternative for current good governance. Accordingly, this method contrasts with the 
Western humanist positivistic method of current governance paradigm. It is also to be 
set as an alternative to Western epistemology, which negates the transcendental and 
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metaphysical elements and other sources of knowledge, which constitute the 
knowledge base of „other societies‟, but yet glorifies the universal epistemology of 
knowledge
7
. This Eurocentric modernity only gives the value of knowledge to any 
presuppositions that confirm these epistemologies. El-Messiri (1994) argues that such 
materialistic and humanistic epistemologies ignite the very idea of imperialism, 
which is the continuation of physical colonialism
8
. The internationalization or 
universalization of this humanistic worldview leads to the exclusion of „others„‟ 
worldview, which entails the denial of others‟ values, beliefs, faiths and norms in the 
field of knowledge. Others‟ knowledge was merely considered as myth, non-
valuable, useless and tales before the Westerners.  
Appropriately, the method adopted in this research crystallizes al-Alwani‟s proposal 
on the systematic and distinguishes the methodological approach to formulate a new 
field of Islamic knowledge through his remarks (1991:233): 
The Fiqh of Politics and government, which is needed by the ummah at 
present, must turn to the goals and purposes of Islam, its general principles, 
and its precepts. In this way, a complete system of political thought may be 
developed, one that can interact with contemporary realities in order to 
realize Islam‟s greater purposes. In this endeavour, all theories must be 
derived from the basis of accepted Shari‟ah source-evidence, while drawing 
upon humanity‟s historical and contemporary experience. 
In light of previous discussions, the establishment of a separate „Islamic 
epistemology‟ will be the prerequisite to developing a new theory of governance. 
Only by allowing the foundations of the governance theory to re-emerge from its 
own ontology, can they be formulated as „knowledge‟ of its kind. Khan (1999: 109) 
maintains that the establishment of „Islamic epistemology‟ will enable Muslims to 
establish the foundations that will bring them out of the darkness of non-Godliness 
into the light (Islam) of hikmah (wisdom). This confirms what Nandy et al. (1988) 
assert, that any effort to establish a non-modernist or non-Western knowledge in the 
                                                 
7
 This rejection of „God‟ interference in the field of knowledge flourished the Western scholars‟ 
inquiry of reason and rationality in defining the reality, hence formulating the „humanistic‟ episteme. 
This humanistic episteme is literally based solely on the metaphysic negation ontology, and being 
coined by Davutoglu (1994) as ontological proximity.  
8
 Consequently, this Imperialistic epistemological vision according to el-Messiri, stood upon certain 
„Eurocentric‟ pillars such as rationalisation, secularisation, expansion and invasion, which lead to the 
centricity of Western sciences upon the others. This worldview has lead to the calamities and genocides 
on the non-Western soils by the Westerner colonial powers under the banner of secular imperialism 
based on materialistic, utilitarian and rational view. He even insists that the historical baggage of this 
imperialistic epistemology vision also encompasses the disaster perpetrated by the Nazis on European 
soil itself (El-Messiri, 1994).   
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world must first claim its own epistemological primacy by de-centring the „Western 
notion of knowledge‟.  
If this research is to be categorized according to its orientation, it comes closest to 
being a form of reconstructive post-colonialism; that is a post-Washington Consensus 
perspective of development informed by ethical and spiritual virtues. However, this 
research does not emerge from ground zero, but it is rather a continuation of previous 
explorations with different themes and methods. As the field of governance 
encompasses various issues in politics, economics, legal and constitutional, the 
research benefited from the existing literature on those subjects, in particular, those 
involved with political, economic and political economy issues. 
1.8. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
Recent discourse on good governance employs far-reaching discussion on political, 
economic, constitutional and legal issues. However, the main concern in order for 
those fields to get together within the radius of governance is the „way to achieve 
development‟. Within this parameter, the exploration of this research only focuses on 
the discussion of governance within the current framework of good governance. This 
rather limited approach to the subject area detaches itself from the conventional 
approach to Islamic political thought that comprises all the discussions on the issue 
of sovereignty of SharÊÑah, the Caliphate, the Caliphs, the relation between Islamic 
ideology and democracy or vice versa and the modern rulings of political 
participation. Perhaps those issues suit the interest of Islamic political thought 
researchers better than researchers of governance.  
Similarly, the details of Islamic juristic rulings on Islamic polity are only addressed 
when they are needed in this research and not at length. The classical approach of the 
jurists in dealing with topics similar to governance is not a preferred method, but the 
outcome of this method is part of the discourse references which will be critically and 
analytically discussed and examined in order to offer a broader exploration of Islamic 
ontological-directed epistemology. Nonetheless, the epistemological sources are the 
main discourse which will be analysed and deconstructed. For this reason, this 
research only employs discursive analysis research approach based on deductive 
method and deconstructed concepts to establish a new alternative model.  
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This generative (non-cumulative) paradigm in looking into the topic of governance is 
to be viewed as an incomplete, non-imperative model and a production of continuous 
ijtihÉd progression, and would not aim at imperialist control of reality as modernity is 
claimed to do. In tandem, in establishing this „Islamic‟ foundation and paradigm, the 
new framework proposed in this research never negates the „others‟‟ values and 
wisdom. Taylor‟s multiple modernity (1999) approach enshrines the similar 
suggested Islamic message that by its nature promotes „epistemic humility‟ in 
forming a universal value through the hybridism of cultures and orientations.  
Lastly, this limited research does not engage in the empirical issues of governance 
due to its purely theoretical nature.  However, it is expected that it should constitute a 
base for future empirical research. Equally, it also limits itself to the aforementioned 
subject and will not expand itself to engage with any additional discussions in 
detailing the technical aspects of the governance system in recent times. Hence, the 
result of this research inevitably leaves much room for further investigation on these 
topics. 
1.9. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS (CHAPTERS)  
After this introductory chapter, the second chapter explains the nature of good 
governance in an overview of the main subject of the thesis. It begins with the 
deconstruction of the term „governance‟ and its multiple usages in recent times. 
Accordingly, a conceptual analysis of the term „good governance‟ as an agenda by 
the Bretton Woods institutions is explained, along with a brief history of its 
beginnings. The philosophy and content of „good governance‟ is explored and 
discussed at length to prepare a general overture in order to establish an alternative 
framework to it.  
Subsequently, the third chapter deals with critiques of the concept of good 
governance, focussing specifically on the instrumental issues rather than mechanical 
or technical matters. It is from this angle that the issue of modernity, which is the 
core foundation of recent governance discourse, is discussed, thus allocating lacunae 
that will be used as a launching pad for this research. Culture as the main element of 
human life that has been ignored by the good governance project is the starting point 
for the research. 
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In Chapter Four, a lengthy discussion on how culture could contribute to the field of 
governance hence achieving its main purpose, namely development, is the main 
theme. From the far-reaching definition of culture, religion as another source of 
values is also examined for the same purpose. Both theoretical and empirical 
arguments are presented to determine the practical role religion could play in 
achieving the governance goal. The discussion of the chapter is a pretext to further 
exploration into how Islam could be an alternative model for governance.  
Consequently, the exploration to establish an Islamic model for governance is 
preceded by the foundational issue to build a new framework to replace the 
conventional one. Islamic worldview through its ontology and its articulation by the 
epistemology is the main topic in Chapter Five. This chapter presents a debate on 
what is the „reality‟ as perceived through Islamic tenets and how it can be articulated 
in the field of governance through specific methodological application of its 
epistemology. 
Chapter Six presents the new paradigm of governance from Islamic epistemology 
through the axiomatic approach. The axioms, which have been deducted from the 
epistemological sources of Islam, present an ontologically-determined realm of 
governance to be practised by Muslims in their political and economic life. However, 
the axioms require a framework of articulation to bring it from utopia to reality.  
The final chapter engages with the articulation of the axioms through „Khalifah 
typology‟ that consist of certain elements essential to enable the axioms to be 
workable. In this final chapter, a comparison between this new model of governance 
and the existing „good governance‟ is made to prove the relative similarity of the 
outcomes of both paradigms despite the differences in their philosophy and 
applications. 
1.10 CONCLUSION 
This study attempts to deconstruct the available knowledge, including Islamic 
knowledge, with the objective of constructing an Islamic ideal or aspirational 
governance concept from the richness of experience and experiments of Muslims 
throughout history. Nonetheless, the journey should be preceded by a thorough 
examination of both ontological and epistemological issues concerning the topic, 
using the available knowledge including Islamic heritage. However, this exploration 
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is not a mere process of „patching up‟ as adopted by researchers and scholars for 
various reasons. Such a process exemplifies a retroactive Westernisation and will 
lead to a wholesale adoption of Western epistemological paradigms, through the 
alteration of terminologies and rationale (El-Messiri, 2006: 50). Through this 
„patching up‟ method, Western Euro-centrism remains eminent as natural, universal 
and ultimate, and accordingly all that is needed is to embellish it, or perhaps 
rearrange some of its components.  
Exploring new territories with new methods by leaving chez soi is similar to what 
Jaques Derrida in Contre-allée terms „departing towards the unknown‟, risking all the 
risks, pleasures and dangers that the „unknown‟ has in store. Moreover, this unknown 
is about exploring a territory which is unpopular and considered an imagined 
„picture‟. For many, imagining a future that is beneficial for humanity is equal to 
dreaming. But hopefully the journey that this research has taken is not as bad as the 
tone of some lines from Orhan Pamuk‟s novel „The Black Book‟ (Kara Kitap): “We 
live but for a short time, we see but very little, and we know almost nothing; so, at 
least, let‟s do some dreaming” (Pamuk, 1994: 183). 
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Chapter 2 
 GOVERNANCE: A CONCEPTUAL INQUIRY 
“Big ideas, attempts at grasping the whole world in thought, 
are renowned for breeding discontent and raising future 
expectations. Big ideas are also well-known sources of fear and 
contempt among their proponents, who accuse them of 
oversimplified descriptions of the world, often suspecting them 
as well of serving as ideological alibis for power groups bent 
on dominating others.  
John Keane, Global Civil Society (2005: ix) 
 
2.1 DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
The „governance‟ phenomenon indeed is another big idea that has re-emerged in the past 
decade. The term was first introduced as a panacea for underdevelopment and poverty in the 
early 1980s, and was suggested as a remedy for many other problems and challenges, as well 
as being viewed as another ideological excuse for certain power groups to dominate others. 
At the same time, the term „governance‟ currently connotes a myriad of meanings depending 
on the context in which it is being used and what adjectives are added to it. The term 
undeniably has its significance and philosophy, so it became very popular and a favourite 
term of many. Hence, this introductory chapter attempts to locate the origin of the term, its 
meaning, framework and philosophy. An unambiguous understanding of the concept is 
crucial in order to comprehend its implications for the framework of this research. 
2.1.1 Defining the Concept 
After the World Bank‟s report on the underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa in 1989, the 
term governance took on a new dimension. It has since become a multi-usage phrase in 
diverse fields and areas beyond semantic variations. The term which was once firmly linked 
to the political setting of government has now become common in the fields of political 
economy and development. The definitions of governance, therefore, are manifold.  
To begin with, the term governance is etymologically connected to the Greek verb kubernân 
which means „to pilot or steer‟. Plato used the verb regarding how to design a system of rule. 
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While the Greek term gave rise to the Medieval Latin gubernare, it bears the same 
connotation of piloting, rule making or steering (Kjær, 2004: 3).  
Lexicographically, governance is derived from the Latin „cybern‟ which means „steering‟, 
the same root as in „cybernetics‟ (the science of control). Cadbury (2002: 1) relates this 
meaning to Cicero (106 B.C. – 43 B.C.) who in his De Senectute (On Old Age) states “[h]e 
that governs sits quietly at the stern and scarce is seen to stir”.  
Later, the term evolved to be used in French (gouvernance) in the fourteenth century to refer 
to „seat of government‟ or the royal officers rather than to the process of governing or 
„steering‟ (Pierre, 2000: 23). It was also used by Chaucer (c. 1343 A.D. -1400 A.D.), with a 
very different connotation, that of wise and responsible (Mandel, 1992: 66-70). 
The term „governance‟ was used extensively in the earlier modern day to mean the act of 
governing, as in the function and performance of „government‟ and the word „government‟ 
was defined as the “form of organization of State” or a “body or successive bodies of 
persons governing a State; ... and administration or Ministry” (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 
2009). The term governance denotes the performance or conduct of governing; the office of 
function of governing; sway, control. Hence, to govern is to “rule or control with authority; 
to be in government” and also refers to the relationship between the governors and the 
governed, such as that between the government and the people, and has at its basis the 
decision-making powers ceded by individuals to those in authority so that the common 
interests of society can be served (Iqbal and Lewis, 2009: 2). For a long time, the usage of 
the term was mainly limited to constitutional and legal issues concerning the conduct of 
„affairs of the state‟ and/or to the direction of specific institutions or professions with 
multiple stakeholders (Jessop, 1998:30). 
Within this framework, the words governance and government differ from each other, since 
government in its technical usage focuses on the political system with its institutions 
(electoral system, type of government, political parties, bureaucratic, etc.), while governance 
implies “general conduct of which power is exercised by governments and authorities at 
national, regional and local levels, and the way in which they fulfil their duties of care and 
accountability in managing and dealing with the economic, social, ecological and cultural 
resources and institutions for which they are responsible” (Van Dok, 1999: 10). Perhaps the 
redefinition by the Canadian Institute on Governance of the term will give a clearer picture 
of this demarcation: “Governance comprises the traditions, institutions and process that 
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determine how power is exercised, how citizens are given a voice, and how decisions are 
made on issues of public concern.”1 
The current use, however, no longer deals with the term governance as a synonym for 
government. Rather, it refers to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of 
ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed (Rhodes, 2003: 46), or it 
might also signify the modes and manner of governing, of the institutions and agents in 
charge of governing. This new broader dimension of the recent use of the term still engulfs 
its literal meaning of “the art of steering societies and organizations” (Graham, et al., 2003: 
2). The new use of the term „governance‟, hence, departs from its original meaning, which 
exclusively connotes the political guidance or steering to the non-hierarchical control model 
focusing on cooperation between state and non-state actors, and the participation of larger 
actors. This new understanding of „governance‟ is broader than that of „government‟.  
A very detailed concept of governance, produced by the Commission on Global Governance 
(1995: 2), clarifies the term as: “The sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, 
public and private, manage their common affairs. It is the continuing process through which 
conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be 
taken”. Consequently, this new paradigm also represents an alternative for the old 
framework of government for hierarchical control, on the level of national, inter-state policy 
(i.e. EU policy) and in international relations (Kooiman, 1993; Rosenau and Czempiel, 
1992). 
However, a thorough investigation of the contemporary utilisation of the term governance 
indicates that it has shifted enormously from its initial usage. Not only has the separation 
between governance and government become exacerbated, governance is also no longer 
confined to the political realm. The term has become a concept that differs in terms of usage 
from one context to another (Williamson, 1996: 11). These differences are elaborated further 
in the following sections. However, despite the multiple usages of the term, or concept, this 
research is only concerned with the specific meaning of governance as a foundational layer 
for its exploration. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Canadian Institute on Governance, (www.iog.ca)  
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2.1.2 Conceptual Framework 
Although governance has only recently entered the standard Anglophone social science 
lexicon, it has become a buzzword in various circles. A closer look at the subject will 
uncover the diverse usage of the term, which is applied to different contexts and different 
connotations. However, the semantic meaning of governance as „steering‟ is still present in 
all the usages despite the differences. The following sections deal with those different usages 
based on the diverse definitions. The definitions imply clearly that the concept of 
„governance‟ is not an exclusive terminology but rather can be applied to a variety of 
organizations and institutions, and is thus not limited to politics or economics as might be 
expected (Rhodes, 1997: 47-56; Rhodes, 2000: 55-63; Hirst, 2000: 14-9): 
(i) Governance as Policy Instrument 
Despite its various and inconsistent usage, the term governance as defined by political 
scientists refers to two of the most basic questions: „Who governs?‟ and „How well?‟ The 
former refers to the issue of power, its distribution and resources in the community and 
political structure, while the latter, referring to the issue of „good governance‟, focuses on 
effective institutions, efficient methods of operation and equitable policy outcomes (Jreisat, 
2004: 1004). This basic understanding of governance deconstructs the very fundamental 
concept of the use of the term governance, which can be found in Hyden‟s (2001) definition: 
Governance is the stewardship of formal and informal political rules of the game 
[which] refer to those measures that involve setting the rules for the exercise of 
power and settling conflicts over such rules. 
This definition is similar to the classical meaning and the general understanding of the term 
governance, which implies the framework of government and the discussion about 
instruments involved in governing the state. This is also the general definition given by the 
World Bank to the term, of governance as: “The exercise of political power to manage a 
nation‟s affair” (World Bank Report, 1989: 60). The focus of discussion in this type of 
governance is about power, the distribution of power, and other issues related to government. 
This definition is similar to that of Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1992: 304), who maintain 
that governance denotes how people are ruled and how the affairs of a state are administered 
and regulated. It refers to a nation‟s system of politics and how it functions in relation to 
public administration and law. Thus, the concept of governance goes beyond that of 
„government‟ to include a political and politically-constructed administration dimension.  
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Kooiman (1993: 258) defines governance as: 
The pattern or structure that emerges in a socio-political system as a „common result 
or outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of all involved actors‟. This 
pattern cannot be reduced to [the outcome produced by] one actor or groups of 
actors in particular. 
This definition does not impose a structure but states that political culture produces its own 
style and structure of governance out of its political culture in an inductive manner, which, 
however, may not be good governance. Graham et al. (2003: 2), in contrast, state that the 
core meaning of governance emphasises the fundamental principle of governance which is 
about power, relationships and accountability: who has influence, who decides, and how 
decision makers are held accountable. Thus, governance according to them is: 
...The interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how 
power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens 
or other stakeholders have their say. 
 
(ii) Governance as minimal state 
Discourse of minimal state has been a heated debate in the political economy field for many 
years, and as an important feature of the neo-classical-based new public administration, it 
refers to the extent and form of public intervention and the use of markets and quasi-markets 
to deliver „public service‟ (Rhodes, 2003: 47). Referring to this neo-classical position, Stoker 
(1998: 18) suggests that: “Governance is the acceptable face of spending cuts”. However, the 
concept refers to more than the „cuts‟, it refers to the nature and the shape of public 
administration or the operation of governance.  Governance as the minimal state 
encapsulates, therefore, the preference for „less government‟ but also „small yet efficient 
government‟. By referring to such notions of governance, governance can best be described 
as: “… self-organizing, inter organizational networks characterized by interdependence, 
resource-exchange, rules of the game, and significant autonomy from the state” (Rhodes, 
2003: 15). 
It should be mentioned that the very idea of minimal state though is not new. From the 
emergence of Smith‟s laissez-faire up to Hayek‟s view on the limited authority of the state, 
the idea has aimed at preserving the individual's rights from being infringed by „the state‟ 
(Hayek, 2007 [1944]), as the minimal state was the theme of the 19
th
 century liberals and 
was the core part of their ideology of „liberties‟. State as perceived by the liberals is only 
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responsible for traditional duties such as security, welfare and the rule of law (Hayek, 2007 
[1944]). Accordingly, the market is to be free from the tyranny of the state. However, this 
notion of less-state control must not be confused with the anarchist idea of state-nihilism. 
The extreme idea of Rand (1967), Rothbard (1961) and Friedman (2002) known as the 
anarcho-capitalism which emphasizes the ultimate free-market and the non-interference of 
the state is not what governance means by minimal state. Similarly, according to the 
proponent of good governance, minimal state is highlighted as an important tool in achieving 
efficiency for development. Even the market‟s efficiency depends heavily on the governance 
issue and minimal state interference. However, in the later stage, due to the failure of the 
market in some cases, some experts are calling for state interference for regulation and for 
efficiency of the economy (World Bank, 1997). 
(iii) Governance as corporate governance 
As can be seen from the two previous technical definitions of the term governance referring 
to its usage in the macro governance issues (public policy and state), the word governance 
has also been employed widely at the micro level, specifically in the public sector. At this 
micro level, the term governance is strongly associated with the concept of „corporate 
governance‟, which deals with business, finance, management and organizational affairs. In 
this framework, corporate governance, also occasionally referred to as „good governance‟ at 
the micro level refers to the way in which business corporations are directed and controlled 
(Jones and Michael, 2004; see Cadbury Report 1992:15).  
The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury, 2002: 1) 
defines corporate governance as: “The system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. This framework indentifies the principles of good governance as being a 
stakeholder decision-making process aimed at efficiency through integrity, openness and 
accountability. Such a concept, as elaborated by Demb and Neubauer (1992:187) in their 
classic work, The Corporate Board: Confronting the Paradoxes, was termed: “The process 
by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders”. 
In explaining the genealogy of the concept, Aguilera and Alvaro (2004: 418) suggest that the 
concept was triggered by certain events, mainly from the period of transition of the 
conglomerate merger movement in the 1960s in the USA to refer to the empire-building 
behaviour by management through hostile takeovers, and then to the shareholder rights 
movement of the late 1980s up to the early 1990s. Initially, the first code of governance in 
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the business sector came into being in the late 1970s in the USA amid the great corporate 
fervour of business, legal, academic, and political constituencies (Aguilera and Alvaro, 2004: 
418). The other event that led to the emergence of the corporate governance issue was the 
1990 British recession and the series of high-profile corporate failures, which resulted from 
the weakness of internal corporate control. The events raised the issue of corporate 
accountability both in the public mind and in the House of Commons (Monks and Minow, 
1995).  
However, numerous scholars and researchers agree that it was the 1992 „Cadbury Committee 
Report: Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the UK‟ (also known as the Cadbury 
Report), the first of several reports on corporate governance which led to the strong 
emergence of the concept in the private sector. It became the flagship guideline that 
deliberately challenged the effectiveness of voluntary regulation and British corporate 
democracy (Aguilera and Alvaro, 2004: 419). The report was concerned with “the perceived 
low levels of confidence both in financial reporting and in the ability of auditors to provide 
the safeguards which the users of the company reports sought and expected” (Cadbury 
Commission, 1992). To overcome this, the report strongly promotes the need for the 
independence of directors, greater shareholder involvement, and the establishment of board 
committees. These elements of procedures and mechanisms are what are still known as the 
corporate governance or good governance of organizations. 
Consequently, since the report, „corporate governance‟ as a guiding concept of management 
of business and organizations has been introduced globally and adopted by many as „good 
practice‟ to ensure the efficiency in the management and operation of organizations; in the 
latter stages of the 20
th
 century corporate governance was widely implemented in the public 
sector after being „translated‟ by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy 
(CIPFA, 1994: 6). The aim of promoting the concept to the public sector is to ensure 
efficiency of governance in the public sector (Rhodes, 2000: 56). The report also urges the 
need to change the culture and the climate of public services towards a more commercial 
style of management. It also points out the need for public service to establish a sound 
system of corporate governance and exercise work practices based on three principles: the 
openness or the disclosure of information; integrity or straightforward dealing and 
completeness; and accountability or holding individuals responsible for their actions by a 
clear allocation of responsibilities and clearly defined roles (Rhodes, 2000: 56). This led to 
the emergence of what became known later as New Public Management (NPM). 
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(iv) Governance as New Public Management 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed drastic reformation movements in the area of public service 
according to the global structural adjustment programmes towards efficiency. „New Public 
Management‟ (NPM) as the new institutional economics2 movement helped to generate a set 
of administrative reform doctrines built on ideas of contestability, user choice, transparency 
and close concentration on incentive structures (Mc Laughlin, et al. 2003).  
NPM is derived from two major ideas: (a) the „public policy‟ schools developed in the 1970s 
which became famous in the 1980s; and (b) the „managerialist‟ movement around the globe 
(Hood, 1991: 6; Lynn, 2003:14; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2005: 8-10).  
This model offered a new approach based on two concepts: the corporate management and 
the marketisation of the public sector operating within the framework of the private sector‟s 
model of business and market-driven values. It was also part of the reform influenced by the 
aforesaid „corporate governance‟ phenomenon that caused a tsunami of reforms in the way 
private sectors were managed or governed.  
Technically, the term „corporate management‟ refers to the implementation of „private sector 
management methods‟ to the public sector through performance measures, managing by 
results and value for money and closeness to the customer (Hood and Jackson, 1991). Such a 
corporatisation approach was part of the crude NPM reform package that led it to also be 
known as managerialism. By the same token, the other part of the reform, the marketisation 
refers to “introducing incentive structures into public service provision through contracting-
out, quasi-markets, and consumer choice” or in other words „new institutional economics‟ as 
it has come to be known (Hood and Jackson, 1991: 5; Rhodes, 2003:48).  
The public management framework implies a diversion from government service delivery 
(rowing) to more of a governance style of service, which involves stakeholders‟ involvement 
in „policy decisions‟ (steering) in public management that has put NPM into a wider 
connotation of the „governance‟ concept (Rhodes, 1997:49). In the meantime, Osborne and 
Gaebler (1992:20) criticised the traditional way of public service provision, proposing a 
paradigm shift reform ideal into the sector with more elements of governance. They argued 
                                                 
2
 The new institutional economics also refers to introducing incentive structures (such as market competition) 
into public service provision. The bureaucracies‟ disaggregation and greater competition through contracting out 
and quasi-markets; and consumer choice are the things stressed by this new trend of economics (Barzelay, 2002: 
15; Gray and Jenkins: 1995). 
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that bureaucracy is a redundant tool for rowing (service delivery) and came up with a unique 
„entrepreneurial government model‟ based on ten principles: 
a) The promotion of competition between service providers; 
b) Empowering citizens by de-centralising bureaucracy into the community; 
c) Measuring the performance of agencies through outcomes; 
d)  Goals and missions must drive them; 
e) Clients are defined as customers and deserve choices; 
f) Problem prevention rather than problem-solving services; 
g) More effort in earning money rather than spending it; 
h) Decentralising authority by embracing participatory management; 
i) Market mechanism operation rather than bureaucratic; 
j) Solving community problems by mobilising the private, public and voluntary sectors. 
In conclusion, within such a framework, the concept of governance operating in the field of 
public service transforms the public sector from its conventional state into a new realm of a 
more efficient operational structure based on corporatisation. Within such a sphere, the 
public sector no longer acts as a service delivery department per se, but rather a corporate 
entity that aims to serve the people as clients with more efficiency based on the market 
values of competition, markets, customers and outcomes (and not only rules and 
regulations). This transformation of the public sector according to Osborne and Gaebler 
(1992:34) promotes less government (or less rowing) and more governance (more steering).  
In tandem, the efficiency of public services is one of the characteristics of good governance 
proposed by the World Bank which defines efficiency in the public services (according to 
their notion of good governance) as: “Competitive and market-oriented; privatisation of 
public enterprises; reformation of civil service through the reduction of over-staffing; 
introducing the budget discipline; decentralisation of administration; and make the greater 
use of non-governmental organizations through the networking framework” (Williams and 
Young, 1994: 87). The presence of all these elements as perceived by the World Bank, as 
well as other international financial institutions is expected to enhance public management 
thus leading to the end of poverty, corruption and all the elements that create hurdles in the 
process of development (Smith, 2003:202-48; Blunt, 2006: 5-8). 
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(v) Governance as Socio-cybernetic system 
In the process of reform, by minimising the state and the efficiency of the public service, the 
decision-making process no longer became the exclusive right of a single central authority. 
The new concept of „governance‟ in its macro realm implies that stakeholders within the 
macro governance system should have their share in the decision-making process. This 
phenomenon has led to what is known as the socio-cybernetic system (Rhodes, 2003: 50). 
The „Socio-cybernetic‟ approach entails the end of single sovereign authority in making 
decisions within the state by introducing the limits to governing by a central actor. In other 
words, policy outcomes are not solely the product of actions by central government. Within 
this new framework, various actors specific to each policy area replace government as the 
single actor. These social-political-administrative actors interdependently formulate 
decisions, actions, intervention, and control with shared goals (Rhodes, 2003: 50).  
Within this framework, „governance‟ is the result of those interactive social-political forms 
of governing. Thus, the act of „governing‟ (or goal directed interventions) becomes separated 
from the „governance‟ process, which is the result of social-political-administrative 
interventions and interactions of government and other actors such as the private firms, 
NGOs, association of NGOs, the civil societies, and business entities (KeOhane and Nye, 
2000: 12).  
Kooiman (1993b: 258) states that “Governance ... can be seen as the pattern or structure that 
emerges in a social-political system as a „common‟ result or outcome of the interacting 
intervention efforts of all involved actors. This pattern cannot be reduced to one actor or 
group of actors in particular.” In the same vein, Governance International UK offers a 
similar view to this new framework of „governance‟, which emphasizes the nature of the 
socio-cybernetic system by describing governance as: “The negotiation by multiple 
stakeholders of improved policy outcomes and agreed governance principles. To be 
sustainable, these have to be made operational on a regular basis”3. 
These interactive interventions and interactions make all the actors in a particular policy area 
interdependent. The order in the policy area thus, is not from the highest level but emerges 
from the negotiations of several involved and affected parties (Rhodes, 2003: 50).  Kooiman 
(1993a: 4) suggests that: “These interactions are ... based on the recognition of (inter) 
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 Governance International United Kingdom (www.govint.org)  
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dependencies. No single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required 
to solve complex dynamic and diversified problems; no actor has sufficient overview to 
make the application of needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action 
potential to dominate unilaterally in a particular governing model”.  
In conclusion, within the aforesaid approach, central government is no longer supreme, but is 
thus minimized. The political system is based on „the centreless society‟ in the polycentric 
state characterized by multiple centres. Hence, the task of government is to enable socio-
political interactions; to encourage many and varied arrangements for coping with problems 
and to distribute services among several actors (Rhodes, 2000:58). Consequently, the term 
„governance‟ within such a framework does not only explain the system, but it also refers to 
the networks amongst the actors involved in the governance process. This can be seen in the 
following framework of the usage of the word governance. 
(vi) Governance as self-organizing networks 
In elucidating the implication of the term governance in its recent multiple usage, Rhodes 
(1996:660) relates it to „self organizing‟ or „inter organizational networks‟. This realm of 
governance means the nature of a network that is autonomous and self-governing. An ideal 
structure of networks according to Rhodes (2000: 61) resists government steering, develops 
its own policies and moulds its environment based on mutual consensus. Furthermore, he 
asserts that the networks are characterised by four major features: interdependence between 
organizations; continuing interactions between network members; regulation by rules of the 
game negotiated and agreed by network participants, and a significant degree of autonomy 
from the state. The networks are not accountable to the state because of their self-organizing 
nature (Rhodes, 2000: 61).  
In the same manner, Kickert (1993a: 275) states that government is no longer the sole actor 
of governance in the contemporary structure of the societal system. Other autonomous social 
institutions in modern countries also play their own role in shaping the policies and the 
future of the country. However, those institutions can only operate with a certain degree of 
freedom of autonomy and self-governance. Deregulation, government withdrawal and 
steering at a distance are all notions of less direct government regulation and control, which 
lead to more autonomy and self-governance for social institutions. This provides a broader 
dimension for governance; hence, it further distances itself from the old usage of the term, 
which refers only to the act of governing by the government. Rhodes (2000:63) suggests that 
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governance as networks is a ubiquitous and important form of governing structure in 
advanced industrial societies.  
This usage of governance fits into the previous framework of governance, which is also 
inclusive. These new usages of frameworks necessitate the involvement of larger governance 
actors and a reduction in the monopoly of single central actors in the „governance‟ process 
for efficiency and effectiveness. The idea of interconnection, networking and self-
dependency as governance does not only apply at the macro-national level, it also expands 
towards the international and supra national. At the international level, the term governance 
is used to indicate the interdependent nature of global actors in achieving mutual goals and 
aims as described in brief in the following paragraphs.  
(vii) Governance as International Interdependence 
Recent studies on governance encompass the discussion on the role of governance in both 
international relations and the international political economy. The global networking of 
organizations and the governance of international agencies that manage to deliver many 
duties conventionally undertaken by the state are part of the discussions. The increasing 
emergence of non-state actors such as NGOs, civil society networks and „anti-globalization 
movements‟ on the global level has seen these interdependent networking actors become 
more crucial.  This interdependent networking structure of international actors has become 
known in recent times as „global governance‟. The application of the notion of governance 
was the natural result of mounting evidence that the international system was no longer 
composed simply of states, but rather the world was undergoing fundamental change (Weiss, 
2000: 806).  
Global governance involves shifting the location of authority in the context of integration 
and fragmentation. Rosenau (1992b: 13) defines governance as follows: “Global governance 
is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to 
the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control 
has transnational repercussions”. In explaining the process of the concept, he maintains that 
global governance is “a pervasive tendency… in which major shifts in the location of 
authority and the site of control mechanisms are under way on every continent, shifts that are 
as pronounced in economic and social systems as they are in political systems” (Rosenau, 
1992a: 18). 
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„Global Governance‟ is, thus, the result of globalization as a socio-economic and political 
fact. This definition implies the erudition of the state authority by international 
interdependencies (Rhodes, 2000: 57). Held (1991:151-7) suggests that under global forces 
four processes limit the autonomy of nation states: the internationalization of production and 
financial transactions; international organizations; international law; and hegemonic powers 
and power blocs. The limited autonomy of the nation state, thus, leads to their weakened 
governance capacities, though they remain as pivotal institutions (Rhodes, 2000: 57). The 
power of the nation state has been distributed to the international level upwards, and to the 
sub-national agencies downwards. The states then become the „source of constitutional 
ordering‟, providing minimum standards in a world of interlocking networks of public 
powers.  Rhodes (2000: 58) then points out how the European Union illustrates the 
transnational policy networks emerging by arguing that: “in the EU, multilevel governance 
posits links between the Commission, national ministries and local and regional authorities”.  
(viii) Governance as New Political Economy 
On the other hand, the term governance is also commonly used in a new discipline known as 
the „New Political Economy‟ (NPE). NPE is an approach to governance which re-examines 
the government of the economy and the interrelationships between civil society, state, and 
the market economy (Rhodes, 2000: 59). Within this tradition, Lindberg et al. (1991:3) 
describe governance as “the political and economic processes that coordinate activity among 
economic actors”. Their research explores the transformation of the institutions involved in 
governing economic activities. The emergence and rearrangement of several institutional 
forms of governance is the main focus of the research.  
A survey of the relevant survey indicates that six ideal types of governance mechanism can 
be identified within the new political economy ideals: markets, obligation networks, 
hierarchy, monitoring, promotional networks, and associations (Lindberg et al., 1991:29). 
Subsequently, in contrast to the idea of „hollowing‟ the state in the new realm of governance, 
the state in this framework is not just another governance mechanism, but it acts as the 
gatekeeper to sectoral governance and can facilitate or inhibit production and exchange. This 
approach in a way is also relevant to public administration because it explores the ways in 
which the state as actor and structure, constitutes the economy and influences the selection of 
governance regimes despite its minimal role which it shares with others, especially in 
decision-making. 
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Following the line of argument, Jessops (1995: 317, 324) points out that governance is “the 
complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both 
operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms 
of reciprocal interdependence”. He also asserts that the basis of hierarchical, top-down co-
ordination is being undermined by the dramatic intensification of societal complexity, which 
stems from the growing functional differentiation of institutional orders within an 
increasingly global society. With this approach, he contrasts the governance as a „new 
political economy‟ with the old Marxist political economy genealogy by segregating 
between governance (as steering the networks) and regulation, which is the core of the 
Marxist approach (Jessops, 1995: 323).  
Jessop‟s analysis of governance draws on his strategic-relational approach with its focus on 
the complex dialectical interrelationships between structure, agency and strategy. Hence, this 
approach, according to Rhodes (2000:60), is relevant to the study of Public Administration 
because of the critical perspective it brings to the instrumental concern of governance with 
solving co-ordination problems, arguing that governance is not necessarily more efficient 
than markets and identifying several strategic dilemmas that make governance prone to fail. 
However, this framework of governance is not appealing in comparison with good 
governance.  
(xi) Governance as ‘good governance’ 
The initial idea of good governance as the antonym for bad governance was developed as a 
concept of governmental and political reform to be imposed on Third World countries in the 
interest of expanding the world market economy. However, after the World Bank 1989 
report on the underdevelopment in Sub-Sahara Africa, the term took on a new dimension 
referring to the structural adjustment programmes of the neo-liberal market agenda of the 
Bretton Woods institutions to minimize the role of governments in favour of the market for 
what they claim as “successful economic development” (Van Dok, 1999: 11). Later in its 
1992 report the World Bank published its ideas of good governance, which it claimed was a 
framework for “sound development management”. The report contains the central elements 
believed to be the formulae for successful development: accountability, a legal framework, 
and information as well as transparency (World Bank, 1992).  
The aim of the good governance concept or framework aimed to achieve responsible 
administration, rule of law receptive to development, and efficient management of the public 
Chapter Two: Governance 
 38 
sector, that is good market economy, while at the same time exemplifying the conditions to 
remove the risks from strategies of globalization and internal lending policies (Bovaid, 2003: 
163-64). Tetzlaff (1995: 113) defines the World Bank as the “inventor and proclaimer of the 
concept”. The term good governance, thus, became widely used by international agencies. 
The philosophy behind such a policy is that it aims to provide international aid only to those 
who are eligible. Those countries with good governance in their state administration, 
therefore, will be entitled to receive the loan, while the countries which exercise „bad 
governance‟ must abide by certain conditions stipulated by the bank and adopt certain 
reforms before they are eligible for the loan (OECD, 1996). 
These motives have been clearly mentioned by the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development), one of the most leading international organizations in 
promoting the idea of good governance along with the World Bank, in their definition of 
good governance. According to them the concept refers to: “the exercise of political, 
economic and administrative authority necessary to manage a nation‟s affairs” (OECD, 
1995: 14). Within this framework, good governance as a reform agenda encourages 
competition and markets; privatization of public enterprise; reforming the civil service, 
introducing budgetary discipline; decentralizing administration; and making greater use of 
non-governmental organizations, in order to achieve efficiency in the public service 
(Williams and Young, 1994: 87)
4
. The word governance, thus, is closely associated with this 
definition.  
To summarize, the term good governance, according to Leftwich (1993) is built upon three 
strands: systemic, political, and administrative. The systemic use of governance covers the 
„distribution of both internal and external political and economic power‟. In this sense, 
governance is broader than government. While the political use of governance refers to „a 
state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate‟. The 
administrative use of governance, however, refers to “an efficient, open accountable and 
audited public service” (Rhodes, 2000: 57). All these elements conclude the very essence of 
the good governance mechanism in achieving its goal for development.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Rhodes (2000) suggests that: “good governance marries the new public management to the advocacy of liberal 
democracy”. 
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2.1.2. Reflecting on the Definitions 
In conclusion, technically „good governance‟ as a comprehensive concept within such a 
paradigm engulfs the previous usages or frameworks of governance. Good governance 
according to this usage encompasses public policy in its political usage; it also encompasses 
corporate governance, the role of minimal state for market economy, and also the NPM for 
the public sector, and the socio-cybernatic system for non-governmental organizations, and it 
crystallises the ideal of the new political economy.  The concept also prepares the foundation 
for global governance as an international interdependence. Further discussion on good 
governance within such a framework is the focal issue of the second part of this chapter. This 
theme is crucial due to its function as a prolegomena of the core issue to be debated in this 
thesis, which is the ideal model of Islamic governance. 
In perspective, the multiple-usage of the term governance exemplifies how it encompasses 
various connotations beyond its initial semantically and literal usage. There is no precedent 
for any particular interpretation of the word, either in the academic realm or in popular 
language. Hence, the boundaries of the concept have been vague. It is used freely to convey 
users' ideas without been dictated by any set of semantic or methodological criteria shared by 
a community of users (Frischtak, 1994:11). As a result, it has been used abundantly to 
express different things which do not necessarily refer to the same problems or issues.  
In dealing with such vagueness, a deconstruction of the concepts developed by the varying 
usages of the term 'governance' refers to certain values that reflect the main idea of steering, 
self-organizing and networking (Rhodes, 2003: 53). These values can be summarized by a 
number of characteristics and can be summarized as follows:  
(i) Interdependent nature between organizations. Governance is broader than government, 
covering non-state actors. Changing the boundaries of the state meant the boundaries 
between public, private and voluntary sectors become shifting and opaque; 
(ii) Continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange 
resources and negotiate shared purposes; 
(iii) Game-like interactions, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and 
agreed by network participants; 
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(iv) A significant degree of autonomy from the state. Networks are not accountable to the 
state; they are self-organizing. Although the state does not occupy a sovereign position, it 
can indirectly and imperfectly steer networks; 
(v) Efficiency in reality is the major determining factor of governance debates. All the usage 
of the term „governance‟ and all the application of concepts using the terminology aim to 
achieve efficiency.  
In conclusion, despite the manifold usage of the term, this thesis will try to narrow the focus 
to „good governance‟ as discussed above. Being the most prevailing connotation of the term 
governance, it will be the major underlying discourse in achieving the main objective of this 
research. In the following section, the characteristics and principles of good governance as 
developed by world institutions will be the main theme for scrutiny and examination. The 
philosophy of these principles is deconstructed to understand why they have been chosen and 
what their relevancy is. These foundational issues are pivotal in this thesis, since the 
establishment of an „alternative‟ paradigm for good governance requires the understanding 
of the contemporary structure and philosophy of the current one.   
 
2.2. GOOD GOVERNANCE: AN INTRODUCTION  
“Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor 
in eradicating poverty and promoting development.”  
Kofi A. Annan, Former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations 
Despite manifold usage of the term „governance‟ in modern times, the „good governance‟ 
that has been widely promoted by international institutions will be the focal point of this 
research. The concept is believed by many to be the modern way of ensuring development, 
harmony and peaceful atmosphere amongst the world's population in the future through 
reforming administration of delivery and services. „Good Governance‟, as an international 
agenda, is closely related to the major factor in governance, the government, in comparison 
with other notions of „governance‟5, as it combines ideas about political authority, the 
management of economic and social resources, and the capacity of governments to formulate 
                                                 
5
 Such a notion has clearly defined by the founder of the term in its modern usage -the World Bank- in its report 
which states that „governance‟ refers to: “the exercise of political power to manage a nation‟s fair” (World 
Bank, 1989: 60). 
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sound policies and then perform their functions effectively, efficiently and equitably (Blunt, 
1995), which imply a sets of rules (system) governing the actions of individuals and 
organizations (society) and the negotiations of differences between them that could only be 
crystallized through proper institutions (Van Dok, 1999).  
To understand more about the concept, a brief look into the historical root of it is essential. 
Literally, the prolegomena of the „good governance‟ agenda dates back to 1989 following 
the World Bank report on Sub-Saharan under-development. The post-cold war period 
witnessed the pro-active role by the Bank to assist the Third World countries in Africa and 
ex-communist countries, especially in Eastern Europe, to develop their economies. The 
World Bank policy during that particular period aimed to bring reform to the public sector 
with the objective of ensuring efficiency and economic growth. It continued this as its policy 
and its practice until a shift took place in the 1990s following a 1989 World Bank report that 
blamed a 'crisis of governance‟ in Sub-Saharan Africa for a lack of effective use of 
development aid in the region (World Bank, 1989). A World Bank Staff Paper in 1991 
identified external agencies as “potentially key political players capable of exerting 
considerable influence in promoting good or bad governance. In raising the shortcomings of 
a country‟s governance, external agencies are calling into question its government‟s 
performance” (Landell-Mills and Serageldin, 1991: 13). 
Nevertheless, looking back at the pre-good governance discourse, a number of other pre-
ceding events also played a role in preparing the ground for the trend. It might be possible to 
trace it back to the post-enlightenment period due to modernity and Eurocentrism, or maybe 
further to the pre-medieval period as far as the Greek and the Romans as discussed in the 
following chapter. However, the main periods for the advancement of good governance 
majorly come from the post-second World War atmosphere of the Cold War and the 
development of the Third World debate. In the following sections, the periods and events are 
discussed in brief regarding the events and factors which led to the emergence of the good 
governance fad.  
2.2.1. The Genesis 
A journey to the core philosophical foundation of „Good Governance‟ as a concept is 
necessary to understand its comprehensive nature. The current liberal democratic values that 
shaped the contemporary notion of governance can be traced root back specifically to two 
major events: the American Revolution, and more significantly the French Revolution. These 
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two revolutions brought the idea of secularization and democratization of society as a final 
blow to the two great orders that used to dominate European and Western politics: the 
„clergy‟ and „the Noble polities‟. As an alternative, two new forces emerged to form part of 
the class of plural societies, the organized „labour‟ and „organized capital‟ along with weaker 
roles of the clergy and the nobility (Finer, 1997, 3: 1567). 
These liberal democratic values also led to the emergence of a few other phenomena that 
contributed to shaping the landscape of modern politics and hence governance. Amongst 
them are: 
(i) Constitutionalism 
Constitutionalism comprises the idea of restricting the powers of the government, to confirm 
the idea of limitation of arbitrary rules and to guarantee individual freedoms. It is based on 
the core principles of liberalism, namely; upholding the ideal of the rule of law, by defining 
the rules on written law or codified documents known as constitution; and treating the 
constitution as the supreme law of the land; without any exclusion upon the citizens in 
abiding them (Finer, 1997, 3: 1571). This idea was enshrined in the Western world after the 
French „Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen‟, and all other written constitutions 
that were to follow. Sartori (1962) describes the constitutions as “a frame of political society 
organized through and by the law for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power”. 
(ii) Nationalism 
The Westphalia treaty was the foundation of the idea of nation state to flourish on European 
soil. However, it was French nationalism which provoked other countries to embrace 
nationalism ideals as the basis of their existence. Spain, Prussia and German-Austria, 
Ireland, Italy, the Rhineland, Poland and the Balkans embraced liberalism hand in hand until 
circa 1848, after which they found their paths veering towards Conservatism (Finer, 1997, 
3:1573). Nationalism has in fact created the pushing factor towards economic survival and 
the struggle to protect the interest of the countries within their borders, which in the later 
period resulted in the emergence of radical ideas such as Fascism and Nazism.  
(iii) Bureaucracy 
The late nineteenth century witnessed a new wave of reforms of public administration. The 
pre-modern bureaucracies which were known as “personal, traditional, diffuse, ascriptive 
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and particularistic‟ were replaced by the modern bureaucracies which exemplified by Weber 
as „impersonal, rational, specific, achievement-oriented and universalistic” (Hughes, 2003: 
19). The reforms started in the UK after the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report which 
criticized the patronage nature of the public offices. The report proposed merit-based 
appointments through examinations, leading to non-patisan and neutral administration.
6
  The 
Report recommended an act of parliament, creating a Board of Public Administration (which 
later became the Civil Service Commission in 1870). The report became a landmark 
document in the development of European bureaucracy and became the guideline for UK 
public management agenda for 70 years (Lynn Jr., 2006: 69). 
The reforms in the UK later influenced opinion in the United States. The assasination of 
President Garfield by a dissapointed civil servant job-seeker as a result of the corrupted 
system in the civil service sector led to the 1883 Civil Service Act (the Pendleton Act) 
(Gladden, 1972: 318). The Act contained four key points:  
a) The selection of civil servants' positions must be through examinations; 
b) Appointments should only be made from the highest-grade achievers in the 
examination; 
c) The interposition of an effective probationary period before absolute appointment; 
d) The apportionment of appointments in Washington according to the population of 
several states and other major areas. 
The model was inspired by the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, who strongly believed in the view 
that politicians should be responsible for making policy, while the administration would be 
responsible for carrying it out. In Europe Max Weber formulated the theory of bureaucracy, 
the idea of distinct, professional public service, recruited and appointed by merit and the idea 
of political neutrality of public servants was the major icon of the reforms. From these two 
figures, the notion that administration could be technically and instrumentally removed from 
the political sphere was derived. Later, Frederick Taylor‟s theory of scientific management 
was adopted by many for the public sector (Hughes, 2003: 20). This traditional model of 
Public Administration, later known as the „burueaucracy‟ model, became the leading trend in 
public services sectors, especially in the Western world. 
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 This method was said to originate from the ancient Chinese practice which imposed examinations as a means 
of the selection of the administrative officials (Lynn Jr., 2006: 41) 
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(iv) Civil Society 
The modern idea of civil society emerged in the 18th century, influenced by political 
theorists; the genesis of the concept was believed to be traced back to Adam Ferguson (1723-
1816) in his Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767 [1980]) and Thomas Paine (1737-
1809) in his Dissertations on the First Principles of Government (Paine: 1975)
7
. Ferguson 
(1980) suggests that the development of a „commercial state‟ is a means of bringing change 
to the corrupt feudal order and strengthening individual liberty. Paine (1795) suggests that 
the institution of civil society is to bring about an equalization of powers that shall be 
parallel to, and a guarantee of, the equality of rights.  However, neither Ferguson nor Paine 
drew a clear distinction between the state and society. It was George Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (1770-1831), who made the distinction in his Elements of the Philosophy of Right 
(1821). Furthermore, Hegel used the term "buergerliche Gesellschaft" (now referred to as 
Zivilgesellschaft) in German to emphasize a more inclusive community (Pelczynski, 1984: 
183). 
(v) Human rights 
The Second World War left scars on the body of universal humanity and world peace. The 
United Nations Organization was then set up to establish a new world order in accordance 
with the principle upon which the war had been fought. The response by the international 
community to the atrocities committed by the Nazis created a landmark for international 
peace and the human rights issue (Donnelly, 2003: 136). The UN according to Article 1 of 
its charter was established with its major purpose being: “To achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. This article hence 
leads to Article 55 which indicates that the UN shall promote “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion”. In order to obtain such goals, Article 68 required the Economic 
and Social Council to set up commissions for the promotion of human rights.
8
 
Thus, on this basis the Council established the Human Rights Commission (1945) that was to 
draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1946 as approved by the 
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 http://www.cooperativeindividualism.org/paine_dissertations_on_first_prin.html. 
8
 http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ 
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General Assembly (Robertson and Merrills, 1996: 27). After a series of meetings and 
discussions by the Commission, the declaration was finally adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly by Resolution 217 (III) on the 10 December 1948 at Palais de Chaillot, 
Paris (Hunt, 2007: 203). However, the Declaration has no binding power and was not 
intended to impose a legal obligation on states, but as a mere declaration of principles for 
which the states were expected to strive. The chair of the Commission, Mrs Eleanor 
Roosevelt stated “it was first and foremost a declaration of the basic principles to serve as a 
common standard for all nations” (Robertson and Merrills, 1996: 28).  
Development in the further stages of the Declaration have been closely related to the 
preservation of human rights and freedoms and no longer measured through economic 
growth alone. During the late 1950s and early 1960s the world witnessed the earlier UN-
related ideas such as decolonization, localisation and human rights sweeping over the global 
political events under the banner of democracy and development. Political and economic 
discourses predominantly overshadowed all the mantras concerning the two aforesaid 
principles; hence they moulded the trend of the domestic policies of many countries as well 
as the foreign policies of the developed countries, specifically the non-Communist countries 
in interfering with the „Third World‟ or underdeveloped nations. During the Cold War, the 
newly independent countries were still against the ideas of „new political economy‟, „social 
capital‟, and „public goods‟, which were debated on the scholarly level of the developed 
countries (Weiss, 2000: 798).  
These new ideas were viewed by some as threats to the newly-emerged and weak countries, 
especially towards their economic and social choices. They remained closed to the 
international political and economic literature of the 1970s and 1980s that promoted public-
choice theory, rent-seeking behaviour, directly unproductive profit-seeking activities, and the 
new institutional economics. It was at the end of this period that the snowball effect of non-
democratic countries, mainly in Asia and Latin America, began to transform themselves into 
democratic nations. Since the overthrow of Portugal's dictatorial regime in April 1974, the 
number of democracies in the world has multiplied dramatically (Diamond, 1992).  
Before the start of this global trend toward democracy, there were roughly 40 countries that 
could be classified as more or less democratic. The number increased moderately through the 
late 1970s and early 1980s as a number of states experienced transitions from authoritarian 
(predominantly military) to democratic rule. This phenomenon has been termed by 
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Huntington (1992) as the „third wave of democracy‟. He defines this “wave of 
democratization” simply as a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes 
that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in 
the opposite direction during that period (Huntington, 1992: 21-26).  
This wave of transitions to democracy was motivated by certain global changes during the 
period, which can be summarized into five major trends:  
(a) the deepening legitimacy problems of authoritarian governments unable to cope with 
military defeat and economic failure;  
(b) the burgeoning economies of many countries, which have raised living standards, levels 
of education, and urbanization, while also raising civic expectations and the ability to 
express them;  
(c) changes in religious institutions which have made them more prone to oppose 
governmental authoritarianism than defend the status quo;  
(d) the push to promote human rights and democracy by external factors such as non-
governmental organizations and the European Community; and  
(e) the „snowballing‟ or demonstration effects, enhanced by new international 
communications, of democratization in other countries (Huntington, 1992).  
2.2.2. Reflecting on the emergence of the concept of good governance 
On the other hand, Weiss (2000: 796) argues that the emergence of governance at national 
level is rooted in a disgruntlement with the state-dominated models of economic and social 
development throughout the socialist bloc and the Third World at this period (between the 
1950s and the 1970s). Consequently, the growing dissatisfaction amongst international 
relations students towards the dominating theories of the realist and liberal-institutionalism 
in the 1970s and the 1980s has lead to the emergence of the „global governance‟ 
phenomenon at the international level. Accordingly, the aforesaid event coincided with the 
practitioners and scholars of development critiques on the failure of reforms in many 
countries to bring development to the people at the end of the 1980s (Ngaire, 1999: 39) 
which led them to the discovery, by the early 1990s, that it was „bad governance‟ that 
contributed to those failures. The renewed interest in institutions for the social scientists 
during that period coincided with this finding. Subsequently, the concern for the institutions 
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has become the topic of discussions amongst economists and experts (Mearsheimer, 1995; 
Keohane, 1995).  
Subsequent to these events, the post Cold War phenomena, which witnessed universal 
interest in democracy and democratization, prepared the ground for scholars and 
practitioners to suggest a panacea from the liberal democratic value formulae essential for 
effective reforms (Diamond, 1992).  The notion of „good governance‟ then was formulated 
not only by having effective reforms, but the complete package of democratic participation 
and accountability. The combination of all these factors prepared a “background for a whole 
new literature and set of prescriptions about good governance” (Ngaire, 1999:40). The 
notion of good governance entails placing the state and society at the service of the market, 
under the presumption that economic growth under a liberal democratic environment alone 
will deliver development. 
The broader understanding of this notion implies the idea of strengthening the institutional 
capacity of the state through the enhancement of autonomy, efficiency, rationality and 
training, but with its minimized role in the market and civil society (Landell-Mills, 
Serageldin, 1991). Under this new concept, the „governance‟ process evolved into a wider 
concept that included the institutions, the market and the society in steering the state. The 
new phenomena have driven researchers to produce new political and sociological literature 
about conditions and institutions needed to represent and mediate the vast and competing 
array of interests in any society. Simultaneously, the international institutions, namely the 
international aid agencies are modelling their own useful indicators of good governance as 
part of their reform package to be implemented by the recipient countries (Ngaire, 1999: 40). 
The indicators are based on certain factors they believe to be the benchmark for good 
governance: participation, accountability, transparency and fairness (World Bank, 1992; 
UNDP, 1993). 
In unison, during the 1980s the import-substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) advocating 
for government interventions in the market to promote large-scale modern industries gave 
way to a new paradigm referred to as the Washington Consensus
9
 (Mehmet, 1997:125-26). 
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 The consensus promotes ten major principles, namely: Fiscal discipline; Concentration of public expenditure 
on public goods (including education, health, and infrastructure); Tax reform towards broadening the tax base 
with moderate to marginal tax rates; Interest rates to be determined and positive; Competitive exchange rates; 
Trade liberalisation; Openness to foreign investment; Privatisation of state enterprises; Deregulation or 
abolishment of regulations that impede entry to restrict competition, except for those justified on safety, 
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This approach identified the market as a universally efficient mechanism to allocate scarce 
resources and promote economic growth. Under its influence, the Bretton Woods 
international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, actively encouraged governments to dismantle market control as the 
„standard‟ reform package for crisis-wracked developing countries (Williamson, 1989). 
According to the Washington Consensus, good governance exists essentially as the political 
administration of economic policies: the deregulation of exchange, trade and prices systems, 
and the preferential treatment of individual and corporate investors, while eliminating 
governmental involvement in credit allocation (Hayami, 2003; Rodrik, 2006). 
The consensus had an enormous impact on the discourse of globalization and became the 
beacon for development, profoundly influencing the drastic reformation movements in the 
area of public service. New Public Management (NPM) was a new institutional economics 
movement during the 1990s which generated a set of administrative reform doctrines built on 
ideas of contestability, user choice, and transparency and close concentration on incentive 
structures (Mc Laughlin, et al. 2003). These doctrines appeared as a new kind of revolution 
to the field, debunking the traditional military bureaucratic ideas of „good administration‟, 
which strongly adhered to the idea of orderly hierarchies and elimination of duplication or 
overlap (Hood, 1991: 6; Lynn, 2003:14; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2005: 8-10). NPM is derived 
from two major ideas: (a) the „public policy‟ schools developed in the 1970s which became 
famous in the 1980s; and (b) the „managerialist‟ movement around the globe. This model 
offers a new approach calling for the public sector to be run within the framework of the 
private sector‟s model of business and market-driven value for efficiency10. 
                                                                                                                                                        
environmental, and consumer protection grounds, and  prudential oversight of financial institutions; Legal 
security for property rights (Hayami, 2003).  
10
 However, this type of reform differed from country to country despite of their managerialism centric and non-
administrative idea. Some countries rejected the „small government‟ ideology, and most favoured it. However, 
they were unified by the perception that views centralized bureaucracy as problematic apart from the two other 
factors mentioned earlier. As an example, the UK has their „Next Steps‟ reform, which is different from the New 
Zealand and Australian versions of contractualisation. Canada has its „La Releve‟; the Irish are implementing 
their „Irish Strategic Management Initiative‟; the German have their „Lean State‟ reform programme; the 
Scandinavians are known for their Scandinavian reforms (Matheson, 2003: 42); while in the USA two books 
managed to create a revolution in the field of public service during the 1990‟s. David Osborne and Ted 
Gaebler‟s best-selling „Reinventing Government‟ and Micheal Barzelay‟s „Breaking through Bureaucracy‟ 
strongly influenced Clinton‟s administration to come out with reforms towards effective public service. 
„Reinventing Government‟ proposed the universal „steering not rowing‟ principles of governance, which 
suggested more participation, accountability and less state control type of public administration. They insist that 
the new proposed model be called „entrepreneurial government‟ (1992: p. xix), which implies: „using resources 
in new ways to maximise productivity and effectiveness‟.  Barzelay‟s book on the other hand, presented the new 
post-bureaucratic paradigm of public management, which provided the text for a new generation of reform-
minded activists (Lynn Jr., 2006: 110). However, the former has had more influence than the latter. 
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The collapse of the Soviet Empire is considered by many as the beginning of the new era, 
and by some as the end of history. Fukuyama (1992) declared that liberalism won and would 
rule the earth to establish a new dawn of human civilization. These ideas led to other events 
that eventually brought about the emergence of the good governance theory. It was the 
World Bank‟s 1989 report on the underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa as a result of bad 
governance which first sparked the term that later became fad du jour to many, as previously 
mentioned in this chapter. After the World Bank's introduction of the narration of good 
governance, the world began to witness the concept and its relationship to political 
conditionality has been largely embraced by other international organizations such as the 
United Nations and other international aid agencies (Burnell, 1994: 485).  
The World Bank's proposal of the good governance agenda was a summary of concepts and 
principles formulated as a result of the events discussed
11
 with the underlying idea that bad 
governance is increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of underdevelopment, 
corruption and other evils in societies. The proposal is closely related to processes of 
democratization, where the primary aim is to intensify the quality of democracy as a 
prescription to development and modernity for the Third World and developing countries. In 
promoting the reform, international agencies utilize a triple strategy: (a) Strengthening 
independent judiciaries and effective legislatures to curb and counterbalance executive 
powers; (b) Empowering and expanding the capacity of civic society by nurturing grassroots 
organizations, advocacy NGOs, and the news media; (c) Financing the democratic 
mechanisms to establish competitive, free and fair elections and other forms of participation 
in governance processes (Kaufmann, 2003). 
With such grand designs, the international agencies and donor countries legitimise their 
interference in the internal affairs of the beneficiary countries (Weiss, 2000). However, the 
degree of interference varies from one institution or agency to another, according to their 
agenda. The agenda of those institutions and agencies could be seen from the characteristics 
of „good‟ being given to their notion of governance. The proposal as a concept keeps 
                                                 
11
 World Bank presented „Good Governance‟ in 1992 as part of the criteria for granting loans to developing 
countries. The proposal promotes reforms in the public sector with „new public management‟ along with the 
theory of rational choice and the theory of public choice, which they believe will lead to the efficiency of public 
services and the public sector in general. At this stage, „governance‟ implies the “exercise of authority through 
formal and informal traditions and institutions for the common good, thus encompassing: (1) the process of 
selecting, monitoring, and replacing governments; (2) the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies 
and deliver public services, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them.” (Kaufmann, 2003) 
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evolving and changes from one institution to another, but the focal discourse maintains the 
same philosophical foundation and aims.  
2.2.3. Good Governance as a concept 
Tracing back the proceedings that led to the surfacing of „good governance‟ as a substantive 
concept or reform agenda, we may possibly conclude that „development‟ was the concern 
and the major aspiration of its early initiators. Additionally, good governance materialized 
on the World Bank‟s agenda as one of the themes of the Bank‟s 1991 Annual Development 
Economic Conference (World Bank, 1992b). In its report, the Bank associates the attainment 
of development with good governance proviso. Furthermore, the Bank conceptualized „good 
governance‟ to indicate the manner in which power and authority are exercised to prepare a 
conducive environment for development “in the management of a country‟s economic and 
social resources” (World Bank, 1992a: 1).  
This conception of „good governance‟ became extensively discussed and debated after the 
above-mentioned report. Other international institutions such as UNDP, USAID, OECD etc., 
which deal with the similar development issues, afterwards redefined the term according to 
their particular aim, aspiration, outline and policies. According to them, the realm of good 
governance is not only confined to the reform of the government that governs, but also 
includes other entities such as public policies, institutions, civil societies, system of 
economic relationships, or a role for the non-governmental sector in the business of the state. 
In sum, good governance, thus, expresses approval not only for a type of government 
(usually democracy) and it relates political values (i.e. human rights) but also for certain 
kinds of additional components (Smith, 2007: 4).  
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), for 
example, in their mission to assist the development of developing countries, define „good 
governance‟ as: “The process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are 
implemented (or not implemented).”12 Here, the concept of the decision-making process 
implies the importance of the democratic process that should be adopted by developing 
countries as development in those countries was normally impeded by the autocratic nature 
of the governments. UNESCAP's approach in crystallizing the good governance concept is to 
restructure the nature and mechanism of the decision-making process in those countries to 
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 http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp.  
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engulf non-state actors to ensure efficiency and democracy. Conceivably, Graham et al.‟s 
(2003: 5) proposition on the citizen‟s function in the decision-making practice in the 
governance process is closer to UNESCAP‟s by saying: “Mode or model of governance that 
leads to social, environmental and economic result sought by citizen”. 
Correspondingly, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) explains the nature 
of citizens' empowerment in the decision-making process in their characterization of „good 
governance‟ as: 
The exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a 
country‟s affairs at all levels. Governance is a neutral concept comprising the 
mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions through which citizens and 
groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations and mediate 
their differences. (UNDP and Governance, 1997) 
This definition implies that good governance is seen as a far-reaching way of steering the 
state through the empowerment and power dissemination progression. Despite its emphasis 
on the significant role in governing, UNDP also includes other elements of power that will 
contribute towards good governance. As can be seen in further arguments, the neutrality of 
the state or government is crucial in order to avoid the enforcement of „one way of 
governance‟, which they believe will decrease the role of non-state actors in development.  
Analogously, OECD has presented a more specific picture of good governance by taking 
into account the objective to be achieved and issues to be embarked upon in the course of the 
idea of governance. Governance according to them is “management of government in a 
manner that is essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of 
law” and characterised by participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, 
effectiveness, equity, etc.
13
 This definition encompasses the role of public authorities in 
establishing the milieu in which other elements of governance function and determine the 
distribution of benefits (OECD, 1995: 14). Similar to the new realm promoted by the World 
Bank, OECD also inclined towards broadening the horizon of governance by including all 
non-state actors in the process of development. 
The Governance working Group of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences has 
also highlighted the issue of non-state actors involvement in development as part of „good 
governance‟ (GWG IIAS, 1996) in their assertion that: “[Good] Governance refers to the 
process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and influence and exact 
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 http://stats.oecd.org 
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policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social development”. This 
definition suggests that good governance involves active interaction between the formal 
institutions of the government and those of civil society. The interaction will encourage 
citizen's participation in order to generate the social, economic and financial policies that 
drive the state economy for the benefit of its citizens (Weiss, 2000:797; Kakabadse et al., 
2004: 230). This definition and other similar descriptions of good governance mention the 
elements of preserving the citizen‟s or majority interest and the way of steering (the what 
and how) remain as its major pillar.  
Apart from good governance, another expanded normative framework for international 
development initiatives under the UN umbrella was introduced under the name Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) as a product of the post-Cold War period. The MDG formed 
part of an innovative international approach to international affairs firmly grounded in the 
concept of „liberalism‟ as a fundamental to peace and economics. This approach, which is 
derived from the Western experience proposes that political and economic liberalization 
would be effective antidotes to poverty and underdevelopment, under the tutelage of the rich 
countries and in particular a new United Nations revitalized after the disappearance of the 
Soviet Union. Thus, promotion of human rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, 
rule of law, property rights, good governance and neo-liberal economics have become part 
and parcel of the international good governance project as well as the basis for a rapid surge 
in social and economic affairs (Bendana, 2004). 
However, as described earlier, good governance, as a prevailing concept in the current 
debate on development, occupies the main theme in this research. Despite its general 
framework described above, the details of what constitutes „good governance‟ are yet to be 
referred to. Due to the variety of parties that promote the concept, the characteristics of good 
governance differ from one proponent to another, with few similarities and goals. Those 
variations of good governance features which narrow the term into the discourse of 
development according to the international financial institutions are discussed in the 
following section. 
2.2.4. Features of Good Governance 
Leftwich (1993) identifies three strands to good governance: systemic, political and 
administrative. The systemic use of governance implies that the process exceeds the normal 
understanding of „government‟ which includes the “distribution of both internal and external 
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political and economic power”. The political use of governance means, “a state enjoying 
both legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate”, while the administrative 
use refers to “an efficient, open accountable and audited public service”. Hence, based on 
these strands the means to achieve „good governance‟ are formulated. Similarly, the 
characteristics of good governance must be developed based on the objectives agreed by the 
stakeholders (Bovaird and Loffer, 2003:10).  
For instance, the World Bank in its earliest prominent 1992 document on good governance 
entitled „Governance and Development‟ identifies the distinctive features of good 
governance as: “Efficient public sector management, accountability, legal framework for 
development and information, and transparency” (Moore, 1993: 24). While a degree of 
similarity can also be found in the European Union white paper on good governance, which 
recommends „European Governance‟ as a system that bears five major characteristics: 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence (White Paper on 
European Governance, 2001). The same qualities with some additions were also agreed by 
the participants of the first World Conference on Governance in Manila agreed upon the 
„Manila Declaration on Governance‟ in 1999 which defines „good governance‟ as: “a system 
that is transparent, accountable, just, fair, democratic, participatory and responsive” (Manila 
Declaration on Governance, 1999). 
The evolving nature of globalization and practice of governance drove the World Bank to 
develop further concepts of good governance in the 1990‟s. Through the World Bank 
Institute and the Research Department of the World Bank led by Daniel Kaufmann and Art 
Kraay, they managed to develop the „World Governance Indicator‟ (WGI) in 1996. Based on 
the data provided by 30 prominent institutions involved in issues related to governance, the 
indicator is applied as a barometer to evaluate the governance performance of more than 200 
countries all over the world (Kaufmann et. al., 2008: 16). However, in their study released in 
May 2005, the World Bank presented the latest update of its aggregate governance indicators 
for 2004 for 209 countries and territories, designed to measure the following six dimensions 
of „good‟ governance: voice and accountability, political stability and non-violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
(Kaufmann et al., 2005). The WGI evaluates the governance performance of those countries 
from these six major dimensions, or characteristics. Those countries with high scores in the 
afore-mentioned areas are considered good governed countries, while those with poor scores 
are considered bad governed countries. 
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Comparably, the United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) as an agency within the 
United Nations (UN) responsible for the development of underdeveloped and developing 
countries also established their own characteristics for good governance to be achieved by 
those countries. According to the UNDP document on the subject, „good governance‟ is 
defined as any system in any country, which has all eight of the following characteristics: 
participation, consensus oriented (policies), accountability, transparency, responsiveness, 
effectiveness and efficiency, equitability and inclusiveness, and rule of law (UNDP and 
Governance, 1997). These elements are to be achieved through a reform package offered by 
the agency. 
To conclude, the qualities and descriptions of „good governance‟ discussed are aimed at 
attaining justice, avoiding dictatorship, ensuring the participation of people in policy making, 
eliminating corruption and administration misconducts, and upholding civil liberty. Its 
proponents consider good governance to be the major factor of economic growth, and thus 
development. Hence, with good governance, the aid given will be effectively utilized and 
fairly distributed for the benefit of the people (Nanda, 2006). Those elements by their nature 
are interrelated. The implementation of any single element with the absence of the others 
will never guarantee the efficiency of governance as believed in by the promoters of the 
good governance approach. 
The aforesaid elements or characteristics could be accumulated as the good governance 
leitmotif, which aims to achieve the following principles (Van Dok, 1999: 13):  
 (i) Conducive framework for the private sector;  
(ii) Market economy with stable, development-oriented economic and budgetary policies;  
(iii) Rule of law and transparency in all areas of the public sector and combating corruption,  
(iv) Competent, efficient and responsible government and administration committed to 
accountability;  
(v) Effective government and administration at regional and local levels through 
empowerment; 
(vi) Democratic political system and a pluralist society; 
(vii) Active participation of the people in political decision-making and development 
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processes;  
(viii) Decisive role of civil society, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs);  
(ix) Efficient national education and health care system;  
(x) Freedom of the press and independence of the media; 
(xi) Protection of human rights. 
However, in summarizing the concept, Graham et al. (2003) summarise all these values in 
five major principles: The first principle is „legitimacy and voice‟ that encompasses 
„participation‟ and „consensus orientation‟. The second principle is „direction‟ based on the 
value of „strategic vision‟. The third principle is „performance‟, which includes the values of 
„responsiveness‟ and „effectiveness and efficiency‟. The fourth principle is „accountability‟ 
which is the basis of both „accountability‟ and „transparency‟. The fifth principle is „value‟ 
which encompasses „equity‟ and „rule of law‟.  
Conversely, due to the failure of some experiments of the good governance project in a 
number of countries, the concept started to evolve and expand. Furthermore, the concern 
over good governance by the promoters has also evolved within the two decades since its 
implementation. It was initially concerned with the improvement of political leadership of 
democracy and integrating economic and social goals through the non-state actors (with the 
banner of minimalizing the state); then the second generation of good governance 
emphasized economic and social rights with a call to bring the state into action to reform 
economic and social development due to the failure of the market; and the current trend of 
good governance is moving towards emphasizing integration of economic and social welfare 
through well-governed society, which entails improvements in governmental institutions and 
sound development management (Weiss, 2000: 805). 
These developments led to the new formulation of the notion of good governance by some 
experts. Mahbub ul Haq (1999), who was known for his statement that “the concept of good 
governance has failed to match the radicalism of human development”, proposed „humane 
governance‟, which comprises holistic reform in politics, economics and civic governance. 
This new concept emphasizes upholding and ensuring the concept of integration between 
good political governance and good economic governance through the empowerment of the 
people (self-organisation) within the framework of good civic governance to serve basic 
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human needs. This proposal inextricably links the principles of „ownership‟, „decency‟ and 
„accountability‟ as its major components. Such ideas preceded the concerns regarding human 
development, human well-being and other human economic fields. However, it is still 
attached to the very similar philosophy and foundation of the initial Washington Consensus 
ideals. 
2.2.5. Conclusion 
The term governance, which technically connotes a wider perception than government, is 
both a very new and a very old subject in political studies. It is closely associated with 
political concepts like constitution, government, polity, politics, bureaucracy and many 
others. The most common usage of the term has been for the description of decision-making 
processes and ensuing implementation, frequently being associated with state institutions and 
mechanisms. However, the contemporary vast development of the Western liberal 
democracies has engulfed the detailed knowledge of mechanisms and actors of governance 
into the realm of „governance‟. Furthermore, the expansion of developmentalism in the 
political economy and developmental discourse has widened the discourse of governance to 
encompasses the field of economics, legal, social and private organizations; hence, 
„reinventing‟ the new concepts of governance (Weiss, 2000: 795-96).  
The former usage of governance denotes more the traditional state (and its political bodies 
and institutions) „steering‟ concept of governance (the state-centric approach). Unlike the 
former, the new definition of governance is a modern concept that focuses on the role of 
society (society-centric) and its ability to governance by co-ordinating common interests and 
self-steering (positive approach) or to resist the regulations and impositions of the state 
(negative approach). This new approach to the notion of governance implies that state is only 
regarded as one of the many equal actors in society, together constituting a network 
regulating and coordinating policy sectors according to the preferences and interests of their 
members.  
Within this paradigm, the discourse of „good governance‟ as part of the continuity of the 
developmental progress emerged with certain aims and goals. The concept that was first 
introduced by the World Bank, and then followed by other international aid agencies and 
financial institutions keeps expanding in response to the agenda prepared by the Washington 
Consensus (Hayami, 2003; Rodrik, 2006). The relatively new concept due to its dynamic 
nature opens the doors for the parties involved to encapsulate their own philosophy to 
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develop a distinctive barometer of the concept based on the agenda they are moving towards 
achieving. Though most of the characteristics developed might vary from one institution to 
another, they share common principles, such as how power and authority are exercised; the 
management of a country‟s affairs; the relationships between rulers and those ruled; how 
conflict is resolved; how interests are articulated and rights exercised etc. (Weiss, 2000).  
Finally, one can also conclude that despite the different interpretations of the term „good 
governance‟ there are common elements agreed by many. The common elements can be 
attributed to four major themes: constitutional reform, political reform, administrative reform 
and public policy reform (Smith, 2007: xi) that works for administration, politics and 
economic development (Heiden, 2001). Based on these themes, the characteristics or the 
mechanisms of good governance are being developed and built to achieve the ultimate goal 
of governance, which is the development of countries with an efficient working 
environment. Despite contrasting terms and concepts, most of the concepts refer to the same 
philosophy and principles to achieve the same goal. However, the aspirational view of good 
governance is not free from its critics. Various parties have debated several issues related to 
the idea, including the motives of the institutions promoting it. The following chapter 
discusses some of the major criticisms launched against the idea of good governance.  
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Chapter 3 
DECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF GOOD 
GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
“More and more people are beginning to realize that 
‘the modern experiment’ has failed. It received its early 
impetus from what I have called the Cartesian 
revolution, which, with implacable logic, separated 
man from those higher levels that alone can maintain 
his humanity. Man closed the gates of Heaven against 
himself and tried, with immense energy and ingenuity, 
to confine himself to the Earth. He is now discovering 
that the earth is but transitory state, so that a refusal to 
reach for Heaven means an involuntary descent into 
Hell”.  
Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (1978: 139) 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The „good governance‟ agenda introduced by international financial and aid 
institutions according to the Washington Consensus is a result of the conventional 
developmental theories, which represents the contemporary kernel of truth on how to 
develop from an Eurocentric perspective (Mehmet, 1997: 127). It was thus promoted 
within the spirit of the emergence of neo-liberal discourse during the 1990s as the 
major prerequisite of development according to its proponents. „Good Governance‟ 
usually, therefore, refers to a political regime based on the model of liberal-
democratic polity, which protects human and civil rights, combined with component, 
non-corrupt and accountable public administration (Neumayer, 2003), and is 
expected to be the outcome of the economic and financial liberalisation policies.  
Despite its fervent promotion as the primary idea in determining the ideal way to 
develop with the objective of ensuring the well-being of the people, it also received 
criticism from various parties for some of its shortcomings. Good governance as a 
concept or agenda was exported from the developed Western countries to the 
underdeveloped or developing countries known as the „Third World‟ after the World 
Bank‟s Sub-Saharan Report in 1989, which is considered by some as an enforcement 
of neo-liberalism idea on the world (Mehmet, 1997: 126). While some scrutinise it as 
neo-colonialism by developed countries (Pagden, 1995; Moore, 1996; Anghie, 2000), 
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and some believe it to be a part of a Western project to undermine the „other‟ way of 
life (Rahnema, 1997: 384). On the other hand, many researchers launched their 
criticism of the concept from its technical failure based on the empirical results of its 
operation in the Latin American region, African countries and the Balkans (George 
and Sabelli, 1994: 142-61; CAFOD, 1998; Goldstein, 2000; Stewart, 2000; El-Said, 
2002; Stiglitz, 2002).  
Since this research does not focus on the technical issues in the operational and 
mechanistic matters of the concept, it aims only to establish the gap in its 
philosophical issues. Therefore the criticism included in this chapter is less concerned 
with the empirical arguments, concentrating instead on deconstructing core subjects 
to show the foundation of the governance discourse. This chapter, consequently, is 
developed around three major criticisms of the conventional good governance 
proposal that relates to the core of the philosophical inquiries. The discussion on the 
liberal agenda within good governance, the Asian values proponents who oppose the 
Westernization of the governance discourse and the post-developmentalist hostility 
towards the „developmental hegemony‟ of the developed countries upon the Third 
World advances as a launching pad for further investigation.  
By deconstructing the line of arguments of the opposition, and the meta-structure of 
the concept, one can see that the most prevailing discourse on „good governance‟ was 
that of modernity and Eurocentrism (Mehmet, 1998). These two predominant 
principles reflect the grand design of the concept in determining how the 
contemporary world‟s population should live. As part of the post-Enlightenment 
legacy, these two cardinal concepts are constantly developing along with the contexts 
and changes, to ensure that the West will always remain at the centre, and the 
peripheries will always remain as they are. Thus, modernity and Eurocentrism as the 
foundational framework for „good governance‟ theory or concept are discussed 
thoroughly below and will be argued in detail regarding their implications for the 
underlying conception of governance with the objective of opening up its concept 
and assumptions so that a robust and logical attempt can be made later to construct it 
through Islamic episteme.   
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3.2. NEO-LIBERALIZATION AGENDA AS GOOD GOVERNANCE  
Amongst the prevailing criticisms of the good governance programme is that it is a 
neo-liberalisation agenda being imposed by the developed Western countries on the 
others. The collapse of the Communist Bloc, the impact of the pro-democracy 
movements and the wave of democratic changes around the globe have been 
recognized as the leading motivations for this agenda. It has also been claimed that 
the promotion of structural adjustment and economic reform programmes in the 
Third World, and later in Eastern Europe towards capitalist economic formation and 
public policy from the late 1970s with the objective of enhancing efficiency, was part 
of the new liberalism influence (Leftwich, 1993: 608; Tetzlaff, 1995).  
Following the trend of the period and due to the failure of developmentalist states 
caused by the debt crisis during the 1970s; and hence their failure to deliver political 
and economic development, the discourse of development, economic growth and 
modernization has shifted towards the new emerging trend of the neo-liberal agenda. 
Therefore, the Washington Consensus came as a new face of hegemonic power in the 
1980‟s (Mehmet, 1997; Kothari, 2005) after it was adapted as part of the new global 
order. The Washington Consensus thus offered structural adjustment and economic 
reform and liberalization policies based on the liberal market economy framework to 
establish the initial base of the coming liberal world. After the collapse of 
Communism as an ideology, Western liberalism declared its victory and was 
promulgated by some as the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992), hence the further 
domination of the Western neo-liberal agenda in the discourse of development with a 
Hegelian mindset. 
The neo-liberal reforms mainly aimed at shrinking the role of state, corporatization 
and interference in others‟ sovereign economy in the name of free-market though 
global interconnectedness has convinced some experts that the idea of „good 
governance‟ as part of the reform, is but a part of the Western agenda to convert the 
world to liberal domination (Moore, 1993; Burnell, 1994; Pagden, 1998; Jreisat, 
2004). Furthermore, the liberal agenda under the banner of „good governance‟ to be 
implemented by Third World countries could be seen in liberal elements as part of its 
reform package, such as neutralizing (or minimizing) the role of the state, 
encouraging and funding liberal democratic reforms in the electoral system, 
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enhancing the discourse of human rights and individual liberties (through the 
freedom of media and politics), empowering of non-state actors (especially the civil 
society organizations and market actors), free trade and free market (capitalism) 
(Williams and Young, 1994). It was apparent that most of the aid given was poured 
into institutions involved in adhering to those liberal elements amid the minimization 
of the state role. In the same breath, Western political leaders frequently uttered a call 
for such reforms during the 1990s, promoting them as „the new beginning‟ for the 
world (Leftwich, 2000: 118-19).  
The „good governance‟ agenda, as discussed in the previous chapter, during its initial 
phase technically imposes the limited state framework which demands greater scope 
for competition and a free market economy leading to democratic reforms and hence 
the policy is considered as an essential tool for development. It was also believed that 
a market economy, within a democratic environment which entails „good 
governance‟, were the key factors of economic growth and prosperity (Leftwich, 
1993: 605). This formula was promoted not only to serve the purpose of economic 
growth, but it was also believed to be crucial to maintaining peace and stability at 
both domestic and international levels (Weiss, 2000: 796-803). However, reality has 
proved that this ideal, widely promoted by international donors, is not a silver bullet 
to solve all problems. Critics of the concept succeeded in raising their concerns 
regarding some of its hidden dimensions and aspects which had been overlooked by 
many.  
In the same line of argument, some radical circles suggest that „good governance‟ as 
promoted by the Western world was indeed part of the wider governance of the 
predominant „New World Order‟ (Leftwich, 1993: 611). This would support 
Fukuyama‟s aforesaid thesis of the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy. However, 
the proponents of „good governance‟ do not easily accept this allegation as they 
believe that the values promoted through the proposed reforms, especially by the 
IMF, World Bank and UNDP, are in fact universally-accepted norms and values by 
many (Graham et al., 2003). Furthermore, it is those values that have brought 
development and economic growth to the developed countries, especially the US and 
Europe, in the last century.  
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Another primary issue is the perception of enforcement of the neo-liberal agenda on 
Third World countries through the human rights framework. Since the World Bank‟s 
proposal for Sub-Saharan development through implementing the „good governance‟ 
elements, the human rights issue has been recognized by most international aid 
donors as the benchmark for good governance, which justifies them pouring loans or 
„donation‟ into any country (Smith, 2004: 48-9). The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) for instance, clearly mentions in its statement 
that its funding is only for those programmes designed to increase participation in 
development, to support and strengthen democratic institutions and civil society and 
support human rights (William and Youngs, 1994: 85).  
Governance is not only perceived as an economic issue but also as a political agenda 
for democratization and, therefore, has always been associated with the protection of 
human rights by not only the donors, but by most of the developed countries‟ leaders 
(Williams and Young, 1994: 85). Shihata (1999: 329-330) insists that the World 
Bank through its good governance project has indirectly contributed towards the 
objective promotion of „human rights‟, by ensuring the development that will benefit 
the people as a whole. Consequently, by uncompromising emphasis on human rights, 
good governance has been seen as a strategy to promote human rights and democracy 
by international agencies (Weiss, 2000: 795; Crawford, 1995; Axworthy, 2001).  
According to the proponents of good governance, the preservation of human rights 
and the application of human rights laws, which are part of the leading liberal values, 
are essential in the achievement of development (Ghai, 1994: 4; Sen, 1999; Donnelly, 
1999). The promoters of good governance policies claim that all the liberal values 
that came with the reform agenda are universally acknowledged for the interest and 
well-being of the people. Democratic values based on liberty, the respect of human 
rights, market economy, efficiency and other liberal values which are strongly based 
on ideals such as individualism, secularism and positivism were, consequently, 
promoted as a prerequisite for the formation of better governance for the people 
(Graham et al., 2003: 8).  
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However, having an introspective into the reality, these „universally accepted‟ values 
should be viewed from their epistemological construct and from their priorities and 
suitability for implementation in underdeveloped or developing countries. Without 
taking into consideration the indigenous and cultural factors, those universal 
elements might be perceived as something foreign despite the positive result they 
might aim to achieve. Furthermore, the conditionality promoted under the banner of 
„good governance‟ by international institutions, only deals with the institutional and 
mechanistic reforms and not the people‟s essentials of the recipient countries. The 
ignorance of the „bread and butter‟ needs of the people, meant most of the reform 
imposed on those countries only resulted in „social conflict‟ and social disparity 
(Mehmet, 1997; Alcantara, 1998; Rodrik, 1998). On the other hand, such 
enforcement might be viewed by some as a neo-colonialist project by the developed 
countries to spread their domination over others, which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
3.3. GOOD GOVERNANCE AS THE NEW FACE OF COLONIALISM  
Shihata (1991:85) explains that the World Bank insists on governance with the 
objective of promoting fairness, justice, liberty, an independent judiciary, respect for 
human rights, and an efficient and corruption-free bureaucracy, and by insisting that 
these were the basic requirements for a modern and efficient state. Despite such 
positive values and expectations attached to „good governance‟ by the aid agencies, 
some researchers have taken a sceptical attitude toward the whole concept and 
policy. The pre-conditional loan from those agencies, namely by the World Bank, 
that comes with the „good governance‟ reform has been viewed, mainly by critics, as 
part of the neo-colonialization enterprise (Tetzlaff, 1995: 20). Stiglitz (2002) states 
that the culture of „conditionality‟ policies imposed by those agencies and institutions 
cultivates the „feel of colonial ruler‟ in them.  
George and Sabelli (1994: 142-61) point out that the concept of good governance has 
been created as a scapegoat for some parties to blame those who failed to fulfil what 
was required from them. The „unfulfilled‟ conditionalities of good governance 
imposed by the World Bank and other international donor institutions to the 
borrowing countries will provide an option to blame them if things go wrong. It will 
be a „blame-the-victim‟ situation. In the same vein some other critics perceive that 
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the „good governance‟ approach is but a subtle way for America to impose its 
hegemonic power upon the developing countries, specifically the African, countries, 
thus resulting in neo-colonialism (Moore, 1996; Anghie, 2000). 
Good governance as a tool for neo-colonialization derived from the long-inherited 
„colonialism mentality‟ was and is actually a mere continuation of Western 
colonialist policies. Pagden (1995) traces the roots of this mentality back to the age 
of Old Greece, where they divided the world into „us‟ and „them‟. This can be traced 
back to Plato‟s complaint about the separation between the Hellenic races and other 
races which they described as „barbarian‟. The Roman Imperium who believed in 
their lordship over the „barbarians‟ later inherited this Hellenistic feeling of 
superiority
1
. This lordship could only be achieved if they managed to impose on them 
their way of life by living in the „Civitas‟, which afterwards evolved to the notion of 
„civilization‟. The Christian Roman Empire then continued the status quo with some 
modifications by adding a religious flavour to it (Pagden, 1998; 2001; 2008; Parekh, 
2006: 16-49).  
Lordship attitudes then became the theme of the European colonialist in their 
colonization expeditions. Not only did the wealth of the colonized countries become 
the main motivation of the colonialist expedition, but the belief that they were the 
only nations with the superiority in understanding the laws of God and of nature over 
the „primitive‟ people drove them to impose their cultures on the people of those 
colonized nations. „The primitives‟ of the colonized lands according to the 
conquerors, were not only their servants, but had also to embrace the European 
lifestyle, European religion (Christianity), European dress and eating habits, 
European beliefs, European technologies, etc (Pagden, 1998: 12-14). Furthermore, 
this attitude later evolved to Kant‟s idea of „ius cosmopoliticum‟ or the cosmopolitan 
rights. It was the original idea of universal laws and political order for all nations. 
The authority of this international rule of law must be guarded by the nations 
themselves for which Kant proposed republican states (Kant, 1991: 102). 
Kant‟s idea of this world order changed from one treatise to another as can be seen 
by the development of the idea itself. For example, in The Idea for a Universal 
                                                 
1
 Aristotle went a step further and equated Europe with freedom, independence, and the rule of law, 
and the non-Europeans with arbitrary, tyranny and slavish submission (Lewis, 1995: 64).   
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History (1787) he describes the world order as a “united power and the law-governed 
decisions of a united will” (Kant, 1992: 47). While in his On the Common Saying, he 
articulated that “This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice” (1793), 
he proposes that the guardian of the world order must be an international society with 
legal powers. The same idea was proposed in his Perpetual Peace (1795). However, 
in his The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), he concludes that such an international 
world order can only be practised in a „universal association of states that come to 
hold conclusively true condition of peace‟ (Kant, 1991:156). This formula offers the 
image of a higher political order, which all societies must emulate as a model “in 
order to bring the legal constitution of mankind nearer to its greatest possible 
perfection” (Kant, 1991: 191). 
This could be viewed as the background for universalism in international political 
affairs. Kant also believed that the practice of cosmopolitan rights is the key to 
harmony and happiness. This explains the genealogy of the aspirations, which the 
modern usage of the term „governance‟ has come to describe. Pagden (1998: 14), 
therefore, argues that the World Bank‟s promotion of „good governance‟ is but 
another “transvaluation of European or more generally Western imperial values” 
implying that they are just continuing the colonization crusades that have been 
pioneered by the Greeks, then the Romans, followed by the Christian Romans, and 
ultimately by the European conquerors during the centuries of colonization. 
Based on a similar argument, the good governance agenda has been associated with 
the Western governments‟ agenda, specifically the United States, to influence world 
economics in their favour (Mehmet, 1997; Anghie, 2000). The World Bank was also 
implied to be working according to Western governments‟ favour (Preston, 1992: 
10), which was the result of the strong influence of the „development orthodoxy‟ 
from the wider development community of the Western world from governments, 
NGOs and academics. Similarly, the focus on governance by the World Bank was 
partly based upon the consensus adopted by those orthodox‟s that political 
considerations play significant role in ensuring and determining development 
(Williams and Young, 1994: 88; Mehmet, 1997).  
The World Bank‟s emphasis on human rights issues as part of the good governance 
project has also been viewed as part of a United States-oriented agenda, which has 
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always had a tradition of focusing on human rights (according to their Universalist‟s 
definition) in its foreign policy (Lancaster, 1993: 13). Such reality fertilizes the 
strong thoughts that the World Bank, through its good governance project, is heavily 
influenced and moulded by the Western agenda, in particular the United States.  
Moreover, some extreme opponents of the so-called „Western‟ version of „good 
governance‟ claim that such sudden interest amongst the West in trade reforms and 
concerns for human rights and democratic reforms are disguises and cynical ploys to 
destroy the competitive advantages of Asian countries (Robinson, 1996: 320). In 
response, they promote what is known as „Asian Values‟. 
3.4. RESPONSES TO THE GOOD GOVERNANCE DISCOURSE FROM THE 
PERIPHERY: THE ASIAN VALUES DISCOURSE  
Amongst other criticism of the universalist approach, rationalizing the idea of 
governance carries the Western philosophy of liberal freedom which, one way or 
another, can be considered as the source of sexism, racism and imperialism 
(Mahathir, 1995a). It was a continual argument amongst the strong proponents of 
Asian values, namely the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir 
Mohammad, the former Prime Ministers of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew and Goh 
Chok Tong, who loudly declared the incompatibility of „Western‟ governance with 
Asian culture and tradition (Bonnett, 2004). Mahathir (1995a) who is known for his 
vocal criticism of the perceived social and political trends in the West, for example, 
has linked the vast and massive social problems in the West to the excessiveness of 
democracy. Western political institutions and unguided freedom in the Western 
world, according to Mahathir (1995b), are responsible for the uncured problems 
taking place on Western soil. Western ideology has bred virulent forms of 
individualism and grasping materialism at the expense of positive community-
oriented values and spiritual well-being according to Mahathir.  
In the same way, Tong and his predecessor, Lee Kwan Yew are proud of their 
country‟s (Singapore) achievements in economic development without adopting the 
Western style of governance. Lee Kwan Yew, for example, points out that through 
adherence to the ideals of Confucius, the Singaporeans managed to erect the 
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monument of prosperity and glory of their country
2
 without having the political 
freedoms of the West. He is quoted as saying: “Singapore.... [is] a Confucian society, 
which places the interests of the community above those of the individual” (Lee 
Kwan Yew, 2000:542). 
Lee also asserts that the main differences between the Confucianism of the East 
Asian and Western liberal societies are the emphasis and the sacredness of the 
family. The state can never replace the role of the family by any means. Family 
values give the strength and influence to every individual in society to maintain the 
culture of thrift, hard work, and filial piety, respect for elders and for scholarship and 
learning. These values, according to Lee Kwan Yew, are the major recipe for 
productive people and helping economic growth (Lee Kwan Yew, 2000: 545-46).  
This indeed refers to micro dynamics of good governance.  
Goh (1994), on the other hand, argues that the right economic policies and the 
preservation of Asian Values are the major ingredients of the country‟s remarkable 
economic growth, rising standard of living, increased longevity, low urban crime 
rates, and massive development. The element of community and nationhood, 
disciplined and hard-working people and strong moral values, family ties and 
traditional network are in fact the golden rules that constitute the Singapore version 
of Asian values according to Goh (1994). He asserts that all these values are related 
directly to „Asian culture‟ which puts group interest „above that of the individual‟ 
(Goh, 1994)
3
. As for them, the Western political liberty and the idea of excessive 
                                                 
2
 This idea was propagated as early as 1983 during the rule of Lee Kwan Yew, who was the then Prime 
Minister of Singapore, when the Institute of East Asian Philosophies (IEAP) which was sponsored by 
the ruling regime PAP was first set up. The objective of the establishment of the institute was to 
advance the understanding of Confucian philosophy so that it could be reinterpreted and adapted to the 
needs of present society (Lawson, 1995:14). 
3
 Asian Values, apart from Mahathir‟s, are strongly attributed to the Confucian Chinese values. Their 
main premise that makes them distinguishable from „Western‟ values are constituted in the following 
points: 
a) The emphasis on family values. Family provides the model for the organization of authority and 
responsibility within the political system. Based on this principle, every individual has great respect for 
the leaders in the community. 
b) Interests of the community or the group take precedence over the vested interest of individuals. Thus 
individual rights and freedoms are secondary to the individual obligations towards the community. 
c) Political decision-making is based on the orientation of consensus rather than confrontation through 
a representative political system. 
d) Social cohesion and social harmony are priorities, which can be attained through moral principles 
and strong authority. 
e) Economic growth and development are associated with social cohesion and strong authority, and a 
right of every citizen and country. Hence, the state plays a critical role in the economy and not the 
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freedom are not suitable and will diminish the Asian values that are the core principal 
of their success (Bonnett, 2004:113-21). 
It should be noted that Malaysia‟s version of „Asian values‟ differs from its 
neighbour in not adopting the Confucianism values. Malaysia‟s multi-ethnic, multi-
cultural and multi-religious society requires a different treatment and approach. 
Racial harmony was addressed as the government‟s major priority in order to 
maintain the political and social fabric of the country. Any racial tension or conflict 
will prevent the development agenda and could be used as a pretext in preventing the 
idea of political freedoms. Hence, in the case of Malaysia, the emphasis is on the 
rights of the majority i.e. Malays and the indigenous people (Bumiputera) always 
have the priority in the country‟s agenda. Therefore, the argument was that the 
Western liberal idea of civil liberty is difficult to implement on Malaysian soil due to 
the different culture and social structure of both societies. However, the concept of 
good governance in Malaysia still refers primarily to transparency, accountability, the 
separation of powers, the end of corruption and social integration (Subramaniam, 
2001). 
The economic growth in Singapore and Malaysia, as well other Confucian Asian 
countries, namely the economic dragons (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
Korea and Japan) is used as evidence that the Western version of liberal democracy 
as found in „good governance‟ is not necessary or a prerequisite for economic 
growth. This argument, however, needs to be clarified. Economic growth alone can 
never be an indicator for development. Those countries that might enjoy growth are 
not necessarily free from corruption, though it might not be as bad as in the 
underdeveloped or other developing countries.  
Furthermore, feeding bellies has become important in the Asian system to maintain 
the autocratic regimes in power and to silence the people regarding the elimination of 
political rights.  People were left without freedom, either to make their own choice or 
                                                                                                                                           
market, unlike the Western liberal ideology. On the other hand, every individual will strive strongly as 
part of his or her contribution towards the state. (Robison, 1996: 310-1; Hofstede and Bond, 1998:8) 
Based on these values, the Singaporean government concluded their good governance constitutes: 
„Accountable and transparent government; Long-term orientation by the government in deciding policy 
options for its society; and social justice, which emphasises equality of opportunity regardless of race 
and religion but through fair competition or meritocracy‟. All this is based on one overarching criteria: 
strong leadership! (Principle of Governance, Singapore government website, 
(http://www1.moe.edu.sg/ne/About_NE/Governance/governance_principles.htm).  
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to enjoy political rights. Nevertheless, it is rather important to realize that people who 
do not have political rights cannot claim their economic rights either. Additionally, 
economic growth per se without freedom can never indicate the level of 
development. Sen (1999), in opposing the „full-belly‟ thesis, maintains that freedom 
of the people, which encompasses political rights, freedom of expression, 
government accountability and the rights of women and the minorities are the 
yardsticks of real development, as these empower individuals.   
In supporting the argument of the proponents of Asian values, Hofstede and Bond 
(1998) argue that Eastern cultures have their own uniqueness in shaping world 
civilization through their own approach, which is distinct from the Western approach.  
Therefore, in culturally contextualising good governance, Subramaniam (2001: 75) 
suggests that the theme of good governance can be seen to assume significantly 
different roles, depending on the political and cultural dynamics operating in each 
particular context. These critics might have their basis in justifying the role of culture 
and religion in governance to a certain degree, but their blanket rejection of 
„Western‟ values, specifically in the issue of governance, is rather vague and to some 
extent might sound rather stereotypical. 
In replying to the opponents of Western values, Lewis (1995) maintains that social 
unrest in the birthplace of Western ideas and philosophies cannot be a justification 
for the rejection of those ideas. Social problems are not solely Western problems; 
they occur everywhere and in fact they are part of universal human problems. He 
asserts that other cultures can never replace Western culture and values. The method 
that was developed by the post-Enlightenment West was indeed the vanguard of the 
exploration of other civilizations and cultures, which hence made them popular. 
Indeed, as he argues, the world should thank the West instead.  
Despite these different angles the supporters of Western liberalism advocating 
„Western‟ democratic good governance, always come to the conclusion that Western 
democracy is still the best invention in human history. The proponents of Asian 
values or cultural relativists might not be justified when they purposefully manipulate 
culture to legitimize their autocratic regime and the practice of dictatorship (Case, 
1994; Lawson, 1995: 5; Diamond, 2000) but the West has a lot to learn from good 
Asian values such as emphasis on family values, community-based governance, the 
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respect of elders and leaders, etc. The reality of the destruction of values and ethics in 
the Western world is undeniable, but that can never be an excuse for not emulating 
the good aspects of the democratic values in accountability, transparency, rule of law 
and the empowerment of the citizens. Liberal values have indeed contributed a great 
deal to curbing dictators and despots in the Western world. Nobody can deny the fact 
that the idea of democracy and liberalism are derived from the ashes of the final blow 
to dictatorship and tyrannies (Lawson, 1995).  
Anwar Ibrahim (1996), former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, proposes a 
middle path. As a contrast to the „Asian Values‟ proposal that he claims is just an 
excuse by the autocratic leaders of Asian countries to justify their undemocratic 
governance, he suggests that the Asians need to acknowledge universal values 
without compromising their own Asian values. He suggests that despite the „right to 
difference‟ some Western values were actually essential for the people regardless of 
their background (Abaza, 2002: 70). The need to learn from each other is the key 
concept to what he calls the „Asian Renaissance‟. 
Ibrahim states in his book „The Asian Renaissance‟ (1996:18-9) that: 
Asians must be prepared to champion ideals which are universal, It is 
altogether shameful, if ingenious, to cite Asian values as an excuse for 
autocratic practices and denial of basic rights and civil liberties. To say that 
freedom is Western or un-Asian is to offend our own traditions as well as 
our forefathers who gave their lives in the struggle against tyranny and 
injustice   
However, Ibrahim does draw the demarcation between his proposals for „Asian 
Renaissance‟ with the European values when it comes to the religious issue. He 
asserts that if the European Renaissance was the final declaration on the death of God 
and the burial of the church‟s role in private life, the Asian position is the opposite. 
Religion, therefore, plays a great role in shaping the Asian people, their lives and 
attitudes. Asian man, he claims „at heart is persona religiousus‟ (Ibrahim, 1996: 18-
19). 
However, despite the debates, one should never neglect the vagueness of the so-
called „Asian Values‟ (Godement, 1997). To which Asians is the term „autocratic 
leaders‟ referring? As the word Asian is mentioned, the Indians are also part of the 
Asian community; the Mongolians are undoubtedly part of the people who constitute 
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the „Asian‟ identity. Apart from them, the Malays in the Malay archipelagos, which 
comprise Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines, 
are amongst those who by identity and genetically are Asians. The Indians, the 
Arabs, the Persians, the Ceylonese and the Ghurkhas are all Asians. Thus, the attempt 
to monopolize or to seclude Asian values only to the idea of Confucianism or any 
other „ism‟ should not overlook those other cultures and values, which do not 
necessarily bear the same philosophy and principle (Sen, 1997: 14; Sen, 1999: 234).  
Moreover, Sen (1999: 234) claims that even Confucius allowed freedom of speech 
and the struggle against injustice. More than that, Confucius also did not recommend 
blind allegiance to the state. Sen also points out the example of the non-Confucius 
style of Asian values, which reflects non-authoritarian rulings such as those of 
Ashoka and Kautilya from India, and the Muslim Akbar, the Moghul.  
In sum, what Sen and other critics of Asian values try to point out is that Asian 
values should never be an excuse for regimes and autocrats to legitimize their 
injustice. What Ibrahim (1998) stated might be true, that whatever values are 
registered in order to define one‟s cultural identity, they must not debunk the 
universal values which condemn dictatorship, injustice, oppression, racism, 
corruption and the curb of civil freedom. On the other hand, Chan (1997) suggests 
that the beauty of the variety of cultures and ethics should complement the 
preservation of human rights, and not repudiate it.  
3.5. THE POST-DEVELOPMENTALIST CRITIQUES  
Amongst other critiques launched on good governance was the aim to be achieved 
from the proposed good governance projects, namely economic growth. Economic 
growth has been associated with development, since it is seen by modern economies 
as an indicator of development itself. Amid different models and philosophies 
applied and developed in defining development, the most prevailing and dominant is 
the belief that the Third World should follow in the footsteps of the West.  
Notions of progress and growth as indicators for (materialistic) development have 
been part of post-Enlightenment Western discourse. However, the contemporary 
notion of „development‟ construed through the exemplified modernization lifestyle 
and national economic growth essentially emerged as a post-World War II 
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phenomenon (Gordon and Sylvester, 2004: 9). Development during the Cold War 
period was a pretext for Western liberal interference in Third World economic affairs 
and was seen as part of the crusade to save those countries from „Communist 
subversion‟ (Enke, 1963: 11); consequently, its aim to bring „progress‟ to the Third 
World was an integral part of the struggle against the Soviet Union and international 
Communism (Gordon and Sylvester, 2004: 11). 
In further delving into the philosophy of development, it can be stated that 
development started as a quest for „modernity‟, and while the history of development 
is complex, the modernization project has consistently been at its core. 
Modernization, loosely defined, denotes “the process by which a society comes to be 
characterized by a belief in the rational and scientific control of man‟s physical and 
social environment and the application of technology to that end” (Mehmet, 1995). It 
is from this paradigm that the discourse of development (despite its universal appeal) 
if deconstructed would be seen as “a set of practices and beliefs that are part of the 
Western political and cultural imagination” (Rahnema, 1997). It presumes a universal 
and superior way of ordering society from the post-Enlightenment Western 
perspective, and that all societies are to advance toward a similar goal in their life due 
to the same worldview. Within this discourse, no local or indigenous cultures, 
economies, self-concepts, or ways of existing are valued and acknowledged, for the 
entire development project is premised on its subjects „developing‟ into the Western 
modernity project which negates other forms of rationalities by imposing its 
hegemonic social formation (Rahnema, 1997: 384).
4
  
Similarly, according to this paradigm, poverty became the benchmark and the 
identity of the Third World, while „development‟ and economic growth were to be 
imposed on them according to the „Eurocentric‟ construction, which is based on the 
experience of Europe, as the only solution. Completing this scenario is the imposed 
„universalist‟ belief that indicates the ultimate superiority of the modern post-
Enlightenment Western culture, values and people, and their theories. This 
worldview has long been orchestrated by Western thinkers and scholars, resulting in 
the colonial era, and is now becoming another magic mantra under the neo-colonial 
banner of the right for the Western world through their institutions to intervene in 
                                                 
4
 This will be elaborated further in the subsequent section on the issue of modernity. 
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politically weaker, poorer and darker countries. Hence, „development‟ becomes the 
legal and political means, as well as the moral justification for interventions. In the 
same spirit, the development paradigm also originated within the context of 
collapsing colonial empires and a global economy dominated by the United States. 
As a result, the US had a profound influence on the formation and operation as well 
as in the construction of the objectives and approaches of the Breton Woods 
international financial institutions post-World War II. These institutions – mainly the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund – are at the centre of development 
theory and policy (Escobar, 1995: 12-14).  
It is through these institutions that the economic experiments and development 
theories, amongst them the „good governance‟ model, have been applied to the 
recipient countries. Development theories have run the gamut as sustainable 
development, micro-development, women-centred development, endogenous 
development, appropriate development, „basic needs‟, and both state and market-led 
development, which are summarised in the term „good governance‟. What began as 
economic growth to eradicate poverty evolved to include “enhancing participatory 
democratic processes”, “enlarging choices”, “affording the opportunity to develop to 
one‟s fullest potential”, “participation in decisions affecting one‟s life”, and affording 
the “means to carry out national development goals and promote economic growth, 
equity and national self-reliance” (Rahnema, 1997: 388-89). 
Unfortunately, the sidelining of local cultural elements in the „Good Governance‟ 
programmes imposed on Third World countries to achieve what is defined as 
„development‟ has resulted in a decline in social welfare and an increase in other 
problems.  Much empirical evidence suggests that the Washington Consensus reform 
through the Bretton Woods institution‟s „good governance‟ programmes has not been 
a total success. Despite the focus on the eradication of poverty and development, the 
social and welfare implications of reform have been disappointing. Theory and 
evidence show that when these policies are implemented as prescribed by the 
institutions mentioned in Latin America and the Middle East and North African 
(MENA) region, the outcome is often a drastic increase in poverty, unemployment 
and inequalities (George and Sabelli, 1994: 142-61; CAFOD, 1998; Goldstein, 2000; 
Stewart, 2000; El-Said, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002).  
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As for the post-developmentalist scholars, poverty and want are not entirely socially 
constructed, but there are concrete aspects leading to them (Kothari, 1997).  They 
suggest that people existed and lived before the West came to their rescue, and they 
dealt with such issues through a variety of internal and locally-constructed 
mechanisms, even if those mechanisms were imperfect (Alatas, 1972). 
Unfortunately, the possible value and viability of such indigenous knowledge was not 
even considered as the Western concept of development was deployed. Likewise, 
many of the currently „underdeveloped‟ regions of the world were, according to 
history, developing quite well before their cultures were crushed or shifted in entirely 
new directions by Western expansion since the 16th Century (Alatas, 1977).   
To discover the root of this paradigm, an exploration into the genuine and substantive 
meaning of modernity is essential; therefore the following sections explain a holistic 
understanding of modernity and its impact on the discourse of governance, and how 
it should be addressed and treated as a prerequisite to the core discussion in this 
research. 
3.6. GOOD GOVERNANCE AS PART OF THE MODERNITY PROJECT  
The critiques discussed in the previous sections generally point to a similar root-
cause that makes the Bretton Woods concept of „good governance‟ a debatable issue. 
Most of the critics imply that the root of the problem is derived from the Eurocentric 
nature of the concept. The neo-liberal agenda, neo-colonialism, Western values and 
developmentalist domination all refer to one main source: the Western influence and 
dominance of the ideological, political and economic construction of the field in the 
discourse of development. Eurocentrism, according to many, is rooted strongly in the 
very realm of modernity. Liberal values, as the core foundation of the „good 
governance‟ reform agenda, is but another product of modernity, which was the 
greatest achievement of post-Enlightenment Europe. To understand the phenomenon 
of modernity, and its comprehensive disposition in relation to good governance, it is 
essential that modernity as a linear development project should be examined by 
making reference to its historical roots as well. Following on from the debate, 
responses to modernity as the foundation of good governance is also discussed. It is 
from this premise that this research is directed to promulgate an alternative means to 
conventional (modernity rooted) good governance. 
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The Medieval Dark Ages nightmare left scars in the minds of Europeans and the 
West in general. The deprivation of humanity under the banner of religion and 
monarchy was the major theme of the period of darkness. It was in such an 
atmosphere that the Church and the clerics as the religious authority determined the 
form of knowledge which kept people ignorant and superstitious. The situation 
legitimized absolutist forms of power as exemplified by the European kingdoms and 
kings prior to the Enlightenment. Until the eruption of the French and American 
revolutions, the status quo remained. These revolutions, which spelled the end of 
absolutist rule, sought to construct a system of power, which was scientific and based 
on rational contract between the individual (who was then male and white), and his 
elected government. Subtle analysis, critical thinking, and diversity of ideas were the 
major theme of thinkers from the period, which had a great impact on both political 
power and thinking and the lifestyle of the people. 
The (nation) state in its modern form was revealed as the individuals‟ representative 
to secure their interests, hopes and ambitions for a better future. However, the most 
pivotal idea of Enlightenment, in which modernization emerged as the focal point, is 
that reason and science have the ability to change and improve the nature and social 
condition of human being. This awakened the Western people from their dependency 
on metaphysics in the search for the well-being of life (Hamilton, 1992; Porter, 
1990). This idea has become so powerful in the modern period and has been accepted 
by many as common sense. In tandem, science allowed humans to determine their 
life, control Nature instead of being controlled by it and to make it more productive 
to serve the purpose of their lives through the invention of machinery, which would 
abolish drudgery, and free humans from illness and famine (Shanin, 1997) and thus 
declare the victory of utilitarianism. In this process, religion and superstition that 
were once heavily depended upon to face those calamities, were now being denied 
and cursed for their failure and irrationality. 
Since then the post-Enlightenment occidental world has revealed itself to be the 
centricity of the future life of the human species. The Enlightenment as a landmark of 
„modern‟ civilization cannot only be defined as a period of time, but must also be 
understood as “a set of interconnected ideas, values, principles and facts which 
provide both an image of the natural and social world, and a way of thinking about 
it” (Hamilton, 1992:21). In supporting this, post-Enlightenment transformation must 
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not be read as a monolithic process, but should be viewed as a gradual process of 
change in the tradition of knowledge and thinking. The pre-18th-century Western 
intellectuals, as an example, labelled the post-Enlightenment period the „Age of 
Reason‟, before „reason‟ was challenged and later intellects shifted to experience and 
sensitivity (empirical) then towards utilitarianism. Despite the diversity, the whole 
process of transformation as a ramification of the Enlightenment on Western soil 
leads towards the generic term of „modernity‟ (Porter, 2001; Wegner, 1994). This 
modernity, which represents “Western civilization and culture”, was glorified as the 
model of absolute truth and value, hence the “universal model of progress and 
development” (Bennett, 2005: 25).  
Marshall (1994: 7) explains the discourse of modernity as follows:  
Modernity is associated with the release of the individual from the bonds of 
tradition, with the progressive differentiation of society, with the emergence 
of civil society, with social equality, with innovation and change. All of 
these accomplishments are associated with capitalism, industrialism, 
secularisation, urbanisation and rationalisation. 
Equally, the idea of modernity can be summarized in a few specific central ideas as, 
„reason or rationality‟ as a way of organizing knowledge (hence a modern man is a 
rational man); however, reason alone is not sufficient in defining truth and 
knowledge, hence „empiricism‟ is the only way to determine the validity of any idea 
through empirical facts as a result of experiments and scientific explorations; thus 
„scientific‟ knowledge is the only key to expanding all human knowledge which 
allows „universalism‟ reason and science to produce general principles and laws to be 
applied to all situations; this will lead to „progress‟ by improving the nature and 
social conditions of human beings through the application of science and reason 
towards their well-being and happiness and must preserve the principle of 
„individualism‟ through the eradication of any domination of the authority upon 
individuals. In fact, it is the individuals who produce society through their thoughts 
and actions and individuals are the starting points for all knowledge and action. 
In order to safeguard those principles, the „Secularist‟ worldview must dominate the 
realm of knowledge and structures to replace traditional religious authority, which 
manipulated and abused society during the pre-Enlightenment years; this entails 
„toleration‟ as the major theme of humanity and modern life enshrining the concept 
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of „uniformity of human nature‟, which teaches the concept of equality amongst the 
human race according to their rights. However, all these concepts can only be 
implemented with the existence of a viable „freedom‟ in individuals‟ lives with the 
absence of any barriers to belief, trade, communication, social interaction, sexuality, 
ownership of property and voicing opinions and thoughts. (Hamilton, 1992:21-2; 
Porter, 2001). 
Apart from the aforementioned elements, the extreme aspects of modernity imply 
that God has been declared dead (Gott ist tot) by the final blow of Enlightenment 
sciences. According to such views, the post-Enlightenment scientific method and the 
spread of the secularization of European society has killed the Christian God that was 
the centre of value and meaning in life for nearly two thousand years (Von Der Luft, 
1984: 263-76). Not only has the Church been prevented from interfering in the public 
sphere, but the metaphysical discourses such as revelation, the sacred and scriptures 
have been confined to private matters and often rejected in the name of modernity. 
While Marx ([1843] 1970), who described religion as the opium of the people (Die 
Religion ... ist das Opium des Volkes) insisted “the abolition of religion as the 
illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness”. While in the 
post-Enlightenment-oriented knowledge, Augusta Comte (Giddens, 1974: 1) 
illustrates the negation of religion in his conclusion of the development of human 
thought. He explains that human thought passed through three stages: theological, 
metaphysical and then scientific (positive) which supposedly parallel the individual‟s 
intellectual development from childhood through adolescence and then adulthood. 
This worldview can best be reflected by the Western epistemology of knowledge, 
which heavily emphasizes the rejection of Church, metaphysics and other „irrational‟ 
hegemony with its strong foundation of secular objectivism, which was later declared 
as „the‟ scientific method in the quest for knowledge (Hall, 1992: 312-13). Such 
development constitutes the liberal tradition in the conceptualization of anything 
related to worldly affairs by negating the presence of religion in the public sphere. 
However the institutionalization of liberalism did not take place until the beginning 
of the 20th century.  
Such a paradigm promotes the meta-narratives or meta-theories that this Western 
worldview can explain the world. Modernization is presented as „the rational‟ and 
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„the universal‟ social project to be achieved by the irrational, passive and „non-
modern‟ others. This meta-narrative or grand narrative (grand récit) was uttered 
loudly by the Enlightenment thinkers such as Diderot, Baron de Montesquieu, Baron 
d‟Holbach, Voltaire, Burke, Adam Smith, Henry Kames, John Millar, Adam 
Ferguson and others (Hall, 1992: 312-13; Porter, 2001), and also by Hegel, Marx and 
Weber. Most of their writings depicted the others, mainly the „Oriental‟, with bad 
images hence requiring the Western modernization project to „civilize‟ them (Said, 
1978; Roberts, 1985: 194-202; Mann, 1988: 10-15; Habti, 2006: 57).  
The term modernity has been synonymously associated with the West. To be modern 
is to be Western as perceived and propagated by many. The West is not constituted as 
a single solid entity; rather it operates at a number of levels, in a number of 
discourses, performing slightly different functions (Sayyid, 1997: 100). The term 
„West‟, apart from being a definition for certain forms of socioeconomic 
organizations such as developed, industrialized, urbanized capitalist, secular and 
modern, is also a discursive horizon centralized in European cultural practices and 
intrinsically involved with the identity of Europe. European cultures, lifestyles, 
systems and knowledge as the main image of the „West‟ and „modernity‟ has been 
put at the centre of human life in modern times (Roberts, 1985; Mann, 1988; Hall, 
1992). This Eurocentrism, which represents Western civilization, reflects „modernity‟ 
and „emancipation‟ and in this manner, is the „end‟ of world history. 
Eurocentric modernism from the day of Spinoza to Descartes, Mill, Hegel, Marx, and 
Darwin until Dewey also implies that science and technology with their positivism 
approach guarantee progress (Sayyid, 1997: 102-6; Bennet, 2005: 25). However, it 
was Hegel who hailed „European experience‟ as the centricity of world civilization 
by declaring its „universality‟ and „ultimate reality‟ upon others. He stated, “As 
Europe presents on the whole, the centre and end of the old world, and is absolutely 
the West so Asia is absolutely the East” (Solomon, 1983: 99). Hegel, according to 
Habermas was the “first philosopher to develop a clear concept of modernity”. As for 
such a „world view‟, Peter Singer states that Hegel was the main contributor for the 
universal intellectual and the political developments of the last 150 years (Singer, 
1983: vii). 
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At the same time, Weber succeeded Hegel in glorifying Eurocentrism and associated 
it with modernity in continuity. Perhaps the most often-quoted remark from Weber‟s 
preface to „The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism‟ (Weber, 2003 [1930]: 
25) provides a clear paradigmatic picture of this blended Eurocentric with 
modernism: 
A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of 
universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of 
circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization only, 
cultural phenomena have appeared which... lie in a line of development 
having a universal significance and value. 
It should also be stated that Weber in his effort to glorify Western values as „the‟ 
universal norm reiterates in many of his works that Western culture has been 
historically described as rationalistic.  He affirms that Western scientific and 
technical adequacy and expediency leads to rational conduct and capitalist activities, 
in contrast with Oriental culture, which is „despotic‟ and deficient in rational 
calculability and hence incompatible with modernity and modernization (Bendix, 
1977).  Habermas (1983: 157) describes it as follows:   
Weber identifies in retrospect the "universal-historical problem" on which 
he endeavored throughout his life to shed light; the question of why, outside 
of Europe, "Neither scientific nor artistic, nor political, nor economic 
development entered upon that path of rationalization peculiar to the 
Occident”. 
Here, Eurocentrism as articulated by Weber presupposes a priori that „only‟ the 
West, since the Enlightenment, has been able to produce the universal normative 
cultural phenomena from its own evolutionary direction (Dussel, 1996: 133). This 
worldview insists that the post-Enlightenment European experience through its 
history and civilization (the Enlightenment philosophy, Protestantism, French 
Revolution and Industrial Revolution) became the heart of Western constructs 
especially in the production of knowledge and social theories (Larbi, 2004: 176; 
Habti, 2006: 54). Modern European culture, civilization, philosophy, and subjectivity 
hence became glorified as the abstractly human universal. Weber (2003 [1930]: 16-8) 
maintains that the cause of European modernity's superiority was possible with 
certain determinations such as capitalist enterprise, capitalist calculus, organization 
of labour power, technico-scientific knowledge, systems of bureaucratized control, 
permanent military power, rationalization of existence at all levels.  
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The „Eurocentric‟ in this manner shaped the humanist modernist discourse in creating 
the superiority of the „Self‟ upon the „others‟, thus determining the normative view of 
the „good‟ of the „Self‟ upon the „bad‟ of the „others‟ resulting in the paradigm of 
„centre-peripheral‟ between the European nation and the others. This „Eurocentric‟ 
paradigm as coined by the post-colonialist thinkers appeared to be „the‟ 
determination of the world populations‟ lifestyle for the modern period (Fanon, 2001 
[1961]; Said, 1978; Einstadte, 2000).  
Equally, modernity as a political and intellectual project, has a long tradition of 
dominating, excluding and misunderstanding the non-West.  One comes to realize 
that the theorization of colonialism which has failed to see the universal and the 
modern in the non-West gives importance to the theory of Eurocentrism incurring the 
mainstream theories of modernity and modernization
5
. This stance seems to imply 
that modernization is not merely a structural transformation but also a practice based 
on discursive formations, e.g. the cultural, scientific, economic and political 
superiority of the West. Western values and beliefs were imposed and forced onto the 
others, specifically the Third World as a means of saving them from 
underdevelopment and backwardness (Schech and Haggis, 2000: xii)
6
. 
Consequently, for the issue of governance, the Western model, which was the most 
appealing and the most successful model hitherto is strongly derived from and rooted 
in this „paradigm‟. Fukuyama‟s ending of the history for humankind supported such 
claims with the assertion that Western liberal values have declared victory over the 
                                                 
5
 It is worth noting that there is a discrepancy between the modernity approach in dealing with physical 
sciences and the discourse of political economic and development. While in the domain of physical and 
natural science, the theory of relativism manifests itself in scientific concepts, hypotheses, theories, and 
even scientific laws. This method implies the abandonment of hard causality, adopting instead concepts 
of correlation and procedural definition and aspiring to a partial rather than a complete explanation of 
phenomena in avoiding the fallacy of simple causality. However, when it comes to the discourse of 
development, politics, economy and governance, the modern (materialist rationalist monist) scholars 
and thinkers remain the mainstream operative paradigm that underlies the outlook adopted by Bretton 
Woods and other neo-liberal institutions (el-Messiri, 2006: 59). 
6
 Alatas (1972, 11-12) claims that any blind imitation of this Eurocentrism imposed by others on their 
own soil and degrading their own culture and civilization is but another glimpse of a „captive 
mentality‟ by the colonized-minded „others‟. The state of „captive mentality‟ merely emulates 
everything from the West based on the Western paradigm in their life without taking into consideration 
its suitability to the different context and culture, without any attempt to criticize and challenge them. 
By doing so, the captive mind will continue the intellectual domination by the colonialist which 
pervades all levels of scientific enterprise including problem solving, analysis, abstraction, 
generalization, conceptualization, description, explanation and interpretation. In this situation, the 
captive mind lacks creativity and the ability to raise original thoughts, continuously directing the 
„others‟‟ minds which are regarded as less superior compared to the Western mind, alas imposing 
„Academic Imperialism‟ by the West on the Western knowledge (Alatas, 2000).  
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others (Fukuyama, 1992), hence neglecting some values and norms, which are 
considered as inadequate with the „universal‟ barometer of modernity and 
development. Market economy along with its components of individualism, property 
rights, liberty, pluralism and small state were part of fundamental factors in the 
liberal framework to ensure the workability of the market system. As part of 
Eurocentric modernity, the concepts mentioned in the previous chapter were believed 
to be the „end‟ version of human economic development. This can clearly be seen 
through the reform agenda imposed and proposed to the underdeveloped and 
developing countries under the banner of the Washington Consensus-oriented good 
governance concept (Mehmet, 1997)
7
. The situation is described by the critics of the 
concept as the „new-colonialism‟ agenda imposed by the liberal Western-dominated 
international institutions dealing with the issue of development and governance. In a 
more detailed prescription, Mazrui (2001) describes the situation as the „hegemony of 
Eurocentric culture‟, characterized by the larger picture of economic stratification, 
military inequality, a disproportionate emphasis on European ideologies, the 
proliferation of Western-derived systems of education, consumerism and lifestyle. 
Moreover, such hegemony was not new. Since the early developmentalist idea 
imposed by the West on the „others‟, the global capitalist realm has brought a 
hierarchical dimension that separated the developed, who benefit from the others 
from the underdeveloped who serve them (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 13-15). This 
hierarchical relationship is the essential political and social vision of modernity in its 
conceptualization of the periphery. According to this the „others‟ were expected to 
accept the values, not only by becoming modern, but also by embracing modernity as 
a project (Huntington, 1971: 285). This hierarchical nature of the relation creates a 
permanent demarcation between the developed Western countries as the centre and 
the „others‟ as the peripheries. The implementation of Western developmentalist 
agenda (as well as the centrally-planned socialist economy as its rival) with its 
various forms (modernization, linear development theory, structural change theory 
                                                 
7
 As an example, Landell-Mills (1991) implies that the World Bank, as one of the promoters of the 
„good governance‟ agenda only assists countries that succumb to the modernization agenda of the 
World Bank. Similarly, Williams and Youngs (1994: 94-96) point out that the World Bank also 
formulates the transformation levels for the developing and underdeveloped countries based on Mill‟s 
liberal idea of liberty. The transformation levels consist of neutral state at the state level to ensure 
market economy through the liberal public sphere at social level, and liberal self and modern patterns 
of behaviour at the personal level. It was only through these transformations that the level of 
governance in any countries would be regarded as „good‟. 
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and international dependency theory) in the non-modernity developing world failed 
to help these countries converge with the aspiration of Euro-centric modernity; 
instead they brought further dependency of the latter on the former (Schech and 
Haggis, 2000: 13-15) or in certain parts of the world alternative development agendas 
resulted in „other modern‟. It should be noted that the global debt crisis during the 
1970s, which was the failure of previous attempts at development requires a new 
approach to bring the lower in the periphery to the centre through convergence.  
However, a new trend emerged after the collapse of Communism - neo-liberalism, as 
described in the previous chapter. Accordingly, neo-liberalism emerged as the final 
version of the modernity project in the economic field culminating with the 
Washington Consensus, hence the „good governance‟ agenda. Akin to the previous 
developmentalist projects, the good governance agenda continues rigorously to 
propagate neo-liberal structural adjustment reform to global societies, thus imposing 
Western-formulated reform agenda onto the „others‟ through the empowerment of the 
market and shrinking the state (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 49-53). However, the 
emergence of Eastern Asian countries to converge with the centre as mentioned 
earlier (Hofstede and Bond, 1998; Pierre and Peters, 2000: 181) opened many eyes to 
how the non-liberal approach would work well in replacing the failure of 
Developmentalism. In responding to such situations, a fresh look into the other 
narratives is needed to formulate new methods of development beyond the 
framework of modernity and Eurocentricity. Consequently, the post-modernist 
approach appears as an antithesis to the whole modernity project. This approach 
became a trend among some critics of modernity as a useful tool by which to 
understand the nature of the aforesaid failure thus formulating a new alternative 
paradigm. 
The Post-Modernists’ Criticisms 
The developments in economies and policies of the developing countries in the 20th 
century indicated that modernity‟s projection of convergence did not take place and 
the „others‟ remained very much within their peripheral existence despite consuming 
modernity.  The failure of the developmentalist agenda in the 1970s is a clear 
testimony to the failure of modernity as a project.  This does not only imply a failure 
in the mechanistic nature of development, but also a clear failure in the aspirations 
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and projections of modernity.  Consequently, the trust in social sciences, which has 
been a product of modernity, has been eroded by claims that modernity, as a project 
cannot be universal, and this eventually paved the way for the emergence of post-
modernity as a reaction. 
In exposing the dark side of modernity, post-modernist thinkers often resort to the 
deconstructive approach. Lyotard (1992: p. xiii) as an example, through his 
deconstruction of modernity as a concept, maintains that the meta-narratives or the 
modernity grand narratives failed to provide general agreement on the rules for 
settling disputes amongst multiple narratives. The modernity being „grand narrative‟ 
promised reason and enlightenment, but its adverse historical records spoiled it, 
namely the Holocaust, the corruptions of empires, mutually assured destruction, 
ecocide etc. He ended his report on knowledge by waging war on modernism totality 
through the exploration and acknowledgement of the „others‟, thus recognizing the 
differences (Lyotard, 1992: 82).  Criticism of the modernism approach to knowledge 
also came from Vattimo who viewed human history as an ongoing process which 
moves towards the perfection of the human ideal. Vattimo claims that history, which 
can be divided into phases and periods, has presented different modes of culture, 
civilization and development. History as a conception in this manner (which views 
itself as a progressive realization of humankind perfection) is required to be unilinear 
(Sayyid, 1997: 107-9).  
While considering modernity as an „incomplete‟ project, in the same manner, 
Habermas insists that the plural contemporary experience of modernity as the sole 
example of universal rationality should be its completion (Habermas, 1984). Giddens 
echoes Habermas by contending that capitalism and the nation-state, the two 
landmarks of modernity, originate from the West hence are part of the larger 
„Western project‟. Ironically, he believes that the ramifications of the contemporary 
worldwide globalization of modernity will contribute towards the new interdependent 
communities in the future history of the world (Giddens, 1990: 174-5).  
Amongst the heavy criticism of the Western domination over the „others‟ through the 
modernity agenda is the viewpoint that can obviously be seen through the work of 
Robert Young. Modernity, as pointed out by Young (1990: 19-20) is „European 
culture‟s awareness that it is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre of the 
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world‟ hence, the West is no longer the axiomatic centre of modernity‟s meta-
narratives. Both agree to acknowledge the role of the non-West or the rest in shaping 
the new reality of post-modernism. Sayyid (1997: 110) describes this kind of post-
modernity as an effort in de-centring the West hence „weakening of the narratives 
that constructed Western identity‟. Subsequently, de-centring the West is also 
equilibrium to the deperipheralization of the rest and bringing it to the centre.  
On the other hand, Foucault (Rabinow, 1984) in his critical analysis of social 
phenomena explains the relation between power and knowledge, and how the former 
is constructing the latter. Equally, although Said (1978) does not specifically 
categorize development as part of Orientalism, his reminder on the imperial nature of 
the Western worlds as part of „systemic discourse by which Europe was able to 
manage the Orient‟ provides a useful point to deconstruct the nature of the modernity 
project represented by the developmentalist and the recent neo-liberal good 
governance agenda as another facet of domination by the former over the latter. 
According to these premises, development as part of the modernity project is thus 
interpreted as a particular vision and intervention, and as a regime of knowledge, 
truth and power to serve the benefit of those who determine the discourse. In the 
same breath, development as an agenda is also viewed as an ensemble of knowledge, 
interventions and narratives, which at the same time represents the power of the 
centre to sustain its hegemony over the peripheries (Curry, 2003; Crush 1995; 
Mitchell 2002; Power 1998; Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997; Schech and Haggis, 2002).  
Despite its severe challenge and destructive discourses on Eurocentric modernity, the 
post-modernity Achilles heel has been obviously noticed. While acknowledging the 
„others‟‟ different epistemological references, the counter-discourse of post-
modernity deconstructs the failure of the modern to acknowledge the worldviews and 
ontological elements in beliefs and values. Post-modernism attacks the meta-
narrative resulting in the denial of truth and reality. What is left after the 
deconstruction of ideas is nothingness (Giddens, 1990: 46). This kind of 
epistemological relativity might serve the purpose of the positivist, in particular the 
Nihilists or the non-Absolutists. In such a situation, the denial and negation of 
revelation and faiths in which adherents hold on to their own truth and reality will 
never find justification, since the deconstructive method of post-modernism will 
leave them with nothingness and the neglect of their ontological ground. Moreover, 
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the post modernity approach could still not bring about convergence in economic 
development, so as a result a linear development could not take place. Similarly, this 
approach is also insufficient to bring about the justification of this thesis in 
discovering the concepts of governance for development from Islamic ontological-
based epistemology. 
Despite its inability to contribute directly to the development discourse, nevertheless, 
post-modernists‟ analytical approach, such as Foucauldian critical assessment of the 
relation between knowledge and power, Derida‟s deconstructivism and Said‟s critical 
analysis of Orientalism, serve as useful social science approaches to explaining the 
social phenomena for the exploration of „others‟‟ narratives and rationality beyond 
the Eurocentric world. Furthermore, beyond post-modernism is a world of multi-
civilization, which offers a pluralistic sphere in which people will rediscover their 
traditions by shaping their own modes of knowing, being and doing due to the 
cognitive rationality. This will bring further recognition of the existence of „other‟ 
social reality beyond the realm of Eurocentric modernity, such as Islamic civilization, 
India, China and other numerous cultures, which are part of this plural world 
(Inayatullah and Boxwell, 2003: 14). Such recognition requires a fresh look into the 
studies of culture to understand the different rationalities due to their narratives. 
Thus, the cultural relativity approach will be further explored to prepare a 
methodological ground for that purpose. 
The Cultural Relativists’ Response 
In the task of establishing the „endogeneity‟, cultural relativism as another response 
to Western ethnocentrism created a different approach by giving a meaning and 
foundation to the other‟s values. The „Cultural Relativists‟ believe that ethnocentrism 
may take obvious forms, in which one consciously believes that one's arts are the 
most beautiful, values the most virtuous, and beliefs the most truthful. It can best be 
understood from the Benedictine-Herskovitz formulation that „what is right or good 
for one individual or society is not right or good for another, even if the situations are 
similar, meaning not merely that what is thought right or good by one is not thought 
right or good by another ... but that what is really right or good in one case is not so 
in another‟ (Frankena, 1973). 
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Boas (1974 [1887]: 66) explains furthermore that: “the main object of ethnological 
collections should be the dissemination of the fact that civilization is not something 
absolute, but that it is relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are true only so far 
as our civilization goes”. Boas and his students understood anthropology to be an 
historical, or human science, in that it involves subjects (anthropologists) studying 
other subjects (humans and their activities), rather than subjects studying objects 
(such as rocks or stars). Under such conditions, it is fairly obvious that scientific 
research may have political consequences, and the Boasians saw no conflict between 
their scientific attempts to understand other cultures, and the political implications of 
critiquing their own culture. 
In the same vein, Gadamer generally stresses the dialogical exchange between reader 
and text, between the present and the past. Pantham cites Gadamer to have stated 
that:  
The human solidarity that envisage is not a global uniformity but unity in 
diversity. We must learn to appreciate and tolerate pluralities, multiplicities, 
and cultural differences. The hegemony or unchallengeable power of any 
one single nation - as we now have with just one superpower - is dangerous 
for humanity. It would go against human freedom… Unity in diversity, and 
not uniformity or hegemony - that is the heritage of Europe. Such unity-in-
diversity has to be extended to the whole world - to include Japan, China, 
India, and also Muslim cultures. Every culture, every people have something 
distinctive to offer for the solidarity and welfare of humanity (Pantham, 
1992: 132). 
Dallmayr (1996: xiii) states that Gadamer has repeatedly envisioned a cultural 
diversity in the globalized cosmopolis of today and an encounter between the cultures 
of the West and the East and henceforth a dialogue. Globalization has greatly 
affected world cultures, and this was one of the concerns Heidegger was engrossed in 
for a long time. With the growing Westernization and acculturation, Gadamer set out 
on cross-cultural engagements and „fusion of horizons‟ and engagement in discussing 
of the Self and Other (Dallmayr, 1996: xiv). Moral relativism as clarified by 
Kluckhohn (1944) did not mean the denial of absolute or universal moral standards 
hence justifying some savage tribe to behave in a certain way for the intellectual 
warrant given. On the contrary, Cultural Relativity according to Kluckhohn means 
that „the appropriateness of any positive or negative custom must be evaluated with 
regard to how this habit fits with other group habits‟.  
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In replying to the cultural relativistic approach, Lawson (1997) solicits the needs for 
others to understand the universal value of Western ideology. While deconstructing 
the rejections and criticism of the cultural relativist of the Western style of 
governance, Lawson (1997) concludes that opponents subscribe to the idea of 
traditionalism.  Traditionalism as an attitude emerges at the point where the 
preservation of a particular social or political practice becomes a matter of political 
concern, often for an instrumental reason. Culture then becomes an excuse and 
scapegoat to maintain the status quo of the elite on the political stage with its strong 
attachment to the people‟s hearts. The autocratic nature of most Eastern cultures thus 
seems incompatible with the democratic nature of the proposed „good governance‟ 
by the West (Lawson, 1997: 6). 
Lawson (1997) warns that the cultural relativism approach that emphasizes the 
suitability of certain ideas with certain territory and boundaries will only create more 
diversion among the world‟s population. The feeling of otherness between nations 
will breed racism as everybody will perceive whatever belongs to the other as a threat 
and will always be looked at suspiciously. Rejection by the cultural relativist is 
perceived by Lawson as a post-Cold-War reaction, and but a phenomena of 
Occidentalism which in a way indirectly supports the conservative radical ideas of 
the clash of civilizations. While defending the liberal thoughts (of the West) as being 
a consistent advocator of appreciation and toleration, Lawson (1997: 10) implies 
indirectly that Western liberalism is still the ideal solution for the world. 
However, such blank prejudice towards the relativist is rather baseless. Eck (1993: 
194) explains that the assumption put on relativism as a total denial of fixed right or 
wrong was against the true ideal of relativism itself; she maintains that: “a thoughtful 
relativist is able to point out the many ways in which our cognitive and moral 
understandings are relative to our historical, cultural and ideological contexts”. It is 
from such an understanding that a thoughtful relativist is a „close cousin‟ of the 
pluralist and someone who is able to „relate‟ to and engage with people of other 
communities and show how absolutism can give rise to bigotry and oppressive 
dogma (Henzell-Thomas, 2002: 15). 
While on the other hand, looking into the role of cultures and other non-Western 
values, it appears that the acknowledgement does not necessarily imply the 
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relativistic nature of them, but rather the recognition of the relativity of their 
epistemology. Kantian cognitive rationality best describes the acceptance of 
epistemologies. The diversity of cultures however, must not be accepted if any 
culture goes beyond the universal values or natural laws that can be agreed upon and 
which abide by common sense. In accordance with this view, the German 
ethnographer Gastav E. Kleman‟s definition of culture as „civilization‟ best describes 
its true meaning. However, it was Taylor who enshrined this type of culture in the 
opening line of his Primitive Culture: “Culture is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morality, law, customs, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society” (Taylor, 1999). In this definition, cultural 
relativism helps in understanding non-Western civilization, by constructing the 
alternative paradigms in the field of development under its new form of „good 
governance‟. 
Additionally, the incorporation or activation of cultural elements represented by 
endogenous values and norms would reflect the hegemony of Western developmental 
discourse, which is described by Escobar (1995) as a “top-down, ethnocentric and 
technocratic approach, which treated people and cultures as abstract concepts, 
statistical figures to be moved up and down in the charts of „progress‟”. With culture 
being considered and involved in bringing up the well-being instead of merely capital 
accumulation for materialistic wealth, the discourse of development will find its new 
appearance as a cultural process and not as a „system‟ or universal applicable 
technical interventions intended to deliver some „badly needed‟ goods to a „target‟ 
population. Governance, which aims for the „development‟ or (in a more culturally 
friendly jargon) the people‟s well-being, becomes a more individual-driven change 
derived from certain significant patterns of behavioural norms accumulated by the 
cognitive rationality of the people, instead of an imposed or enforced agenda from 
outside.   
This new alternative discourse of (cultural-inspired) development will emerge as a 
non-destructive force to culture under the name of people‟s interest unlike the current 
prevailing „Eurocentric good governance‟ (as coined by Escobar (1995: 44)). The 
recognition of such a paradigm will also eradicate the endless separation between the 
„developed‟ West and the less-developed and inferior „Third World‟, hence ending 
the inherent discrimination within the international system as described by Bhaba 
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(1990). In fact, the perceived „less-developed‟ is to be converged with the more 
„materially developed‟ not with the domination of the latter over the former by any 
governance reform agenda or through certain financial institutional aid, but through 
the mutual strategic economic alliance and exchanging technologies based on mutual 
recognition and acknowledgement
8
. In an effort to position culture within the 
discourse of development as a new reconstruction concept of governance, the 
colonial discourse of current governance must first be identified and replaced. The 
post-colonial approach of criticizing the colonial hegemony in discourses exemplifies 
another useful method. Accordingly, reconstruction of a new cultural-inspired 
discourse of governance from the „other‟ perspective would surface through the post-
colonialist argument.      
Post-Colonialists’ Response  
Post-colonial theorists are those diverse groups of thinkers or scholars who aim to 
deconstruct the legacy of colonial rule through critical engagement. Their efforts at 
destabilizing colonial rule, deal not with the political gamut aftermath per se, but 
with the economic, cultural, intellectual and the most intensive one, literacy 
(Ashcroft et al., 1995: 2-3). The post-colonialists start by deconstructing the colonial 
idea and theories to reveal the meaning behind colonial discourses; then they 
emphasize the restructuring of theories and knowledge based on the discourse of 
endogeneity, which detaches its paradigm from the colonial meta-narrative (Williams 
and Chrisman, 1994: 7-8).  
Amongst other criticisms by the post-colonialists of modernity were the uneven 
forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political and social 
authority within the modern world order. They directed their challenge at 
normalizing the Western hegemony on the ideological discourses of modernity. This 
situation led many post-colonial writers to stress the importance of retrieving and/or 
constructing a culture, which offers a positive identity. Hence, formulating their 
critical revisions around issues of cultural difference, social authority, and political 
discrimination is another means of revealing the antagonistic and ambivalent 
                                                 
8
 But of course, as mentioned in prior paragraphs, the acknowledgement of cultural relativism is not a 
justification of any systematic and legalized human rights abuse and any undemocratic rule in the name 
of culture. The notion of justice, which is widely accepted by the international community and 
recognized by religions and cultures as Sen (1998) presented in his assertion of the central principle of 
freedom) must remain unabridged. 
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moments within the „rationalizations‟ of modernity (Bhabha, [1994] 2008: 265-6). In 
explaining such a stance, During (1987: 33) highlights “the need, in nations or groups 
which have been victims of imperialism, to achieve an identity uncontaminated by 
Universalist or Eurocentric concepts and images.” 
In sum, the key concept in approaching the alternative discourse to Eurocentric 
knowledge within the method of post-colonialism is the acknowledgement of all 
civilizations as potential sources of social science theorizing (Alatas, 2001:58). As 
such the rational post-colonialist approach paves the way for the establishment of the 
lost identity as the result of colonialism. It emerged to challenge the „modernist 
colonial ideology‟ being imposed on them and presented an alternative solution from 
the „other‟ point of view. This post-colonial discourse then will promulgate 
endogenous intellectual creativity and an autonomous tradition of social science for 
decolonization and the indigenization of the social sciences. In this way alternative 
discourses constitute a revolt against „intellectual imperialism‟ by purging 
Eurocentrism and thus “register a crucial break from the hegemony of a colonial 
past…” (Alatas, 2001: 58).  
Due to the nature of this approach, which emphasizes the issue of representation by 
revealing the colonized people‟s experiences, large chunks of the studies were aimed 
at destabilizing a number of the binaries underlying the discourse of the West and the 
rest. Accordingly, this deconstruction method leads to the reconstruction of the 
colonized‟s own development discourse in the ways canvassed by their own 
worldview and cognitive rationality, hence an alternative paradigm that will put the 
Enlightenment ideals of modernity into question (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 70). 
Similarly, in the field of political economy and the discourse of development, such an 
approach provides „alternative‟ discourse on governance that will be directed as a 
counter or opposition to the current Eurocentric discourse on „good governance‟. 
Thus, the exploration of „alternatives‟ for the Western production of a universal code 
of „good governance‟, which emphasized the „one cloth suits all‟ approach, would be 
another critical assessment of the project of modernity.   
Following the line of argument presented by the post-colonial theorists, it was the 
cultural sphere factor that shaped the relationship between the West (as the 
hegemony) and the others (as the colonialized) (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 70). Thus, 
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the element of culture must be taken into account in any study of governance 
(UNDP, 1994; Blunt, 1995; Dwivedi, 2001 and 2002). Blunt (1995:4) maintains that 
any definition of governance must be able to accommodate local variations. In the 
same way, the World Bank (1992) in its discussion on „Governance and 
Development‟ illustrates the mutual needs of both the relative ideological and 
cultural neutrality of the general account and the ethnocentrism of certain features of 
the more detailed analysis of good governance.  
However, any alternative cultural-based model of governance should not appear in a 
vacuum and reject the universal „good‟ presented by the current discourse. Instead, a 
new relationship between the reality represented by the Western agenda and the 
alternative cultural paradigms should be constructed as a new hybrid model of 
governance. In developing such a new paradigm, a new approach of multiple 
modernities could be a suitable framework for the hybridity.  
Since governance is also perceived and constructed socially, as opposed to the 
Universalist claim of modernity, different culturally expressed norms with their own 
ontologies and epistemologies are expected to lead their own construct of governance 
as a process regardless of the nature of the outcome.  As Schumpeterian world-view 
considers that each vision should lead its own paradigm, it is natural that each culture 
should create its own governance construct with its own value system.  This can be 
located within post-modernity, which accepts the logical expression of the „other‟ 
forms as long as they have their own internal consistency.  While the post-modern 
condition helps to acknowledge the existence of other constructs, the „other‟ 
constructs‟ failure to develop their own paradigm results in not reaching the post-
modern condition, but rather mimicking modernity in various modern forms leading 
to the emergence of multiple modernities. 
Multiple Modernities 
In modern times, philosophies, faiths and ideologies compete with each other to 
impose their definition of the perennial truth. Even if we look into the broader 
dimension, different societies with their own civilizational history and background, 
are living with their sui generis culture and values, which they perceive as the 
definite „way of life‟ according to their own ontology and epistemology. The past 
civilizations, which mostly emerged not on Western soil, (i.e. Indian, Chinese, 
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Babylonian, Egyptian and Islamic civilization) contributed towards determining and 
shaping the culture of the Western predecessors. Transitions to what we know as 
modernity, took place in those civilizations long before the Europeans and the 
Americans, alas producing different results that reflect the current predecessors‟ 
divergent starting points. Furthermore, those cultures, ideologies, faiths and 
philosophies are also imposing their own „meta-narratives‟ on those who adhere to 
their values. This is what is best described as „multiple modernities‟ rather than the 
„vernacular‟ modernity (Taylor, 1999; Eisenstadt, 2000; Wittrock, 1998).  
Taylor (1999: 162) maintains that different cultures‟ understandings of the person, 
social relations, states of mind, good and bad, virtues and vices, and the sacred and 
the profane are likely to be distinctly rooted in their previous experience of 
civilization. He asserts that: “The future of our world will be one in which all 
societies will undergo change, in institutions and outlook, and some of these changes 
may be parallel, but they will not converge, because new differences will emerge 
from the old. Thus, instead of speaking of modernity in the singular, we should speak 
of „alternative modernities‟.”  
Within this idea, Westernization is no longer synonymous with modernity, and the 
Western version of modernity is not the only authentic face of modernity despite its 
historical precedence and the fact that it continues to be the basic reference point for 
the „others‟ (Eisenstadt, 2000: 3). The multiple-modernities approach could be an 
effective approach to bring the „other‟ civilizations or cultures into the centre. Hence 
the centre will not be dominated by a single hegemony associated only with an 
ethnocentric interpretation of the term „modernity‟. This reassessment of modernity 
and detaching the sole monopoly of a certain version of what is modern will 
acknowledge the role of „others‟ in determining the trend of the world‟s population. 
The most prevailing idea of this new approach is the presumption that the 
contemporary world could best be understood as a story of continual constitution and 
reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programmes. This ongoing reconstitution 
involves all actors contributing towards the emergence of all-encompassing new 
„meta-narratives‟ instead of different competing narratives. Multiple institutions and 
ideological patterns are to be reconstructed by specific social actors in close 
connection with social, political and intellectual activists, and social movements in 
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pursuing different programmes of modernity, holding every different view in what 
makes societies „modern‟. Through the engagement of these actors with broader 
sectors of their respective societies, unique expressions of modernity are realized. 
In conclusion, the multiple modernities project shifts the previous Eurocentric 
domination paradigm of modernity by emphasizing the inclusionary dynamic of 
„modernity‟ and allowing the peripherals or „others‟ to be borrowed and cross-
fertilized into the existing „meta-narratives‟. This paradigm challenges and 
diminishes the logic of exclusionary divergence, binary opposition or the clash of 
civilizations, which were the central discourse of Eurocentrism. Accordingly, 
Westernization is being detached from its synonym, the „modernity‟ project. 
According to this, the Western patterns of modernity are not the only „authentic 
modernity‟, despite their status quo as the historical precedence and the basic 
reference points for others (Asutay, 2009b)
9
. 
In the field of governance, multiple modernities can be best viewed from the way 
development (which is the main goal of governance) is perceived. The failure of 
convergence to the modernity project through the developmentalist agenda brought 
the modernist critics to re-evaluate the way people perceive the notion of 
„development‟. As a result, each vernacular modern appearing in the world emerged 
from different foundations and paradigms, hence leading to multiple modernities. 
Post-developmentalist criticisms as discussed earlier were amongst the prevailing 
discourse of the anti-thesis. Similarly, the growth of references to sustainable 
development in the 1970s and 1980s, were also part of an increasingly reflexive 
                                                 
9
 However, to bring the paradigm of multiple or multi-modernities is to challenge the domination of the 
existing Eurocentrism, which enjoys its supremacy in imposing its meta-narrative to the „other‟. The 
pre-„end of history‟ period, where the „other‟ version of modernity, namely Soviet Communism 
(Eisenstadt, 2000: 11), despite its Western and post-Enlightenment origin, failed to cohere with the 
status quo. However, the collapse of Soviet Russia as the final frontier of Communist ideology left 
Western liberal democracy as the sole champion of modernity for the civilized world (Fukuyama, 
1992). Accordingly, Huntington (1992) asserts that the emergence of another version of civilization 
which creates multiple centres would invite a clash of civilizations after the collapse of Communism. 
Fukuyama (1992) in contrast, declares the final triumph of Western liberal values upon the other 
civilizations or modernity, hence echoing the Hegelian thesis of the end of history. Perhaps, despite the 
contrast between Huntington and Fukuyama, both of them with animus and disdain agreed on the 
superiority and the centricity of Western liberal civilization. Akin to other contemporary proponents of 
the predominant West, the other version of modernities, civilizations and cultures are seen as the 
enemy of the kernel truth of development and human civilization.  
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criticism of mainstream development assumptions and practices (Redclift, 1987). 
Additionally, as modernity has been reconceptualized as multiple (Sivramkrishnan 
and Agrawal, 2003) or, according to Eisenstadt et al. (2002: 22), as „diverse yet 
related‟ modernities, the mainstream thinking about development and its geographies 
becomes more challenging and contested. The modern way to look into development 
is not solely considered as the product of the West alone. 
It is according to this reasoning that a fresh look at alternative means to the existing 
„good governance‟ agenda is but another attempt to raise the other version of 
modernity.  In searching the rationale for different narratives for governance, the 
values and the sources of others provides the rationale.  It is a fact that no human 
endeavour is value-free, which implies that reality is socially constructed (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966).  Despite the Eurocentric modernist projection of universal values, 
to dictate the everyday lives of individuals, reality proves that individual actions are 
produced and carried out in a socially constructed manner due to the particular 
worldview to which they subscribe, which explains the differences in each area of 
life (Asutay, 2007).  In a similar manner, “economic systems … do not function 
within a vacuum, but significantly affected and shaped by a set of „influential 
factors‟, mainly the worldview subscribed by the society” (Bornstein 1979: 7).  
Within the framework of multiple-modernities, the alternative narratives for 
development are to be explored with a more useful conceptualization and to fit in 
with the new inclusive framework of modernity beyond the post-development 
critique (Pieterse 2000) and post-modernist deconstructivism. This is similar to 
Curry‟s suggestion that post-development should go beyond critique to explore and 
emphasize alternatives. In his words: “…one way forward for post-development is to 
begin to focus on the non-market economic relations associated with gift exchange 
and social embededness of economies. By emphasizing the social dimensions of 
economy, post-development strategies for alternative development would seek to 
identify and enhance opportunities for the inflection of market economic 
relationships and practices to align development efforts more closely with indigenous 
socio-cultural meanings of development” (Curry, 2003: 420). 
It is within this inclusive framework of multiple modernity that the exploration of 
„Islamic‟ governance as another narrative to fit into the existing „good governance‟ 
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agenda will find its justification. However, to bring religion into the public sphere in 
the post-modern period requires a different approach due to the pre-modern 
experience with the Church. In this way, religious values and ethos from their 
specific ontology and epistemology as part of the wider definition of culture will be 
the main discourse to be analyzed. With culture becoming the major theme for the 
exploration, a rigorous exploration of the relation between culture and religion, and 
the role of both in the process of development should be carried out.  
3.7. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A CULTURAL APPROACH TO 
GOVERNANCE  
The appreciation of other civilizations and values would lead to a more mutual 
understanding within the world community. Furthermore, mutual acknowledgement 
and mutual respect alone would not be sufficient without the symbiosis process of 
these modernities. Epistemological humility is a vital prerequisite to enable people of 
different cultures to learn and mutually exchange values that share common interests, 
hence developing new universal values, which is no longer vernacular and 
ethnocentric. The discursive formation of respect, recognition and pluralism should 
be the theme of such a realm (Eisenstadt, 2000: 20-21).  
According to this rationale, further discussion on the topic will explore the realm of 
religion and faith as different versions of culture in defining the notion of „good 
governance‟ from „others‟‟ worldview. In the current trend of cultural studies, 
religion and faith from a phenomenological perspective gives the human race a 
„sacred canopy‟ against the threat of the meaninglessness (anomie) of the world and 
accordingly will lead society to appreciate the innate precariousness of the nomos 
(meaningful order) (Berger, 1967: 28).  In the same vein, Armstrong (2002) asserts 
that neglecting the influence of faith (which she calls „mitos‟) in the contemporary 
life is indeed a great loss. She adds that the failure of incorporating the „mitos‟ in real 
life will lead the logos community astray and to calamity. On the other hand, a great 
deal of empirical evidence indicates that religion and faith also play a pro-active role 
in the field of civil society, which is amongst the major actors in the political 
economic life of a country, as well its governance (Gaush-Pasha, 2005).  
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In responding to such needs, perhaps a new method of studying the role of culture 
and faiths in governance is necessary. A great deal could possibly be learned from 
Islamic values relating to the issue of governance that was the product of the 
worldview presented by its epistemological sources. The same scale should be 
applied similarly to the rich Confucianism-oriented Chinese culture and philosophy 
from the advice of Confucius and Mencius. In the same way, the Dharma-based 
Indian values articulated from the wisdom of Kautilya and Asoka regarding political 
and administrational affairs is another invaluable topic to enhance the ideal. The 
same rationale should be applied to other cultures and faiths that have views 
concerning the matter of governance. In spite of this, the exploration and the 
articulation of those values must be conducted with cautiousness and according to 
universal values without neglecting any element of justice, fairness, freedom, liberty 
and human rights. The existing abuse of culture to justify the misconduct and 
undemocratic proceedings committed by certain regimes should not be taken as a 
good example of the ideal of incorporating culture and faiths in the field of 
governance. 
On the other hand, regarding the empirical field, current reality proves that many 
indicators point towards the workability of the multiple modernities approach within 
the current modern framework of governance. Amongst others, the emergence of 
cultural and faith-oriented organizations and movements in the political, social and 
economical fields has created a substantial impact on the discourse of development in 
many developing and developed countries. Islamic relief and social organizations, as 
well as the emergence of Islamic political parties as part of the „Islamism‟ 
phenomenon in Muslim countries globally, is an example of the enormous extent to 
which faiths can explicitly contribute towards the betterment of people‟s social-
political condition as well as their economy.  
The sporadic activities of the Evangelists in tackling the issues of hunger, famine and 
poverty in many underdeveloped countries and similarly the Church‟s mobilization in 
support of the anti-apartheid campaign and the Jubilee campaign for debt forgiveness 
were arguably other central themes to the visibility of faith-based organized 
contributions towards the process of governance. Similarly the active mobilization of 
Latin American Catholic churches in support of literacy is another example. While in 
another part of the globe, Ghandism, Buddhist Savordhaya, Buddhist Tzu Chi and 
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other faith-inspired and faith-based organizations‟ involvements prove that religion is 
another facet of culture that could play a positive role in the governance process 
(Casanova 1994: 3-10; Nasr, 1995; Piscatori and Eickelman, 1996; Bayat, 2007; 
Mandeville 2001).  
The following chapter will look into the deeper definition of culture, which 
encompasses faiths and other issues with a view to providing a philosophical 
examination of how these elements can contribute to the field of governance. The 
theoretical foundation of the topic will be articulated by some empirical factors 
supporting the argument based on the achievements of the harmonization between 
culture (and faiths) and modern governance. Due to the concise nature of the chapter, 
the empirical evidence taken from secondary sources will only work as a 
prolegomena to the main discussion of this thesis, which is to develop an Islamic 
theory of an ideal model of governance rooted in its ontological foundation and its 
epistemological sources. 
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Chapter 4 
ENDOGENIZING CULTURE AND RELIGION IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
“I ascribe a basic importance to the phenomenon of 
language. To speak means to be in a position to use 
certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that 
language, but it means above all to assume a culture, 
to support the weight of a civilization.”  
        Franz Fanon 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter argued in a critical manner that „governance‟ is „good‟ if it suits 
the framework designed mainly by Bretton Woods institutions according to values 
they believe in. As per the aforementioned critical arguments, those values might not 
suit the nature of some underdeveloped societies or states to improve their 
performance in social, political and economical fields. In support of this, a number of 
reports suggest that certain programmes imposed on those countries not only 
worsened the situation but also brought other new problems (George and Sabelli, 
1994: 142-61). Lack of „endogeneity and cultural characteristic in tackling 
underdevelopment issues has been identified amongst the lacunae within the 
International Financial Institutions‟ (IFI) good governance projection by other 
outstanding researchers and international reports (Hofstede, 1993; UNDP, 1994; 
Blunt, 1995; Dwivedi, 2001 and 2002; Schech and Haggis, 2002). Hence, an 
exploration for the panacea based on the values of society is justified for its possible 
potential to cure the aforesaid situation. Since all these conceptions are socially and 
culturally constructed, East Asian countries‟ experiences as mentioned in the 
previous chapter could be an example of how values and culture could play their role 
in development. 
Accordingly, culture in its wider definition has its unique dynamism to play a 
significant role in resolving problems of underdevelopment (Bhabha, 2008 [1994]). 
Unfortunately, the predominantly post-Enlightenment modernity-oriented values 
subscribed by most of the IFIs have failed to acknowledge this reality. Culture has 
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become the last unexplored frontier of international efforts to promote economic 
growth and development (Arizpe, 1998), while economic growth and policy models 
are mainly based on Eurocentric experiences. In regard to this, Enrique V. Iglesias 
(1997) remarks, “there are diverse aspects in the culture of each people that can 
promote economic and social development. These must be found, reinforced and 
used as building blocks”. Due to such positions, many relentless but non-dominant 
voices since the 1990s have called for the acknowledgement of culture in the 
development discourse. 
Primarily, it has been the conventional Western Eurocentric paradigm of 
development and governance discourses that has constituted major obstacles for the 
appreciation of culture in both fields. The belief in Western modern values as the 
centre of world development must first be challenged before further investigation. 
Such a task is not new, even in the Western academic milieu since the post-
Structuralists position, which is part of the wider concept of post-modernism, 
challenged this status quo with its discourse of compartmentalization of (modernity‟s 
assumption of) meta-narrative into small narratives. This acknowledgement of other 
narratives, which was part of the post-modernity‟s discourse during the 1970s, has 
led to a discussion on culture in economics, finance and management.  The failure of 
the developmentalist project in the periphery or the „countries of the others‟ as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, was amongst other factors that contributed 
towards such interest. The exploration of other narratives has led some academics to 
explore culture as another means of development (Schech and Haggis, 2000: 33-38). 
In conjunction with those efforts, this chapter endeavours to deconstruct the 
modernity discourse as a dominating paradigm in development and governance by 
elaborating the critics‟ arguments to pave the way for culture to be another 
alternative style of „governance‟. As a result, an Islamic model of governance is 
proposed to fit into this new alternative framework. To begin with, a comprehensive 
but brief definition of culture and its nature should advance further arguments. 
4.2. REDEFINING CULTURE 
Etymologically, the term culture is derived from the Latin word which means: „The 
cultivation of soil‟. In English, it bears numerous meanings as a result of the long 
historical usage of the word. The term „culture‟ has been defined and used across 
Chapter Four: Endogenizing Culture and Religion in the Construction of Good 
Governance 
 100 
various academic disciplines with different meanings and connotations. Bocock 
(1992: 234) identifies five different usages of the term culture in standard English: 
“Culture as cultivating land, crops and animals; culture as cultivation of mind, arts, 
civilization; culture as a process of social development; culture as meanings, values 
and ways of life; and finally culture as practices which produce meaning. However, 
this enumeration does not imply the limitation of the term itself”. The current usage 
of the word culture brings a wider and rather dynamic utilization of the term. Such 
complication in defining the vagueness and wideness of the term culture leads 
Raymond Williams, a leading cultural theorist, to point out that, “Culture is one of 
the two or three most complicated words in the English language” (Williams, 1983: 
87). 
Just like its literal meaning, the technical meaning of culture also varies. Guilford 
(1959: 5) for example, defined culture as: “The interactive aggregate of personal 
characteristics that influence the individual‟s response to the environment”. This 
definition implies the psychological-behaviour meaning of culture. For him, culture 
determines the identity of a human group‟s response to its environment. Kluckhohn 
(1951: 86) gives a more critical explanation of culture, which transcends the meaning 
of „response‟ as mentioned by Guilford. For him, culture “consists in patterned ways 
of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols. 
Constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their 
embodiments in artefacts, the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. 
historically-derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values”. 
Kroeber and Parsons (1958: 583) in the same vein expand the territory of culture to 
the system of behaviour in their explanation of culture as “transmitted and created 
content and patterns of values, ideas and other symbolic meaningful systems as 
factors in the shaping of human behaviour and the artefacts produced through 
behaviour”. In generalizing these two definitions, Hofstede (1984: 20) concludes that 
culture is “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of 
one group or category of people from another”. However, a wider definition of 
culture can be seen in Encyclopaedia Britannica (2005), where culture is identified 
as: “Behaviour peculiar to Homo sapiens, together with material objects used as an 
integral part of this behaviour. Thus, culture includes language, ideas, beliefs, 
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customs, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, and works of art, rituals, and 
ceremonies, among other elements” (Bocock, 1992; William, 1961). According to 
such definitions, values, faiths and religion as belief systems are considered as other 
elements of culture. 
In their explanation of ideas, Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 17) sum up that values, 
ideas and matters of belief, which are part and parcel of cultural elements, determine 
moral guidelines. Moreover, they also often act as road maps, usually in the absence 
of a unique equilibrium of the institutionalized decision-making determinant or in the 
absence of „objective‟ criteria as a determining factor. This role of culture resembles 
Johann Gottfried Herder‟s argument that human creativity, evidenced by the great 
variety in national cultures, shows that human experience was mediated not only by 
universal structures, but also by particular cultural structures (Adams and Dyson, 
2007: 91-2). To summarize, culture as a substantive concept, exemplifies a complex 
whole that includes knowledge, belief, art, morality, law, customs, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.  Thus, a better 
understanding of cultural differences amongst the human race is one of the main 
contributions the social sciences can make to practical policy making in 
governments, organizations, and institutions and as well to ordinary citizens 
(Hofstede, 1984: 8). 
In defining the substance of the term culture, Shariati
1
 concludes it as the holistic 
accumulation of the spiritual, mental, moral, and historical nature of a nation, which 
is metaphorically similar to natural resources. The accumulative interdependent 
elements of culture due to the appearance and demise of successive generations 
merging into certain forms of spiritual assets of a nation is akin to the formation of 
natural resources from animals and plants pressurized within layers in the depth of 
the earth over the centuries, which due to the interplay of myriads of variables have 
been transformed into vital economic substances. Culture belongs to history since 
man‟s character is not suddenly formed from nothing in a single period. 
However, the Asians whose soils have witnessed the emergence of various ancient 
civilizations (Babylonian, Chinese, Indian and Islamic civilization) have different 
                                                 
1
 http://www.shariati.com/culture.html. 
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views in defining the nature of culture. Culture according to these civilizations is not 
only about what people do, but it is rather an attitude of mind, a mental outlook and, 
most crucially, their worldview or Weltanschauung. The rich cultural heritage 
inherited from those past civilizations within the life of the people is alive to history 
and to their unique and sentient traditions. Due to such notions, culture according to 
Asians encompasses the modes of knowing, being and doing which determine the 
society‟s view of knowledge and its epistemology. Furthermore, such views also 
shape the way society perceives its meaning of existence, hence impels the norms of 
individual behaviour (Sardar, 2003). Based on such arguments, a comprehensive 
overview of these different approaches will bring a new dimension to the study of the 
role of culture and development, which is the core subject of this chapter. 
4.3. CULTURE AND GOVERNANCE: ESTABLISHING A NEW PARADIGM 
In searching rationale for an alternative paradigm of governance based on culture, the 
values and the sources of cultures from its wider inclusive definition provide the 
rationale.  It is widely acknowledged that no human endeavour is value-free, which 
implies that reality, including the issue of development as part of economic reality, is 
socially constructed (Asutay, 2007). Each action of individuals, including their 
economic and financial behaviour and views towards development is significantly 
affected and shaped by a set of „influential factors‟, such as social, cultural and 
environmental values and factors (Bornstein, 1979: 7). This was noticed and 
acknowledged by Mill (1836 [1995]: 55), when he argued as far back as 1836: “… in 
whatever science there are systematic differences of opinion … the cause will be 
found to be, a difference in their conceptions of the philosophic method of the 
science, the parties who differ are guided, knowingly or unconsciously, by different 
views concerning the nature of the evidence appropriate to the subject.  They differ 
not solely in what they believe themselves to see, but in the quarter whence they 
obtained the light by which they think they see it” [Mill 1836 (1995): 55]. 
Accordingly, “religion, ideology or any strongly-held set of values, ideals and mores 
have an impact and influence which have to be taken into serious consideration” 
(Nomani and Rahnema 1994: 43), as in the words of Mill, their „light‟ comes from 
different sources. 
Furthermore, incorporating culture into the discourse of development (as the major 
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aim of good governance) in international debate has been a mounting concern since 
the 1990s. The former president of the World Bank, Stiglitz (1998) for instance, 
insists that the Washington Consensus paradigm, which perceives development as a 
„mere technical problem that requires technical solution‟, should not be the final 
parameter for the development discourse. Accordingly, he also proposes that a 
greater degree of humility and the relinquishment of epistemological arrogance are 
required in developing alternative solutions by learning from other types of variables 
(Stiglitz, 1998).  
In addition, the formulation of a new approach to conventional economic thought 
must acknowledge some humanistic elements involving culture and value issues 
articulated in „human capital‟ and „social capital‟ as a major theme along with other 
types of material capital. Economic and material growth per se, as perceived by 
many is insufficient in bringing a comprehensive solution to poverty and 
underdevelopment if it does not take into account the cultural constructed norms of 
the society in relations to these concepts and issues (Kliksberg, 2004: 5). The 
previous chapters have proven how culture has its own dynamic and potential to 
promote social and economic development. Arizpe (2004) suggests that development 
theory and politics should incorporate the concepts of values and culture due to its 
role in developing the social fibre on which politics and economy are based. The 
failure to include these elements in many places leads to cultural tensions and 
feelings of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, cultural values should be preserved due to their essential function as 
cohesive forces for development in the face of time where many other values are 
weakening (Stiglitz, 1998). Rationally, culture and values that enhance both human 
and social capital will generate public order through the production of good citizens 
who live in mutual cooperation, mutual assistance transcending conflicts, that mount 
up to establish the social stability (Coleman, 1990; Newton, 1997). Similarly, 
Wickrama and Mulford (1996) present their argument that social development is 
crucial in order to enhance democratic participation, and prove their thesis on the 
correlations between the two with statistical examinations.   
Similarly, culture will help to create a community of believers based on moral norms 
and values that will enhance social cohesion, social behaviour and cultural 
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expressions that assist by providing ground for good government and social equality. 
They also play an important role in stimulating solidarity through the social capital 
and overcoming market flaws by means of collective actions and the use of 
community resources (Baas, 1997). This rationale is similar to what has been asserted 
by Chang (1997) who stressed that: “Values lay the foundation for a concern between 
one individual and another that goes beyond just personal well-being. They play a 
critical role in determining whether networks, regulations and trust will evolve.” 
However, values counted by the development researchers are those that are rooted in 
culture and strengthened or weakened by that culture, such as the degree of 
solidarity, altruism, respect, or tolerance, are essential for sustained development” 
(Kliksberg, 2000: 19). 
Equally, in the wider scope of macroeconomics, some researchers suggest that 
culture is important for developing local economies in peripheral areas by facilitating 
socio-cultural and economic networks, which stimulate local and regional 
development (Ray, 1998; Jenkins, 2000).  In the same way, Cochrane (2006: 324) 
maintains that culture plays a significant role as an underlying cause in determining 
the vibrancy of local economies. While in explaining the role of culture in developing 
new economic models, Casson (1993) points out that culture as „collective 
subjectivity‟ will enhance efficiency through good behaviour, integrity, honesty, trust 
and cooperation that is likely to reduce transactional costs. By the same token, he 
suggests an ideology of, „voluntary association‟, which implies natural association 
amongst individuals through cultural means and working mutually for the purpose of 
production and other activities. This has a great impact on economic performance. 
The argument of the behavioural role of culture in economic development is also 
proposed by Throsby (2001), who suggests that culture provides objectives for group 
development through certain worldviews, values and beliefs, and it will also affect 
economic efficiency by affecting behaviour, innovation, group dynamics and 
decision making processes. 
It is for this reason that UNESCO (1997) suggested in its 29
th
 General Conference 
Report that culture (if it is strengthened and supported) could be an enormous 
potential key element in the struggle against poverty. The same argument was voiced 
by the then President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn (Kliksberg, 2000: 12) 
who emphasized the essentiality of growth and social development interdependency 
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and further suggested that: “Without parallel social development there will be no 
satisfactory economic development”. While on another occasion, the President of the 
World Bank also emphasized the significance of social development through social 
justice and equality to complement institutional and structural reform for political 
economic growth and human prosperity. Thus, social capital and culture are key 
components of these interactions (Kliksberg, 2000: 12). 
In conformity with this ideal, long before the discussion on culture and development, 
Dwight Waldo (1971), a prominent name in Public Administration proposed that 
developing nations should explore their own version of development hence bypassing 
the ills of the industrial phase experienced by developed countries, mainly in the 
Western world, by rejecting the hegemony of the Eurocentric nature of economic 
development modelling. This proposal, however, was not alien, since the idea of 
„endogeneity‟, which emerged in the 1940‟s, had prepared the ground for the new 
idea of cultural emergence in the field of public administration, implying that the 
future of one country should be created and not copied (Cunnigham, 2005). The 
ideals also urge the need to acknowledge the cultural and heritage elements in 
shaping society‟s future by not blindly imitating the experience of others which 
might not suit its context and social topography. This might best interpret Kant‟s 
argument that human beings are not capable of direct, unmediated knowledge of the 
world (Guyer, 1987: 11-2). 
The „endogeneity‟ proposal was also seriously promoted at the 1977 UNESCO 
conference in Tangiers, Morocco, on the subject of „adaptation of administration to 
different socio-cultural contexts‟. The thesis was that administrative norms which are 
part of the wider definition of macro-governance must be developed according to the 
geographical cultural sphere of a particular society and must not be imposed through 
external elements (here, the Western models) that might have limited utility. This 
might have been in the mind of Michael Hudson (al-Buraey, 1985: 316) when he 
maintained that there is a need to recognize others‟ ideals in establishing their own 
narrative of political development (which includes the field of governance). He 
simply argues, “There are no grounds for predicting a unilinear trend toward a 
universal condition of political development on the normative level”. While in the 
same manner, religious themes (as another facet of culture) achieved prominence in 
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the 2004 Human Development Report on Cultural Liberty, and special issues in 
World Development (1980), Gender and Development (1999), and Development 
(2003). 
In sum, since the new paradigm of economic development is microeconomic-
oriented by focusing on individual and community development and capacity 
enhancement, culture emerges as an important determining factor in the development 
process for motivating people and shaping their related preferences in a micro field.  
Similarly, incorporating culture, faiths and tradition as part of the wider definition of 
„culture‟ into the field of development, economy, and politics is not a completely 
new emerging trend. In addition, religion and faiths as part of the ontological and 
epistemological sources of culture, which contribute towards shaping the 
development of a community‟s worldview, are also to be viewed as part of the wider 
definition of culture. Equally, in many situations, religions and faiths also evolve 
over time according to culture and in response to social and environmental needs. 
This mutual and intertwined relation of culture and faiths and their role in 
development allows more room for the exploration of how belief systems could 
contribute both directly and indirectly towards the discourse of governance. 
Much has been written, as can be seen in the following section, on the constructive 
relation between religion and faith as another facet of culture with the larger aspect of 
governance. Religious people and institutions may be agents of advocacy, funding, 
innovation, empowerment, social movements, and delivery of services; hence they 
may contribute towards the development of socio-economic, as well as the political 
life of a nation. Armstrong (2000) asserts that neglecting the influence of faith, which 
she terms „mitos‟ in the modern human galaxy is indeed a great loss for man‟s life. 
The failure to incorporate mitos in reality means life will lead the community to a 
state of anomie (internal instability). In this way, religion as part of culture is worth 
considering in studies of governance as a source of epistemology in formulating 
alternatives to the conventional Western-oriented mode. The following section 
discusses both theoretical study and empirical evidence in presenting the prospect 
and rationale of incorporating religion and faiths in the realm of governance. 
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4.4. RELIGION AND GOVERNANCE: NEW TYPOLOGY, A 
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY  
The question still remains as to how religion or faith as another facet of culture fits 
into the discourse of development within the post-Enlightenment world of modernity 
values. Under the modernity project, it is not only cultures which are against 
„rational‟ or „universal‟ (liberal) values that are not welcomed in the public sphere, or 
more precisely in the political-economical fields, but they have also been turned into 
no-go zones for faiths and religions. Such precepts are to be understood from the 
historical perspective as mentioned in the previous chapter of the failure of church-
state domination over the people. Initially, since the decline of religious domination 
on Western soil, the constant struggle to eliminate religion as a whole from the public 
sphere became a norm in the major discourse of philosophers, scholars and most 
Western thinkers. 
Despite the initial goal of those who waged this struggle to constrain and deprive the 
hegemony of religion in secular arts and sciences, and other „worldly‟ realms, Kant 
brought this struggle to a new dimension with a compromising formulation. Through 
his transcendental idealism, „religion‟ was acknowledged as the only means to 
engage lofty metaphysical issues, but inappropriate for all other matters. For 
everything save meta-physics, reason is both necessary and sufficient, and it is with 
this division of intellectual labour that Western modernity was founded. This position 
taken by Kant, restricting religion to an important set of metaphysical concerns, 
protects its privileges against state intrusion, but restricts its activity and influence to 
this specialized sphere (Lincoln, 2003).   
The Kantian approach nevertheless is far from useful in explaining the current global 
trend of the return of religion in many „secular‟ territories, and in setting up the 
foundation which needs to be applied in this research. In reality, the contemporary 
return of religion goes beyond the „transcendental‟ border and encroaches the area in 
which faiths were once totally banned. In conjunction with this phenomenon, the 
main thesis of this research is to be constructed. In determining a presupposition to 
present the focal point idea of this research, which is to introduce Islamic values as 
part of the contemporary governance discourse, the ground for such debate must 
initially be prepared. Through the employment of Taylor‟s multiple modernities 
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approach, the following argument deals with such concerns. However, a 
philosophical introduction to how religion constructs an alternative solution for 
governance is essential.  
Religion from the consequential and functional perspectives will lead society to 
appreciate the innate precariousness of the nomos (meaningful order) (Tipton, 1984: 
282-84). Equally, from a phenomenological perspective, religion gives the human 
race a „sacred canopy‟ against the threat of the meaninglessness (anomie) of the 
world (Berger, 1967: 28). However, the modern positivistic approach to the discourse 
of development and governance which devalues religion and other normative 
elements to stress the quantifiable aspects of human experience rather than the 
meaning will never be an efficient tool for the functionalist view of religion. The 
only choice is to shift towards more interpretative and consequentialistic approaches, 
which seek to interpret human action and focus on understanding the meanings 
people give to their own actions and the consequence of those actions to the topic of 
study, which in this research is development and good governance. The emphasis 
hence is moved from mere observation and description (what is) to understanding 
(why and how) hence challenging the conventional value-free proposition of 
positivism (Thompson and Woodward, 2000: 52-3). 
With regard to the „why‟ and „how‟ questions posed earlier, philosophy of ethics 
represents a useful tool to understand the significant nature of religion. For instance, 
the philosophy of ethics raises the question of goodness. This question results in 
many ethical theories each of which leads to different conclusions or answers to the 
question „What should one do?‟ or „How should one live?‟ (i.e. Kantian ethics, 
Aristotelian ethics, Mill‟s utilitarianism, etc.). In the same line it also examines moral 
claims, which underpin a society‟s core values and social norms. Akin to other 
ethical and moral theories, religion as another source of ethics and established 
doctrines provides substantial answers for those questions. By applying the typology 
of „tradition‟ (according to the definition by Alasdair MacIntyre, 2007 [1981])2), 
                                                 
2
 According to MacIntyre (2007 [1981]) in his „After Virtue‟, the Enlightenment Project that negates 
traditional morality has failed. We are now left with the remnants of the traditional system that can 
sustain us. In the book, he also argues for the continued validity of the Aristotelian attempt to ground 
moral thinking in the virtues, those qualities which develop in us as we seek a vision of the good, 
striving in collaboration with others towards ends which disclose themselves more fully as we pursue 
them. He declares liberal individualism to be at odds with this tradition. MacIntyre was accused of 
being a relativist due to his in profound rejection of absolutist morality. In the prologue of the 2007 
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religion is to be understood as a conception of „what good living is about‟, which is 
then expressed through social practices performed by believers. Within such 
concepts, we could conceptualise an early assumption of how religion (as a set of 
ethical propositions along with its theoretical structure) would fit into the discourse 
of development and governance. 
Similar to the „tradition‟ typology of religion, Lincoln‟s (2003: 5-7) deconstruction of 
religion, brings another holistic view in explaining the nature of religion. In defining 
his concept, Lincoln attributes four (what he calls polythetic and flexible) domains as 
the characteristics of religion: (i) It entails a transcendental discourse (from its claims 
to authority and truth); (ii) It imposes a set of practices with the goal of producing a 
proper world according to the religious discourses to which the practices are 
connected; (iii) It requires a community whose members construct their identity with 
reference to the religious discourse and its practices; (iv) It depends on institutions 
that regulate religious discourse, practices, and community, reproducing them over 
time and modifying them as necessary, while asserting their eternal validity and 
transcendental value. Lincoln also implicitly constructed religion with a beyond-
transcendental and more comprehensive framework. Such a definition also implies a 
maximalist type of religion unlike the Kantian (and other) minimalists. 
Furthermore, religion as a form of ethical doctrine could profoundly act as agent to 
attain the internal good in development through its doctrines on social cohesion, 
mutual co-operation and virtue-based community. Practically, the process of 
development is not an axiological neutral human activity, but like other activities it is 
impregnated with values and ethics (Cortina, 2007). Apart from mainstream liberal 
economic ethics (i.e. efficiency, competitiveness, economic growth, human rights, 
etc.) there are also other culturally traditional ethics and religious ethics that are 
worth incorporating into the discourse. It is from this premise that the Aristotelian 
concept of praxis is worth employing to explain how ethics and tradition could 
                                                                                                                                           
edition, MacIntyre suggests: “... the best type of human life, that in which the virtues is most 
adequately embodied, is lived by those engaged in constructing and sustaining forms of community 
directed toward the shared achievement of those common goods without which the ultimate human 
good cannot be achieved.”  
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enhance society to cooperate in attaining the telos (the internal good)
3
 and the same 
goes for religion.  
Following this line of argument, governance encompasses the discourse of politics, 
economics and public administration, thus is value-loaded at its most elementary 
level and shaped by individual values derived from individual worldviews, as part of 
individual social construct. Since factors affecting worldviews differ, different 
worldviews exist leading to different „systems‟ for different peoples (Asutay, 2007). 
Religion and faith are amongst the major determining factors that fundamentally 
construct worldviews. The meaning (nomos) that religion brings through its 
ontological dimension leads to the construction of distinguishing narratives to 
development through the governance process. Accordingly, this distinctive religion-
based framework represents the endogeneity of non-Western discourses on 
governance, hence creating narratives instead of the meta-narrative of the modernist 
projection of universal values. According to the previously-mentioned multiple 
modernities framework, the acknowledgement of other worldviews allows religion to 
have its role in the creation of alternative means in the realm of governance. The 
following section explains the more significant role of religion in development as the 
aim of governance through the explanation of how religion could be articulated in 
development, theoretically and empirically. 
4.5. ARTICULATION OF RELIGION IN DEVELOPMENT  
As previously mentioned in the discussion on modernity, the concept of 
secularization has been amongst the major prevailing elements of modernity. With 
the word secularization, it can be understood that religions and faiths are unwelcome 
in the public sphere, which amongst others, includes the realm of governance. 
Nevertheless, a closer scrutiny of the subject from the sociology of religion approach 
as well as anthropology and other current approaches, might show that a certain 
degree of religion is being accepted beyond its Kantian metaphysical border within 
the modernity project. Similar to the approaches mentioned in looking into the 
                                                 
3
 By applying MacIntyre‟s Aristotelian insight into the role of tradition in human life, Cortina (2007: 5-
6) concludes that traditional bonds can motivate the work of development in motivating society to 
attain the „internal good‟ within certain ethical and moral frameworks through the cultivation of virtues 
by different social agents according to certain model facilitated by political, economical, and citizens‟ 
institutions based on specific philosophical foundation. With such framework, she claims that people 
are not means for other ends, but are valuable in themselves.  
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response towards modernity, the subsequent arguments furthermore look into 
rationality and on how religion still has the dynamism to exist and function in 
„secular‟ territories including having an impact on development. 
In his effort to understand the way in which religion can find its place and function in 
the public sphere, Casanova (1994: 5-6) employs a sociological approach in 
proposing the concept of „deprivatization‟ of religion. He explains how 
secularization (as one of the landmarks of modernity) would allow religion and faith 
to enter its public sphere in a homeostatic way through the current global uprising of 
religions around the world.
4
 As there is no monolithic way of explaining the nature of 
the relation between secularization and religion, he insists that this new phenomenon 
is not a continuation of the decline of the established caesaro-papist church that has 
been rejected and which declined after the final blow it received from the modernity 
project.  
In the same way secularization, as a process of differentiation between various 
spheres (economic, social, political, religious, etc.) and the social and scientific 
sphere, progressively emancipated itself from the prism of religious institutions and 
norms. This differentiation process leads to the deprivatization of religion, where 
religion refuses to be relegated to the private sphere. At the same time its claim to 
enter the public sphere left to it by the process of differentiation that is civil society, 
redefines the very boundaries of the differentiated spheres. Thus, civil society has 
been a field where the deprivatization of religion has found a way to escape from 
mere private territories into the supposedly „secular‟ realm. Through this new space, 
religious institutions and organizations pose their repudiation to the status quo of 
positivism by bringing the interconnection of private and public morality, and by 
challenging the claims of moral spheres and renormativisation of the public 
economic and political spheres (Casanova, 1994: 5-6).  
From another sociological point of view, the social norms approach could also 
explain the consequence of religions as a set of values for social practices (Raz, 1999, 
2003).  This approach claims that values would be meaningless without shared social 
practices to sustain them (i.e. solidarity, freedom, taxation, mutual co-operation, 
caring, etc.). Values as „irreducibly social good‟ are inherent in numerous social 
                                                 
4
 Berger (1999) coins such situation as the „desecularisation‟ of the world. 
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relationships, such as family, trade unions, interest groups, religious communities, or 
those bound by a common history or language (Taylor, 1995). These social norms 
contribute a large degree of involvement towards development through civil society 
and social capital. This situation is supported by the way faith-based or faith-inspired 
organizations and movements vigorously utilize the environment to articulate their 
ideals, hence good governance and development. 
In the same way, the anthropologist Talal Asad (1993) rejects the traditional 
anthropological perception of religion as mere symbols that resemble a system of 
meanings.
5
 He maintains that religion needs coercion, through law and power, to 
make individuals act according to religious precepts; it also presents social 
embodiment and constitutive activities of the world which implies the need for a set 
of practices to express the beliefs, as well as discipline (by institutional structures) to 
enforce them and a community of believers in which this discipline is exercised and 
enjoys their allegiance and serves as for base of their identity. Due to the needs of 
social and public spaces to exercise religious beliefs, he concludes that the religious 
world and the social world are inseparable and interact in an interdependent and 
mutual manner. Akin to the previous argument, the recent global return of religion 
into the public sphere exemplifies this anthropological theory. 
It is rather interesting to discover that even the founder of the liberal market 
economy, Adam Smith (1976: 189-814) also acknowledged the contribution of 
religion in the realm of the laissez-faire economy. In his magnum opus „An Enquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’, Smith explains the role of 
established clergy towards the market-oriented economic development process 
through the „moral enforcement‟ mechanism. The values of honesty and integrity as a 
determination of the veracity of business ethics are essential for the enhancement of 
business activities. He further advocated an „open market‟ and „freedom of speech‟ 
for all religious groups so that rational discussion about different religious beliefs and 
practices can create an environment of “good temper and moderation”, which is 
essential for sustained growth and development (Smith, 1976: 793-94).  This indeed 
                                                 
5
 Here, Asad was replying to the traditional anthropological definition established by Clifford Geertz 
(1973) that views a religion as (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, 
and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely realistic.  
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indicates that even at the beginning of political economy, religion and values were 
perceived to be important factors shaping individual choices and behaviour, which 
indeed came to an end with Marshalian revolution. 
Similarly, Khan and Bashar (2008) deconstruct the functions of religion and present 
the way through which religion can contribute to development from several 
dimensions. For instance, Islamic ethics will affect productivity through certain 
personal traits of ethics, thrift, honesty, and openness to people. Furthermore the 
enhancement of economic growth and development by promoting a positive attitude 
toward honesty may increase levels of trust and reduce levels of corruption and 
criminal activity. Religious rituals on the other hand also play a significant role in 
economic activities by promoting in-group trust and cooperation that help overcome 
collective-action problems. In the meantime, religions also exert a positive impact on 
human capital by enhancing education levels through the encouragement of seeking 
knowledge to epitomize wisdom. All these motivations will accumulate the creation 
of „social capital‟ which is essential to growth and development, hence good 
governance and vice versa (Guiso et al., 2003; Ruffle and Sosis, 2003; Alkire, 2004; 
Marshall, 2005; Noland, 2005; Haynes, 2007). 
By following this line of argument, it seems that religion acts substantively as a 
catalyst for the accumulation of „social capital‟6 and thereby growth, which is a 
widely-accepted norm in development literature (with different kinds of 
interpretations and definitions). Following the successive emphasis on physical 
capital, human capital and knowledge capital, researchers find adding „social capital‟ 
to growth models as an explanatory variable enhances the explanatory powers of 
growth and development models in an indigenized manner  (Khan and Bashar, 2008).  
„Social capital‟ refers to social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
                                                 
6
 Social capital is a post-Washington Consensus trend to explain the role of social networks and society 
in cultivating the economic prosperity and sustainable development. Smith (2000-2009) argues that the 
notion of social capital first appeared in Hanifan‟s discussions of rural school community centres (see, 
Hanifan 1916, 1920). The term was used to describe “those tangible substances [that] count for most in 
the daily lives of people” (1916: 130), which is particularly concerned with the cultivation of good will, 
fellowship, sympathy and social intercourse among those that „make up a social unit‟. However, it took 
some time for the term to move into academic debates before Jacobs (1961) utilized the term to coin 
the “relation to urban life and neighbourliness”, and Bourdieu (1983) with regard to social theory, and 
then Coleman (1988) in his discussions of the social context of education. Finally, the term culminates 
as a popular term in defining the social relation as another tool for development through the works of 
Putnam (1993; 2000). It was Putnam who successfully introduced the social capital as a popular focus 
for research and policy discussion. 
Chapter Four: Endogenizing Culture and Religion in the Construction of Good 
Governance 
 114 
trustworthiness which arises from connections between individuals in the same way 
as physical capital (accumulated by physical objects and human capital) and refers to 
the properties of individuals. In this way, social capital can be depicted closely to 
what some have called “civic virtue” (Putnam, 2000: 19). Collier (1998) on the other 
hand, in explaining how social capital can contribute towards overcoming the issue 
of poverty, characterizes social capital as the internal social and cultural coherence of 
society, the norms and values that govern interactions between people, and the 
institutions in which they are embedded. Social capital, hence, has a significant 
impact on economic advancement through social networking, which acquires positive 
externalities and facilitates joint action for mutual benefit outside the market.  
Collier (1998: 16-17) further divides social capital into two categories: the „civil‟ 
social capital (non-official) and „government‟ social capital (official). The former 
refers to micro cooperation and coordination which govern interactions between 
individuals as economic agents through trust, solidarity, fraternity, reciprocity and 
interpersonal networks, while the latter incorporates the benefits of law, order, 
property rights, education, health and good government. Through social capital, 
transaction costs and information costs could be reduced, thus making physical 
capital and human capital more productive. In this spirit, religion as both the 
foundation (source) and framework for civil social capital contributes to the building 
of networks in society.  
Despite the externalities that it may produce (and has already produced in many 
cases), religion, as a motivation for social capital, works very well to enhance the 
role of civil society, participation, eradicating poverty and corruption, education and 
accountability. The effects of religion on social capital and development can be seen 
in the contemporary, empirical studies which show how the current global uprising of 
religion is contributing towards the fields of the political-economic and the social 
sphere. As discussed earlier, social capital is also able to generate public order 
through the production of good citizens who live in mutual cooperation, mutual 
assistance transcending conflicts, and striving to establish social stability, which are 
vital in good governance (Coleman, 1990; Newton, 1997), as these lead to capacity 
development for economic development in communities. 
Marshall (2005: 8-12), however, suggests that religion and faith can play a greater 
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role in development beyond civil society and social capital parameters. In the paper 
„Faith and Development: Rethinking Development Debates‟, she proposes that 
religion can give hope and meaning to the lives of millions of people through their 
teachings on core values which are essential to human relationships. This will 
balance the distribution of wealth through the philanthropic missions by faith 
organizations to help poor communities. The paper also maintains that faith is 
another motivational factor for engagement towards development. This has been 
proven through the global Millennium Development Goal agenda throughout the 
world in developing educational sectors, dialogue and health issues. In terms of 
conflicts, faith organizations have also played a tremendous role in providing 
solutions, preventions and humanitarian support. Faith communities have also 
contributed immensely towards the recovery of many post-conflict and post-calamity 
situations. The post-December 2004 tsunami is a prevailing example.  
4.6. RELIGION AND GOVERNANCE: EMPIRICAL CASES FROM THE 
PERIPHERY 
Much has been produced in exploring the empirical evidence to show that faith, 
ethical and moral-based approaches can fit into the discourse of development (Alkire, 
2004; Marshall, 2005; Noland, 2005; Haynes, 2007). Amongst them are the studies 
done on the co-relation between the efficiency of the bureaucratic system and 
development with Confucius ethics in some East Asian countries (Frederickson, 
2002; Harris, 1990). Despite its authoritarian approach, it was proven and 
acknowledged that the Confucian traditions managed to bring rapid growth to some 
of the countries (Frederickson, 2002; Harris, 1990; Dellios, 2005).  Some argue that, 
not only did the Western-rule-of-law based governance fail to manage complex 
social problems with laws and regulations but they also witnessed relentless calls for 
greater morality amongst their leaders.  
Likewise, Roman Catholic social teachings, and in particular those since Populorum 
Progressio, articulate a faith-based view of development in which the contributions 
of spiritual disciplines and of ethical action to a person‟s „vocation to human 
fulfilment‟ are addressed alongside contributions made by markets, public policy, 
and poverty reduction (Reed 2001: 21-30). Meanwhile in Central and Southern Latin 
America, further visions of development have arisen in the liberation theologies by 
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some radical Catholic priests,
7
 who criticize structural injustice and call for greater 
religious engagement in political and economic institutions to ensure equitable 
development processes. Their cause and struggle aim to awaken the people to rise up 
against the causes of their poverty and deprivation and recognize development as 
liberation through political education and conscientization. Many point out that these 
began with the publication of Gustavo Gutierrez‟s Theology of Liberation, and 
distinct liberation theologies have emerged on other major faiths accordingly 
(Gutiérrez, 1988; Rowland, 1999; Akhtar, 1991; Phongphit, 1988; Gillingham, 
2005).  
On the other hand, religions and faiths also play a pro-active role in the field of civil 
society, particularly in the field of social capital, which is amongst the major factors 
in the political economic life of a country, as well as its governance. The Global Civil 
Society Report 2004/5 (p. 5) argues that “There is no way we can understand the 
logic, strategies and dynamics of civil society anywhere in the Third World unless we 
bring the transcendental dimension back into our analysis. Religious devotion is a 
fundamental motive for many social movements in the South, from Latin America to 
Africa and South Asia” (See also Romero 2001: 475-90). Political and social 
movements and advocacy campaigns have often drawn upon religious motivations 
and the support of religious leaders. For instance, the churches‟ mobilization in 
support of the anti-apartheid campaign and the Jubilee campaign for debt forgiveness 
was central to their political visibility.
8
 In this vein, the Catholic Church was also 
among the parties mobilized in support of literacy in Latin America (Casanova, 1994: 
3-10; Mandeville, 2001). 
The emergence of what is known nowadays as global (non-violent) political Islamic 
movements all around the Muslim world has to some extent contributed towards the 
democracy and good governance process. Their contribution can be clearly seen in 
                                                 
7
 The Liberation theologies confirm that solidarity with the oppressed has become a religious practice. 
They believe that any discourse of good governance (such as democracy, human rights, the rule of law 
and the free market are baseless when social and political relationships derive their authority from a 
basically unjust and exploitative social order (Kumar, 2003: 19). 
8
 The Jubilee 2000 campaign for the cancellation of the unpayable debt of the most highly indebted 
countries demonstrates the efficiency and how the strong influence of religious organizations could be 
when they are mobilized as a collective lobby. It also proves that religious actors can play active roles 
beyond the monasteries and ritual-spiritual issues, and can also act as purveyors of moral values which 
is important for bringing a fairer deal for a global egalitarian and holistic development agenda 
(Tyndale, 2003: 26). 
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the constant struggle against corruption and administrative misconduct of the mainly 
undemocratic regimes of Muslim states.  It is becoming apparent in most Muslim 
countries that parties with Islamic aspirations emerge as the voice of the people for 
reform and criticize the massive extent of corruption committed by the regimes that 
in many cases leads to poverty and the underdevelopment of most Muslim countries. 
Through the democratic activities of these religious movements, we can see how 
religion plays a role in the political life of the people (Nasr, 1995; Eickelman and 
Piscatori, 1996; an-Naim, 1999; el-Affendi, 2003) through a constant struggle to 
produce a „better society‟. 
Consequently, the activities and orientations of those movements manage to 
influence development on the soil they on which they operate to some extent. By the 
same token, the Islamism phenomenon also has a significant impact on the social 
capital of the community in many Muslim nations. Their relentless struggle to 
provide welfare, charity and education to the people as part of their modus operandi 
benefits a large proportion of the community in which they live. The movements also 
rigorously manipulate the vacuum left by most of the Middle Eastern and North 
African states ruled by autocratic and corrupted regimes with their mechanisms and 
institutions. Despite their initial aim, which is to spread their ideologies as well as for 
recruitment purposes and using the activities as the pretext, the movements have 
contributed massively toward tackling many social problems that the regimes have 
regularly overlooked (Bayat, 2007; Harrigan and El-Said, 2009).  
In the field of socio-economic development, the active involvement of religion in 
governance can be seen through faith-based organizations‟ (FBO) activities. These 
organizations, whether they are local, national, or international, within the larger 
picture of civil society, are significant purveyors of education, service delivery and 
other non-market activities. Many of the efforts are driven out of their religious 
motivation and consciousness of their duty in spreading the values to which they 
adhere (Ferris, 2005). As an example, the most popular and greatest efforts to be 
studied belonged to the Christian evangelical development agency, World Vision 
(Myers, 1999). In 2003, they had a cash budget of US $819 million, and an effective 
budget of US $1.25 billion due to in-kind contributions, which were later utilized for 
their evangelical works all around the globe (World Vision, 2003).  
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Another famous example is the Buddhist self-governance „Savordhaya Shramadana‟ 
Movement in Sri Lanka, which managed to mobilize its members to develop the 
underdeveloped rural and suburban areas in the country with physical facilities. 
Inspired by Ghandi,
9
 the movement, established by Dr A.T. Arayatne, provided 
people with educational means, health, communications and job opportunities, which 
enhanced the economy of the people
10
 (Zadek, 1993; Kumar 2003). Akin to those 
FBOs, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Islamic Relief, Catholic Relief 
Services, the Aga Khan Development Network and others also deliver significant 
resources hence contributing to the development of many countries all over the 
globe. According to the holistic contemporary technical definition of governance, 
these organizations effectively mobilized the third sector to cultivate development 
and eradicate poverty, which is amongst their essential contribution (Fukuyama, 
2001; OECD, 1995; Fukuyama, 2001; OECD, 1995; Eigen, 2005; Ghaus-Pasha, 
2005: 2; Ikekeonwu et al., 2007).  
This is what inspired the establishment of the World Faiths Development Dialogue in 
1998 to become a dialogue platform between different religions and faiths and the 
multilateral development agencies by James Wolfensohn and Lord Carey, then 
Archbishop of Canterbury (Tyndale, 2003: 26). The World Bank‟s „World 
Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor‟, also maintains that 
religious schools, institutions and organizations in many countries were referred to 
frequently as effective delivery mechanisms for the people. The report also highlights 
the importance of faith groups in providing services, emphasizing the importance of 
people‟s participation in planning and running them, as well to make the services 
accessible to all levels of the community voluntarily (WFDD, 2003)
11
. It should also 
be mentioned that the World Bank‟s „Faiths and Environment: World Bank Support 
2000-5‟ Report stresses that many positive engagements and the efficient role of faith 
                                                 
9
 Ghandian „gram-seva’ (village service) ideal has been the basic philosophy for his notion of 
development. The idea reflects that service was fundamental to community upliftment. According to 
Ghandi, development as part of the nature akin to life and time is cyclical. Development according to 
him is not a process of human endeavour but rather as a process of life. „Service‟ is thus to find a sense 
of satisfaction in service and not in its outcomes and targets. Service is to build a society based on 
compassion and respect where diversity of cultures, religions and ethnicities could flourish together. 
This very ideal is derived from the cardinal principles of the Hindu worldview, „Seva‟ (service) which 
aims to create an interdependent and harmonious society based on sharing and caring. (Kumar, 2003: 
16-17).   
10
 The famous slogan used to get its members participating in the voluntary activities was “We build 
the road and the road builds us”, see: http://www.sarvodaya.org/.  
11
 www.wfdd.org.uk/programmes/wdr/WFDDWDR2004.pdf, retrieved on 25
th
 March 2009. 
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organizations and institutions around the globe have contributed proportionately 
towards the preservation of the environment and sustainability of their countries with 
the support given by the World Bank (World Bank, 2006).  
Having said all that, the involvement of faith in civil society and the social capital 
sphere emerged to fill the gap in the current Western-oriented liberal system of 
governance. Despite the role they played, the discourse of development based on 
religious precepts was not well developed as a separate discipline of knowledge from 
the religions‟ unique ontological roots, but rather a mere response to certain 
circumstances and realities. In fact, evaluation of the existence of religions or faiths 
or culturally-inspired factors along with their paradigms were still viewed and 
evaluated using the conventional economic paradigm, without any appreciation of 
their own unique cultural cognitive paradigm. Furthermore, the variables used to 
evaluate the rationale of incorporating religion or culture into the current governance 
paradigm still represent considerable bias in favour of Eurocentric modernity values 
in examining the subject.  
Thus, since religion and culture-based models are as rational as conventional 
paradigms in economic development and governance areas, exploration of culture 
and faith as alternatives for the conventional Western paradigm requires a 
formulation that is based on their unique worldviews, epistemologies, histories, and 
the arts (Alatas, 2001: 59) and not just merely filling in the gaps in the existing 
system. It must also appreciate and acknowledge unique paradigms of religions or 
cultures in explaining how ideal „governance‟ should be with the objective of 
galvanizing the concept for the acceptability of the societies in which such concepts 
will work out. In this case, the establishment of such alternative epistemological 
paradigms should precede the exploration of its mechanisms. Moreover, religion or 
cultural-based paradigms, as alternatives with their relevant surroundings, are 
creative, non-imitative and original, non-essentialist, counter-Eurocentric, 
autonomous from the state, and autonomous from other national or transnational 
groupings (Alatas, 2001: 59).  
The proposed approach in terms of endogenizing culture and religion despite its 
radical nature must not be interpreted or lead to the consequences of the total 
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rejection of what is „Western‟. The Western experience,12 especially in the field of 
governance, without doubt has given a great deal of benefit to human history. The 
systems, mechanisms, tools and institutions that operate within the modern Western 
atmospheres have indeed delivered justice for their inhabitants under the banner of 
freedom and democracy. Development, high quality of life, welfare system, 
eradication of tyrants and depriving regimes, accountability, transparency, respect for 
the rights of others were amongst the intrinsic universal values of most cultures and 
societies. Instead of emerging as rivals to the conventional Western paradigms, they 
would enrich them and widen the current parameters, thereby transforming them 
from closed paradigms based upon modern Western assumptions into open-ended 
universal human paradigms based on knowledge of all cultural formations in all of 
their specificities and manifestations and attempt to arrive at a higher level of 
abstraction and, therefore, universality (el-Messiri, 2006: xiv).  
4.7. CONCLUSION: ‘ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE’ AS ANOTHER CULTURAL 
APPROACH TO GOVERNANCE  
In accordance with the previous rationale, Sardar‟s (1989: 7) assertion that the 
pluralist world demands from people of different cultures to work out „their own 
ways of being, doing and knowing‟ is worth acknowledging. Such an effort will lead 
to the construction of cultures‟ own „science and technologies‟, hence undertaking 
„their own civilization project‟ instead of blindly imitating the Eurocentric 
paradigms. Furthermore, he maintains that no civilization can retain its vitality if it 
does not possess its own science, just as the American sciences can be said to be 
different from Europe‟s. Based on this premise, Sardar (1985: 104) concludes that 
efforts to revitalise Islamic thought by establishing its own character from its own 
unique worldview and epistemology are crucially essential in order to put an end to 
what he calls „Western epistemological imperialism‟, which presupposes that 
knowledge is neutral, separated from values and essentially „secular‟ (Sardar, 
1985:104; 1989: 48). 
Based on the previous arguments, Islam as one of the major world cultures and faiths 
is another field to be explored in formulating alternative means for conventional 
                                                 
12
 This will take into consideration both the institutional dimension of modernity (Giddens, 1990) and 
the cultural project of modernity (Habermas, 1990), which are inter-related, in developing the 
modernity project. 
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theory of development (through good governance concept). Islam as a belief system 
and a way of life, as perceived by Muslims, provides a comprehensive ground for 
such an inquiry. Thus, in some relative manner, Islam could not find itself 
comfortable within the rather narrow framework of the post-Enlightenment concept 
of religion
13
. As Iqbal (2008) suggested, the essence of Islam comprises the matter of 
faith, feeling, and intellectual, doctrinal, philosophical and other spheres of human 
life. Furthermore, Maxime Rodinson‟s (1973) characterization of Islam as an 
ideologie mobilisatrice, that is an ideology that facilitates social and political 
mobilization, could shed some light on how Islam is capable of establishing its own 
inner foundational ground to drive Muslims toward development. 
This corresponds with the global penchant amongst some contemporary Muslim 
intellectuals who insist on the need to establish knowledge and discipline articulated 
from their own episteme that was unjustly ignored, abandoned and isolated. 
However, their challenge then is to formulate a new alternative at successive levels of 
refinement, to diversify its articulation, and to relate it to multiple contexts to replace 
the existing discourses. Hence, this new normative and cognitive „paradigm‟14 
encompasses the implicit „concepts, theories, perspectives, and worldviews as well as 
beliefs and values‟ (Mona Abul Fadhl, 1990: 15-38; 1991: 15-44; 1994: 309-13). The 
creation of these new paradigms requires an epistemological approach to reconstruct 
the field from new fundamentals that are far from a cumulative process by 
articulating or extending the old paradigm (Kuhn, 1996: 11).  
                                                 
13
 Religion is translated as „al-dÊn‟ in Arabic. The term connotes two different definitions due to its 
usage and context. The general definition for „al-din‟ refers to the way of life and all manners that 
relate to conducts from both ritual-spiritual aspects and the secular. This comprehensive meaning of 
„al-din‟ was acknowledged by al-Shatibi through his saying: “(al-dÊn as the way of conduct) is but an 
act of worship that encompasses rituals (‘ibÉdÉt), customs (‘ÉdÉt) and human relation (mu’ÉmalÉt)”, 
and his remarks on another occasion, “All the human conducts that are recognized by the SharÊ’ah is 
but an act of worship”. Such a wide scope for the meaning of „al-din‟ comprises every action and 
conduct of humans which will find its general and moral guidance in al-Quran and sunnah (Prophet 
Muhammad‟s traditions), implicitly and explicitly. While the specific meaning of „al-dÊn‟ refers to the 
„ritual-spiritual context‟ which the Muslim scholars define „al-umur al-dÊniyyah al-ta’abuddiyyah‟ and 
does not involve any other human conduct such as economics, politics, education, culture and etc. (al-
Uthmani, 2009: 86-105). In our discussion, the main concern will focus on the general meaning of „al-
dÊn‟ as the way of life as perceived and believed in strongly by many Muslims. It is from such a 
worldview that the epistemological issues regarding the subject of governance can be explored and 
derived. 
14
 El-Messiri (2006: 4) defines paradigm as: “a mental abstract picture, an imaginary construct, and a 
symbolic representation of reality that results from a process of deconstruction and reconstruction”.   
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Consequently, the development of a new paradigm requires a fresh look into both 
ontological and epistemological issues concerning the subject. In dealing with this 
matter Al-Faruqi (1992) asserts that Muslims should embrace their own identity to 
shape their own civilization based on an Islamic worldview (and epistemology) and 
not one taken from others. Alternatively it must emerge from the core of Islamic 
creed, tawÍÊd or unity of God, which is considered as a priori, and believed to 
explain the „truth‟. It is from this (assumed) a priori „truth‟ that the reality of life and 
the world are explained, and hence it becomes the Muslims worldview.  This 
worldview illuminates the ideal of Islam and conceptualizes an epistemological 
paradigm from which Muslims derive their knowledge. Accordingly, the attempt to 
explore Islamic ideals as an alternative to conventional governance set-up must 
embark from this starting point
15
.  
Therefore, a new method is required
16
 to undertake this task to uproot Islamic 
principles of governance with a fresh new method to construct a new alternative 
epistemological paradigm within the magnitude of a value-laden ontology-
determined epistemological system. This new approach must transcend the current 
(nature-matter) materialistic monism of governance by replacing the ends of its 
process with transcendental values, and by making humans as a starting point of the 
subject and not as mere commodities. Furthermore, it must fit into the framework of 
(comprehensive contemporary usage of „good‟) governance from the ontologically-
determined Islamic epistemology through the deductive method. In formulating this, 
all Islamic principal values concerning material, spiritual and ethical issues related to 
the subject will be articulated in the form of mathematical axioms. As far as the term 
epistemology is concerned, the exploration will also involve Islamic heritages and 
classical contributions on the subject, but without literal transcriptions, rather it 
denotes the ongoing, creative attempt to apprehend the paradigm implicit in different 
Islamic texts and phenomena.  
                                                 
15
 Thus, such an effort is not a mere de-Westernizing science as stated by Tibi (1995), but it is an 
emerging process of knowledge production as asserted by el-Messiri (Hirafi, 2009).  
16
 Due to such rationality, this thesis is not an emulation of the conventional legal positivistic approach 
of the jurists (fuqahÉ) in dealing with the subject, which often comes with the notion of reclaiming the 
past experience in its literal meaning into current reality. The investigation will also avoid the adoption 
of the textual literalists‟ method in imposing their literal understanding of text and the ideal of the 
Prophet‟s period into the current framework despite the differences of context, needs, underlying 
rationalities (‘illat) and the spirit of the higher objectives (maqÉÎid) to be achieved from Islam.  
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This attempt should be generative in looking into the subject of governance and be 
manifested as an incomplete certainty as a result of the continuous ijtihad 
progression. It must not aim to give an alternative meta-structure design of reality as 
the modernities claimed. Furthermore, this emerging comprehensive theory will not 
try to reduce reality into its materialist components or dimensions, nor will it try to 
eradicate dualities. It will not stress the whole at the expense of the part or vice versa; 
similarly it will not stress continuity at the expense of discontinuity or vice versa. In 
contrast, it relates the particulars to general without necessarily reducing the part to 
the whole or the particular to the general and it attempts to reach the pivotal point 
where one phenomenon is related to another, yet remains distinct from it. In applying 
it to the discourse of governance, the individual and small social units cannot be 
eradicated in the interest of the state, and the human cannot be disregarded in pursuit 
of the natural. Hence, the deliberation on the issue of governance will not focus on 
the materialistic components such as institutions or mechanisms or growth per se, but 
it will encompass the holistic nature of human life in accordance with the Islamic 
worldview.  
On the other hand, due to the new nature of „governance‟ that engulfs diversities of 
social, legal, political and economic dimension, a new distinctive approach is 
essential in dealing with the issue from an Islamic methodological perspective. In 
relation to that, Choudhury proposes that modern political economic issues be treated 
by applying modern socio-economic analysis with new presupposition established 
from Islamic epistemology (1992, 1995, 1999, etc.). This kind of approach suggests 
that the theoretical foundation of Islamic political economy should emanate from the 
complete substitution of the neo-classical idea of replacement and its later variations 
by the „Principle of Universal Complementarity‟ (Choudhury 1994). This approach is 
essential to this research as a study of Islamic ontology‟s epistemological role in 
ethico-economic and political systems with governance as its grand subsystem as a 
new emerging theory and not merely a „patching-up‟ process. 
The following chapter deals with this foundational issue by establishing an Islamic 
method to the subject. Here, al-Faruqi‟s tawhidic episteme is needed to prepare the 
underpinning of such a foundation. In an attempt to organize the „foundation‟ 
(worldview) for a new model of governance, the principle of tawÍÊd, is identified to 
formulate the epistemology of Islamic conception of governance. However, in 
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establishing this „Islamic‟ foundation and paradigm, this new framework does not 
negate the „others‟‟ values and wisdom. Taylor‟s multiple modernity approach 
enshrines the similarly-suggested Islamic message that by its nature promotes 
„epistemic humility‟ in forming a universal value through a hybridism of cultures and 
orientations.  
Islamic epistemology as formulated by the Quran and the Sunnah (Prophet‟s 
tradition) welcomes the symbiosis of wisdom from other sources even from the non-
Islamic. This ideal was addressed in the Quran (49: 13), where the verse dedicates its 
message to the whole human race by urging it to welcome the diverse nature of the 
human race by mutually learning from one another. This is expounded in detail 
within the following chapter on Islamic epistemology. Without a meticulous 
investigation of this very fundamental basic, it is impossible to verify the Islamic 
character of the outcome. 
Nevertheless, it is the ontology that will maintain the core identity or endogeneity of 
Muslims‟ identity. The rereading of the Malay mythical legendary warrior Hang 
Tuah‟s motto „Tak kan Melayu hilang di dunia‟ (Never should the Malays feel lost in 
the world) should represent the very nature of this approach. Despite Hang Tuah‟s 
odysseys around the world, and his cosmopolitan spirit in knowledge and wisdom, he 
still managed to preserve the Malay-Muslim worldview within himself without losing 
his self-confidence or his identity (Noor, 2009).  
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CHAPTER 5 
SEARCHING FOR ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
SOURCES FOR ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE  
 “And, irrespective of what one might assume, in the life of a 
science, problems do not arise by themselves. It is precisely 
this that marks out a problem as being of the true scientific 
spirit: all knowledge is in response to a question. If there 
were no question, there would be no scientific knowledge. 
Nothing proceeds from itself. Nothing is given. All is 
constructed.”  Gaston Bachelard (1934) 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION: ONTOLOGY AND WORLDVIEW 
As discussed in the previous chapter, any quest to provide an alternative to the 
conventional conception of „Good Governance‟ due to having been sourced from 
different „light‟ must not only represented as a process of presenting different 
pictures, or mechanisms with its own values and norms, but also must be preceded 
with different ontology and epistemology in formulating them. While in the field of 
governance, the creation of alternatives implies not only the materialization of new 
systems but also a whole new structure of knowledge that reflects how reality is 
being perceived by different views from the existing paradigm. Hence, the 
alternatives in such structures represent a whole new branch of knowledge with its 
own epistemology. However, the quest for epistemology in any branch of knowledge 
can never be achieved without being preceded by a proper scrutinization of the 
ontological aspect, the exploration of which provides a bigger picture of the 
knowledge by representing the notion of the „reality‟ of the world it represents.  
The notion of reality in one‟s mind is a socially constructed reality through the values 
of a particular worldview emanating from a particular ontology.  This worldview 
later describes the notion of reality for its subscribers. In articulating the accurate 
meaning, function and importance of the worldview in a person‟s life, an individual 
without a worldview is like “a man who has an abundance of furniture and is 
continuously moving it from house to house” that nothing is ever fully unpacked or 
put in its right place so proper use can be made of it (Shariati, n.d.). In the same 
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meaning, to having a great deal of compartmentalized knowledge without a 
foundation of a definite world view is akin to have all the materials needed to build a 
building but lacking a design as to what should be built. To simplify, worldview 
represents a paradigm that summarizes the comprehension that a person has about 
„being‟ or „existing‟. It explains the meaning of „knowing‟ such as the meaning of 
life, society, ethics, beauty and ugliness, truth and falsity (Palmer, 1996: 114; 
Cobern, 1991; Vidal, 2008).  
A worldview could be seen as an articulated perception of social reality in the 
idealism of Hegel; the dialectic materialism of Marx; the existentialism of Heidegger, 
Jaspers and Sartre; the absurdity of the futilism of Albert Camus and Beckett; the 
Taoism of Lao Tze; the „karma‟ of Hinduism; the pain and nibanna or nirvana of 
Buddha; the wiÍdat al-wujËd or unity of being of ×allÉj; the pessimistic determinism 
of KhayyÉm; Schopenhauer and Metternich, etc. Unlike modernity‟s universal 
reality, the variety of worldviews reflects the „cognitive rationality‟ that constructs 
human‟s way of thinking and perceiving the „world‟ and „life‟ they live within. In the 
same token, in supporting the differences of worldviews, Eaton (1990: 7-8) states that 
people‟s perception and people‟s interpretation of reality varies from one to another. 
Even the very obscure surrounding environment, which appears the same before 
everybody‟s eyes, would have different meaning in one‟s apprehension. Context, 
surrounding, beliefs, physical structures, norms, amongst others are involved in 
shaping the differences of the way people think and envisage, and hence the rejection 
of objective reality. According to such premise, the current assertion of Western 
modernity on its universality upon others in an attempt to impose it ad infinitum is no 
longer valid in the post-modern or multiplicity of the modern world as it assumes that 
there is only one fixed single view to determine the conduct of humankind and 
neglecting the multiplicity cognitive nature of the human mind (el-Messiri, 2006: 
20). 
Such a universalist view of modernity, however, reflects the cultural imperialistic 
nature of Eurocentric hegemony (self) upon the „others‟ by imposing one symmetric 
geometric pattern of reality based on monism of reason, causality and absolute 
control rather than incomplete, asymmetric patterns that are more representing the 
plurality of human life. This neo-imperialism is also exemplified in the modernity 
framework that asserts only one single method from that single (world)view to 
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explain reality. Such paradigm is based on the assumption that the centre of the 
universe exists within the modern Western materialistic ontology and not beyond it, 
while „others‟ are expected to converge towards the Eurocentric „reality‟ in order to 
be „accepted‟. This indeed represents an inconsistency with reality, which comprises 
various cognitive paradigms and worldviews.  
The term ontology is etymologically derived from a Greek word, onto which means 
‘something that exists’, and logos, which means ‘logical knowledge’.  Thus, literally, 
the term ontology refers to the knowledge of ‘reality or characteristics of something 
that might also exist in abstract terms’ (Runes, 1976: 219). However, interestingly 
this term was never used in ancient philosophy even during the time of the Greeks. It 
was first constructed by Lohard in his „Liberdeadeptione‟ (1597) and „Ogdoas 
Scholastica‟ (1607) as “the metaphysics, which considers all things in general, as far 
as they are existing and as far as they are of the highest general and principles 
without being supported by hypotheses based on the senses” (hrstrom et al., 2005: 
425). While technically, the term ontology is defined as “a branch of philosophy 
concerned with articulating the nature and structure of the world” (Wand and Weber, 
1993:220), and might also briefly be defined as well as “a set of terms and their 
associated definitions intended to describe the world in question” (Uschold and King, 
1995:1). In the same meaning, it is also defined as “a theory concerning the kinds of 
entities and specifically the kinds of abstract entities that are to be admitted to a 
language system” (Webster‟s Third New International Dictionary, 2002). In sum, the 
ontological question is about answering, “what is the form and nature of reality and, 
therefore, what is there that can be known about it”.  
The ontological and epistemological questions concern what is commonly referred to 
as a person's Weltanschauung or worldview. Weltanschauung could be defined as “a 
comprehensive view or philosophical conception of life, world and universe 
especially from a specific standpoint” (The Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995: 1592; 
Collins English Dictionary, 1998: 1731), which is also best described as “a set of 
implicit and explicit assumptions about the origin of the universe and the nature of 
human life” (Chapra, 1992: 1). Different worldviews lead to different values and 
norms, simply because through one‟s worldview he sees and explains the world and 
his place in it. As a building with its foundation, worldview serves as an essential 
base for man since the way he thinks, acts, behaves and his reflections towards 
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everything are directly influenced by his worldview (Chapra, 1992), which, as argued 
later, justifies the Islamic governance through the Islamic worldview. 
The modern Western Eurocentric realm developed their worldview based on an 
adverse experience of the pre-Enlightenment period. The Enlightenment was 
perceived as the rebirth of a new world, which rose from the ashes of the dark ages 
into a new „civilized‟ future. The Churches, which represented religion and religious 
institutions, were blamed for the pre-Enlightenment state of darkness and the 
uncivilized world. The philosophers and thinkers during the Enlightenment and post-
Enlightenment period hence formulated „science of man‟ instead of depending on 
„God centred knowledge‟ (Porter, 2001: 19). This new formulation directed the 
dominance of an empirical-scientiﬁc approach to knowledge (positivism), claims of 
individualism, negative freedom, and instrumental rationality (Taylor, 1999: 156)
1
.  
Eventually, „secularism‟ had dominated all the domains in people‟s life in the West. 
Any attempt to bring out God from church into the public domain was considered as 
taboo, uncivilized and a move towards the dark past.  
It was the search of certainty and rationality that drove post-Enlightenment Europe to 
reject all metaphysical and religious dogma from the field of knowledge and reality. 
Uncertain divine laws were replaced with the certainty of the empirical results of the 
senses and observation. In the same token, divine providence was replaced by 
                                                 
1
 Such methods became the major principals of the Positivist philosophers. They insisted that true 
knowledge is based on scientific statements. The statements can only be verified based on empirical 
results, and could only be derived from observations and logical deductions from them. According to 
these methods, any statements that could not be disconfirmed by observations such as values, ethics 
and moral judgements were meaningless and not scientific, hence the negation of religious beliefs from 
the body of knowledge (el-Messiri, 2006: 29-38). This conclusion then becomes the cardinal principal 
of the Vienna circle. Reuben (1996) writes that: “In the late nineteenth century, intellectuals assumed 
that truth had spiritual, moral and cognitive dimensions. By 1930, however, intellectuals had 
abandoned this broad conception of truth.  They embraced, instead, a view of knowledge that drew a 
sharp distinction between „facts‟ and „values‟. They associated cognitive truth with empirically verified 
knowledge and maintained that by this standard, moral values could not be validated as „true‟.  In the 
nomenclature of the twentieth century, only „science‟ constituted true knowledge. Moral or spiritual 
values could be „true‟ in an emotional or non-literal sense, but not in terms of cognitively verifiable 
knowledge. The term „truth‟ no longer comfortably encompassed factual knowledge and moral values.” 
However, positivism hence requires the framework of „secularism‟ as its competent worldview. The 
dark ages of the European continent caused by the amalgam of churches and the state causes the 
transition to secular thought in the whole Western realm, which later claimed its universality. 
Secularism is but the triumph of reason (science) over superstition (metaphysics) to Western 
civilization. In tandem, religious faith is portrayed as inferior to and in constant conflict with reason 
(the true knowledge). Consequently, secularism is glorified as the most vital pillar for modernity 
(Tawney, 1926). While the Enlightenment, which is the period where secularism and positivism 
emerge is perceived as the dawn of the Age of Reason, where the world and the people are enlightened 
by reason, science, and a respect for humanity.  
Chapter Five: Searching for Ontological and Epistemological Sources for Islamic 
Governance 
 129 
providential progress. No knowledge, under such worldview can be accepted as valid 
upon an unquestioned foundation if the sphere of reason is wholly unfettered because 
even the most firmly held notions can only be regarded as valid „in principle‟ or 
„until further notice‟, failing that, “they would relapse into dogma and separated from 
the sphere of reason, which determines the validity of any premises” (Giddens, 1990: 
49). This worldview as claimed by the Western philosophers had dynamited obsolete 
religious myths about man and his place under God, thus breaking with „mythopoeia‟ 
thinking and advance “from myth to reason” (Porter, 2001: 19). 
Such worldview connotes the unity of sciences and the mind‟s ability to accumulate 
information and recreate reality in accordance with natural law, which reinforces the 
idea that only science can guide societies and rationalize them. With regard to the 
subject governance, a closer glare into the way development and growth (as the goals 
of good governance) are being defined by contemporary economists, we could 
identify the concept of nature-matter and materialist monism is derived from value-
free positivism underlying its whole framework. Both development and growth is but 
a variation on the natural and economic structure, a one-dimensional entity that can 
be explained within the framework of the modern Western worldview of economics 
based on materialism and causal monism. Hence, both concepts are both quantified 
and measured in general materialistic terms and become an end to themselves, and 
not a means to achieve an end. In replacing the non-rational values, (materialistic) 
development itself as a manifestation of progress is considered as the ultimate value. 
With such a background, materialistic progress is becoming ad infinitum on the level 
of theory and ad nausem on the level of practice (el-Messiri, 2006: 40-41), while the 
heterogeneous „other‟ understanding including Islamic worldview perceive these 
through different means and value systems and norms through different paradigm.  
The rest of this chapter thus explores the Islamic worldview to establish the 
ontological foundations needed in attempting to construct a new paradigm of Islamic 
good governance through the ontological and epistemological construct of Islam.  
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5.2. CONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE: 
ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL BUILDING BLOCKS 
After the brief introduction as part of the previous chapter, this chapter begins with 
the issue of ontology as a core fundamental principle for „Islamic‟ alternative to 
current paradigm of governance. The discussion starts with the presentation of the 
„tawhidic reality‟ as the ×aqq (truth and reality) presents the very ontology of 
Islamic knowledge and the central principle, through which Muslims interpret reality 
and which is expounded in detail. The ontology then articulates to the reality through 
„epistemology‟ derived from Islamic ontology, which constitutes the foundation of 
the new „Islamic‟ theory of governance as the worldview of Islamic governance. The 
epistemology reflects the originality of the theory, which is in a way to develop a 
new paradigm of knowledge in the field of development studies.  
The discussion continues with the articulation of both elements in classical and 
contemporary literatures dealing mostly with political and economical issues through 
the framework of Islamic thought. The literatures will be analytically and critically 
analyzed to locate gaps and lacunae that will justify the exploration of this research, 
hence formulating a different method and paradigm in establishing an alternative 
model for governance. 
5.2.1. Tawhidic Reality 
In contrast to the aforesaid Western paradigm as a worldview, Muslims derive their 
worldview from the Qur’an or the revealed knowledge, which explains its a priori 
ontology by insisting the very core and comprehensive concept and application of 
TawÍÊd or the Oneness and uniqueness of God the Almighty. TawÍÊd as an axiom 
derived from the premier principle of Islamic theo-centric cosmology encapsulated in 
the declaration of ShahÉdah (LÉ ilÉha illa AllÉh) which proclaims the denial of any 
other god apart from AllÉh and also the affirmation on the sui generis of Allah as the 
„almighty God‟ to be worshiped and glorified2. This principle implies that Allah is 
                                                 
2
 Despite its basic definition, tawÍÊd implies the unification of Allah and the denial and rejection of any 
association of AllÉh with the creatures; different theological schools of thought define tawÍÊd with 
different elaboration in detailed comprehension of the concept. The classical Muslim theological 
philosophers (who were also known as the „MutakallimËn‟ (theologians)) were divided into two major 
sects: the MuÑtazilah (pure rationalists) and the AshÉÑirah (moderate rationalists). Both sects 
interpreted „tawÍÊd' based on the Islamic theo-philosophical method as the understanding of 
affirmation of the unification of AllÉh in His essence (dhÉt) and attributes (ØifÉt). However, in details 
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one in His essence (dhÉt), one in His attributes (ØifÉt), one in His names (AsmÉ´), one 
in His works (afÑÉl), and the only object of worship. Such principle also solicits the 
other interrelated principle of tanzÊh (no compromise with the transcendent purity of 
AllÉh) for His existence (wujËd); and rejection of any type of relationship of 
ontological proximity and identification between the absolute (Allah) and the relative 
(created beings) in His status as the Creator and administrator of the universe 
(rubËbiyyah) and the only worshipped God (ulËhiyyah). Any actions that contradict 
or breach this principle of tawÍÊd is considered as shirk or associating the 
absoluteness of AllÉh with other beings. The state of shirk, which is antithesis of 
tawÍÊd, condemned strongly in the Islamic belief system and those who committed it 
were disqualified from being true Muslims.  
The TawÍÊd concept becomes the axis mundi of homo-Islamicus (or the Islamically 
re-affirmed individual) ontology and determining the „truth‟ and the „reality‟ for 
Muslims. It represents the ultimate truth or reality, which is known in Islam as ×aqq 
in their life. This concept, clearly articulated through the status of human beings from 
an Islamic perspective, was deliberately elucidated in the Qur‟an through the story of 
human creation, and accepted as „a priori‟ in Muslims‟ faith. The purpose of the 
human race creation has been described in the Qur‟an a few times through a dialogue 
between God and the angels (2: 30-39; 15: 28-44; 38: 69-74). There, God expressed 
His will to the angels the creation of a new being who would be the best of all His 
creatures and hence would be assigned the status of His vicegerent (KhalÊfah). As a 
vicegerent, man is responsible not only for himself, but also for everything in the 
universe including the animal kingdom and nature. In order for man to understand his 
responsibility and status, God frequently demands him to observe, ponder and use his 
                                                                                                                                           
they diversify in defining the relation between the essence and the attributes. As for the MuÑtazilah, 
tawÍÊd requires the separation of essence as the pre-existent and eternal and His attributes. The 
AshÉÑirah in contrast believe that both the essence and the attributes are eternal and in fact belong to a 
single entity, which is Allah Himself. Nonetheless, both of the sects agreed that Allah‟s attributes are 
sui generis and nothing is equal to His glory and greatness. On the other hand, the MuÍaddithÊn 
(scholars of ×adÊth) along with others who reject the theo-philosophical tendency of the MutakallimËn 
opt a literalist approach to tawÍÊd. Ibn Taimiyyah, whom the new formulation of tawÍÊd paradigm 
spearheaded this school of thought enumerated tawÍÊd into three major categories, tawÍÊd ulËhiyyah 
(Believing that Allah is One with no partner or associate in His divinity), tawÍÊd rubËbiyyah (Lordship) 
and tawÍÊd al-asmÉ´ wa al-ÎifÉt (names and attributes). Despite of the differences of methods in 
defining the „unity‟ or „oneness‟ of Allah in His essence and His attributes, all agreed in one common 
conclusion that tawÍÊd entails transcendence (tanzÊh) which is the act of denying or rejecting anything 
that will lead to immanence (tashbÊh) between Allah and His creation. Any act of such will be 
considered as a blasphemy act of associating (shirk) Allah with the creation. 
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rationality
3
. The ability of man to rationalize is simply based on his possession of 
reason (Ñaql), physical and intellectual capabilities, knowledge and other resources. 
This endowment by God in a way is the raison d‟être of human superiority upon 
other creatures. 
Equally, the Qur‟an also speaks of a covenant between man and God (7: 172) in 
which man recognized God‟s position as his Creator. In other words, this covenant 
implies that the ability to perceive the existence of the Supreme Being is inborn in 
human nature. By highlighting the rights and obligations of God over man, and man 
over man, the Qur´Én establishes the point that man serves God mainly by serving 
humanity and other creatures. By comparison to the „secular materialistic‟ position of 
the Western worldview, the khilÉfah (vicegerency) position and the covenant taken 
by the human race to execute their responsibility (Qur´Én, 33: 72), is to worship God 
by living according to His guidance (ÑibÉdah) (Qur´Én, 51:56) and to develop and 
administrate this world in a harmonious way for the benefit of all creatures (ÑimÉrah) 
(6:165; 45:13). Such responsibility or trust has been rejected by other creatures, but 
accepted by human beings: hence, they are living in this worldly life in the state of 
being tested (Qur´Én, 6:165). 
As a prerequisite of being tested, man was also endowed with freedom or ikhtiyÉr to 
choose. Such freedom, which made man different from the angels, gives man a 
determining power to deliver his responsibility, thus, making him accountable before 
God. For every decision or choice an individual takes, he is accountable
4
 as being 
mentioned in the  Qur‟an (75: 36; 23: 115; 76: 2). It is through this responsibility-
accountability paradigm, the  Qur‟an points out that worldly human life is connected 
to the Hereafter. Human life in this world (as a testing ground) will be the major 
determination of his new life after his demise. It is his choice then which will lead 
him either to falÉÍ or salvation in this world and in the Hereafter or otherwise. Thus, 
the objective of individuals is to achieve iÍsÉn or beneficence to achieve falÉÍ. 
In essence, Muslims believe that reality, namely life, has two dimensions: eternal and 
temporary. The temporary worldly life was created for man to be tested in 
                                                 
3
 Look, for example, 4:82; 7: 24; 23:68; 38: 29; 47: 24. 
4
 And also, Prophet MuÍammad has mentioned it in myriad, and amongst the famous was the report 
which mentioned that every single individual is a leader, and everybody will be accountable for his 
leadership (narrated by al-BukhÉrÊ (1985: 1/304) and Muslim (no date: 2/ 1459)). 
Chapter Five: Searching for Ontological and Epistemological Sources for Islamic 
Governance 
 133 
determining his eternal life in the Hereafter (Qur’an, 6: 165). “Islamic ontology 
presents a comprehensive integrated unique bi-dimensional worldview, this world 
(universe) and the Hereafter”5 yet interlink, as this world is perceived to be the 
„fields‟ of the Hereafter. Such ontology differentiates between ontological proximity 
of the post-Enlightenment West and of the worldviews of other religions. The 
repercussion of this „tawhidic reality‟ can clearly seen in the way Muslims respond to 
their worldly life, in which governance is part of it (Iqbal, [1974] 2008: 155). Within 
a pristine understanding of this tawhidic reality, governance as a process and 
development as the result of the process are taken out from the Western materialist 
monist paradigm absolute donnee. Instead, the implication of tawhidic reality 
expands the implication of the governance process and its end beyond the 
materialistic notion towards achieving falÉÍ, a „multi-dimensional comprehensive 
salvation‟.  
This state of „multi-dimensional comprehensive salvation‟ or falÉÍ6 in the worldly 
life can be achieved through the comprehensive well-being in one‟s life as a result of 
conformity to guidance (see: Qur’an, 2:189; 3:130; 3:200; 5:35; 5:100; 24:31; 28:67; 
24:51). This comprehensive well-being could be obtained through preservation of the 
highest objectives of SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid), which is interpreted as human well-being, 
when the guidance is being followed and implemented in one‟s life. Furthermore, the 
tawhidic reality that shapes an individual‟s worldview will turn him to a „being‟, 
„doing‟ and „functioning‟ individual who will try to secure and promote the MaqÉÎid 
to ensure falÉÍ not only for himself but also for the community and the human 
species in the universe by enhancing iÍsÉn. This also indicates that tawÍÊd 
necessitates social well-being alongside individual well-being and makes also the 
responsibility of the individual to contribute to the social well-being.  The Qur’an 
states this „functioning‟ individual‟s mission as the continuation of Prophet 
MuÍammad‟s mission as the mercy agent to the universe, as evidenced in the 
                                                 
5
 Which is totally against the views of existentialists like Jean Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger and 
others‟ opinions, which say that human life or human existence is without purpose (Baheshti and 
Bahonar, 1993: 161-4). 
6
 FalÉÍ is derived from the root of Fa-la-ha and originally means, „to plough‟ (Ibn al-ManÐur, 1955: 2/ 
547). Plough implying going through a route with difficulty and eventually reaching to harvest, the 
word has been apparently adapted to have a general meaning of reaching safety and salvation after 
struggling for it. In the context of Islam, falÉÍ means attaining triumph and prosperity in the worldly 
life and the Hereafter. This of course can be reached when God is pleased with his servant (although 
this pleasure is the result, to a great extent, of God's own extreme mercy and forgiveness). 
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following verse of the Qur’an: “For I [AllÉh] have created you [MuÍammad] to be 
nothing but a blessing for all creation”7.  
It should be noted that an important social articulation of tawÍÊd is being the source 
of justice as well.  In other words, the true meaning of tawÍÊd in human life also 
emphasizes the importance of justice as part of tawhidic implication on individual 
conduct. TawÍÊd implies the vertical ethical axiom implying justice, which 
necessitates individuals to live with the spirit of justices amongst themselves.  
However, tawÍÊd‟s articulation of justice is related to vertical ethicality and hence 
refers to individuals having equal distance to God.  In other words, this implies that 
individuals are equal in their relationship with God. It is upon such a concept of 
equality that justice must prevail as the common value shared by the individuals, 
hence equality in the sight of AllÉh. This has consequences on the falÉÍ process as 
part of iÍsÉn.  Consequently, falÉÍ of a human being during this life and the 
Hereafter is reflected by the eternal life in Heaven. 
This „tawhidic reality‟ worldview, which is a sine qua non for Muslims, provides a 
unique dimension for the inquiry of Islamic epistemology of knowledge
8
. Tawhidic 
reality as the ontology needs to be articulated by the epistemology to bring itself into 
reality. The following section, hence, explores Islamic epistemology that is inspired 
by tawhidic reality in order to prepare the ground for further exploration of Islamic 
governance. 
5.2.2. Islamic Ontological Quest for Epistemology 
Quest for epistemology is the quest to answer three major questions: „What 
knowledge?‟; „What can we know?‟, and if we think we know, it raises the third 
main question: „How do we know that we know?‟.  In other words, in an easier 
                                                 
7
 Al-Qur’an, 21:107. 
8
 Davutoglu (1994: 78-9) developed his own „Qur‟anic System of Semantics‟ in establishing what he 
called „Ontologically determined epistemology‟ through linking the frequently used terms in al-Qur’an 
which he believes indicate significant messages on the topic. He further elaborates that Allah 
(mentioned 2800 times) is the Owner of the universe (Rabb, mentioned 950 times) that He created 
(kawn, mentioned 1300 times). He is communicating (qawl, to say, mentioned 1700 times) through His 
Rusul (messengers) that brought His Ñilm (knowledge and to know (verb), mentioned 750 times) to be 
conveyed to human beings. He also develops the etymological relation between Allah as ÑAlÊm (the all-
Knowing) with the ÑÉlam (world or creatures) through His Ñalam (signs) by imparting to them His Ñilm 
(knowledge). He insists that within the framework of this semantic system, it is impossible to separate 
the context of knowledge from the context of being, hence the strong attachment between Islamic 
epistemology of knowledge with the ontological antecedents. 
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manner, the field of epistemology as an intellectual enterprise is replying to the quest 
of what constitutes knowledge and the methodologies for acquiring it (Khan, 1999: 
109). Since Islam provides a particular ontological base, the establishment of 
„Islamic epistemology‟ enables Muslims to provide the foundations for liberatory 
philosophy that will bring Muslims out the darkness into the light (Islam) of Íikmah 
(wisdom) (Khan, 1999: 109). This confirms what Nandy (1988) asserts that any 
effort to establish a non-modernist or non-Western knowledge in the world must first 
claim its own epistemological primacy by decentring the „Western notion of 
knowledge‟. Islamic epistemology in such meaning provides the foundations needed 
for a new Islamic paradigm of „governance‟. 
By referring to the dominion of tawhidic reality, „the quest of epistemology‟ as 
foundation for Islamic theory of knowledge must begin from the arch-principal that 
all knowledge is dominated by its sacred quality and nature. Muslim scholars never 
separated knowledge from revelation unlike post-Enlightenment Western 
epistemology (Nasr, 1994:123). Such an assumption derives from the very 
ontological argument that Allah, which Muslims believe as the only omnipotent God 
and the Creator had created everything. Consequently, such belief affirms that all 
knowledge, including those produced by human logic or reasoning like everything 
else in the universe ultimately originates from Allah, as they are related to knowing 
what Allah created on earth. Allah as believed by Muslims is the all-Knower, all-
Seeing, and the source of all the knowledge in this world. Allah equipped human 
with reason and knowledge of this world. These qualities enable humans to be the 
guardian and the khalÊfah or vicegerent of Allah in the universe. 
It was through this vicegerency task that Adam has been exalted and elevated above 
other creatures despite of its earthly origin (Qur’an, 2:30)9. The elevation and the 
                                                 
9
 The answer for those questions should depart from the gist of the Tawhidic reality that explains that 
the human race was created as the „vicegerent‟ of God on earth. However, this vicegerency was envied 
by IblÊs (Satan) who believes that he is superior to Adam and his offspring (al-Qur’an, 2:34). It is true, 
that Adam‟s earthly origin made him as well as his children weak thus making them easy prey to the 
resentment and machinations of IblÊs. IblÊs‟ first ever victory in deceiving the human nation was his 
ability to seduce both Adam and Hawwa which lead to their expulsion from Heaven (al-Qur’an, 2: 36). 
This victory remarks the beginning of the endless conspiracy of IblÊs to make Adam‟s children prone to 
the ignorance of IblÊs and to lose the Names (the keys of knowledge) given to them. The expulsion 
prepared a new dimension of human history on earth that remarked the genesis of human chapter on 
earth. Adam and Hawwa realized their mistake and repented to God, who later promised both of them 
His guidance. As long as the pair and their offshoot obeyed and followed divine guidance, they would 
be safe from the machinations of IblÊs (al-Qur’an, 2: 37-8). The guidance will also assist them to fulfil 
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choice was made by Allah who had taught Adam all the names (Qur’an, 2:31) or the 
nature of the world as a preparation for such position. Many exegesists interpret „the 
names‟ as the key of knowledge (El-Sheikh, 1999: 61). God also bestowed Adam 
with Ñaql (reason) to distinguish him from the non-human nation. These two elements 
(reason and knowledge) qualified Adam and his consort, Hawwa to be the leader of 
God‟s creatures in heaven and earth. A general conclusion can be drawn from this 
event as part of Islamic epistemology that God or Allah is the main source of 
knowledge. Since He was the one who created the universe, and He was the one who 
endowed Adam and his offspring with knowledge and reason, Muslims believe that 
He is the origin of everything and the ultimate source of knowledge (He is al-ÑAlÊm: 
The all-Knower) (al-Qur’an, 6:59; 34:26). In describing such nature, Allah Himself 
asserts: “If the ocean were ink (wherewith to write out) the words of my Lord, sooner 
would the ocean be exhausted than would the words of my Lord, even if we added 
another ocean like it, for its aid” (Qur’an, 18:109). Hence, since Allah teaches the 
way of knowing, Qur‟anic knowledge constitutes the source of Islamic epistemology 
as well. 
This could also be identified from the far-reaching understanding of the Qur‟anic 
verse (25:35) which indicates that God is “The light of the heavens and earth”. Ibn 
Sina argues that all knowledge existing in this world is part of God‟s knowledge, and 
it is revealed to us through a divine, active intellect and that the intellect bestows 
light upon light (guidance upon guidance) on human beings (Yezdi, 1996: 14-16; 
193-94). God in this specific verse declares himself as the main source of knowledge 
                                                                                                                                           
their ultimate goal both in the dunyÉ and the Ékhirah. This „guidance‟ then becomes the medium of 
how God communicate with His beings in imparting His knowledge to them. As Soroush (2009: 2000) 
maintains in his analogy of such situation, it is just like taking the water from the ocean. The human 
can never be able to take the whole ocean, but only receive a small portion of the ocean water in a pail 
or container that transmitted it from its original source. This promise of guidance entails the continuous 
mission of the Prophets whom have been chosen by God as a mediator or messenger for the guidance 
of their fellow man (Qur´Én, 62: 2; 74: 1-3; 87: 6-9). The guidance that consists of true knowledge 
from the Creator is sent in the form of revelation (waÍy) or times in the form of kutub (books) or ÎuÍuf 
(scrolls). In them, He taught human beings His positive commands, His prohibitions as a test for them, 
His promise (waÑd) and His threat (waÑÊd), the ghaybiyyÉt (unseen), the life Hereafter (Ékhirah) and the 
prophecies of events that would occur in the future (nubuwwÉt). The Messengers or Prophets in such 
cases acted only as „the‟ channel of communication and not as „the God‟ in human form or the 
„revelation‟ itself. Al-Qur’an clearly states that: “Say: The knowledge is with Allah only, and I am but 
a plain warner” (67:26). However, Prophets and Messengers as the chosen individuals for such a task 
were equipped with certain qualities that qualify them to deliver the mission. Hence they are infallible, 
wise, aided by an evident miracle, bring about deductive knowledge and the knowledge in fixity, and 
also responsible in conveying the details and the true understanding of God‟s guidance.  
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(light) for the human being. While in many other verses, it is indicated that God 
declares profoundly He is ÑAlÊm (the All-Knower), al-×akÊm (the All-Wise), al-×aqq 
(the All-Truth), al-KhabÊr (the All-Aware). For that reason, it is a religious duty upon 
every Muslim to pursue their search for truth and knowledge and to accomplish their 
duty as „khalÊfah‟ on earth.  This, thus, clearly identifies the ontological nature of 
Islamic epistemology. 
The relation between ontology and epistemology of Islam is clearly identified from 
the acceptance of the revelation sent to the Prophets as mentioned by the Qur’an. It 
was described that prophets were sent or chosen from mankind to preach to their 
people on the guidance (books and scriptures) revealed for them to follow. As for the 
final Prophet as believed by Muslims, MuÍammad was chosen and trusted with al-
Qur’an that is affirmed by Muslims as the „final revelation‟. The Qur‟an as guidance 
was given numerous titles to manifest its capacity as the major epistemological 
source for Muslims such as KalÉmullÉh (God‟s word), al-FurqÉn (the criterion 
between truth and false) and al-KitÉb al-MubÊn (the clear book). Along with the 
Qur’an, Prophet MuÍammad was considered in Islamic ontological antecedents as 
the other major epistemological source for knowledge, as he is the guide to the 
guidance.  Hence, his traditions (known as Sunnah or ÍadÊth), in which his words, 
actions and tacit approvals being recorded are but a part of that general meaning of 
revelation as understood and agreed widely by Muslims
10
 despite of its humanly 
nature. Nasr (1996: 27) coins that for Islamic philosophy to be accepted as „Islamic‟, 
it must rooted from these two epistemological sources. 
In sum, tawÍÊd is the root of the Islamic worldview and system of values (Yezdi, 
1996). With it, Muslims confirm that God‟s Oneness is the cause and effect of the 
„interactively integrated‟ process of the universe and is expressed both in the realm of 
comprehension and in the order of cognitive reality. As a result, in the epistemology 
of tawÍÊd, the difference between Kantian a priori and a posteriori does not exist, 
and the ontological difference between form and reality is also inessential 
(Choudhury, 1993). The Qur‟anic verse (20: 114) “My Lord! Increase me in 
                                                 
10
 Muslims since the day of al-ShÉfiÑÊ had agreed that ×adÊth or the Prophet traditions is recognized as 
revelation though not at par with al-Qur’an but has the legal authority equal to it (el-Khadduri, 1987: 
109-16). There are many indicators in al-Qur’an indicating the importance of Sunnah as part of the 
revelation and as a complement to al-Qur´Én, (Qur’an, 3:31; 3: 132; 4: 65; 4: 80; 16: 44; 24: 63; 33: 36; 
49: 1; 53: 3, 4; 59: 7, and others) (Azami, 1977; al-Hafnawi, 1991; Mahmoud, 1998; al-SibaÑÊ, 2006; 
QaraÌÉwÊ, 2007). 
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knowledge” indicates that God enjoins Muslims (through Prophet MuÍammad) to 
literally plead Him for knowledge. The verse implies that God declares that He is the 
fountainhead of all knowledge in the universe; hence, the human being should seek 
His guidance in their search for knowledge (Mir, 1999: 99). Based on this „tawhidic 
reality‟, revelation (waÍy) received by all prophets from the Divine source, is 
considered the most certain knowledge,
11
 which constitutes the knowledge and the 
articulation of the divine knowledge in their understanding of the world. 
5.2.3. Rationality (Ñaql) and revelation 
After identifying the nature of Islamic ontology and epistemology, it is also 
important to identify how these works in the generation of knowledge.  Thus, the 
articulation of knowledge according to ontology and epistemology necessitates some 
other foundational axioms, one of which is Ñaql. As it is through Ñaql, individuals 
perceive and comprehend the knowledge created and disseminated by God through 
revelation. 
In this tawhidic paradigm, revelation also stimulates human Ñaql to recognize the 
beneficence of their Creator, to worship Him alone, to execute the mission as 
KhalÊfah on earth. ÑAql alone is not sufficient without the efficacy of the senses as 
mechanisms to digest the experiences as part of the mankind knowledge. Revelation, 
as guidance from the Creator, must be informed by the reason and to be stimulated by 
                                                 
11
 Amongst the perceptions on the relation between knowledge and religion amongst the post 
Enlightenment Western community, is that God has been hiding the knowledge from human being just 
like the churches once hid the knowledge of reading and writing from the people. The discovery of the 
knowledge of reading and writing by the majority of people lead to the revolution against the church 
(Behishti and Bahonar, 1993: 145-7). However, this is not the case in Islam, the first verse to be 
revealed to the Prophet MuÍammad was “read” (al-Qur’an, 96: 1). Despite of the illiterate nature of the 
Prophet himself, the whole idea of Islamic teaching was the value and the virtue of knowledge. Adam 
was created with knowledge according to al-Qur´Én. He was equipped with knowledge to make him 
more superior than the rest of the creatures, hence entitled to be the trustee of the world (Qur’an, 2: 30-
33; 31: 20; 11: 61; 67: 15; 17: 70). Moreover, knowledge has been regarded very special in Islam. 
There are several places in the Qur‟an where God praises those who posses knowledge (2:32; 39:9; 
58:11). In the same token, a lot of statements being narrated to Prophet MuÍammad that place men of 
knowledge at the level of the heirs of the prophets, praise the seekers of knowledge and those who 
impart it to others, and also stress the obligation upon every Muslims to seek knowledge. In sum, Islam 
indentifies knowledge as a marker of privilege. Thus according to this „Tawhidic reality‟, the act of 
attaining knowledge is not only a possibility but is indeed necessary and regarded as an obligation upon 
all Muslims unlike the Greek and sophists, who in contrast view knowledge as vain imagination (Wan 
Daud, 1989: 62). Having said that, instead, knowledge “possessed a profoundly religious character, not 
only because the object of every type of knowledge is created by God, but also the intelligence by 
which man knows is itself a divine gift” (NaÎr, 1994: 123). According to NaÎr (1994: 150), the ultimate 
aim of knowledge in Islam is to be able to “perfect and actualise all the possibilities of the human 
soul”; that leads to “that supreme knowledge of the Divinity which is the goal of human life”. 
Chapter Five: Searching for Ontological and Epistemological Sources for Islamic 
Governance 
 139 
the senses (Qur’an, 7:9; 67:23). The Qur‟an reminds Muslims to be grateful for such 
a precious gift, “the faculties of knowing”, bestowed upon them by the Almighty. 
These faculties are important as sources of empirical knowledge of the world were 
very much emphasized. It has also been emphasized that the physical senses as 
instruments of knowledge do have their limitations (Bakar, 1999: 6-7).  
On the other hand, by acknowledging the Ñaql and the senses, al-Qur’an asserts that 
there are indeed other sources of knowledge in which proper study and orientation 
compliment the truth of revealed knowledge. However, these other sources do not 
carry the same status as waÍy as the non-revealed knowledge is not directly bestowed 
by Allah to man. On the other hand, it is vulnerable to methodological and 
axiological limitations. To acquire non-revealed knowledge, humans are equipped 
with all the necessary faculties of knowing which enable them to search for all that 
they need to know (Wan Daud, 1989: 36-37). The status of Ñaql tÉbiÑiy (pure reason), 
has been recognized by both al-Qur‟an and Sunnah as a prerequisite for the inquiry of 
such knowledge. In the same meaning, al-Qur’an reiterates the importance of 
comprehending, contemplating, thinking, pondering and other activities that relate to 
the reason (Ñaql) and reasoning
12
. 
Furthermore, al-Qur’an also regards the universal phenomenal as „ÉyÉt‟ or signs of 
God‟s universal system to remind “those who are possessed of intellects” (li ulÊ al-
AlbÉb) (3:7, 190), and are capable of invoking reason. Likewise, al-Qur’an also 
constantly encourages, urges or exhorts human beings to spare no effort in utilizing 
their sensory faculties to „hear‟, „carefully listen‟, „look and insightfully see‟, 
„ponder‟ all the „ÉyÉt‟ in the Qur’an itself (revelation) and the „ÉyÉt‟ around them. 
Those who refuse to do so were abhorred and condemned as ÌiÑÉf al-ÑuqËl (possessed 
of weak intellects or minds), la Ñaqla lahum (possessed of no intellect at all), la 
yaÑqilËn (incapable of sound reasoning) (5: 58, 103; 10: 42; 22:46; 59: 14), and even 
castigated as being mindless as beasts (anÑÉm) and understand nothing “except a 
shout or cry” (25:44; 2:171).  
                                                 
12
 i.e. al-Qur’an invokes reason consistently by using verb roots referring to the use of the intellect (and 
their clusters), such as fahama (understand, realize), faqaha (understand, comprehend), fakkara (think, 
reflect), tadabbara (ponder, deliberate), and Ñaqala (search for causes, find reasons and connect ideas 
in order to comprehend). In the same vein, the verb Ñaqala is repeated in the Qur’an about fifty times, 
and the rhetorical refrain „afalÉ taÑqilËn‟ (Can‟t you reason?) is repeated at least thirteen times in 
various context of reasoning (al-Sheikh, 1999: 72).  
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This is simply because the human mind or Ñaql was inherited with the „nature 
knowledge‟ of „names‟ that was endowed to Adam and his offshoots. This nature of 
knowledge embedded within Ñaql, which some call rationality just needs to be 
simulated by experience, and then it will lead to the expansion of the mind itself. 
This kind of knowledge is also a field of acquisition. The Qur‟an story about the son 
of Adam who murdered his brother and learned from the crow on the way to bury the 
corpse of the murdered
13
 indicates an important epistemological lesson on the role of 
experience and rationality. The traditions of Prophet MuÍammad himself have 
recorded myriad of statements implying the importance of Ñaql and rationality as 
sources of knowledge. Amongst them was the Prophet‟s reply to MuÑÉdh bin Jabal 
amid sending him to Yemen as a judge. After asking MuÑÉdh on his references in 
giving his judgement to the people, Muadh replied: al-Qur’an and the Sunnah, and in 
the absence of both sources while dealing with issues, he resort to using his rationale 
by doing ijtihÉd (Ajtahid bi ra´yÊ). The Prophet testified MuÑÉdh‟s method of 
judgement as the one affirmed by Allah and His messenger
14
.  
Prophet MuÍammad also confirmed in his word: “I have been sent only for the 
purpose to complete good morality.”15 This tradition apparently indicates that Islam 
recognizes the good morality and good values of others as Islam was sent through the 
Prophet to complete them. In the same meaning, the tradition emphasizes on the need 
to learn from the Ñaql which is the source of the moral which is not derived from the 
revelation. This can clearly be seen in the Prophet‟s practices in a couple of events 
such as remaining some of the pre-Islamic etiquettes, acknowledging some of the 
pre-Islamic political conventions such as Íilf al-fuÌËl
16
, Íaq al-jiwÉr, niÐÉm al-
                                                 
13
 “Then Allah sent a raven, who scratched the ground, to show him how to hide the shame of his 
brother. „Woe is me!‟ Said he; „Was I not even able to be as this raven, and to hide the shame of my 
brother?‟ Then he became full of regrets” (Qur’an, 5:27). 
14
 Narrated by AÍmad (2000: 37/333), al-Arnaut recommends this ÍadÊth as authentic due to its 
meaning and wide acceptance by Muslim scholars despite of its weak (ÌaÑÊf) chains of narrators 
(sanad). 
15
 Narrated by Malik in al-MuwaÏÏa´ (Ibn Abdil Bar, 1968: 24/333), and recommended as authentic 
(ØaÍÊÍ) by Ibn Abdil Bar (1968: 24/333-334). The ÍadÊth was also narrated by AÍmad (2000: 14/512-
13). 
16
 fuÌËl commonly means „virtuous‟, while Íilf literally means „alliance‟ or „confederation‟, but the 
term is often translated as „Alliance of the Virtuous‟ (Ibrahim, 1982: 355). It was a pact of the pre-
Islamic Meccan people in which Prophet MuÍammad was involved in its formation during his youth. 
The pact was formulated in order to establish justice in the Arabian peninsular for maintaining the 
harmonious environment amongst the tribes for better trade by upholding the principal of justice, 
helping the vulnerable parties and collective intervention in conflicts to establish justice. The famous 
pact was pledged by various chiefs of tribes in the house of ÑAbdullÉh bin JaÑdan. After receiving the 
revelation, the Prophet lamenting about the pact and affirmed on the legitimacy of such pact before the 
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MuwÉlÉh, etc.  
Another practical example of the status of human Ñaql in Islamic epistemology is the 
tradition, which was reported by one of the Prophet‟s Companions, ÙalÍa who 
narrates: “I was walking with the Prophet when he passed by some people at the tops 
of their palm trees. He asked: „What are they doing?‟ They answered: „Pollinating the 
male into the female.‟ He replied: „I do not think that this will be of benefit.‟ When 
they were told about what the Prophet said, they stopped what they were doing. 
Later, when the trees shed down their fruits prematurely, the Prophet was told about 
that. He said: „If it is good for them they should do it. I was just speculating. So, 
forgive me. But if I tell you something about God, then take it because I would never 
lie about God‟.”17 Another narrator added that Prophet MuÍammad said: “You know 
your worldly affairs better than me (antum aÑlam Ñan umËr dunyÉkum).”18  
Another tradition that implies the same spirit of the importance of learning from the 
experience is Prophet MuÍammad‟s decree on „ghilah‟, which literally means the 
occurrence of sexual intercourse during the period of nursing a child. The pre-Islamic 
Arabs strongly believed that such practice was harmful for the nursing baby if its 
mother were to become pregnant, which in reality has no logical basis. Regarding the 
matter, Prophet MuÍammad was recorded as saying: “I had almost intended to forbid 
„ghilah‟. Then, I noticed that the Byzantines and Persians do that without it causing 
any harm to their children.”19 The Prophet‟s affirmation on the experience of the 
other nations was indeed an indication of a testimonial way in describing the reality, 
which is part of empirical approach in searching for knowledge and truth
20
.  
                                                                                                                                           
revelation by saying, “If I were invited to a similar alliance or treaty in Islam, I would welcome the 
idea.” (Narrated by AÍmad). RamaÌÉn (2007: 20-2) formulates three principles from this pact of 
alliance that will benefit the contemporary Muslims: 1) Islam embraces values derived from the human 
conscience and rationality; 2) Islam acknowledges the righteousness of non-Muslims and the 
importance of preserving justice as a universal value regardless of faith and belief; 3) The message of 
Islam is not a closed value system, but an open one and welcomes any mutual understanding and co-
operation with other value systems on the basis of common interest.  
17
 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1735). 
18
 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1836). 
19
 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 2/1066). 
20
 Amongst them, an example from a ÍadÊth narrated by Muslim (no date: 3/2222) from ÑAmru Bin al-
ÑÓÎ, which he was reported as saying: “I heard the Prophet (Peace be Upon Him) and he said: „On 
Judgement Day most of the People will be Romans‟.” ÑAmru said to him: „What do you mean by what 
you say?‟ He said: „I say what I heard from the Prophet‟. He said: „It may be because they have four 
qualities: they are patient and refrain from civil unrest; they are quick to rouse themselves and recover 
after a disaster; no sooner have they fled then they attack; they are charitable to the poor and the orphan 
and the weak; and fifth: they have prohibited the oppression of kings‟.” Furthermore, this is the spirit 
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The important role of Ñaql in developing knowledge and Islamic recognition of it 
leads MuÍammad Abduh to stress that: “If it were upon the Prophet to explain the 
natural and astronomical sciences, that would be the end of the activity of human 
senses and intellect, and that would spoil human freedom….  Yes, the Prophet 
advised people briefly to use their senses and intellect on whatever improves the 
welfare, broadens their knowledge, and in the end advances their souls….  Therefore, 
the doors for these sciences are intellect and experimentation not tradition and 
religious sciences” (al-DhahabÊ, 2:420). However, despite the appreciation of the role 
of „Ñaql, the realm of rationality in Islam is still a bounded one, as this type of 
rationality only finds its legitimacy within the framework of the ontology or 
„tawhidic reality‟. Any transgression beyond the parameter of the worldview or any 
contradiction with it nullifies the authority of Ñaql in Islamic tradition. This bounded 
rationality distinguishes Islamic epistemology from the Western
21
. 
Accordingly, Islam does not deny the fact that knowledge could be attained and truth 
could be achieved. However, the plausibility for the attainment of knowledge in 
Islam is derived strongly from the basis of Islamic ontology that all the knowledge 
originated from Allah, the all-Knower and the sole Creator. Allah‟s knowledge has 
been imparted to mankind as the „khalÊfah‟ or the trustee in two ways: first, through 
revelation (waÍy), which was only revealed through a few selected people through 
the divine act. This type of knowledge despite of its divine origin was being 
disseminated to all mankind as part of their duty as God‟s messengers to the world. 
In addition, such knowledge was not confined to the metaphysics per se, but also 
included the guidance of human worldly affairs for their well-being (maÎlaÍah) in 
both worlds. The knowledge of the metaphysic, or known in Islamic tradition as the 
ghaybiyyÉt or the unseen can only be known through this way, and accepted as the 
                                                                                                                                           
of cohesion conveyed by al-Qur’an, in which the humankind are addressed by al-Qur’an to learn from 
each other due to the differences in cognitive rationality they may have. See al-Qur‟an (49: 12) “O 
People! We have created you out of a male and a female, and We have made you tribes and sub-tribes 
that you may recognize (and do good to) one another. Surely, the most honourable of you in the sight 
of Allah is he who guards against evil the most. Verily Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware.” 
21
 According to the Western worldview, religion is the domain of faith, where reason and faith could, at 
times, be mutually exclusive. However, in Islam, religion is the domain where reason is exercised to its 
own limits, and admits the existence of true, incorrigible and infallible knowledge, which is obtainable 
only from genuine and authentic messages of God. 
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iÑtiqÉd (belief) with the level of certainty (yaqÊn)
22
.  
The other way Allah imparted His knowledge to mankind was through the „names‟ 
(key of knowledge) that been thought to them. The natural knowledge, which is 
inherited cognitively, makes them able to understand the nature (names) of the world 
and its surroundings. With that natural inherited talent, humans stimulate their 
rationality (Ñaql) and their senses (ÍawÉs) by experience to establish their knowledge 
about the world, its nature and the system of things (sunan al-kawniyyah). This type 
of knowledge could be attained through acquisition (either through invoking the 
rational by thinking, through empirical means or others), hence known as the 
acquired knowledge (Abu Bakar, 2001: 67-68).  
In responding to the demarcation between Godly knowledge and human knowledge, 
Ibn Rushd (1966:185) suggests that human knowledge must not be confused with the 
divine because of their essential differences and that „true‟ knowledge is the 
knowledge „of God‟. This hierarchical structure of epistemology is derived from the 
strict ontological hierarchy in Islamic thought that according to Ibn Rushd, is to 
dignify the nubuwwah (prophecy) as the sole source of the revealed knowledge. He 
deliberately emphasizes this classification to differentiate Islam as the „true‟ religion 
from Greek myths on which Plato built his epistemology (Ibn Rushd, 1966:251).  
In the same vein, Al-GhazÉlÊ in his earlier writings, namely al-MankhËl min TaÑlÊqÉt 
al-UÎËl (The Sifted of Jurisprudence Commentary) had identified ten levels of 
knowledge. The ten levels start with the knowledge of the existence of the self (al-
Ñilm bi wujËd al-dhÉt), pain and pleasure, followed by knowing the impossibility of 
the agreement of contradictions and ending with the knowledge that results from 
narrations (samÑiyyÉt). While dealing with the epistemological issues of knowledge 
in Islam, al-GhazÉlÊ stresses the role of logic and reason as one of the sources of 
knowledge refuting the al-×ashawiyyah group who restricted the sources of 
knowledge to only the Qur‟an and Sunnah without any room for the former. Al-
GhazÉlÊ also concludes that rational discernment (tamyÊz) is the source of knowledge 
                                                 
22
 According to the Muslim theologians, the level of certainty (yaqÊn) also varies according to the imÉn 
(innate belief). The Ñilm yaqÊn (certain knowledge) is only the first step towards believing, established 
through the knowledge of things. The „ayn al- yaqÊn (knowledge by sight), which is the second step in 
believing of the ghaybiyyÉt through experience, in which the certainty of the believed things is gained 
after experiencing some spiritual encounters. The utmost certain knowledge, the Íaqq al-yaqÊn 
(knowledge by the unity of subject and object) is the highest level of knowing and believing and is only 
attainable by an elect few (Akhtar, 1995). 
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to humans and that there is a certain level of discernment (not rational but instincts) 
possessed by the animals making them incapable of seeking truth and knowledge
23
 
(al-GhazÉlÊ, 1970, 50). 
This enumeration of knowledge by al-GhazÉlÊ might not be helpful if being accepted 
in its literal and classical manner. The superficial understanding of the argument will 
lead to the replication of the earlier attempts of the Muslim scholars in enshrining 
their ideals of „Islamic‟ political sciences. However, in establishing „Islamic 
Governance‟ as a new emerging knowledge, the subject should be explored from the 
ethos and moral perspective instead of lengthy discussion on the mechanistic 
institutional or fiqhÊ (legal) approach. In contrast with the conventional political 
institutional approach to the issue of governance, which deal mostly on the deductive 
based mechanistic problems, the ethos and moral horizons dealing with the 
epistemological issue should found the base for a new paradigm. 
Despite of the enumerations and classifications in which the revealed knowledge was 
                                                 
23
 However, in the later stage al-GhazÉlÊ (Bakar, 2006: 203) formulates new categories of knowledge 
specifically in both his treatises, MÊzÉn al-Ñamal and „The Jewels of the Qur´Én‟. In those pieces, he 
suggests that knowledge can be classified into four major categories: theoretical and practical sciences; 
presential (huÌËrÊ) and attained knowledge (huÎËlÊ) sciences; religious (sharÑiyyah) and intellectual 
(Ñaqliyyah) sciences; and farÌ Ñayn (obligatory on every individual) and farÌ kifÉyah (obligatory on all) 
sciences. However, he gives more extensive emphasis for the third category. Religious sciences (al-
ÑulËm al-SharÑiyyah) is defined by al-GhazÉlÊ in his „Book of Knowledge‟ as “those which have been 
acquired from the prophets and are not arrived at either by reason, like arithmetic or by 
experimentation, like medicine, or by hearing, like language” (al-GhazÉlÊ, 1962: 36-7). Where else, the 
intellectual sciences (al-ÑulËm al-Ñaqliyyah), it has been defined by al-GhazÉlÊ as those sciences which 
are attained by the human intellect alone (al-GhazÉlÊ, 1937: III, bk. 1, 1372-4). 
However, his definition of religious sciences was not consistent since in the same book he divided the 
praiseworthy religious sciences into four parts: 1) Science of the sources (uÎËl) which constituted by 
four major sciences, the Qur’an; the Sunnah (Prophetic traditions); the ijmÉÑ (concensus of the Muslim 
mujtahids); and athÉr al-ØaÍÉbah (Traditions of the Companions); 2) Science of the branches (furËÑ), 
that is fiqh (jurisprudence) and science of the Hereafter; 3) Preludes of the sciences (muqaddimÉt), such 
as linguistic sciences to understand the Qur´Én and the Sunnah; 4) Supplementary (mutammimÉt) 
sciences such as the science of Qur‟anic interpretation. 
Ibn KhaldËn (2005 [1967]: 344) enumerates these sciences under the category of the transmitted 
sciences (al-ÑulËm al-naqliyyah), which is wider and larger scope than al-GhazÉlÊ‟s first definition of 
the religious sciences.  
Despite of the different categorizations by al-GhazÉlÊ, Bakar (2006: 205) denies any contradiction 
between the definition and al-GhazÉlÊ‟s latter classification since al-GhazÉlÊ himself gave the title of 
muqaddimÉt (preludes) and mutammimÉt (supplementary) to the third and fourth categories rather than 
calling them the religious sciences by themselves. Consequently, al-GhazÉlÊ (Bakar, 2006:205, 222) 
positions the sciences of ethics and politics under the category of religious sciences rather than 
intellectual or philosophical unlike al-FarÉbÊ who preceded him in the classification of knowledge. In 
his al-Munqidh min al-ÖalÉl (al-GhazÉlÊ, 1952: 19), al-GhazÉlÊ clearly states that the Muslim 
philosophers‟ teachings in the political and ethical sciences were drawn mainly from the revelation 
send to the Prophets. The philosophers, according to al-GhazÉlÊ never separated their knowledge of 
both sciences from the revelation by independently relying on reason. From such a premise and in 
conformity with his definitions, he concludes that political and ethical sciences must be included into 
the division of the religious sciences. 
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given further emphasis and higher status in Islamic intellectual milieu, Muslim 
scholars never maintained that the empirical sciences are useless or harmful. In fact, 
the history of Muslims has shown how that empirical knowledge emerged and 
flourished parallel with other revealed-based knowledge. Although a few incidents 
did happen when some knowledge perceived by certain groups of Muslims as 
contradicting with the fundamentals of Islamic teachings, thus, threatening the 
originality of Islam, it has never managed to shape the mainstream understanding of 
Islam and the tradition of Islamic intellects.  The rejection of non-revealed 
knowledge or any discrimination towards empirical knowledge will result in the 
decline of Muslims in their worldly affairs. With regard to such issues, Faruqi 
(1992:1-5) asseverates that all sciences in Islam, whether religious, moral, or natural 
are essentially a quest to discover the order underlying the variegated world of 
multiplicity. 
In responding to such a classical dilemma, RamaÌÉn (2009) proposes the reading of 
„two books‟ (the revelation and non-revealed knowledge) in order to establish a new 
Islamic paradigm in producing knowledge in the contemporary period. While 
enunciating the limitation of the classical methods of the jurists (fuqahÉ´) and the 
maqasidic approach with a little appreciation of its universal deductive, he insists on 
the need to explore the universal experience. The universal experience, which was 
part of the product of time, is but another verse (ÉyÉt) from God for Muslims to 
comprehend and stimulate their rationality to work on it. This universal experience 
should be understood together with the revelation that guide Muslims with its general 
principles and detailed guidance in some of its parts. Thus, such a suggestion 
indirectly implies the need for a discursive formation between some of the adequate 
Western epistemological strategies with an Islamic one. 
It should be noted that this demarcation of knowledge leads to different 
classifications of knowledge amongst the classical Muslim scholars, based on the rule 
of priority they believe in. The enumeration prepares the foundation for an alternative 
ideal for governance. This alternative ideal will be structured on the „ontological 
determined epistemology‟ or the „articulated tawhidic reality epistemology‟. 
Similarly, tawhidic reality oriented epistemology also implies that knowledge 
possessed by human beings is only valued by obeying God‟s guidance in the 
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terrestrial life
24
. By implementing such, human beings will guarantee their falÉÍ. In 
this case, such articulation of „tawhidic reality‟, is obviously contrasting the post-
Enlightenment Western epistemologies, which are literally based solely on the 
metaphysic negation ontology, which is classified by Davutoglu (1994) as 
ontological proximity. This rejection of „God‟ interference in the field of knowledge 
flourished in the Western scholars‟ inquiry of reason and rationality in defining the 
reality hence formulating the „humanistic‟ episteme, which is in a total contradiction 
with Islam. El-Messiri (1994) argues that such materialistic and humanistic 
epistemologies ignite the very idea of imperialism, which is the continuation of 
physical colonialism.
25
 The internationalization or universalization of these 
humanistic worldviews lead to the exclusion of „others‟ worldview, which entails the 
denial of other‟s values, beliefs, faiths and norms in the field of knowledge. Other‟s 
knowledge was merely considered as myth, non-valuable, useless and tales before the 
Westerners.  
5.2.4. Epistemological Sources: Methodological Concerns 
The ontological and epistemological aspects are the most crucial elements in 
establishing the foundation required for the axiomatic approach in developing 
„Islamic governance‟. Philosophical enquiries in establishing the grounded theory, 
which contributes to knowledge development, must have its own unique foundational 
dimension, which differentiates it from the others. Hence, knowledge from „tawhidic‟ 
understanding is not the result of inventing or rediscovering or knowing something 
                                                 
24
 This notion of knowledge requires a holistic approach that entails the embracement of socio-political 
and moral aspects. One who possesses knowledge in Muslim history is also the one who is himself 
furnished with high morality and ethics. The possession of knowledge invokes the owner of the 
knowledge to act upon their beliefs and commit themselves to the goals, which Islam aims at attaining.  
Hence, the Islamic theory of knowledge encompasses knowledge (the process of acquiring 
information), insight, social actions and the fruits of the knowledge itself. While in the same manner, 
the ultimate purpose of Ñilm or knowledge according to the Tawhidic reality is for one to execute his 
mission as KhalÊfah, and in the same meaning, the attainment of knowledge is also for the well-being 
of the human life in both worlds
24
. In such manner, this paradigm can guide Muslims to separate 
between „good‟ and „bad‟ knowledge and ideas according to their worldview (Mir, 1999: 101). 
25
 The imperialistic epistemological vision according to el-Messiri, stood upon certain „Eurocentric‟ 
pillars such as rationalisation, secularisation, expansion and invasion, which lead to the centricity of 
Western sciences upon the others. This worldview has lead to the calamities and genocides on the non-
Western soils by the Westerner colonial powers under the banner of secular imperialism based on 
materialistic, utilitarian and rational view. He even insists that the historical baggage of this 
Imperialistic epistemology vision also encompasses the disaster perpetrated by the Nazi in European 
soil itself (el-Messiri, 1994).   
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unknown, but the rediscovery of that which has always been known. This challenges 
the post-Enlightenment West worldview‟s domination on knowledge. 
Upon such rationale, the quest to formulate an Islamic model of governance requires 
new ijtihÉd to converge both revelation and acquired knowledge. New methods, 
which are more dynamic but at a same time normative, should be employed to 
proliferate Islamic ideals on the governance issue in conforming to the parameter of 
„tawhidic reality‟ determined epistemology. This new method must have the role of 
the rational to abstain any literalist approach towards the texts (revelation). A new 
way in looking into the substantive issues within the text by taking into the account 
the context and socio-historical elements in applying certain interpretation of the text 
relate to the field of governance is indispensable. Moreover, (bounded) rationality is 
also vital in developing holistic ethical and moral concepts from the revelation for the 
field of governance. Furthermore, such „moral foundation‟ could be developed 
through a thorough examination on the universal values and common senses from the 
highest objective of SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah) through the „universal inductive 
method‟ to achieve „human well-being‟.  
Accordingly, this new method demands for an exploration of significant ontological 
determined epistemological sources to ensure the originality of the new model (as a 
new emerging knowledge) in terms of sources, framework, concepts and objectives. 
Revelation, represented by al-Qur’an26 and Sunnah (Prophet MuÍammad tradition) 
are major references in the realm of Islamic epistemology
27
, while the history of the 
four guided Caliphs (al-khulafÉ´ al-rÉshidËn), as a historical proof on the articulation 
of the revelation is another undisputed source in such formulation. However, this 
does not give any divinity to their experience or any impeccability to their actions. 
Finally, maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah (the higher objectives of SharÊÑah) as another approach 
towards understanding revelation will be another epistemological source in 
                                                 
26
 Davenport ([1882] 2009: 48-49) says: “The Qur‟an is the general code of the Muslim world, a social 
civil, commercial, military, judiciary, criminal, penal and yet religious code. By it everything is 
regulated – from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life, from the salvation of the soul to the 
health of the body, from the rights of general community to those of each individual, from the interest 
of man to those of society, from morality to crime, from punishment here to that of the life to come”. 
27
 Gibb (1958: 73-74) explains: “For Muslims its proof-texts were to be found in the Koran and 
Prophetic Tradition; and on this assumption the jurists and theologians of the second century elaborated 
a structure of Law that is, from the point of view of logical perfection, one of the most brilliant essays 
of human reasoning”. 
Chapter Five: Searching for Ontological and Epistemological Sources for Islamic 
Governance 
 148 
fathoming any „implicit general idea‟ or hidden wisdom of SharÊÑah in its bigger 
picture to be reflected unto the field of governance. 
In the quest of Islamic epistemology, the tawhidic reality only provides the 
foundation for the question „what is worth to know‟. The proposition in replying to 
such a question leads to the establishment of the sources of knowledge without 
further explanation on how to derive knowledge from the sources. The revelation is 
that represented by al-Qur’an and Sunnah requires certain esoteric methods in 
formulating knowledge. The status of reason in corresponding to the revelation also 
demands another epistemological method in bringing the harmonization between the 
two sources. In responding to such topics, Muslim scholars, mainly the uÎËliyyËn 
(jurists) have elucidated few methods, which resulted to different approaches in 
extracting rulings and knowledge from the sources.  
Al-ShÉfiÑÊ for instance, adopts the textual analysis through procedures for 
interpreting the meaning of the revealed text, and extends its application to actions 
and events not directly addressed by revelation (Khudari Beq, 2002: 5). This method 
resulted in the emergence of many new knowledge, such as fiqh (Islamic rulings), 
ÑulËm ÍadÊth (Sciences of ×adÊth) and ÑulËm al-Qur´Én (Sciences of al-Qur´Én) and 
uÎËl al-Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) itself as a science of epistemology. In dealing 
with the revelation, al-ShÉfiÑÊ strongly emphasized the language and literature 
explanation of both al-Qur’an and Sunnah without neglecting the context which was 
supported by the asbÉb al-nuzËl and asbÉb al-wurËd (al-ShafiÑÊ, 1940 [1358H]). Al-
ShafiÑÊ‟s method was later emulated by master uÎËl al-fiqh scholars, known as the 
ShafiÑites or al-MutakallimËn. In contrast to the ShafiÑites, the Hanafites tried to 
enumerate certain groups of rulings from the revelation based on its similarity and 
the common ground thus clarifying their logical underlying causes (ÑillÉt) which lead 
to the rulings instead of looking into the details of the evidence from al-Qur’an and 
Sunnah separately or particularly. From this extraction methodology, the Hanafites 
formulate certain principles, tenets and categories (qawÉÑid istinbÉÏ) to be applied on 
new events, which SharÊÑah is silent on. Such methods reconstruct the sequences of 
dialectical reasoning (text-context), starting from legal answers and working its way 
up towards the codification and theoretical fundamentals (Khudari Beq, 2002: 6).   
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Realizing the limitation of revelation (Qur‟anic text and the Prophet‟s tradition) 
Muslim scholars resorted to the method of (fiqhÊ) qiyÉs or legal analogy. For 
centuries, the method being accepted by nearly consensus of scholars as a primary 
procedure for extending the rules of SharÊÑah to new events which no provision could 
be found in the revelation about them. However, these two methods only work 
excellently in the field of positive legalistic or mainly utilized as the tool of deriving 
the fiqhÊ rulings or the Islamic jurisprudence from revelation.  Its limitation in 
covering larger and wider events for the narrow result of such procedure (by 
comparing two particular objects or events only) leads to its inability to cover other 
aspects of knowledge concerning human life. 
Along with the aforementioned limitations, the two previous methods are also 
ostensibly absent of the overarching principles of general SharÊÑah rulings, which are 
useful to establish new formulation of a new method in harmonizing revelation and 
reason (Safi, 1996: 90-1). Despite of the wide acceptance of the two methods for 
centuries in the field of fiqh, they failed to formulate a useful tool for the Muslim 
intellects to communicate with the social sciences based on Islamic epistemology and 
worldview. This phenomena lead to the scarcity of literatures in such fields for 
several centuries. Eventually loopholes invoked IbrÉhÊm al-ShÉÏibÊ (died 790H) to 
establish his thesis of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah (the higher objectives of SharÊÑah) based 
on the procedure akin to Ibn Sina‟s „form of argument‟28, which promotes the pattern 
of syllogism (logical qiyÉs) and induction (istiqrÉ´).  
Al-ShÉÏibÊ (1996: 2/ 29-39) argues that the particular or juz´Ê rules of SharÊÑah are not 
operating independently by themselves, but rather governed by the universal laws 
(qawÉnÊn kulliyyah). These laws, according to al-ShÉÏibÊ could be indentified through 
a thorough reading on the revelation, which represents the „SharÊÑah‟. This thorough 
reading or what he coins as istiqrÉ´ kulliÊ (complete induction) procedure expands the 
scope of ijtihÉd from its early narrow limitation of particular legal qiyÉs to the wider 
universal laws to govern the rules of new events all over the time. This new 
procedure utilize both induction (particular to general) and deduction (general to 
                                                 
28
 Ibn Sina (1960: 169-75) notes that the movement of thoughts (fikr) in reasoning entails the 
production of new knowledge. The movement of thoughts can only produce scientific knowledge if it 
follows the form of an argument (Íujjah). The argumentation could then follow the two main patterns 
of syllogism (logical qiyas) in which is designed to ensure the validity of the argument (ÎiÍaÍ) with its 
formal rules; and induction (istiqrÉ´), which is beyond the normal, applied deductive reasoning. 
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particular) methods in harmonizing revelation and reason. Such a comprehensive 
new approach, however, is distinguished from the classical application of inductive 
method by al-ShafiÑÊ (through his demarcation of generality (ÑÉm) and specificity 
(khÉs)) by its functional purpose. Instead of applying it only as a tool for textual 
analysis, al-ShÉÏibÊ includes istiqrÉ´ as a methodological tool for deriving principles. 
In the same token, al-ShÉÏibÊ also managed to integrate inductive and deductive 
reasoning into a unified methodology. 
The maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah approach also implies the new utilisation of logical qiyÉs 
(syllogism) to replace the conventional fiqhÊ qiyÉs (legal analogy) in legal reasoning. 
The tool that was so popular in kalÉm (theosophical) tradition as well as the 
philosophical works has been introduced by al-ShÉÏibÊ to replace the tamthÊlÊ qiyÉs 
(analogy) or fiqhÊ qiyÉs (legal analogy) as the only allowed form in fiqh studies 
throughout the centuries. The syllogism became so essential in the process of 
formulating SharÊÑah rules from the revelation after al-ShÉÏibÊ managed to prove the 
necessity to combine both induction and deduction approaches for the systemisation 
of fiqh. Based on the syllogism, al-ShÉÏibÊ concludes that the universal laws or higher 
objectives (which he calls maqÉÎid) of SharÊÑah are to protect and promote human 
interest (maÎÉliÍ) in the terrestrial life and also in the Hereafter. This maqÉÎid is to be 
categorized into three hierarchical levels, in which the maqÉÎid al-ÌarËriyah 
(necessary purposes) resides at the top, and followed by the ÍÉjiyyÉt (exigencies) and 
taÍsÊniyyÉt (facilities) respectively
29
 (al-ShÉÏibÊ, 1996: 2/326).  
In sum, al-ShÉÏibÊ managed to establish a new epistemology in producing new 
Islamic knowledge through his istiqrÉ´ kulliyy (complete induction) method. The 
classical Muslim scholars of manÏiq (reason) who employed the procedure of 
induction in their arguments (Íujaj) differentiated between istiqrÉ´ tÉmm (complete 
induction) and istiqrÉ´ nÉqis (incomplete induction). The application of the former 
will lead to the production of definite (qaÏÑiy) knowledge while the former gives a 
Ðanniyy (probable) knowledge (al-GhazÉlÊ, 1993: 1/51-2). In doing such, al-ShÉÏibÊ 
                                                 
29
 The al-maqÉÎid al-ÌarËriyyÉt is essential to human life and is indispensable for the attainment of the 
„interest of religion and life‟, without which destruction and disorder would prevail. There are five 
necessary purpose of SharÊÑah in this category: the preservation and the promotion of religion (dÊn), 
life (ÍayÉt), progeny (nasl), property (mÉl) and intellect („aql); while the ÍÉjiyyÉt are the corollary 
principles intended to ease hardship and extreme difficulties which could lead to idleness and 
inactivity; and the taÍsÊniyyÉt are to promote the positive in human life which belongs to the area of 
virtue and morality (al-ShÉÏibÊ, 1996: 326).  
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sheds specific light on this rule-extracting process and imposes a general deductive 
approach in the light of the said higher objective.  
According to such approach, examination of texts cannot be carried out unless public 
interest (al-maÎlaÍah al-ÑÉmmah) is taken into account. Ultimately, the preservation 
and promotion of the maÎÉliÍ (interests) are only determined to serve the higher 
objective set up by the divine Lawgiver. This method harmonizes revelation and Ñaql 
(rationality), or even more, it gives rationality an enormous role in interpreting the 
revelation (Al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 2004: 70). It might be one of the useful tools in the creation 
of new knowledge based on ontology-determined epistemology. Furthermore, the 
understanding of the universal laws of SharÊÑah from the maqasidic approach will 
give a wider scope of exploration on the moral issues in the governance field. Despite 
of its heavy dependence on reason, the maqasidic approach still keeping the tawhidic 
reality thus remains as the bedrock for its ontology.  
However, the post-modern world urges the Muslims to deal with the texts beyond the 
aforesaid traditional and classical way of the fuqahÉ´ (jurists). Texts must not be 
confined in the classical orthodox epistemological framework, but must be expanded 
to an epistemological enquiry by looking into its meaning for the contemporary 
sciences. In achieving such means, Muslim intellects should depart from their initial 
traditional paradigm in dealing with the sources. With due respect to the 
aforementioned comprehensively evolved method developed, the expansion of the 
Qur’an-Sunnah episteme requires a re-reading both of the scriptures of the texts. The 
new reality of human knowledge due to the changes in life, in specific the 
humanities, demand a new approach
30
 in looking into the two sources (Al-Alwani, 
1991). This new approach, however, is not the modification of the sources, but rather 
a transformation of the mind and eyes that read them, which are indeed naturally 
influenced by the new social, political, economical, and geographical and 
scientifically environment in which they live. A new context changes the horizon of 
                                                 
30 The call for renewal and the re-reading the texts is not a new phenomenon. The late al-AfghÉnÊ and 
his disciple, MuÍammad ÑAbduh promoted it in the calling for reform (iÎlÉÍ wa tajdÊd). As for al- 
AfghÉnÊ, ÑAbduh and the proponents of reform, amongst those causes that can rejuvenate the ummah 
(Muslim community) is the new interpretation of the Qur’an. ÑAbduh (1966) with his eclectic theology 
approach proposes that the SharÊÑah is equivalent to natural law (with the exception of religious rites 
(taÑabbudiy) (Enayat, 1982)). In expanding the guidance of al-Qur’an and shunning away from the 
limitation of the traditional literal exegesis of al-Qur´Én, ÑAbduh believes, for: “On the Last Day God 
will not question us on the commentators on how they understood the Qur‟an, but He will question us 
on His Book which He sent down to guide and instruct us” (Jansen, 1974: 19). 
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the text, renews it and sometimes gives it an original purport, providing responses 
never before imagined (RamaÌÉn, 2006: 4). 
5.2.5. New Approach to the texts: Epistemological method-related concerns 
In referring to the topic of governance, the maqasidic method could be crystallized 
by having a holistic and comprehensive contemplation of the Qur‟anic verses and the 
authentic Sunnah
31
. They are to be understood to derive some concepts, principals 
and terms based on their accurate and proper understanding and their usage without 
neglecting the socio-historical factor during the Prophetic era.  
In dealing with the texts for the establishment of new principles of governance, the 
exploration of the Qur‟anic episteme is to be used in extracting moral and ethical 
principles and values that correspond to the issue of governance.
32
 It is worth also to 
look into the texts from the consequentialistic „moral and value‟ perspective, since 
the resulting hermeneutic of legal rulings is based not so much on specific rules 
                                                 
31
 Al-DiÍlawÊ (Hermansen, 1995: 387) asserts that: “There is no way for us to obtain knowledge of the 
divine laws ... except through the report of the Prophet... There is also no way for us to have knowledge 
of the sayings of the Prophet … except by receiving reports which go back to him by successive links 
and transmission, whether they are in his words; or they are interrupted Traditions whose transmission 
was verified by a group of the Companions and the Successors...and in our time there is no way to 
receive these reports except to follow the literature written in the science of Tradition.” 
32
 As an example: Al-Buraey (1985: 237), derives certain principles related to politics and 
administration which is useful in the exploration of the discussion of governance: 
1. Sovereignty: General (2:255) (3:26) (6:18) (13: 9, 16, 41) (18:26) (20:6) (21:23) (23:88) (36:83) 
(38:5) (59:23) (95:8) (114:1-3). A. Sovereignty of God alone (2:107) (3:154) (6:57) (7:54) (12:40) 
(16:28) (18:26); B. Legal Sovereignty (2:229) (5:44,45,47) (7:3) 
2. Fundamental Right: General (2:258) (3:105) (4:29,93,148) (5:78,79) (6:109,165) (17:33) (24:23,27) 
(31:18) (49:6). A. Security of Life (17:33); B. The Right to Private Property (2:188,267); C. The Right 
to Human Dignity (49:11,12); D. The Right to Privacy (24:27,58) (49:12); E. The Right to Dissent 
(3:110) (4:59) (7:165); F. The Right to Religious Tolerance (6:108) (29:46); G. The Right to Legal 
Defence (4:58) (17:36) (49:6); H. The Right to equality Before the Law (28:4); I. The Right to Basic 
Necessities (51: 19); J. Freedom of Association (3:104); K. Freedom of Belief and Conviction (2:256) 
(10:99); L. The Principle of Personal Responsibility (6:164). 
3. Principles of State, Government and Administration: General (4:58,59) (5:2) (7:69,74,128,129) 
(21:105) (22:40,41) (24:55) (35:39) (38:26) (42:38) (49:13) (57:25) 
A. Rights of the State over Citizens: (i. Loyalty (4:59); ii. Maintenance of Law and Order (2:191) 
(5:33) (7:85); iii. Co-operation and its limits (5:2) (76:24); iv. Participation in Defence (9:38,39));  
B. Principles of Foreign Policy: (i. Mutual Respect for Pacts and Treaties (8:58) (9:4,7) (16:91) 
(17:34); ii. Honesty and Integrity in All Dealings (16:92); iii. International Justice (5:8); iv. The Quest 
for Peace (8:61); v. Respect for Neutrality and Non-Combatants (4:89,90); vi. Prohibition of 
Imperialist Exploitation (16:92) (28:83); vii. Protection and Support for Muslims Abroad (8:72); viii. 
Friendly Relations with Neutral Powers (60:8,9); ix. Kindness in International Relations (55:60); x. 
Just Retribution for Transgressors (2:194) (16:126) (42:40-2)); 
C. The Administration of Justice (4:58,135) (5:8,42) (6:153) (7:29) (16:90) (24:2) (42:15) (57:25); D. 
The Ruler and the Ruled (2:124,247) (4:58,59) (5:2,33,34) (12:55) (18:28) (26:151,152) (49:13); E. 
People‟s Authority (2:247) (3:26) (4:59,83); F. The Principle of Consultation (shËrÉ) (3:159) (42:38); 
G. The Principle of Leadership (2:124,247) (3:118) (4:58,59,83) (18:28) (26:150-2) (38:28) (39:9) 
(49:13). 
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spelled out by the text as it is on the ethical principles revealed as God‟s purposes 
behind the text.
33
 Such approach is indeed in the line with the spirit of the revelation 
itself in which most of the verses and rulings understood from the verses (even those 
that directing to the total obedience to God), justified or reasoned by their moral 
aspect, which is the ramifications of the acts that can benefit the worldly life thus 
going along with reason. 
According to Abduh (1966), human reason must be used in the line of the Qur‟anic 
guidance, since throughout its text, the Qur’an asserts the importance of using human 
reason and knowledge as a way to know God and be a good Muslim.
34
 Abduh asserts 
the importance of using one‟s practical sense when interpreting. He critiques the 
approach of using the classical understanding of al-Qur’an, which fails to have useful 
answers to many of the contemporary questions being asked by ordinary people and 
the intellectuals during his period who have been strongly influenced by the rational 
thinking of the „West‟. It was his aspiration to see religion (Islam) to be involved in 
their life, instead of remaining an abstraction and existing only in the mosques‟ 
sphere
35
. 
However, it ought to be noted, that all the worldly rulings and the instruction did not 
explicitly expound in al-Qur’an. Or else, it would not be a sustainable guidance for 
human beings due to its contextual nature from the exoteric meaning of the Book. 
The Qur‟an can only function as the last long guidance through its enlightening 
approach towards worldly matters. Verse 69 in chapter 16 implies that the Book (al-
Qur’an) as „tibyÉn‟ (enlightening) for everything. Any attempt to explain the verse 
otherwise will bring a massive contradiction with the reality. The divine 
Enlightenment from the text thus must be translated into the general guidance 
through the process of „tadabbur‟ (reasoning and contemplating). 
                                                 
33
 For instance, al-Qur‟an replete with comments on social matters such as often taking a humane stand 
on behalf of the weak (Ahmed, 1985:47), mutual cooperation amongst the people, and the need for 
social justice in order to maintain stability in this worldly life and the life Hereafter. In the spirit of 
such critical revisiting of the way to deal with al-Qur’an, one can learn from al-Ghazali critiques on the 
effort to understand al-Qur´Én from its literal meaning. In referring to such methods, he insists that the 
method is not sufficient for an understanding of the realities of the real meanings (haqÉ´iq al-maÑÉnÊ) 
of al-Qur’an.” (Heer, 1999: 241). 
34
 In many verses, the Qur’an gives an indication of this issue, amongst them (2:102) and (114:1-7). As 
for the importance and use of reason, see, for example, (79:26). 
35
 It can be seen on his passion that … “Islam should be the moral basis of a modern and progressive 
society, but that it could not approve everything done in the name of modernization ... A Muslim 
society could adopt European ideas and sciences without abandoning Islam itself” (Hopwood, 1998: 6). 
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Accordingly, the consideration of the socio-cultural and socio-political context of the 
verses, which could be detected through historical events concurrent with their 
revelation, will assist the understanding of the underlying causes of those verses. This 
approach helps the exploration of Islamic ethical messages and philosophical 
precepts that are worth to be applied to the field of governance, hence developing a 
new science called Islamic governance. Such an approach brings the implicit 
messages related to the governance issue unearthed from the two sources to be more 
morally and rationally reasonable than the dominant discourse of the traditional 
(relatively) deontological legal positivistic fiqhÊ approach. However, this approach 
does not imply the negation of all the existing exegesis formulated by the classical 
scholars. Classical mufassirËn (scholars of tafsÊr or exegesis) have contributed their 
best in preserving the original meaning of the revelation that suits the situation they 
were living with
36
. Despite of their contextual-oriented exegesis, it prepares a general 
outline for the later generation in dealing with the text through the understanding of 
proper usage of certain semantic and technical terms, concepts and principals in the  
Qur‟an. The semantic and metaphoric elements in the Qur‟an lie strongly from the 
full comprehension of the Arabic language. Consequently, the classical exegesis, 
which is strongly based on the tradition and full understanding of the Arabic 
language, enables one to comprehend the messages conveyed by the  Qur‟an. The 
unfamiliarity with the Arabic language, its style, and the Islamic faith may be barriers 
to a true interpretation of the Qur‟an (Al-Baqillani, 1951)37.  
Equally, Prophet MuÍammad‟s tradition or the Sunnah also requires a new method to 
deal with.
38
 Sunnah as a whole is not to be viewed with monolithic lenses; in fact, the 
classical scholars divided the actions of the Prophet into distinct categories. The 
division of Sunnah into legislative (sunnah tashrÊÑiyyah) and non-legislative Sunnah 
                                                 
36
 The Classical approach to the exegesis and commentary of al-Qur‟an can generally divided into two 
major methods: interpretation of the  Qur‟an according to the traditions (tafsÊr bi al-ma´thËr), in which 
the interpretation of the  Qur‟an through the  Qur‟an itself, or the Prophet‟s traditions (sunnah), or the 
opinion of the Companions (ÎaÍÉbah) and the early generation of Muslims (al-salaf al-ÎÉlih); while the 
second method of interpretation of the  Qur‟an was known as the interpretation according to individual 
opinion (tafsÊr bi al-ra´y), in which the exegetes use their own reason in understanding the meaning of 
the  Qur‟an (Ayoub, 1984: 22-23)   
37
 As al- Baqillani (1951: 31) says in his „IÑjÉz al-Qur´Én‟ (Miracle of the Qur’an): “no one could 
appreciate its miracle like the well-versed Arabic linguists.” 
38
 In this research, I would opt the moderate way in dealing with Sunnah. Only authentic (ÎaÍÊÍ or 
Íassan) ÍadÊth will be accepted in this thesis. In dealing with the method of identifying authentic 
ÍadÊth, I rather combine the method of the mutaqaddimËn (the early scholars of ÍadÊth) and the 
muta´akhkhirËn (the later generation of the scholars of ÍadÊth). 
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(sunnah ghayr tashrÊÑiyyah) as an example, has provided useful guidance in order to 
distinguish between a ÍadÊth, which provides a basis for a fiqh rulings and a ÍadÊth, 
which does not (al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 1998). Furthermore, the Sunnah, concerning the 
political field is to be demarcated between what is „tashrÊÑ‟‟ (legislative / legally 
binding) and what is „siyÉsah‟ (politically oriented / not legally binding)39. These are 
the rulings, which originate from the Prophet in his capacity as imam or head of the 
state in his dealing with political issues and state administration, and are heavily 
depending on the contexts. This type of Sunnah does not entitle individuals to any 
right, nor oblige them unless a lawful authority to that effect gives a decree (al-
Qarafi, no date: 1/205-09).  
Those politically oriented decisions made by the Prophet, as crystallized by Ibn al-
Qayyim (1973: 4/ 373), “to realize the benefit of the public (ummah) on that specific 
context and situation”. He coined such kind of Sunnah as „siyÉsah juz´iyyah‟ 
(specific policy)
40
. Consequently, for this type of Sunnah, it is not legally binding on 
Muslims in later generations; rather it is a political decision made by the Prophet that 
can be accepted or rejected due to the benefit of the public on the context and 
situation in following the footstep of the Prophet from whom derives the judgement 
out of such principle (UthmÉnÊ, 2006: 14). Such a stance relates to the doctrine that 
Prophet MuÍammad did resort to his reasoning (ijtihÉd) in worldly matters that do 
not relate to the rituals, morals and core tenets of the creed (Shaltut, 2001: 499-503).   
Such demarcation was explored even during the days of the Prophet. The 
                                                 
39
 The Classical UÎËl al-Fiqh scholars discussed the demarcation between various instructions of the 
Prophet in his capacity as a „political leader‟ and those actions and instructions in his capacity as a 
„divinely inspired prophet‟. They are: a) Special legislative actions not predicated upon revelation, but 
special or specific actions relating to managing the state. For these type of Sunnah, They are not 
binding upon the whole ummah or future generations; b) Actions related to the public interest, which 
the Prophet acting as a „head of government‟ and without which harm may occur to some specific 
circumstances and not a general rule for legislation; c) Actions/inferences, based upon a mere personal 
choice and preference. This is where the Companions of the Prophet would always distinguish between 
His actions as a [divinely inspired] Messenger and those as a political and military leader. In regard to 
this category of Sunnah, the Prophet frequently consulted the relevant people on matters related to their 
expertise many occasions (i.e. such as warfare) due to the Qur‟anic advice to him “consult them about 
the matter”; d) Actions related to non-religious matters, the scholars differentiated between the ÑibÉdah 
(worship) and the muÑÉmalah (social interaction). However, Ibn ÑÓshËr (2006: 34) expounded more on 
the issue and divided the Sunnah into 12 categories: Legislation (tashrÊÑ), issuing edicts (fatwÉ), 
adjudication (qaÌÉ´), political leadership of the state (ÑimÉrah), guidance (hady), conciliation (ÎulÍ), 
advice to those seeking his opinion (ishÉrah), counselling (naÎÊÍah), spiritual uplifting of people 
(takmÊl al-nufËs), teaching of transcendent knowledge or lofty truth (taÑlÊm al-haqÉ´iq al-ÑÉliyah), 
disciplining (ta´dÊb) and non-instructive ordinary statements (tajarrud Ñan al-irshÉd). 
40
 It was categorised by Ibn ÑÓshËr as „al-tashrÊÑÉt al-juz´iyyah‟ (specific jurisdiction), (Ibn ÑÓshËr, 
2006: 36).  
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Companions have shown their concern on what is „revealed‟ and what is „rational‟ 
from the Prophet‟s decision41 (al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 1998: 38). They repeatedly asked the 
Prophet before putting their opposing ideas to the Prophet‟s, “Is that what was 
revealed to you, or was it merely your idea?” or “Was that from the revelation, or 
was that a strategy for war?”, etc. These are related to policy matters which could 
best be dealt with by the concerned leadership through the process of consultation 
(shËrÉ). It is therefore argued that a distinction should be made between a decision 
made on a question of law and a decision made on a question of policy. These 
decisions concerned policy issues and were not intended to become permanent legal 
rules (al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 1998).  
However, such enumeration does not imply the negation of religion and its values in 
Muslims‟ life. The terrestrial affairs conducted by Muslims albeit its ijtihÉdÊ 
(rational) nature are still within the radius of their tawhidic worldview, hence not 
detached from its foundational core. The Prophet himself advised his Companions by 
saying: “If I command you of the religious matters, execute them; and what I 
command you due to my rationale, verily I am a human being”42. In the same vein, as 
for the political and economic issues, the decisions taken by the Prophet was merely 
based on rationality but still taking into account the revealed knowledge in 
determining the aim and impact of the decision. In dealing with this type of 
traditions, they should not be taken as definite, rigid, and defined rules meant for all 
times and all situations to come as mentioned earlier. Instead, we should focus on 
what the Prophet intended to achieve (Rahman, 1996: 147-8).  
Those traditions should be understood to have meant to „prevent a certain public 
harm and to acquire a certain public interest (maÎlaÍah ÑÉmmah).‟ The spirit of „the 
prevention of public harm (mafsadah) and the acquisition of public interest‟ should 
                                                 
41
 There are many incidents to prove such claim. For instance: during the battle of Badr, Hubab bin 
Mundhir, one of the Companions voiced out such worry when he counter-proposed the Prophet‟s 
decision to place the Muslim army on the top of the hill; in the same token Omar objected to the 
Prophet‟s decision on the fate of Badr‟s prisoners of war; While on an other occasion, the Prophet‟s 
decision to maintain the people of Medina inside the city was opposed by the majority, who preferred 
to leave Medina and engage in an open fight with the Makkan army during the battle of UÍud; in the 
same way Salman‟s idea to dig a ditch surrounding Medina during the AÍzÉb battle (also known as the 
battle of the ditch (Khandaq)) was adopted due to his experience witnessing the Persian strategy in 
countering the enemies siege; and many more reflect how the Companions managed to differentiate 
between what is „revealed‟ and what is a mere „rationale‟ from Prophet‟s decisions (al-MubÉrakfËrÊ, 
2002: 195, 208, 222, 273). 
42
 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1835). 
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be pursued. However, the means used to prevent public harm or to achieve public 
interest may differ and the qualification and quantification of such benefit differ from 
one context to another. In dealing with those traditions, Ibn al-Qayyim (1973: 4/ 373) 
asserts that most of the policies were taken for the sake of justice and to be defined by 
public interests. Furthermore, it was not the actions to be understood or emulated 
literally, but the spirit and the underlying causes that could be fathomed.  
In concluding on such discussion, RiÌÉ (1984: 10) states that “any rules derived from 
the sunnah (traditions), if they are not directly related to religious matters (al-aÍkÉm 
al-dÊniyyah), are the fruit of Prophet‟s ijtihÉd, and we are not obligated to follow him 
in „civil, political, and military matters‟ (al-maÎÉliÍ al-madÉniyyah wa al-siyÉsiyyah 
wa al-Íarbiyyah)”, is a useful guide to be implemented in revisiting the 
epistemological aspect of the Sunnah. He further suggests that: “God has entrusted 
(fawwaÌa) to Muslims the management of their worldly affairs, both individual and 
collective, particular and general, on the condition that the worldly offend neither 
religion nor the guidance of the SharÊÑah”. This statement should be a maxim to 
enlightening the whole process of investigating the ethical and moral messages from 
the Sunnah in relation with the topic governance.   
While in the matter of governance, although it is not necessary to emulate or impose 
literally the Prophet‟s traditions that are merely based on his political judgments, 
nonetheless they are needed in order to understand the underlying ethical and moral 
rationalities with all the values hidden in them from the aforementioned 
consequentialistic value and moral approach. The Prophet‟s actions and decisions 
along with the wisdoms beneath them should be viewed under the universal 
principals extracted from the Qur’an earlier to provide the stable moral framework 
for the governance process as could be seen in the ensuing chapter. The inter-
connection between these two sources is utterly essential in expounding the 
comprehensive and integrated meaning of Islamic guidance according to the tawhidic 
worldview. The negation of any of these two sources will lead to the incomplete 
picture of Islam, hence giving the wrong result and misleading message. By 
formulating such mechanism, the tawhidic episteme will be overarching the 
establishment of „Islamic‟ governance. 
In looking into how the revelation from both the Qur´Én and the Sunnah could be 
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articulated into different contexts and situations, the experience of the four guided 
Caliphs, as the first righteous leaders in Muslim history must be taken into account. 
The decisions and actions taken by the Caliphs in their governance reflect their social 
realization understanding of the text on how it works within the realm of political-
economic life different from the time it was revealed (the Prophet‟s period), and not 
dealing with them with a mere consequential independence deontological approach. 
The differences of ijtihÉd taken by them will enshrine the more holistic view on how 
the messages could be implemented amid changes and in different ways yet still be 
inspired and enlightened by the same principals and spirit.  However, by exploring 
the epistemological aspects of Caliphatic history does not necessarily mean they have 
to be emulated literally without taking the context and the socio-historical factors of 
the time into account and which are discussed in the following section to provide 
historical contextualisation for the use of ontology and epistemology of Islam in 
developing principles and policies. 
5.2.6. Historical Context of Islamic Epistemology: Experience in the KhulafÉ´ al-
RÉshidËn Period 
Unlike the teleology, dialectic and historicism approach, Muslims‟ approach to 
history focuses mainly on the lessons (Ñibar, singular: Ñibrah) that can be learned 
from it (Ibn KhaldËn, 2005). Many lessons could be learned from Muslim history 
since the first day of revelation. However, the period of the Prophet‟s Companions 
occupy a special position of eminence and merit in Islamic epistemological inquiry as 
well in Islamic faith (Ibish, 1966: 108). It is simply because they were the first to 
believe in Islam, and they witnessed the revelation, living with the Prophet, and the 
recipients of the message when it was first handed to the human being and then 
articulated into the worldly life. By such virtue, and of their closeness to the Prophet 
they were regarded as the best authority for the knowledge of the Prophet‟s tradition. 
Despite the fact, it was the four-right guided Caliphs (Abu Bakar, ÑUmar, ÑUthmÉn 
and ÑAlÊ) who were the most prominent followers amongst the Companions 
according to Muslims apart from the Shi‟ite tradition (Ibish, 1966: 110). As for the 
epistemology of Islamic governance, the practices of those four Caliphs are to be 
taken as part of the way of how revelation guidance is to be articulated into their 
governance style.  
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The first four Caliphs are regarded as the orthodox pious rulers of the Muslim ummah 
and Islamic community. As Muslims believe, it was during their period that Islam 
was practised perfectly and, with the dramatic conquests and the expansion of the 
Islamic state, was described by Lewis (2006:12): “it appeared that „God smiled on 
Muslims‟”. Thus, the khulafÉ´ al-rÉshidËn period served as the ideal reference for 
both spiritual and temporal achievements for the later generations of Muslims 
(Ahmed, 1985: 57; Watt, 1996: 40). The raison d‟être of the pious Caliphate was the 
continuation of the divine basis of the polity through strict imposition of Qur‟anic 
injunctions and the rulings of the Prophet. The Caliphs exercised their own ijtihÉd 
and many of the rulings came to be regarded as part of the experiments-turned-
guidance for later generations in dealing with their political life. In articulating the 
importance of this era to the Muslims, Lindholm (1996: 79) remarks: 
Remembering their glorious world-conquering past, Muslims have not 
pictured the „City of God‟ in the Christian manner as beyond ordinary ken, 
achieved in the radiant future by faith and renunciation. For them, God‟s 
mandate was actually realized in historical reality, under the authority of the 
Prophet himself and the four pious rulers after him.  
Lindholm (1996:80) observes that Muslims over-glorified these periods as “divinely 
ordered social formation” thus the Muslim thought was “saturated with longing for a 
return of this ideal era”. However, this does not indicate that their experience became 
sacrosanct thus bearing a kind of sacredness. The essence of their experiments was 
merely the method in dealing with issues according to the clear and purified 
understanding of the two major sources of Islam, elsewhere; they were merely 
fallible humans (ÑUthmÉnÊ, 2006). 
With due respect to this experience, it cannot bypass its own time and place. As long 
as the political practices were relative, so is the case of the pious Caliphs' 
experiences.  Islamic political doctrine is an ongoing process with huge room for 
ijtihÉd (reasoning) an innovation unlike the ritual-spiritual elements of Islam. The 
experiment of the Caliphs should be viewed from a revelation-guided social 
constructivist point of view. It is rather wrong to emulate their experience literally 
into the different socio-economical context of other period. Hence, what could be 
learnt from those experiences are the methodology applied by the Caliphs in dealing 
with the situations based on their epistemological orientation, which was purely 
inspired by the tawhidic worldview. Upon that, the Caliphs‟ methods in interacting 
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with the changing Islamic reality, with reference to their governance and 
administrative ijtihÉd are also essential lessons to be studied and critically analyzed 
in enriching the effort to develop new ideals for Islamic governance.  
The best way to deal with the experience of those Caliphs, hence, is to explore the 
common principles and guidelines followed by them in executing their task of 
governance in helping to structure the nature of Islamic epistemology in practice. 
Any close scrutiny on the subject will find the „maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah‟ (objectives of 
SharÊÑah) that was tried to be achieved by the Caliphs in their actions and 
judgements, with the attainment of justice for „falÉÍ‟ will be the main motivation. 
These universal principles remained the determining factor in shaping the governance 
methods taken by them. The importance of understanding the maqÉÎid, as mentioned 
in the discussion on developing new knowledge from the revelation, is also essential 
as a key in dealing with the four Caliphs‟ experiences to understand its value as an 
epistemological source. Without such tool, the emulation of history might result in 
imposing an imagined reality into the current reality, which will never answer any of 
the contemporary problems. In understanding the maqÉÎid, and in bringing the 
maqÉÎid as an efficient tool in developing the concepts of „governance‟ according to 
the tawhidic episteme, the following discussion will engage in the descriptive inquiry 
of the subject. 
5.2.7. Al-MaqÉÎid al-Kulliyyah (the Comprehensive Objectives) 
In harmonizing the rational and revelation, thus avoiding a literal textual approach to 
the revelation, Muslim scholars have engaged with both the Qur’an‟s and the 
Sunnah‟s implicit messages through varying methods. Those methods were applied 
to deduct the universal meaning to understand the hidden objectives God tried to 
convey to human beings. Such meaning prevails in the words of IbrÉhÊm al-NakhaÑÊ 
(died 96H) as: “Verily, the rulings of Allah have their own specific objectives which 
are reflected as benefit and wisdom upon mankind” (Obeydi, 1992:132). With the 
same understanding, another classical jurist, Al-Izz bin Abdul Salam (Abdul Salam, 
n.d.: 1/9) claims that “the greatest of all the objectives of the Qur´Én is to facilitate 
benefits (maÎÉliÍ) and the means that secure them and that the realization of benefit 
also included the prevention of harm”. It could be comprehended from his word that 
all the obligations of the SharÊÑah were predicated on securing benefits for the people 
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in this world and the next, and it is the duty of Muslims to discover them and thus 
observing those objectives in their life and during the implementation of those duties 
(Obeydi, 1992). 
These objectives were later expounded by al-GhazÉlÊ (1993) who maintains that the 
objective of SharÊÑah is to preserve or protect the maÎÉliÍ (singular: maÎlaÍah), 
exemplified by five main essentials of human beings: faith (dÊn), life (nafs), 
intellectual (Ñaql), property (mÉl) and lineage (nasl)
43
. Al-GhazÉlÊ believes that the 
major purpose of SharÊÑah law is to „safeguard‟ or preserve those essentials, which 
eventually bring benefit for human life. Due to such rationale, al-Tufi (1989: 239) 
concludes that the preservation of these objectives consists in both “attracting utility” 
(jadhb al-nafÑ) and “repelling harm” (rafÑ al- Öarar), and should be used as the 
major source of law after the Qur’an and the Sunnah. He adds furthermore that in 
some cases of muÑÉmalÉt (contracts and transactions), maqÉÎid would supersede 
some minor rulings in the  Qur’an and the Sunnah to achieve the highest objectives. 
However, in the issues of ÑibÉdÉt (rituals or spiritual duties) which is the direct 
interactions with God, and considered as God‟s rights, the human mind cannot and 
should not attempt to discern the reasons behind the textual injunctions unlike the 
muÑÉmalÉt, where God delegated to humanity the right and duty to set up just rules 
and regulations in accordance with the public interest (maÎlaÍah).  
It could be noticed that prior to al-ShÉÏibÊ‟s definition of al-maqÉÎid, other writers 
namely al-JuwaynÊ, al-GhazÉlÊ, and al-ÑIzz bin ÑAbdul SalÉm emphasized more on 
the notion of „protection‟ and „preservation‟. The word „hifÐ‟ (protection) has been 
recognized as the ultimate objective of SharÊÑah. As aforesaid, al-GhazÉlÊ (1993: 
1/172) coins in his al-mustaÎfÉ that the highest objective of SharÊÑah is to „preserve‟ 
or „protect‟ faith, life, intellectual, lineage and wealth or property44. Al-JuwaynÊ 
                                                 
43
 Al-GhazÉlÊ suggests that: “In its essential meaning it (maÎlaÍah) is an expression for seeking 
something useful (manfaÑah) or removing something harmful (maÌarrah). But this is not what we 
mean, because seeking utility and removing harm are the purposes (maqÉÎid) at which the creation 
(khalq) aims and the goodness (ÎalÉÍ) of creation consists in realizing their goals (MaqÉÎid). What we 
mean by Maslahah is the preservation of the MaqÉÎid (objective) of the SharÊÑah law, which consists 
of five things: preservation of religion, of life, of reason, of descendants and of property. What assures 
the preservation of these five principles (uÎËl) is MaÎlaÍah and whatever fails to preserve them is 
mafsadah and its removal is MaÎlaÍah” (al-GhazÉlÊ, 1993: 1/286-7). 
44
 Al-Risuni (1992: 124) maintains that ÑAbdul MÉlik bin ÑAbdullah al-JuwaynÊ or known as ImÉm al-
×aramayn (478H/ 1085 AD) (the Imam of the two holy sanctuaries) was the first person to classify the 
maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah into three major categories: Essential, Complementary or Embellishment and 
Desirable or Luxury (ÌarËriyyÉt, ÍÉjiyyÉt, taÍsÊniyyÉt) all relating in one-way or another to maÎlaÍah. 
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(Awdah, 2006: 16) who preceded al-GhazÉlÊ also points out that the maÎlaÍah 
(benefit) (which he classified into three categories) are to be „protected‟. Al-ÑIzz 
(Abdul Salam, n.d: 1/9) despite of his general statement of maÎlaÍah as mentioned 
earlier (which is the general meaning of maqÉÎid), happened to seclude the meaning 
of maÎlaÍah into the connotation of „ÍifÐ‟ or protection too. 
Nevertheless, al-ShÉÏibÊ manages to bring a better and more comprehensive meaning 
of the maqÉÎid, when he added the element of „promotion‟ instead of protection or 
„ÍifÐ‟ per se. He suggests that SharÊÑah is not only being revealed to protect or 
preserve the maÎlaÍah, but it also promote the maÎlaÍah in order to realize the 
benefit for human life. The five essentials in the human life (or six according to 
some) are not only being protected and preserved, but also being promoted and 
propagated as could be fathomed from the deduction reasoning of the revelation. 
Hence, the word „ÍifÐ‟ might not be suitable in such sense; instead, the word 
„riÑÉyah‟ or observance, which is more comprehensive and extensive, is a more 
suitable term for such a notion.  
With such extensive concepts of maÎlaÍah, it could be interpreted as infusing a real 
substance into the external shell (of Islamic rulings and law), thus proves that moral 
obligation is related to Divine Omnipotence and Will and how the former in fact 
necessarily flows from the latter (Rahman, 1979: 115). With the proper 
understanding of such philosophy, the application of the true understanding of 
revelation could avoid the legal positivism approach, which acts according to the 
formulated law without responding to the moral consequences of it. 
Drawing on the Qur‟anic verses: “We sent you not but as a mercy for all creatures” 
(107: 21); “Allah does not wish to place you in difficulty, but to purify you, and to 
complete His favour to you” (6: 5); and “In the Law of Equality there is (saving of) 
life to you”(179: 2), al-ShÉÏibÊ concludes that “Upon exploration of SharÊÑah we have 
concluded that it was only set up to serve the interests of man. This is a conclusion 
that no one can dispute. Canon laws were made for only one purpose and that is to 
serve the interests of humans in this life and in the Hereafter”. In his magnum opus, 
al-MuwÉfaqÉt, which is one of the foremost treaties in this field, al-ShÉÏibÊ 
                                                                                                                                           
His pupil, al-GhazÉlÊ later on developed JuwaynÊ‟s idea further, by classifying the MaqÉÎid into the 
preservation of the five essentials as discussed earlier.  
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categorizes into three classes the maqÉÎid that divine messengers were sent to fulfil 
in the lives of humans. There are maÎÉliÍ ÌarËriyyah (essential requirements) 
without which life will be ruined, maÎÉliÍ ÍÉjiyyah (requirements pertaining to 
general needs) without which man can survive but maybe in distress and hardship, 
and maÎÉliÍ taÍsÊniyyah (ameliorative requirements) whose absence would not 
seriously undermine the quality of life (al-ShÉÏibÊ, 1996: 2/ 326).  
However, Ibn al-Qayyim (n.d, 4: 309-11) presents the maqÉÎid from a different angle 
through emphasizing that justice and equity in ensuring welfare, as the utmost 
maÎlaÍah to be preserved through Islamic SharÊÑah. Furthermore, he insisted that the 
means to justice and equity could never be captured by a finite list; hence, reason will 
guide the Muslims on how to ensure both justice and equity in changing 
circumstances. The articulation of maqÉÎid from this expanded point of view will be 
helpful in the effort to develop policies based on Islamic ontology in this thesis. 
Similarly, Al-QaraÌÉwÊ (1991) views the more inclusive approach to maqÉÎid and 
further extended the list of the maqÉÎid according to the contemporary reality and 
discourse to include social welfare and support (al-takÉful), freedom, human dignity 
and human fraternity, among the higher objectives and maqÉÎid of the SharÊÑah. 
These are undoubtedly upheld by both the detailed and the general weight of 
evidence in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Apart from him, a few other contemporary 
scholars also proposed other essentials, which emerged as the result of modernity and 
the development of human life. Environment and quality of life are amongst the 
themes included in the proposal as part of the new ÌarËriyyÉt (essentials) being 
observed by SharÊÑah.  
To conclude the discussion about the importance of maqÉÎid, we could summarize 
that the maqasidic method represents a comprehensive holistic but rather universal 
approach towards SharÊÑah. Any studies conducted on Islam, the SharÊÑah or the 
epistemological sources of Islam must never abandon the discussion on maqÉÎid. In 
the same vein, maqÉÎid is but a crucial tool in understanding the revelation or the 
texts of the sources, in which the negation of it will lead to the misinterpretation of 
the texts, hence Islam as a whole (Awdah, 2006). 
In presenting a new normative governance theory based on Islamic epistemology, 
highest objectives of the SharÊÑah or maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah should be the focal point of 
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the discussion, as maqÉÎid helps to operationalize and articulate Islamic knowledge 
into a mechanism of and principles for governance as a practical reality. In other 
words, under the shade of such argument, the maqasidic approach will assist the 
quest to develop the aim of tawhidic reality into an Islamic governance model. As the 
aforementioned ontological maxim is concerned, the aim of the vicegerency mission 
of individuals is to fulfil the attainment of falÉÍ, which leads to the benefit in both 
worlds. The articulation of falÉÍ could be found in the comprehensive achievement 
of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. The accomplishment of all the tiers of maqÉÎid (ÌarËriyyÉt, 
ÍÉjiyyÉt and taÍsÊniyyÉt) in the governance process can be a benchmark of an 
accomplishment of „good‟ in the governance process. This situation can be explained 
in the modern jargon of „human well-being‟.  
If the maqÉÎid is to be perceived as the aim through the articulation of falÉÍ then it is 
no longer a mechanistic element to the governance process. It is a means and goal by 
itself. By such, good governance from an Islamic point of view is a governance 
process that consists of the maqasidic elements to fulfil the maqasidic end. 
Accordingly, within this paradigm, the governance process is not just a consequence 
of an independent deontological activity for just a sheer discharge of responsibilities 
for the sake of delivering the vicegerency tasks. In fact, it is to be viewed from a 
virtue based consequentialistic paradigm. It is a process to attain a holistic end for the 
benefits of individuals through its tawhidic individualistic paradigm, which goes 
beyond the instrumental value meaning. This paradigm imposes multi-dimensions of 
benefits, which encompass both individuals and community benefits, in this world 
and the Hereafter. 
Additionally, maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah provides valuable intellectual foundation for the 
subsequent development of Islamic governance theory. One of the principal 
objectives of the SharÊÑah is the prevention of mafsadah
45
. The induction of textual 
proofs in abundance point out the fact that removal of corruption (dar´ al-mafÉsid) 
                                                 
45
The word mafsadah, derived from the root word fasada or fasad, has been mentioned almost fifty 
times in the Qur´Én and has a wide range of meanings, amongst others: “a state of disorder, or 
disturbance, or of destruction, annihilation, waste, or ruin” (Lane, 1978: 1/ 2396). It also connotes 
mischief, corruption, exploitation, wrong, and all forms of injustice, mismanagement, anarchy, and 
chaos
45
. FasÉd is the opposite of iÎlÉÍ, derived from the root word ÎalaÍa, which literally means 
“good, incorrupt, sound, right, or a proper state, or in a state of order” (Lane, 1978: 2/216). IÎlÉh refers 
to a state of equilibrium where things are in a proper order and balance. Muslim jurists have also used 
the words sharr (evil) and Ìarar (harm) as synonymous with mafsadah. 
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and acquisition of good (jalb al-maÎÉliÍ) are “the comprehensive objective of the 
SharÊÑah” and the “fundamental universal rule of the SharÊÑah” (el-Mesawi, 2006: 
88-90). Muslim jurists are of the opinion that any measure that prevents a mafsadah 
is in line with the objectives of the SharÊ´ah even if the latter does not provide any 
indication as to its validity or otherwise provided however, that it should not turn a 
prohibited act into a permissible one and vice versa (al-GhazÉlÊ, 1993: 1/ 139-40).  
The prevention of public harm or evil (mafsadah ÑÉmmah) should be amongst the 
priorities of Islamic governance according to the orientation of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah.  
However, the harm (mafsadah) due to the dynamic interaction of human life presents 
itself in a variety of forms. It varies in degrees due to different contexts and societies, 
and can hardly be enumerated, not even through the revelation for the dynamism of 
the development of the human mind and its needs. Hence, the prevention of a certain 
public harm (mafsadah) to public interest in a certain context requires diversity of 
approaches and policies. In dealing with the issue of governance, maqÉÎid determines 
the radius of policies governing the society by accumulating general benefits and 
avoiding harm to the whole community to enhance public interest (maÎlaÍah 
ÑÉmmah) (al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 2000: 2/ 986).  The eradication of mafsadah (in its various 
forms) that may lead to underdevelopment, unemployment, and economic crises and 
impede the accomplishment of the maqasidic goals is indeed an act of good (Islamic) 
governance.  
Above all, the whole idea of maqÉÎid implies a comprehensive implementation of 
justice in the community through the preservation and promotion of human well-
being, which is the ultimate aim of a governance process. maqÉÎid part of 
epistemological sources in Islam is becoming a foundation to define human well-
being. Thus, the articulation of Islamic ethos that might be useful for governance will 
be taken under the shade of this maqÉÎidic-based human well-being consideration. 
The articulation of this approach will be seen in the formulation of the axioms relate 
to governance from Islamic epistemology in the following chapter.  
The activation of maqÉÎid within such understanding can be understood within the 
spirit of verse (2: 177) in al-Qur´Én:  
It is not righteousness that you turn your faces towards East or West; but it is 
righteousness to believe in Allah and the Last Day and the Angels and the 
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Book and the Messengers; to spend of your substance out of love for Him, for 
your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask; and 
for the ransom of slaves; to be steadfast in prayers and practice regular charity; 
to fulfill the contracts which you made; and to be firm and patient in pain (or 
suffering) and adversity and throughout all periods of panic. Such are the 
people of truth, the God-fearing.  
 
5.3. HISTORICAL ARTICULATION OF ISLAMIC ONTOLOGY AND 
EPISTEMOLOGY: CONTRIBUTIONS OF MUSLIM SCHOLARS IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR GOVERNANCE 
A visit to both classical and contemporary Islamic literature relating to the 
governance discourse is essential in this research to locate how Islamic ontology and 
epistemology is articulated throughout history in developing the notion and policies 
related to governance. It will illuminate the quest to trace how Islamic ontology and 
epistemology could contribute towards the subject. Due to it being a recently 
developed notion, specific research directly dealing with the relation with the concept 
and notion of governance in Islam is scarce. However, classical literature on Islamic 
polity and economics or anything that brings close meaning to the notion of 
governance would serve as references to this research, which can help to see how 
Islamic ontology and epistemology is articulated in historical knowledge. The long 
history of Muslim and Islamic civilization constitutes a long series of experience of 
Islamic polity. Long before Hobbes, Mills, Rousseau and other Western political 
thinkers and writers propelled their masterpieces the Muslim scholars had been 
dedicating themselves in producing literature related to political thought and the 
political system alike.  
Since the dawn of Islamic civilization, Muslims‟ governance experience, which 
encompasses institutions and rulings, has been part of Muslims‟ life. Cahen (1970: 
2b: 531) suggests that political matters were conceived in terms of religious affairs 
since the dawn of Islam. Indeed, politics and economy have been part of the wide 
range teachings of Islam. Prophet MuÍammad himself was both a ruler or 
administrator (of Madinah and the Muslim nation) and a prophet. Being part of 
SharÊÑah rulings, political and economic issues were discussed by classical Muslim 
scholars under the shade of their epistemological sources. In tandem, Muslim 
empires, throughout the centuries also contributed in preserving the tradition and the 
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system in varying manners. Some implemented the teachings literally, and some have 
been very selective, and some others chose to rationalize them with the context.  
It was these experiences that motivated Muslim scholars throughout the centuries to 
preserve Islamic contents of politics and economics by producing a mountain of 
literature on the subject. Methods of developing the literature might vary, but the 
contents, which involve political, economic, constitutional and administrative 
aspects, are still the same. Classical literatures were mainly authored during the 
period where Muslims were living under the shade of their geo-politically diverse 
and pervasive empire state. The Caliphate institution also stood proudly as the 
supreme political institution across the Muslim lands despite of its feeble condition in 
some periods. The discussions in those literatures, therefore, mostly focus on the 
context the authors were living in. In general, classical jurists (fuqahÉ´) mainly 
attributed their writings for two major disciplines; the jurisprudence (fiqh) and 
theology (ÑaqÊdah) with the issue of Caliphate or imamate remained as the centre of 
the discussions (Tibbi, 1986: 15).  
Contemporary literature on governance, on the other hand, was produced during the 
situation where Muslim nations were in a feeble state, without a Caliphate and when 
other Islamic political institutions were not functioning. Reactions towards the 
colonialization of Muslim lands and the remedies for weakness of Muslim leaders 
were amongst major motivations for the production of the relatively recent literature. 
Writings from this category engage predominantly on the topics of the „Islamic 
state‟, „Islamic Caliphate‟ or the means to re-establish the classical Muslims‟ political 
system or thoughts. However, in formulating an emergent paradigm to a new 
framework (governance) that might not be the case of previous literature, a different 
way of revisiting those opuses is needed.  
In surveying the existing relevant literature, generally, the literature could be divided 
into eight categories: The classical institutionalism approach; classical fiqhÊ 
(jurisdiction) method; literature produced by Muslim philosophers; „mirrors‟ for the 
rulers; literature produced by reformists; literature developed by the revivalists; 
literature produced by neo-revivalists and researches produced by academics. 
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5.3.1. The Classical Institutionalism Approach  
Historically, most of the literature produced using the institutional approach engaged 
heavily on the topic of khilÉfah or imÉmah (leadership), political institutions, duties 
and obligations of the institutions. The institutionalism approach of the classical 
scholars gives a glimpse on the concepts of governance practiced by Muslims 
throughout history. There were many institutions established by the Muslim rulers, 
especially during the Abbasid period, which reflects the understanding of efficient 
and effective public administration as part of the „good governance‟ in those periods. 
It is important to note that most of the governance institutions established in the 
classical period were merely a continuity of the existing system inherited from the 
previous powers, i.e. the Persians, the Romans, et al. Those institutions were kept 
intact with few adjustments for the assimilation process with Islamic values and 
norms (al-Buraey, 1985: 233). 
Buraey (1985: 257, 261) suggests that these institutions are examples of the functions 
and values that were embedded within the Muslim community in the past and could 
be a guideline for contemporary Muslims. They enshrine the manifestation of the 
Muslim administrators on how to govern efficiently throughout their worldview. 
There are numerous pieces produced by classical Muslim scholars based on such 
methods. However, the most prominent ones in dealing with the topic of governance 
are as follows:  
(i) Al-AÍkÉm al-SulÏÉniyyah (Governance of the rulers) by al-MÉwardÊ (circa 
364 H/975 AD – 450 H/1058 AD) 
The book was written as a reaction towards the fatigue of the Abbasid Caliphs, and 
the emergence of the non-Arab (Buyids) domination upon the Islamic empire 
(Hanne, 2007: 55-102). It comprises twenty chapters with topics ranging from the 
major issue of the Islamic political system, the Caliphate or Imamate (central 
leadership of the Muslims) to administration of justice, finance, and natural 
resources. It engages also in the discussion of the institutions within the Islamic state, 
from the executive power, judicial, governors to the security forces within the state 
(al-Mawardi, 2005: 37-82). There is also a full chapter on the „DÊwÉn‟, which is 
similar to the modern-day bureaucratic system and its regulation on corruption as a 
landmark of the Muslims governance since the day of the second rightly guided 
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Caliph, Umar, and during the Abbasid reign (al-MÉwardÊ, 2005: 282-308). Al-
Mawardi ends his book with the final chapter on the Íisbah institution, which focuses 
mainly on the accountability of both people and the government (al-MÉwardÊ, 2005: 
337-362), thus becoming known to be the first author to treat the subject. 
His treatment on Íisbah brought a new dimension of Islamic concept of 
accountability, transparency and participation embodied in institutional appearance. 
While dealing with the issue of separation of power, al-MÉwardÊ brings the concept 
of the administration of judiciary (quÌÉt), which is separated from the office of the 
Caliph and the viziers. The concept of the rule of law is enshrined clearly in his 
discussion on the topic of maÐÉlim in his treaty as part of the institution existing 
during his time to deal with the administrative cases involving the higher government 
officers including the governors and the Caliph himself (al-MÉwardÊ, 2005: 116). 
However, from the first page to the end of the concluding part, the topic ShËrÉ, 
which is the most essential element of Islamic governance, is absolutely invisible. 
Though he discusses the issue of ahl al-Íil wa al-Ñaqd (the people who loosen and 
bind) and their duty in selecting the Caliph (though in brief) (al-MÉwardÊ, 2005: 6-7), 
but the concept ShËrÉ as a mechanism of empowerment was never mentioned. 
(ii) GhiyÉth al-Umam fÊ al-Tayyath al-Úulam (The Saviour of the Nations from 
the Chaos of Darkness) by ÑAbdul MÉlik ibn ÑAbdul Alah ibn YËsuf ibn 
MuÍammad al-JuwaynÊ (419 H / 1028 AD  – 478 H – 1085 AD) 
This book was also known as al-GhiyÉthÊ (the Saviours). It was originally written by 
al-JuwaynÊ as a gift to the grand vizier of ÑAbbasid during his time, NiÐam al-Mulk, 
to serve as a legal advice for the vizier to carry out his duties as defined by the 
SharÊÑah rulings (Khir, 2007:80). Al-GhiyÉthÊ significantly discusses the condition of 
Muslims in the state of the absence of Islamic government. In other words, it had a 
two-fold purpose: to examine the form of Islamic government and the options open 
to the Muslim community in case of the non-existence of such a government. The 
book starts with dealing with the issue of the ruler (khalÊfah) and all issues related to 
the institution. While in the second part of the book, the author normatively explains 
how the political and religious life of the Muslim community in the absence of the 
khalÊfah should be conducted (al-Juwayni, 1979: 18-22). 
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Al-JuwaynÊ (1979: 72-76) treated the political system with the notion that it is a 
fertile ground for ijtihÉd, and not bounded with definitive evidence. Hence, he 
adopted a critical approach to the prevalent political realities and uses his 
independent mind to analyze and judge the wide array of views about their legality 
(Khir, 2007: 81). He was critical also to al-Mawardi‟s method, which according to 
him was too simplistic in dealing with the text, and further accused him of trying to 
impose his own ijtihÉds as if they were definitive evidences. Helmi (al-JuwaynÊ, 
1979: 23) suggests that most of the Sunni authors on the Islamic political system and 
thoughts who came after al-Juwayni, such as Ibn Taimiyyah and others were 
influenced by „al-GhiyÉthÊ‟. 
(iii) al-SiyÉsah al-SharÑiyyah (Statecraft according to the SharÊÑah) and al-
×isbah fÊ al-IslÉm (The Institution of ×isbah in Islam) by Taqiy al-DÊn ÑAbul-
ÑAbbÉs AÍmad ibn ÑAbd al-HalÊm Ibn Taimiyyah, (661H/1263 AD-728H/1328 
AD) 
In his „al-SiyÉsah al-SharÑiyyah‟, Ibn Taimiyyah implicitly brings the conduct of the 
ruler within the preview of the SharÊÑah. As a realist of his era, he maintains that 
there is no single official Islamic form of government in Islamic traditions. The 
classical forms of the Islamic KhalÊfah state were merely built based on opinions, 
circumstances and custom (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005). Rulers are to be elected by the 
people, or by the choice of the majority to be their servants through the doctrine of 
wilÉyah, which is a mutual contract between the people and the ruler. A ruler hence, 
holds the responsibility to look after the people and to implement justice in his 
territory (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005: 13). He strongly opposes the idea of dictatorship and 
appointed rulers; as well he was against the idea of the small elite choice in electing 
leaders (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005). Unlike his predecessors, Ibn Taimiyyah did not put 
most effort in his treatises dealing with the issues relate to the Caliphate as the ideal 
of the state symbol in Islam and the institutions supporting it
46
.  
He advocates a kind of political pluralism involving participation in the state in his 
discussion on the matter of ShËrÉ. He tried to give a more democratic interpretation 
                                                 
46
 This happened during the reign he lived in where Muslim territories were fragmented into 
independent states and the Caliph was no longer the central power of the Muslim nation (Ibn 
Taimiyyah, 2005: 257-60). 
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of ShËrÉ by involving every citizen in the process of ShËrÉ, and not to confine it only 
to a certain group of people. People according to him, should not only be subjects of 
obedience, but also must be actively involved and participate in the affairs of the 
state by the power given to them by the SharÊÑah. They must play the role of check 
and balance in the power exercised by government (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005: 250). In 
maintaining the order and the ideal of just and virtuous state, Ibn Taimiyyah suggests 
that collaboration between the leaderships and the ÑulamÉ´ is essential. ÑUlamÉ´ or 
the religious scholars, as the representatives of society, according to Ibn Taimiyyah 
must play the role of a mediator between the ruler and the ruled (Zubaida, 2005: 
100).  
He also touched upon the issue of effective governance by pointing out elements of 
ineffective administration of a state, such as favouritism, nepotism and incompetency 
of administrators and government‟s officers. He discussed in detail about duties and 
responsibilities of executive power, the principle of competence in personnel 
selection, the right person for the right post and so forth. He suggested that the more 
qualified person is better and more suitable for any governmental post than the one 
who fears God most but is incapable of executing the tasks. The trust to preserve the 
benefit of the larger community and the need to serve the best for the religion 
demands such decisions (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005: 9-14 and 21). Accordingly, public 
function, in what Ibn Taimiyyah believed as the most Islamic and efficient model is 
the one rested on two bases: capacity (quwwah); and trust (amÉnah) (Ibn Taimiyyah, 
2005: 20). The issues of equity in management, justice in collecting and distributing 
funds, consultation, decision making, and many others related to governance were 
also part of the discussions in the book (Ibn Taimiyyah, 2005: 37-60). Based on his 
contribution to the world of administration and management in this book, some 
scholars crowned him as the father of Islamic administration (Bureay, 1985: 277).  
Another significant treaties by Ibn Taimiyyah regarding the matter of politics and 
governance is his classical book „al-×isbah fÊ al-IslÉm‟ (the institution of hisbah in 
Islam), which has become the major reference for the discourses on Islamic political 
thoughts and Islamic economy. In this particular book, he insists that religion could 
not be practiced without state power. The religious duty of enjoining good and 
forbidding evil (amar maÑrËf nahy munkar) which is the gist of Íisbah institution can 
never be exercised in the absence of power and authority of a leader (imÉm) (Ibn 
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Taimiyyah, 1985). The book was divided into two major chapters. In its first chapter, 
Ibn Taimiyyah deals with the concept, principles and mechanisms for the 
management of an Islamic economy and highlights how different institutions of 
Islam play their respective roles to achieve the objectives of justice and freedom in 
society (Ibn Taimiyyah, 1985: 17-70). In chapter two, the author deals with the 
principals of the Islamic society, which are based strongly on the concept of 
enjoining the righteous and forbidding the evil, the imamate (leadership), its 
institution, responsibilities and some elements relate to the issue along with the 
elaboration on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled with regards to their 
rights and responsibilities (Ibn Taimiyyah, 1985: 73-133) 
(iv) Al-Muqaddimah (Prolegomena) by Ibn KhaldËn (732H/1332 AD – 
808H/1406 AD). 
Ibn KhaldËn‟s magnum opus was his „kitÉb al-Ñibar‟47, a seven-volume universal 
history book, of which the first, the Introduction or „al-Muqaddimah‟, is where he 
sets out his main theory. In „kitÉb al-Ñibar‟, he analyzes the basic conditions of 
Islamic life with a mind open to facts as a keen and shrewd observer. In the book, he 
interprets history and reveals its secret through comparison, theoretical 
comprehension and the analysis of the nature and causes of historical events, from 
which he derived the general laws which lay behind those events (Lambton, 1981: 
155). Al-Muqaddimah independently serves as a key to past history and being 
recognized as literature that can facilitate practising statesmen towards a better 
judgment and a better appreciation of present-day events (Walzer, 1963: 45). 
Ibn KhaldËn compares the lives or cultures of civilized people (ÑumrÉn ÍaÌÉrÊ) in the 
city with the life of the Bedouin (ÑUmrÉn BadÉwÊ) and tried to establish a relation 
between the two (Ibn Khaldun, [2005] 1967: 91-122). The major thesis of the book 
was the author‟s view on the importance of ÑaÎabiyyah for any state, empire or 
community
48
. The ÑaÎabiyyah‟s importance within the tribal unit is shown 
                                                 
47
 The full title of the book reads „KitÉb al-ÑIbar wa DÊwÉn al-Mubtada´ wa al-Khabar fÊ AyyÉm al-
ÑArab wa al-ÑAjam wa al-Barbar wa Man ÑAÎarahum min DhawÊ al-SulÏÉn al-Akbar‟. Rosenthal 
translates it as „Book of lessons and archive of early and subsequent history, dealing with the political 
events concerning the Arabs, Non-Arabs and Berbers, and the supreme rulers who were contemporary 
with them (Ibn Khaldun, [2005] 1967:1, 13) 
48
 The word ÑaÎabiyyah could be translated to a modern abstract sociological terms like „a collective 
group united by a sense of solidarity‟ and „the irrational feeling of solidarity‟ (Walzer, 1963: 58); 
While Rosenthal (Ibn KhaldËn, [2005] 1967) translate it to „Group feeling‟. 
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exhaustively, he believes, but its application goes far beyond mere tribal life and are 
of an almost universal validity (Ibn KhaldËn, [2005] 1967). He thoroughly 
understood the importance of the religious element in the actual events of Islamic 
history, and demonstrated how thoroughly „religious‟ and „political‟ forces are 
intertwined. Thus, he concludes that the ÑaÎabiyyah alone without an additional great 
force provided by the religion will never be sufficient to establish great civilization 
and vice versa
49
 (Mahdi, 1957: 199-201). Al-Muqaddimah expounds historic-
sociological themes far excellent than its contribution towards the discourse of 
governance. The opus proportionately enlightens a holistic approach in understanding 
human nature, and Muslim socio-historical context needed to formulate a new ijtihÉd 
for a new model of governance.   
5.3.2. Classical Contribution of FuqahÉ´  
Classical Muslim jurists (fuqahÉ´) have prolifically produced enormous volumes of 
fiqh encyclopaedias in dealing with political issues concerning Muslims. The topic of 
imÉmah (leadership), its responsibilities, the qualification of an imÉm or caliph, its 
authority, the bayÑah (oath of allegiance) and issues surrounding it, the ShËrÉ 
mechanism and its institution, and other things are amongst the themes discussed in 
those encyclopaedias. Methods applied by the fuqahÉ´ also heavily emphasize the 
purely legalistic mechanism of determining the rulings rather than dealing with 
philosophical and historical elements. On the other hand, there are a few literature of 
the kind that deal with some specific political-economic issues in separated volumes. 
This type of literature normally engages with the issues discussed in rather specific 
and directed areas and most of them have become major references for some selected 
fields.  
Amongst those books were KitÉb al-KharÉj by AbË YËsuf (circa 113H / 731-182H / 
798), KitÉb al-KharÉj by YaÍya bin Adam (130H / 752 AD - 204 H / 818 AD) and 
KitÉb al-AmwÉl by AbË ÑUbayd al-QÉsim bin SalÉm (150/4H/ 770 AD  - 224H / 838 
AD). However, apart from Abu Yusuf‟s KitÉb al-KharÉj, the two other books were 
                                                 
49
 Helmi (al-JuwaynÊ, 1979: 24) coins in his work that Ibn KhaldËn‟s idea of „aÎabiyyah‟ (solidarity or 
social cohesion) was in reality taken exactly from the idea of „shawqat‟ (power, i.e. the ruler must be 
the one who has the might and accepted by the people) discussed by al-Juwayni in al-GhiyÉthÊ (1979: 
96). However, this claim seems to be rather blunt since Ibn KhaldËn did not even mention either al-
JuwaynÊ‟s name or his work as his reference, while in the same time he pointed out that he benefited or 
referred to the writing of al-MÉwardÊ and other scholars.  
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merely compilations of Prophet MuÍammad‟s traditions along with the Companions‟ 
views, with little comments and idea from the authors. 
(i) KitÉb al-KharÉj (Land taxation) by AbË YËsuf (circa 113H / 731 AD - 182H / 
798 AD) 
KitÉb al-KharÉj is the only work surviving among the many treatises Abu Yusuf 
produced. The book deals with KharÉj (Land taxation) issue and other topics related 
to the political issues such as public finance, penal code (al-JinÉyÉt), the rulings on 
apostates, the position of the judges and government officers, the issue of loyalty and 
treason which probably existed during his time. His work was more judiciary in 
nature due to his background as the chief judge and a jurist of his time (al-Jneidal, 
1986: 2/135). After his death, the HanafÊ School used his work as a textbook for 
study. In his introduction to the book, Abu Yusuf states his reason for writing the 
book, which was originally replying to the request of the Caliph HarËn al-RashÊd 
(AbË YËsuf, 1934: 3). Some of the contents in the book also imply advice from the 
author to the Caliph, which he structured on a question-and-answer basis. There, he 
supported his arguments with evidence from the Qur’an and the Prophetic traditions, 
which he articulated in reasoning form based on his own analysis.  
AbË YËsuf‟s contribution towards the idea of the governance of a country‟s 
economic development based on Islamic ontology can best be summarized into three 
major points: The importance of justice and piety in the governance of the national 
treasury and policy by abiding God‟s rule and avoiding forbidden revenue and 
expenditure; respect for individual private ownership and non-interference of the 
state on people‟s wealth; and finally, the positive role of the state to develop the 
country through the encouragement of labour and land exploration rather than 
keeping them under welfare and as a regulator to regulate the market from any 
misconducts through the Íisbah mechanism (AbË YËsuf, 1986). The arguments and 
examples given by the author might only be suitable within his context; however, the 
substantial part of his justifications in those arguments exemplify the fuqahÉ´ method 
in producing new ijtihÉd to the subject and is worth to be studied. 
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5.3.3. Muslim Philosophers’ Contribution to the Relevant Literature 
Literature that has been produced by such methods emphasize mostly on the 
philosophical side of politics. In most of the treatises, the philosophers tried to 
harmonize the Hellenistic philosophies with Islamic values. The most prominent of 
all Muslim scholars from such a method was AbË Nasr MuÍammad al-FarÉbÊ (260H/ 
870 AD - 339H/ 950 AD). In both his treaties, namely „al-MadÊnah al-FÉÌilah‟ and 
„al-SiyÉsah al-Madaniyyah‟ he discusses the ideals and the aim of the „MadÊnah al-
FÉdilah‟ virtuous or excellent city (Walzer, 1985). 
Al-FarÉbÊ‟s teaching concerning political life and government is based on his 
understanding of Plato‟s political philosophy and the manner in which he tried to 
introduce it to a society governed by divine law (al-NajjÉr, 1980:112). Concerning 
the issue of leadership, al-Farabi enumerates the quality of the supreme ruler (the 
Caliph) in more or less orthodox terms while dealing with the opinions of the 
inhabitants of the virtuous city (MadÊnah al-FÉdilah) (Walzer, 1985: 247-9). 
However, unlike the other authors who deal with the issue of Caliph and the 
prerequisites of one in becoming a Caliph for the Muslim community, al-FarÉbÊ in 
„SiyÉsah al-Madaniyyah‟ does not discuss much about the religious qualities but 
rather discusses the philosophical requirement needed from a Caliph. He believes that 
a ruler for the ideal regime must combine the philosophic with the prophetic faculty. 
In the same piece he abandoned any reference to God, revelation and SharÊÑah, 
instead points out that the most important quality of the first ruler is the love of truth 
and wisdom (al-FarÉbÊ, 1959: 105-8). 
While in his other piece, „FuÎËl MuntazaÑah‟, al-FarÉbÊ points out that the supreme 
ruler (Ra´Ês AwÊwal) of the virtuous city must posses the quality of wisdom, perfect 
prudence, excellence of persuasion, excellence in imaginative representation, 
physical ability to wage war, and a perfect physical body (al-FarÉbÊ, 1971:46). The 
ruler with all those qualities is called by al-FarÉbÊ „al-DustËr‟. This view caused 
some researchers to imply the possibility that al-FarÉbÊ could be a Shi‟ite. However, 
Lambton (1981:72) refutes such claims proving that al-FarÉbÊ did not subscribe to the 
idea of „chosen‟ or „selected‟ lineage to be the major condition of becoming the 
„Ra´Ês‟ (leader) of the virtuous state, especially in his book, „TaÍÎÊl al-SaÑÉdÉt‟. 
Furthermore, al-FarÉbÊ asserts that in the case of the absence of a ruler with such 
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qualities, the administration of the state then must be delegated to a group of men 
who combine these qualities among themselves. They are known then as the select 
chiefs (ru´asÉ´ akhyÉ1r) and their regime is called the regime of the excellent. In 
case such a group is not found, then the chief of the city should be knowledgeable of 
the laws and traditions laid down by those who managed the cities previously. In 
such a situation, the ruler must have the wisdom and the correct opinion to interpret 
and apply these laws to new circumstances, and the other qualities as a credible elder 
as well as the ability to wage war. He will then be called the King of the Laws and 
his regime the Kingdom of the Laws. Finally, if such a person is not to be found, its 
place must be replaced by a group of men combining all of these qualifications, and 
they would then be known as the Chiefs of the Laws (al-FarÉbÊ, 1971: 66-7). 
Al-FarÉbÊ sets freedom as the major principle of a virtuous and democratic city, 
where each one of the citizens is given free rein and left alone to do whatever he likes 
and no one has any claim to authority unless he works to promote their freedom. 
Another major principle is equality, which implies that all the citizens are equal, and 
their laws say that no man is in any way at all better than any other man (al-FarÉbÊ, 
1959:141). Al-FarÉbÊ upholds that the citizen must have consent to participate in 
political activities, even if in a limited role, because they must strive for happiness by 
utilizing their ability to reason. However, Al-FarÉbÊ opposes the idea of rendering the 
decision-making process by government to the masses. Such a position is also 
applauded by Ibn Rushd who views the jumhËr or the majority of the people as „the 
people of rhetoric‟ (al-NajjÉr, 1980:111).  
Furthermore, Al-FarÉbÊ maintains that the rulers should be able to maintain power 
and not be forced to succumb to wavering political ideas of the citizenry. 
Furthermore, the citizens‟ city must live with the spirit of taÑÉwun (mutual co-
operation) and must avoid greed, selfishness and individualism (Walzer, 1985: 229). 
Such a city according to al-FarÉbÊ will be desired by many to live in (Zakaria, 1986: 
86, 88).  Neither Plato nor Aristotle mentioned this quality of mutual co-operation. 
One could conclude that in such a way, al-FarÉbÊ had managed to give a new 
meaning to the „ideal state‟ based on the Islamic spirit of „ummah‟ (nation) and 
„ukhuwwah‟ (brotherhood) in which the ideal of Islamic governance was based 
throughout its history. However, al-FarÉbÊ did not contribute much to new ideas but 
rather explained Plato‟s Republic in Muslim jargon (Hofmann, 2001: 4). 
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5.3.4. Mirror
50
 Approach 
The closest approach of classical Islamic literature to the topic of governance was the 
„mirror‟ approach. The „mirrors‟ have been defined as advice given to the rulers 
(khalÊfah, sulÏÉn, emÊr) on the ethical conduct of their government and to uphold the 
concepts of justice and SharÊÑah laws. They normally deal with the ethical, technical 
and details of governance and administration of the state. Mirrors are concerned with 
the art of government and governance. Mirror‟s authors are learned men often 
experienced in political and administrative affairs as viziers (ministers) or officials of 
the Muslim states and empires. Their method is that of anecdotes based on or 
resulting from political aphorisms. Their goal mainly is to educate the subject 
through their advice and examples. There are many mirrors produced by classical 
Muslim scholars in various languages. However, the most prominent amongst them 
all are the following: 
(i) al-Adab al-KabÊr, al-Adab al-KabÊr al-SaghÊr and RisÉlah fÊ al-ØaÍÉbah by 
ÑAbdullÉh Ibn al-MuqaffaÑ (103H/ 721AD – 139H/ 757AD)  
As the pioneering mirror literature in Muslim history, these treatises were miniature 
mirrors for the addressee, presumably the prince of the caliph, and were very useful 
in reflecting the Islamic ethos in the respected realm as administrative text. In these 
pieces the author addresses al-ManÎËr (who may have never seen it) on specific 
problems facing the new ÑAbbasid regime that succeeded the Omayyad‟s with no 
logical arrangement. Three major institutions of governance have been treated 
acutely in these books: the army (al-jund), the judiciary (al-qaÌÉ´) and the land 
taxation (al-kharÉj). The literal contents of the books might not be a suitable piece 
for contemporary democratic governance; however, it is a prescriptive reference in 
understanding the political and socio-historical atmosphere of the time and fuqahÉ´ 
responding to it. The author insists on the essential of an ethnically mixed body that 
should be taught only the tenets of a clear, concise religious code issued by the 
Caliph. In ensuring the army‟s standing, morale, and future loyalty, the author 
suggests certain reforms on the welfare and meritocracy, including the removal of 
fiscal duties from the military, officer recruitment from the ranks based on merit, 
                                                 
50
 Mirrors are those literature reflecting principles of Islamic ethics produced in the pre-modern period 
mainly by Kings‟ advisor to crown princes or to the kings themselves as advice on how to 
appropriately conduct their affairs as a ruler. 
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religious education, inculcation of integrity and loyalty, regular pay linked to 
inflation, and maintenance of an efficient intelligence service throughout the empire 
(Ibn al-MuqaffaÑ, 1998). Apart from the suggested technical reforms, these mirrors 
also describe the ideal personalities and good conduct that Caliphs should live by. 
(ii) SiyÉsat NÉmah by NiÐÉm al-Mulk ( 408H/ 1017AD – 485H/ 1091AD),  
This landmark treatise on Islamic mirrors comprises fifty chapters, compiled by the 
vizier NiÐÉm al-Mulk just before his death. It was actually an answer to MÉlik Shah‟s 
request on how to deal with the cause of the troubles mounting in his kingdom 
(Lambton, 1984: 55). His answers in the book are mostly substantiated and illustrated 
by a large number of anecdotes
51
 mainly taken from history and tradition to explain 
every principle of political conduct (NiÐÉm al-Mulk, 2002: xvi-xvii). Good 
administration of a state according to NiÐÉm al-Mulk must bear certain 
characteristics that will ensure justice, stability and harmony. Primarily, he 
emphasizes on the need of stability in a state by fulfilling the needs of the people, and 
the full control of the market through a planned economy by the state (Rivzi, 1977: 
111, 165-67). According to his idea, the state works as both benevolent protector of 
the people and market regulator. The people‟s interest and welfare are the 
responsibility of the state in ensuring stability and the people‟s well-being.  
In tandem, the people must also adhere to the same principle to create the God-
fearing atmosphere. In such a way, an ideal Islamic government is the one that 
depends for its existence on the presence of law and moral-abiding subjects (Rivzi, 
1977: 96). Moreover, NiÐÉm al-Mulk concludes that only by abiding the SharÊÑah, the 
supreme law in the state, the ruler will attain his support from the people. This shows 
how unity between religion and politics is crucial in an Islamic state. Throughout 
such an ideal, NiÐÉm al-Mulk has given a new definition of „state‟ as a political 
institution with strong moral, social and humanitarian attributes (Rice, 1961: 97); 
while the moral attributes in this case derive from the sovereignty of Allah. He 
insisted the importance of judiciary independency, rule of law and an accountability 
system to be exercised within the Muslim community and to be the major principle of 
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 Some of the anecdotes are not correct and had been mentioned loosely by NiÐÉm al-Mulk to make 
his point (see: Rivzi, 1977: 31) 
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the state. Apart from the worldly quality of the ruler, the foremost quality that should 
furnish a Muslim ruler is taqwÉ (piety) (NiÐÉm al-Mulk, 2002). 
The significance of this book is such that the main principles enunciated in the book 
still guide nations and rulers in their relations with one another and in their domestic 
affairs. This is perhaps attributed to the high degree of pragmatism and viability 
inherent in the ideas propagated because the book is an expression of a realistic 
political theory which emerges out of an actual political situation, and, therefore, 
helps us to understand the stage that the development of Muslim polity reached in the 
5th century AH / 11th century AD. Thus, there exists a strong cohesion and cogent 
embodiment between theory and practice, partly arising out of the position of Nizam 
al-Mulk as a real-life statesman. 
(iii) NaÎÊÍÉt al-MulËk (Counsel for Kings) by MuÍammad AbË ×Émid Al-
GhazÉlÊ (450H/ 1058AD – 505H/ 1111AD),  
The title of the book implies that the theme of the book is similar to NiÐÉm al-Mulk‟s 
SiyÉsat Nameh. The book deals solely on the ethical and moral lessons relating to 
statecraft and administration like other mirrors. It does not indulge with the issues of 
systems and institutions of the Islamic state, but the advice may be drawn for the 
improvement of the administrative and bureaucratic machinery of the contemporary 
world (Bureay, 1985: 277). Al-GhazÉlÊ started his book with the issue of creed by 
explaining the principles of creed with special emphasis on the attributes and glory of 
God, and the issue of the Hereafter. The introductory chapter implies the importance 
of accountability (Bagley, 1964). Though he did not specifically mention the word 
accountability for the topic of the chapter, thus can clearly be understood from the 
message he tried to convey within the sentences he used in the discussion. The 
message can obviously be comprehended in his reminder to the rulers that their 
power is but an endowment and trust of God to them. Their duty is to care for the 
people and to commit him to the ideals of fairness and justice, for justice is the value 
that upholds any government‟s legitimacy.  
Al-GhazÉlÊ reiterates to the addressee that they will be accountable before God 
during the resurrection day and will be questioned on their performance and delivery. 
Al-GhazÉlÊ proposes ten principles to the rulers to follow in order to succeed during 
the day of judgement. Those principles imply good conduct and good administration 
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values that should be followed by the rulers (Bagley, 1964). Al-GhazÉlÊ defines the 
aim of politics is to determine the destiny of man in the life Hereafter
52
. He also 
mentioned other qualities of political institutions that were created to support the 
rulers in their administration. As an example, he discusses comprehensively about the 
function of the kuttÉb (secretaries) as a pillar of good government. Bagley (1964) 
insists that al-Ghazali reflected his Aristotelian and Persian tendencies in the piece 
through some of his thoughts and advice which he decorated within an Islamic 
framework. On the other hand, Diyab (1990:  442) diagnoses that al-Ghazali‟s 
political views were shaped by the context he was living in, where there was 
widespread political dissension, hence he so felt a need for an authority which would 
bring about political unity, demonstrate it‟s sovereignty and regulate cultural and 
political life. 
5.3.5. The Contribution of Reformists on the Relevant Literature 
During the eve of the collapse of the Ottoman dynasty and during the calamity of the 
Ottoman Caliphs, few writers bloomed to present their critiques on governance issues 
in Muslim states. Most of the issues discussed by those who were then called 
reformist, were concerned with people‟s rights, the despotic nature of Muslim 
leaders, freedom of politics and Muslim unity. European Enlightenment remnants on 
the political life of the Europeans have shaken those reformists intellectuality. Their 
exposure to the freedom of people and the invisibility of the despotic nature in the 
Western world made the reformists began to contemplate the situations in Muslim 
countries. Amongst prominent contribution made by the reformists are the following: 
(i) ÙabÉ´iÑ al-IstibdÉd (The Nature of Dictatorship) and ‘Umm al-QurÉ’ (Mother 
of the cities) ÑAbdul RahmÉn al-KawÉkibÊ (1854-1903). 
ÙabÉ´iÑ al-IstibdÉd (The Nature of Dictatorship) was al-KawÉkibÊ‟s critique of the 
Muslim rulers of his time. While „Umm al-QurÉ‟ on the other hand, articulates his 
ideal of the ummah unity under one unified commonwealth (Imarah, 1988; Abu 
                                                 
52
 This answers why al-GhazÉlÊ (Bakar, 2006:205, 222) positions the sciences of ethics and politics 
under the category of religious sciences rather than intellectual or philosophical unlike al-FarÉbÊ. In his 
al-Munqidh min al-ÖalÉl (al-Ghazali, 1952: 19), al-GhazÉlÊ clearly states that the Muslim 
philosophers‟ teachings in the political and ethical sciences were drawn mainly from the revelation 
send to the Prophets. The philosophers, according to al-GhazÉlÊ never separated their knowledge of 
both sciences from the revelation by independently relying on reason. From such premise and in 
conformity with his definitions, he concludes that political and ethical sciences must be included into 
the division of the religious sciences. 
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Hamdan, 1992). Both books were highly influential in the field of Islamic political 
thought as well in the issue of governance, and are considered as the landmarks of the 
author‟s contribution towards the discourse of governance.   
In ÙabÉ´iÑ al-IstibdÉd, Al-KawÉkibÊ alerts his people to the cause of their malady, so 
that they would be able to do something to change the situation they are living 
within. There, he blamed the dictatorship style of governance for the weakness of the 
Muslims. He strongly rejects the notion that Islam allows dictatorship, and suggests 
that the main pillar of good governance from an Islamic point of view is the practice 
of accountability and the large space for people‟s freedom to exercise their political 
rights (al-KawÉkibÊ, 1953:18-9). This was shown, as he states, in early Islamic 
government, where Islam established the foundation of political freedom (al-
KawÉkibÊ, 1953: 8-9). Furthermore, he maintains that dictatorship and education run 
in opposite directions. All dictators are in trouble when their people become well 
educated. Hence, they try to keep their people in a state of ignorance (al-KawÉkibÊ, 
1953: 25-30). Moreover, he asserts that dictatorship weakens the national economy 
and encourages social corruption, destroying moral values.  
In Umm Al-QurÉ, Al-KawÉkibÊ presents his idea of unity through minutes of an 
imaginary conference attended by fictional representatives, which he describes as 
thinkers belonging to known towns of 22 Muslim countries. He supposes that those 
representatives should be the scholars who are representing the civil society (due to 
his admiration of the Western notion of independent civil society). Through the 
discussion, al-KawÉkibÊ tries to impose his idea that reform could only happen to the 
ummah only through educational means and driven by the scholars as the leaders of 
civil society. He strongly disagrees that politics could play much of a role in the 
reform process. He imagines that those prominent people were convened in Mecca 
(also known as Umm al-QurÉ) during the Íajj (pilgrimage). The theme chosen for the 
conference is “the identification of the causes of the state of backwardness of the 
Muslim ummah, its symptoms and how to overcome it and set the Muslim ummah on 
the road to recovery” (al-KawÉkibÊ (1316H): 11-12).  
The conference identifies no less than 86 causes of Muslim weakness, and then 
concludes that: “Muslims all over the world are indeed in a state of deadly lethargy; 
and the only remedy for the sickness then is only through proper education and 
Chapter Five: Searching for Ontological and Epistemological Sources for Islamic 
Governance 
 182 
continuously motivating young people to strive for a better status; to be taken in 
collective efforts by scholars and sages of insight and wisdom” (al-KawÉkibÊ, 
1316H): 91-99).  
This book though does not directly involve the topic of governance; throughout the 
discussions of the representatives, some issues concerning governance have been 
deliberately addressed. The issue of political system, civil society, freedom and 
accountability have been debated in that imaginary conference. In the issue of 
governance, the conference finally agrees that progress is linked to accountability 
while regress is linked to despotism.  
(ii) al-×ukËmah al-IstibdÊdiyyah  by JamÉl al-DÊn al-AfghÉnÊ (1838-1897). 
In al-HukËmah al-IstibdÊdiyah, al-AfghÉnÊ claims that the absence of justice and 
ShËrÉ (council), and non-adherence by the government to the constitution, were the 
diseases that led to the ummah‟s state of paralysis. He strongly suggests participation 
of the people in the state governance for the citizen freedoms and rights. All citizens 
should be allowed to participate in the political and social dimension in the state 
governance through ShËrÉ and election. He strongly condemns despotism, which he 
considers as the fatal attribute to the ummah. Its existence in the ummah body is an 
earlier sign of its decline (Tamimi, 2000).   
There, he professes his obsession with the philosophy of the republican government, 
which he sees as restricted government that is accountable to the public, and seeks 
the consultation of the governed, that is thus the antithesis of the absolutist one. The 
very idea of accountability, participation and transparency can clearly be understood 
from his endeavour. He was amongst those who persuaded the Ottoman Caliphate to 
be transformed to a constitutional state (al-Jneidal, 1986: 2/335). However, he did not 
try to address the detailed concepts of effective governance from Islamic traditions 
nor the history apart from the general principles, which might be due to his lack of 
experience in the field of governance and administration. The only example he saw 
during his trips to the Western countries was the freedom and the peoples‟ 
participation that seemed the major absence on the Muslims‟ soil. His approach to the 
subject gave an introduction for any researcher to engage with the issue (Keddie, 
1968). 
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(iii) al-KhilÉfah (the caliphate) by MuÍammad RÉshid RiÌÉ (1865-1935) 
In his book al-KhilÉfah, RiÌÉ emphasizes Islam as a comprehensive religion that 
comprises guidance, mercy, and socio-civic policy (which he means by politics). He 
states: “As for the socio-civic policy (muÑÉmalÉt), Islam has laid its foundations and 
set forth its rules, and has sanctioned the exertion of opinion and the pursuit of ijtihÉd 
in the matters related to it because it changes with time and place and develops as 
architecture and all other aspects of knowledge developed. Its foundations include the 
following principles: that the authority belongs to the people; that decision-making is 
through ShËrÉ; that government is a form of republic; that the ruler should not be 
favoured in a court of law to the layman for he is only employed to implement 
SharÊÑah and the will of the people; and that the purpose of this policy is to preserve 
religion and serve the interests of the public” (RiÌÉ, 1988: 9). 
On the economics reform, with all his knowledge on classical Islamic paradigm of 
macro and microeconomics, he proposed the fourteen points on how Muslims can 
improve their economic and financial situation (RiÌÉ, 1986: 316-17). The points 
concentrate mostly on Islamic principals of ownership, expenditures, social justice 
and Islamic doctrine of benevolence individuals via zakÉh (alm), infÉq (charity) and 
waqf (endowment). RiÌÉ believes that such an Islamic approach is a middle path 
between classical Capitalism and Socialism, and stresses that the zakÉh system is the 
most important instrument in the macroeconomics of the ummah (RiÌÉ, 1956: 
10/183). While in political reform, RiÌÉ asserts that true Islamic polity consists of 
two major elements: the acceptance of tawÍÊd and shËrÉ (mutual consultation) in 
matters of state. Unfortunately, despotic rulers, he argued, have tried to make 
Muslims forget the latter by encouraging them to abandon the former. RiÌÉ was also 
known as a staunch proponent for the restoration or rejuvenation of the KhilÉfah or 
caliphate institution for Islamic unity (RiÌÉ, 1988). 
5.3.6. Contribution of Revivalists on the Relevant Literature 
The total collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the year 1924 brought a new dawn for 
Muslim political life globally. Long before the total death of the empire, numerous 
initiatives had been put forward to save the weak empire in order to rejuvenate the 
pro-active role of the Islamic Caliphate it used to play in the past. Enayat (2001:78-
103) mentions several efforts that had taken place after the collapse like the Pan-
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Islamism movement, the Caliphate Congress in India and others in bringing back the 
Caliphate institution to the realm of Muslim politics. But none of them reached their 
goal, but ended up with failure. Muslim revivalists who were generally seeking to 
reinstate Islam as a religio-political order as a panacea to the global Muslims social, 
economical and political crisis later took this vacuum. They believed that true Islamic 
life at both personal and communal level could only be implemented under the 
„Islamic State‟ in which the systems applied were derived from the teaching of the  
Qur´Én. The Islamic State‟s scope of control is coextensive with the holistic view of 
human life, the temporal and spiritual, are under the purview of Islamic ideology.  
×assan al-Banna and AbË al-AÑlÉ al-MawdËdÊ are frequently referred as the 
cornerstone for the Islamist revivalism. Their ideas became a major launching pad for 
the global phenomenon of Islamist movements and managed to shape major events 
and discourses in the later period. These forefathers of the revivalist movement are 
worth to be mentioned in the exploration of understanding the principal of Islamic 
governance due to the nature of their discourses. Their ideals have been subscribed 
by many in creating the new reality as a panacea for the lame condition of the 
Muslim nation in their effort to rebuild the perceived glory of the past.  
(i) ×assan al-Banna (1906-1949) 
Al-Banna (1988: 101-3; 394-5) laid down the „big picture‟ of Islamic governance in 
his „MarÉtib al-ÑAmal‟ (the Levels of Struggle). He pointed out that the destruction 
of the Caliphate institution, which he considered as the guardian of both the Muslim 
ummah (nation) and the religion, has led to the demand from every Muslims to 
rebuild it from the ashes. The struggle for such a cause, he suggests, must start from 
the very foundation of the Muslim ummah, which is the individual. Hence, he 
asserted that an ideal Muslim is the one who is practicing the real teachings of Islam 
in his life based upon his ideal crystallized in what he called „UÎËl al-ÑIshrÊn‟ (the 20 
Fundamentals); those individuals must engage with the second unit of the ummah, 
which is the family; the family units will constitute the Muslim community which 
will play their active role in establishing the Islamic government in the Muslim land; 
the Islamic government will then unite under the banner of the Muslim 
commonwealth and ruled by the Caliphate institution; this, however, is not the 
ultimate aim for the struggle. The Muslim commonwealth is responsible in 
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establishing what he called as „ustÉdhiyyÉt al-ÑÉlam‟ (the Patron of the world) which 
can be understood as the „Islamic World Order‟ (el-GhazÉlÊ, 2000). Upon such 
argument, Mitchel (1969: 131) suggests that al-Banna was preparing a movement 
towards achieving the „Islamic Order‟ rather than an „Islamic State‟, founded on the 
ground of the framework. 
Al-Banna's goal of an Islamic nation was to be built upon the reform of individual 
hearts and souls. This would be followed by the organization of “society to be fit for 
the virtuous community which commands the good and forbids evil-doing, then from 
the community will arise the good state” (al-Banna, 1988: 54; 101; 118-22; 135-7; 
330-1). While someone another occasion, al-Banna (1978: 33, 36) claims that a 
Muslim state which deserved IkhwÉn endorsement is the one that has four major 
criteria: the constitution, laws and rules should be Islamic; the responsibility for 
carrying out political decisions should be given to those who are practicing Islam; the 
foreign policy should be in accordance with Islamic principles; and it should not 
hinder attempts to establish genuine Islamic systems locally and internationally. In 
conclusion, al-Banna‟s less-radical approach towards the issue of Islamic governance 
emphasizes more the virtue of functioning and moral or faith-based individuals along 
with the implementation of ShËrÉ and Islamic ideology as the basic foundations of 
the Islamic community (Moussalli, 1993). 
(ii) AbË AÑlÉ al-MawdËdÊ (1903 – 1979) 
Unlike al-Banna, MawdËdÊ‟s philosophy of governance was crystallized in his 
debates on the issue of Islamic state and its system, which is strongly associated with 
his name. Islamic governance in Mawdudi‟s Islamic state stood upon three 
foundational principles: TawÍÊd (oneness of AllÉh); RisÉlah (prophethood); KhilÉfah 
(man‟s vicegerency of AllÉh) (MawdËdÊ, 1976: 9). The principle of tawÍÊd implies 
that the sovereignty of God exceeds other legal or political sovereignty of human 
beings, thus the idea of ×akÊmiyyah (God de facto sovereignty in all aspects of 
human life), hence the right to enact and legislate rested alone for God. The 
×akÊmiyyah entails that human-made ideologies are not acceptable and have no place 
before God‟s laws and systems. (MawdËdÊ, 1982: 253; 1983: 166).  
MawdËdÊ (1982) further suggested that Prophet MuÍammad manifests God‟s de jure 
sovereignty on earth and his teachings to be part of the revelation of God in enacting 
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the laws and any systems relating to human life. Islamic societies and communities 
over all time are to emulate in their life all the systems and guidance shown by the 
Prophet, while people as the vicegerents of God possess limited authority delegated 
to him by God. As vicegerents or God‟s representative on earth, they are obliged to 
administer their life, and in this specific manner, their political life and state 
according to God‟s will, which is enshrined in the teaching of the Qur´Én and 
Sunnah. People as God‟s vicegerents are only the executers of the laws given by 
God. 
However, MawdËdÊ did not favour the purely theological „Church run-state‟ version 
of the Islamic State. He insisted that the Islamic State is an ideological state which 
implements the systems of Islam in the whole aspect of its administration and its 
government and administrators being chosen by the people according to the concept 
of shËrÉ. He chose the term „Theo-Democracy‟ for his ideal state (Mawdudi, 1985: 
37). Despite his acceptance of the people‟s choice of government, he intensely 
rejected the amalgam of the Western idea of „Nationalist Democracy‟, which was 
promoted by the colonial powers in India. Such an idea will only ensure the 
predominance of the Indian and non-Islamic forces and influences upon other races 
and religions in India (Metcalf, 1987: 135). 
While in the economic sector, Mawdudi emphasizes strongly on the need to establish 
a healthy economic order aligned with the nature of humanity. What he exactly 
means by nature of humanity was the very idea of social justice that recognizes both 
private ownership with individual rights with the responsibility of society and the act 
of benevolence towards one another, in which the welfare of the less-fortunate or the 
vulnerable will be taken care of. Furthermore, Mawdudi was against the interference 
of the state into the market and individual life, except as the role of regulator to avoid 
any mischief and corruption. He argued for the fair distribution of wealth based on 
needs and welfare rather than equal distribution without taking into consideration the 
needs and socio-background. He was quoted as saying: “Equality of the unequal is no 
equality at all! Neither it is proper to change natural inequality nor to extend 
inequality to unnatural limits and make them inequitable. Both the extremes are 
equally reprehensive. A healthy economic system should maintain justice and keep 
the distribution of wealth within the limits prescribed by the Lord of the universe.” 
(Kausar, 2005: 130) 
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5.3.7. Contribution of Neo-revivalists 
The term neo-revivalist term refers to certain individuals from the revivalist school of 
thought but who later shifted from the typical idealism of the earlier discourse to the 
realization of the need to appreciate the best of other worlds. This new discourse as 
coined by el-Messiri (2003) is derived from those who experienced both the Western 
and Islamic backgrounds. These cohorts started to engage with subject matters such 
as democracy, social justice, accountability, transparency, human rights and other 
modern political systems. Unlike the forefathers, the new discourse proponents 
seriously endeavour to incorporate those universal values with their struggle to create 
a new realm for Muslim society in their homeland. As for them, the universal values 
from the „others‟ are in common with Islamic values and principals. Such a situation 
created an emergence of literature in the Islamists‟ circle and also to the debate on the 
issue of governance. Amongst the prominent figures from the Islamist circle who are 
genuinely known as the proponents of this new discourse, according to el-Messiri 
(2003), are Al-Ghannouchi, al-QaraÌÉwÊ, MuÍammad Immara, Salem al-Ewwa, 
Azzam Tamimi, Louay Safi et al.  
5.3.8 Researches by academicians 
There are also massive writings by academicians relating to the issue of governance. 
Most of the literature deals with the research on Islamic development, management, 
public administration and institutions in various languages. Amongst them are: 
Kettani‟s „al-TartÊb al-IdÉriyyah‟ (1927); HanÊfÊ‟s „A Survey of Muslim Institutions 
and Culture‟ (1964); Subhi Saleh‟s „al-NuÐum al-IslÉmiyyah‟ (Islamic Systems) 
(1965), and the others with the same title by ×asan and ×asan (1962); al-ÑAdawi 
(1972) and Wasfy (1977); ×usainÊ‟s „Arab Administration‟ (1966); Hamidullah‟s 
„The Muslim Conduct of State‟ (1968); Sherwani‟s „Studies in Muslim Political 
Thought and Administration (1970); Mansour‟s „Systems of Government and 
Administration in Islamic Shari‟ah and Man-Made Law‟ (Arabic) (1971); Wasfy‟s 
„MuÎannafÉt an-NuÐum al-IslÉmiyyah‟ (1977); Asad‟s The Principles of State and 
Government in Islam (1980). On the other hand, an abundance of research dedicated 
specifically to the topic „Íisbah‟ which was part of the crucial elements in the 
classical Islamic governance throughout history had been produced for the non-
indoctrination or non-ideological academic purpose. Al-Buraey (1985: 292) lists a 
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couple of them, which had been written in English, Arabic and French. However, 
none of them really has any direct impact on the debates on the new concept of 
governance.  
Thus far, Al-Buraey‟s Administrative Development: an Islamic Perspective (1985) 
should be regard as a worthy piece in dealing with the subject matter. Despite of its 
focus on „administrative development‟, it also discusses a wide range of issues 
concerning governance. Its attempt to explore the classical experience and to derive 
the values and principals to be applied unto the contemporary reality enrich the 
alphabets of „Islamic governance‟ inquiries. Unlike other researchers who are solely 
engage with the historical artefacts to be implemented in the modern climate without 
analyzing the socio-historical context of the current situation, al-Buraey managed to 
allocate the lacunae in the contemporary set-up without neglecting the contextual 
elements of the previous experiments. Despite of lengthy discussions on 
administrative development issues and Islamic foundations, the ontological and 
epistemological issues were clearly abandoned. The book prepares a clear picture of 
empirical and practical proposals on the issue of governance, but neglecting the 
philosophical and theoretical essence, which is needed in developing new knowledge. 
5.3.9. Reflecting on the Nature of the Classical and Recent Literature 
The preceding section provides a detailed account of the material produced by the 
Muslim scholars over the centuries, some of which are directly related to the subject 
matter, while most of them provide general remarks related to the topic of 
governance.  Since this study aims at developing a systematic model of governance 
according to the ontological and epistemological provisions of Islam, as described 
above, a critical review of the above-presented literature is essential. 
A critical comprehension on the nature of the afore-described literature reflects that 
they are mostly eclectic and advice-oriented, which consequently identifies 
governance as the process of Islamization of the inherited system of the land 
conquered by the Muslims, either through the fiqhÊ-oriented or philosophical 
approach.  Furthermore, those literatures were not produced systematically that they 
do not directly attempt to systemize the relevant knowledge by locating it in the 
ontology and epistemology.  In other words, indeed they emerge from Islamic 
ontology because the contributors‟ knowledge base was Islam, but as general rules 
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rather than principles, which shapes a paradigm.  In short, these attempts were not 
aimed at a paradigm but they were mainly pragmatic attempts of having a better 
administration for Muslim rulers, rediscovering the power discourse to the ideal fiqhÊ 
legal positivistic orientation, or sometimes, the aqÊdah-motivated rhetoric (especially 
in the issue of imÉmah (leadership of Muslim nation)), etc. as for the classical pieces.  
Elsewhere, on the other hand, contemporary literature was produced under certain 
circumstances where the previous central governance institutions such as the 
Caliphate were banished and other political institutions were not functioning as they 
once were. As a result, contemporary contributions would be categorized to some 
extent as mere reactions constructed by the social reality of the global Muslim nation 
(ummah) due to the colonialisation of Muslim lands, while some of the pieces were 
produced as proposals and remedies to improve the weakness of Muslim leaders. As 
previously described, most of the writings from this category engage predominantly 
on the rhetoric of „Islamic state‟, „Islamic caliphate‟ or the means to re-establish the 
classical Muslims‟ political system or thoughts.  
With reference to the topic of governance in its modern framework (which defined in 
the earlier chapters of this thesis as another means for development), a new 
formulation is needed since the historical as well as current literature have not 
sufficiently and systematically contributed to the development of a particular 
paradigm, as the former is only aimed at providing remedies, and the latter seems to 
be obsessed with the politics of erecting the „golden age‟ rather than engaging with 
the systemic of the process.  Hence, this study represents a modest attempt to provide 
a systematic attempt in overcoming this gap in Islamic thought and policymaking. 
5.4. CONCLUSION 
The effort to formulate and establishing a new theory of governance based on Islamic 
ontology and epistemology, as reiterated earlier requires a new way of looking into 
the epistemological sources itself. Instead of dealing with the sources with legal 
positivistic deontological approach, this research suggests a value-based 
consequentialistic position based on a universal deductive method of maqÉÎid. 
Unlike most of the classical and many literature dealing with the topic of governance 
(which were produced under the field of Islamic political system or thought) 
emphasizing largely on the governance institutions, mechanisms and legal issues, this 
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new method will emphasize the hidden moral and ethical message beneath the texts. 
Likewise, this new method will produce certain principals and philosophical topics of 
governance as the prevailing discourse.  
The classical exegesis is necessary in understanding the relatively holistic picture of 
the SharÊÑah, since it relates between the divine message and the articulation of the 
message through the Prophet‟s words, actions and his Companions. Hence, the 
meanings derived should not be confined in a certain historical context neither to be 
literally applied to the non-context, but rather to be expanded through the universal 
deduction method based on the central idea of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. In tandem, a new 
proposed approach to expand the meaning of the Qur’an is also needed in the effort 
to explore the epistemological meaning of the revelation serving the expansion effort 
in bringing the wider understanding of the revelation-reasoned concepts onto the 
broader horizon.  
The expansion should not ignore the universal ethical message conveyed in many 
Prophetic traditions (Sunnah) as the articulation of the divine inspiration into the real 
world. Concepts and principals derived from such a process should be linked to each 
other in discovering the underlying wisdom from the  Qur‟an and Sunnah to be put at 
the horizontal sphere of human life. In formulating such methods, human reason 
based on experience and universal law (common sense) must actively be included as 
a beacon. The method is to be developed within the realm of the tawhidic reality in a 
very comprehensive scope and not the legal positivistic framework. The best of 
natural law from human rational experience in the contemporary world in such a 
method will then find itself within the realm to achieve the aforementioned maqÉÎid 
al-SharÊÑah, which can best described in the contemporary jargon as „human well-
being‟. 
The four Caliphs‟ experience can translate those concepts through their policies and 
innovations. However, those concepts are to be expanded through a thorough inquiry 
of the underlying ethical and moral philosophy and the implicit messages they 
convey to enlighten worldly life under the shade of the universal understanding of the 
higher objective of SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah). A bigger picture on how they 
can establish the concept of falÉÍ for human life beyond the contextual limit is by 
relating to the concepts one to another on the ground of tawhidic ontology. Having 
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said that, the universal values within the spirit of those inter-related concepts should 
be unearthed by articulating them into the axioms representing the philosophy of 
governance that serve the interest of humankind in their worldly life.  
Similarly, previous classical and contemporary literature provides a proportionate 
methodological approach reflecting on how both ontology and epistemology could be 
articulated in the political-economic field. Nevertheless, as mentioned, the literature 
do not offer a systematic framework needed to fill the gap of the subject matter of 
this thesis but a new formulation is required, hence this research comes to bring a 
fresh articulation of Islamic ontology and epistemology in the field of development, 
policymaking and governance. Through this formulation, a complete epistemological 
framework of Islamic governance could be established; hence, the Islamic ontology 
formulated „Islamic governance‟.  
Furthermore, in this research, this new formulation will use a maxim-based approach 
in constructing principles for the new Islamic model of governance. The exploration 
to deduce the principles of Islamic governance demands the effort to identify Islamic 
ethical postulates of sufficient generality by using the epistemological approach. 
These ethics could be articulated through a set of axioms, which represent the whole 
realm of tawhidic reality (Naqvi, 1994: 41, Asutay, 2007). The axioms are needed to 
elucidate in the manner that they posses all the characteristics of a spanning set, i.e., 
one that can serve a foundation for deducing scientific statements to be applied on the 
field of governance. These axioms in short must adequately encapsulate the 
comprehensive meaning of Islam‟s ethical philosophy. However, this set of axioms 
does not necessarily include all aspects of Islamic ethics, but encompasses relatively 
those dominant aspects that are pertinent for deducing the rules of Islamic 
governance. The following chapter on the architectonics of Islamic governance will 
engage with the topic of axioms and elucidate deliberately on the details of the 
axioms. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ARCHITECTONICS OF ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE: LOCATING THE AXIOMS, 
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND WORKING MECHANISM 
 “Allah commands you to deliver the trusts to those to 
whom they are due; and whenever you judge between 
people, judge with justice. …” (Al-Qur’an, 4: 58) 
  
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
For centuries, most classical and contemporary Islamic scholars have intensively and widely 
utilised the legal positivistic fiqhÊ method in dealing with Islamic political or economic 
issues. For most of them, the rationale behind this was that the nature of those things was 
part of the SharÊÑah body of legislation. This is simply due to the classical uÎËl al-fiqh‟s 
deductive method, which was/has been adopted as a major prevailing discourse in 
establishing the status of fiqh, in legislating most human affairs. This normative legal 
positivist method inspired the establishment of governance institutions in the past. 
Consequently, contemporary neo-Classical literalists have frequently echoed this classical 
approach. Upon such idealism, current global Islamic revivalism has ignited a kind of 
consciousness in redeveloping a „utopia‟ of a fiqh-oriented Islamic „state‟ or 
„commonwealth‟ as an ideal model of „Islamic‟ governance. This situation has resulted in a 
call for the resurrection of archaic mechanisms and structures of the classical administrations 
of Muslim empires to be transformed into a reality. Nevertheless, any thorough scrutiny of 
the classical governance models of the past will show that they were developed according to 
the particular context of the time.  
For instance, Omar, the second righteous Caliph according to Muslim history, emulated 
many Persian administrations in his style of governance. Accordingly, succeeding Caliphs 
and rulers have followed his example. This dynamic but non-systematic attitude implies the 
pivotal role of ijtihÉd and reasoning in formulating the governance models historically. The 
dynamism however gravitated toward certain core principals and immutable foundations in 
creating the fiqhÊ-inspired theory of political governance. Hence, any literal imitation of the 
classical structures of governance without understanding their underlying philosophy or 
objectives will end up in imposing a utopia onto reality. For this reason, this research will 
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adopt a non-conventional way of dealing with governance issue to develop an ideal Islamic 
model.  
As was discussed at length in the previous chapter, the approach applied in this thesis to 
formulate a new model of Islamic governance will be inspired by and founded on a specific 
Islamic ontological-determined epistemology instead of emulating the classical normative 
legal discourse to explain the nature of Islamic governance.  
Appropriately, this model will be articulated through logical expression by using axiomatic 
formulation to explain its philosophy and fundamentals so that its working mechanism can 
be identified. Bachelard (1964) maintains that ideas can be conceptualized genuinely in a 
geometric form, which he believes to be the most proper language to validate and soundly 
explain itself. He adds that mathematical expression is the best language to express concepts 
and ideas, for exact scientific concepts can be conceptualized through mathematical forms. 
Consequently, the expression of philosophical or ideological ideas through mathematical or 
geometrical language will present the best proof of the fact that intellectual ideas are logical 
and scientific as opposed to conventional philosophies and religions which have to engage in 
discussion, argumentation, sophistry, debates and comparisons to prove their logic, which 
according to Shariati
1
 are the weakest language of expression.  
Due to such rationale, the ensuing paragraphs provides a structural expression exemplified 
by axioms developed from Islamic epistemology in explaining the Islamic ontology inspired 
ideal model of governance. This is due to the fact that in order to quantify as a distinguished 
governance paradigm, Islamic governance must also have foundational axioms alongside 
values and norms derived from the Islamic ontology.  These axioms describes briefly in the 
following section along with their etymological root to justify as to why they are related to 
the topic of governance. Accordingly, the later section will elaborate on how those axioms 
could be integrated into governance framework, hence the formulation of a new model of 
governance. These axioms, which constitute the principal foundation of the proposed 
governance, are then being articulated in the reality through a unique and specific framework 
as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 http://www.shariati.com/islamgy1.html.  
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6.2. THE AXIOMS 
Etymologically, the word axiom comes from the Greek word (axioma) or (axioein), which 
means that „which is deemed worthy‟ (axios), or fit or that „which is considered self-
evident‟. Among the ancient Greek philosophers, an axiom was a claim that could be seen to 
be true without any need for proof. In the modern understanding, a set of axioms is any 
collection of formally-stated assertions from which other formally-stated assertions follow 
by the application of certain well-defined rules. According to this view logic becomes just 
another formal system. A set of axioms should be consistent; it should be impossible to 
derive a contradiction from the axiom. A set of axioms should also be non-redundant; an 
assertion that can be deduced from other axioms need not be regarded as an axiom (Naqvi, 
2003: 147-49). 
An axiom is a self-evident truth upon which other knowledge must rest, and from which 
other knowledge is built up. To axiomatize a system of knowledge is to show that all of its 
claims can be derived from a small set of sentences that are independent of one another. 
Sardar (1985: 210) suggests that an axiomatic approach is important for Islamic economics 
to develop its own tools of thought and analysis and also its unique institutions, thus 
detaching it from a Western foundation. Thus, an axiomatic approach could be meaningful 
for an Islamic worldview if it satisfies four criteria: it must be an adequate and legitimate 
representation of Islam‟s ethical views; it must form the smallest possible set; the elements 
of the set must be internally consistent; and the axioms must have predictive power (Naqvi, 
1994: 40-1). On this basis, a certain set of axioms can be developed to summarise Islamic 
ethical philosophy in relation to governance.  
These principles or axioms are those which lead to spiritual development and enable the 
human being to reach noble heights of thought and action and rightfully claim the title of 
vicegerent of God on earth according to most Islamic economists. In addition, they aim at 
bringing up „functioning‟, „doing‟ and „being‟ individuals.  Various Islamic economics 
theorists such as AÍmad (1980), Siddiqi (1981), Naqvi (1981) and Chapra (1992, 2000) have 
applied this approach as a foundation for their discourse. Similarly, this axiomatic modelling 
approach and system analysis is applied in formulating the foundation of „Islamic 
governance‟ in this research. This foundation will demonstrate the interactive and dynamic 
nature of the new theory based on contemporary economics‟ philosophical approach within 
the wider scope of political economy rather than in the narrow spheres of taqlidÊ (classical 
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and traditional) legal positivistic fiqhÊ framework. Thus, Islamic governance, within such an 
approach proposes an ethical and systemic understanding of political economy inspired from 
the ontological and epistemological sources of Islam. Consequently, the proposed 
governance model not only deals with merely means and forms (institutions and 
mechanisms) but also with the ends and substance represented through its unique axioms and 
means to articulate them. 
Few axioms were formulated by Ahmad (1980), Siddiqi (1981), Naqvi (1981) and Chapra 
(1992, 2000) in explaining the framework of Islamic economy, amongst them: TawÍÊd, 
which refers not only to the unity of God, but also the unity of human life; adl (justice) or 
equilibrium as a mean for social justice; ikhtiyÉr (free will) which explains human freedom 
in the realm of worldly affairs and the life hereafter; tazkiyah (growth towards perfection) 
which explains the necessity of growth through purification of attitudes and relationships and 
hence implies the endogenisation of Islamic norms and values for development in terms of 
micro development of individual, society and the natural environment according to their 
development path; rubËbiyyah (divine arrangements for nourishment, sustenance and 
directing things towards their perfection) which implies the necessity of sustainable 
economic growth and development; khilÉfah (vicegerency), which defines human beings as 
vicegerent of Allah on earth implying man‟s ultimate accountability to Allah; IÍsÉn 
(Perfection): which means comprehensive beneficence and excellence, and the final 
crowning glory or finishing embellishment, and finally the maqÉÎid (highest objective of 
SharÊÑah), which determine the  utmost motivation for Islamic economics, which is the 
security of human well-being. Eventually, the ultimate aim of this axiomatic structure of the 
dynamic process of development in the economic, social and spiritual sense is falÉÍ, or 
salvation and happiness in this world and the hereafter. 
However, in formulating the axioms related to the issue of governance within the radius of 
Islamic framework, a semi-adjustment of the axioms with the addition of another related set 
of axioms are needed. This new and technically semi-different set of axioms will be 
expounded in detail in this section in terms of how they relate to the field of governance 
from their semantic origin and the consequences of the terms in their technical usages.  
Thus, the axioms formulated to construct a philosophical foundation for an ideal (Islamic) 
governance are as follows: tawÍÊd (unity), indicates the vertical dimension of the Islamic 
ethical system; amÉnah (trust) as a guiding principal for the empowerment of individuals in 
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the governance process, al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn (justice equilibrium and beneficence) to provide 
for the horizontal dimension of equity and a benevolence society; ukhuwwah (universal 
solidarity) and iÎlÉÍ (constant striving for comprehensive excellence with ethical and moral 
considerations). In order for these axioms to work efficiently, other previously-mentioned 
axioms developed by the Islamic moral economists are needed, such as ikhtiyÉr (free will) to 
constitute the functional norms of the governance process in the parameter of endowed „free-
will‟ with responsibilities. Similarly, both the previously-mentioned tazkiyah and rubËbiyyah 
axioms are necessary to provide an inclusive and broad nature of growth in human life 
according to the larger picture of the elemental aspect of governance, the maqÉÎid al-
SharÊÑah. MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah is an essential ethical and moral foundation in Islamic 
governance used to understand the text and to expound the principles of Islamic political 
economics in relation to the objectives of the SharÊÑah as a way or system of life, instead of 
just a legalistic traditional fiqhÊ nature.  MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah in such a context concludes that 
Islamic governance is a means to achieve „human well-being‟ in the worldly life and the 
hereafter, as the „falÉÍ‟ axiom states.  
Together, these axioms define the foundational principles and framework, in which the 
governance process takes place, incorporating intra-and inter-generational social justice and 
worldview. Moreover, it reveals itself in the methodological framework of the Islamic 
political economic system. Unlike the normal approach to axioms as merely „a set of 
formally stated assertions from which other formally stated assertions follow by the 
application of certain well-defined rules‟, the explanation for axioms that constitute Islamic 
governance analyses the inner structure and underlying philosophy of those major concepts. 
A holistic picture of those axioms can never be understood without any analytical 
consideration of other key terms surrounding them. The details of those axioms are as 
follows: 
After having the preceding discussion in providing justification for the axiom based 
paradigm in articulating the micro foundations of governance, the followings sections 
provides in detail discussion on each of the axiom and their respective implications in 
relation to governance. 
6.2.1 TawÍÊd (Unity of God) 
As repeatedly mentioned in this research, the Islamic worldview is based on tawÍÊd, or the 
Oneness of God. Consequently, the centrality of a Muslim‟s life is also based on this concept 
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of tawÍÊd, which outlines the Muslim‟s character and lifestyle as khalÊfah (vicegerent) as 
asserted in the chapter on ontology. Consequently, all his deeds are acts of submission and 
worship. This “particularly denotes vertical dimension of Islam linking the imperfect and 
finite social institutions with a Perfect and Infinite Being” (Naqvi, 1994: 26). Unlike the 
post-Enlightenment worldview that dictates that all knowledge and systems should be 
objectively value-free, Islamic governance emphasizes values and morals, which are rooted 
strongly in revelation so that, in this case, individuals can indigenise governance as a concept 
and practical reality by identifying it as stemming from their own values.  
Accordingly, the articulation of Islamic worldview in a Muslim‟s life will represent values 
and moral elements that are nourished by the guidance of revelation (Ghannoushi, 2001: 
109). Subsequently, the formulation of governance axioms should be derived from such 
centricity. The basis of legitimacy of governance in Islam would follow that the prerogative 
that governance is a part of public interest or maÎlaÍah. Consequently, the right to govern 
has been vested in the people with their bounded rationality and guided by a tawhidic 
worldview.
2
  
6.2.1.1. Definition 
TawÍÊd, as an Arabic word, derives from the root word Wa ×a Da, which means one, and it 
confirms the action or the articulation of oneness and unifying. Apart from the theological 
debates on the unity of God‟s attributes, the socio-political episteme reading on the tawÍÊd 
concept can lead to a new aspect in understanding the philosophy of Islamic governance:  
i) TawÍÊd implies the unity of the universality of God‟s message (revelation) to 
human beings
3
. According to this tenet, Muslims believe that revelation is the centre 
of human life. It serves as the intrinsic guidance on how to live and conduct oneself 
as part of the means to worshipping Allah
4
. Accordingly, it also represents the central 
philosophy of the Islamic system of knowledge. TawÍÊd inspires a system of 
governance, which is value-laden and strongly constructed on moral principles. In 
                                                 
2
 However, this does not recognise a religious authority or theocracy akin to the medieval European relation 
between Church and the state (Abduh, 1956: 58-59). 
3
 Yusuf Al-QarÌÉwÊ (1977: 99-105) points out that: “Indeed, syumËl permeates time in totality, life in totality, 
and all aspects of human life in its entirety… it is a thesis for all time and generations, and not just for a certain 
period or era… it is a thesis that speaks to all humanity, all nations, all races, and all social classes.  Indeed, 
Islam is a thesis for all mankind. It is also a thesis for every level of human of life and its existence... It is a 
thesis for mankind in every aspect of life.” 
4
 (Qur‟an, 64:1; 22:18). 
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this way, this Islamic-ontology-derived concept of governance contrasts the current 
positivistic notion of governance, as it relates to the higher objective as defined by 
Allah. 
ii) TawÍÊd also implies the unity of creation as makhlËq (creatures) created by Allah. 
Human beings are khalÊfah (vicegerents) empowered by Allah with the responsibility 
of amÊn (trustee)
5
 to take care of all other creatures on earth (al-Qur´Én, 7:74) with 
permission to make the most of (istiskhÉr)
6
 the universe but with moderation and not 
causing any destruction (fasÉd)
7
. Within the radius of this axiom, the environment, 
the animal kingdom, and future generations of human being are considered as one 
nation, which needs to be taken care of by the „trustee‟8. Inspired by this position, 
Islamic governance is a system in which sustainability and concern for the future 
should be the main theme.  
iii) TawÍÊd also implies the equality of human beings as one nation and one 
community. Being the vertical ethical dimension of Islamic political economy, it 
implies equality of individuals in terms of their closeness to Allah.  Therefore, this 
very concept necessitates mutual understanding and mutual recognition amongst 
human beings for them to live peacefully and in harmony under the shade of 
brotherhood (ukhuwwah). 
Each of these definitional aspects of tawÍÊd has consequences for governance in terms of 
shaping its value proposition, which are discussed in the following section. 
6.2.1.2. Implication of tawÍÊd on governance: 
Iqbal ([1974] 2008: 154) confirms that the essence of tawÍÊd articulates the meaning of 
equality, solidarity and freedom. Those meanings require an endeavour to be transformed 
into space-time forces and to be articulated in a definite human organisation. Upon such 
                                                 
5
 Most of the ideologies concerning the relation between human being and the environment, according to al-
FarËqÊ (1984) are born of crisis, including the environmentalism or eco-centrism in this manner, but Islamic 
ideas of the relation between human being and the environment derives from the „tawhidic‟ worldview, which 
indicates that: a) Allah as the creator and the Supreme Master; b) Human being as the servants and vicegerent; 
c) Allah instructed human being via revelation; d) The ultimate triumph in the human life is the total submission 
to Allah‟s will.  
6
 Qur‟an (11:61; 16: 5-6; 10-11; 12-14). 
7
 The command to preserve the universe from destruction can be clearly deduced from the verse: “For I [Allah] 
have created you [MuÍammad] to be nothing but a blessing for all creation (ÑÉlamÊn)” (Qur’an, 21:107).  
8
 “There is not an animal on earth nor being that flies on its wings, but forms part of communities like 
you...”(Qur’an, 6:38) 
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premise, the idea of well-being, development and other features of good governance must 
originate soundly from this tawÍÊd axiom (Omar, 1992: 41-3).  
According to this line of reasoning, the tawhidic worldview, demands that ideal governance 
should only be established through comprehensive regulation of moral and spiritual aspects 
of human beings through the establishment of peace and harmony for the entire humanity 
based on justice and truth
9
. It is through the manifestation of tawÍÊd that any new idea on 
politics or economics rooted from it would attain its originality (Bennabi, 1993: 65). 
Accordingly, a tawhidic-inspired government will produce a state of God-fearing and piety 
amongst the actors of governance, and consequently, all parties involved in the process, will 
conceive their participation and actions as part of worship (ÑibÉdÉt). This inner feeling will 
enable the actors to function actively in gaining pleasure and reward from God, and 
similarly, the state of this continuous consciousness and connectedness with God through the 
implementation of the process will give rise to a state of imÉn (faithful and piety). An 
individual who possesses imÉn and has it as an inner motivation in his daily life (mu´min) 
will have the motivation to live with the spirit of Islamic governance presented by the 
axioms. 
Tawhidic worldview also implies that the vertical dimension and equality of the Islamic 
ethical system manifests itself in the inherent equality of each individual as represented by 
their equal proximity to God. Such a worldview exemplifies the very meaning of equality 
from Islamic precepts of conduct. This concept also leads to a great contribution of Islam to 
the „political‟ field, which is the concept of perfect and unadulterated equality10. This idea of 
human equality has been vividly illustrated in various Qur‟anic verses in which every stage 
of human life has been described as uniform at every stage and in whatever period of world 
history he flourished (Qur’an, 36:77; 67: 19-21). In the same way, Islam put an end to even a 
semblance of any superiority of man over man on the basis of race, colour or clime in al-
Qur’an (49: 13) and in many of the Prophet Muhammad‟s traditions, particularly his famous 
farewell sermon (khutbah al-widÉÑ), when he declared that henceforth there would be no 
distinction between Arab and non-Arab, and no differentiation between their status (Haroon, 
1963: 265-6). Based on this argument, the society, which Islam promoted, was going to be a 
                                                 
9
 This is similar to what was coined by Nadwi (1968:204-5) that any system rooted in such an Islamic 
worldview, will be aiming for a healthy civilisation. 
10
 Likewise, in explaining an ideal nature of a political system, al-FarÉbÊ pointed out that equality amongst the 
people is amongst the main essential pillars of the polity of in his utopian „the virtuous city‟ (al-madÊnah al-
faÌÊlah) (al-FarÉbÊ, 1959:141). 
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classless society without any discrimination between classes, races or even religions in 
governance. 
This concept of equality is the foundation for the Islamic concept of social justice in 
governance through the principal of „universal solidarity‟ or ukhuwwah (Shari‟ati, 2007: 68). 
It is from this equality-based ukhuwwah within the framework of the axioms of amÉnah 
(trust) and ikhtiyÉr (free-will) that individual political freedom and liberty sprung. 
Accordingly, tawÍÊd, as an essential part of an ideal governance system, provides for 
freedom of action whereby each individual is viewed as an integral part of the whole, to be 
empowered in the decision-making process with concern the public interests. This principle 
also implies a continuous and sustained system through “risÉlah (God‟s Prophets as the 
source of divine guidance); Ékhirah (life-after death, that is the continuity of life beyond 
death and a system of accountability based on divine law)” (AÍmad 2003: 193). In 
conclusion, tawÍÊd as an overarching principle in Islamic theory of governance entails that 
Islamic governance is a comprehensive framework of amÉnah (trust) to be delivered through 
its entire process, in upholding al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn (justice and benevolence), with the theme 
of ukhuwwah (universal solidarity) and sustained by iÎlÉÍ (constant striving for 
comprehensive excellence) in achieving the maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah as the prerequisite of falÉÍ.  
TawÍÊd as the arch-principal of all the Islamic governance axioms enlightens the rest of the 
axioms for Islamic governance. However, due to its generic nature, the tawÍÊd axiom 
requires other philosophical foundations or axioms to complement and explicate the 
complete picture of an ideal model of governance to be established in this thesis. Direct 
implication of tawÍÊd could be exemplified within the notion of amÉnah (trust), since human 
life itself; according to the Islamic worldview, is an amÉnah from the Creator. Equally, 
humankind is also the vicegerent (khalifÉh) of Allah on earth. The following section will 
deal with the concept of amanÉh and how it could benefit the construction of ideal Islamic 
„governance‟, thus worthy and necessary of being one of its axioms. 
6.2.2. AmÉnah (Trust) 
The tawÍÊd axiom asserts the position of the human being as God‟s vicegerent. According to 
this understanding, God had rendered his trust to them to administrate this world well and 
make it a peaceful and safe place in which to live. God also designed a special task for the 
vicegerents, which was to exalt him (ÑibÉdah) and to develop this world (ÑimÉrah). As 
„trustee‟, every single individual is rendered with the trust (amÉnah) in his or her horizontal 
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relations with other individuals. Everything in the universe belongs to God and everything 
was created for the service of man, who may use anything in the world for a positive 
purpose, but he is not supposed to abuse anything
11. The „entrusts‟ are the rights and 
responsibilities of one individual over the other (Qur’an, 7:74). In explaining this general 
idea of trust upon each individual, the Prophet MuÍammad has been quoted saying: “Behold, 
each one of you is a guardian, and each one of you will be asked about his subjects. A leader 
is a guardian over the people and he will be asked about his subjects; a man is a guardian 
over the members of his household and he will be asked about his subjects; a woman is a 
guardian over the members of the household of her husband and of his children, and she will 
be asked about them; a servant of a man is a guardian over the property of his master, and he 
will be asked about it.”12 
6.2.2.1. Definition 
Semantically, the word amÉnah (trust) is derived from the root word Aa Ma Na, which 
means peace, safety, protection, and a state without danger and risk (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 13/ 
21-25; and for the English meaning: Hans Wehr, 1979: 35-36). The term also denotes the 
aspiration to be entrusted to bring peace, safety from any danger and risk through a 
trustworthy protector. AmÉnah is central to a Muslim‟s life; subsequently every Muslim 
individual is entrusted to deliver his or her amÉnah just as prescribed by the aforementioned 
ÍadÊth. Furthermore, from the same root comes the word imÉn (faith or belief). A mu´min 
(believer) is at the same time an amÊn (trustworthy person). AmÉnah is in the state of 
ma´mËn (safe and secured), in the hand of mu´min who is amÊn. In such correlation, amÉnah 
is equal to the state of good faith; hence, many verses and ÍadÊths condemn the act of non-
trustworthiness and betrayal. They are described as nifÉq (hypocrisy) and fisq (mischief). A 
believer must be trustworthy and a trustee according to this „amÉnah‟ paradigm. 
In the field of governance, this trustee typology dictates responsibilities of every actor in its 
process. It is stated in the Qur’an: “Allah commands you to deliver the trusts to those to 
whom they are due; and whenever you judge between people, judge with justice...” (Qur´Én, 
4: 58); and in another verse: “Follow God, follow the Prophet, and those from among you 
who have been entrusted with authority” (Qur’an, 4: 59). Fundamental principles of 
                                                 
11
 The quality of believers in delivering amÉnah has been mentioned in many places in al-Qur’an: (4:58); 
(2:283); (33:72); (9:27); (23:8); The virtue of being a trustworthy or al-AmÊn also was associated with the 
quality of the Prophets (26: 107, 125, 143, 162, 178); (7: 68); (44: 18); (28: 26); (12: 54). 
12
 Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 1/304; 2/848, 901, 912; 3/1010) and Muslim (no date: 2/1459). 
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governance based on the Qur‟anic concept of amÉnah and its implication on society are 
illuminated by the light of these verses
13
. An ideal governance aspiration embraced by the 
Muslim community is based soundly on individuals‟ practice of amÉnah in their daily 
conducts. AmÉnah within the individuals‟ self will create self-accountability to guide his 
conduct, which will create an inner feeling of responsibility to deliver the trust given and 
enable him to refrain from corruption and mismanagement. This inner feeling exemplifies 
the meaning of iÍsÉn (comprehensive excellence) in which a person lives in constant 
awareness of God. IÍsÉn is essential in delivering amÉnah, and only emerges as an 
accumulation of imÉn. The state of imÉn entails amÉnah and vice versa. The Prophet 
Muhammad explains the inter-relation of ÊmÉn and amÉnah in many of his traditions
14
.   
However, behavioural norms alone are not sufficient to crystallise the bigger picture of such 
a concept of governance.  It requires a comprehensive accountability system at every layer of 
governance mechanisms and institutions. For instance, amÉnah must be the prevailing and 
viable underlying philosophy for accountability, transparency and efficiency in serving the 
society whether in the public or private sector. Such a system with effective supporting 
institutions will bring the governance process closer to the notion of imÉn as the fruit of 
amÉnah. Furthermore, self-realisation of such concepts within individuals will contribute 
towards the micro-discipline of society. Thus, amÉnah or trust being an important dimension 
of good governance is enshrined in Islam as an essential element of faith.  This implies that 
this dimension of good governance is no longer an optional matter for those who have imÉn, 
but rather for them, it is an integral part of their value system. 
The Prophet Muhammad has shown the articulation of amÉnah in his life as he was known, 
even before becoming a prophet, as al-amÊn (the trustworthy). Furthermore, many of his 
traditions exemplify how amÉnah played a central role in his practice of governance. His 
strong emphasis on the importance of amÉnah could be seen in his appointment of state 
officers to execute their administrative duties, amongst them al-wulÉt (governors), al-ÑÉmilÊn 
(tax collector) and al-quÌÉh (judges) who were the main bureaucrats of the „city state‟ of 
                                                 
13
 For a detailed discussion, see Ibn ÑÓshËr, 1984: 2 /91-102. Ibn ÑÓshËr‟s analysis of verses 4: 58-59 is one of 
the most comprehensive and insightful. It should be noted that Ibn Taymiyyah‟s al-SiyÉsah al-SharÑiyyah fÊ 
IÎlÉÍ al-RÉÑiy wa al-RaÑiyyah and al-MÉwardÊ‟s al-AÍkÉm al-SulÏÉniyyah wa al-WilÉyÉt al-DÊniyyah focus only 
on verse 4: 59.  
14
 Amongst those, the ÍadÊth: “The fornicator, at the time he fornicates, does not commit adultery while he is a 
faithful believer (in the state of ÊmÉn), and the thief, at the time he steals, does not steal while he is a faithful 
believer (in the state of imÉn).” (Narrated by al-BukhÉrÊ (1985: 2/875, 5/2120, 6/2487 & 2497) and Muslim (no 
date: 1/176)). Perhaps this tradition states that a believer (mu´min) loses his ÊmÉn when he is not delivering his 
amÉnah by committing adultery and stealing, and vice versa. 
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Medina
15
. Moreover, principles of accountability and transparency permanently applied to 
the government of revenue and expenditure of the provinces, as well the officials who 
administrated them (Buraey, 1985: 245). This can be seen in many of his traditions, amongst 
them an incident where an ÑÉmil returned to MadÊnah loaded with tax revenues, and asserting 
that a substantive portion of the revenue was given to him as tokens from certain people, 
then the Prophet reminded him by saying: “What is wrong with the man whom we appointed 
as a tax collector and he said this is for you and that was given to me? If he stayed in his 
parent‟s house, would something be given to him?”16. On another occasion, the Prophet 
reminded his companions by saying: “Whomsoever we appoint over an affair, we shall give 
him provision. What he takes after that is breach of trust.”17 
Thus, the fundamental idea of amÉnah in governance is signified by the notion of 
accountability before God and community. It was on this basis that the Righteous Caliphs 
understood their positions and duty, as to personally supervise the community‟s affairs and 
to protect their maÎlaÍah (benefit) and their rights. It was reported that during Omar‟s time, 
when he was returning from one of his journeys he saw a woman with her children who were 
starving by the side of a tent which was situated in an isolated territory. Being the Caliph, 
and with the feeling of responsibility and amÉnah, he approached her tent and asked her 
about „Omar, the Caliph‟ without introducing himself to her. In return, she swore against 
Omar for not taking care of her family‟s welfare. Omar replied her: “How can Omar know 
about you who live so far?” She replied: “If he cannot be aware of his subjects, why has he 
accepted the burden of leadership?” Her reply made Omar agreed to take care of her welfare 
from then on (Al-Tabari, 1994: XIV/110). This incident indicates how leadership and 
governance are indeed an „amÉnah‟ (trust and responsibility) to be delivered according to 
                                                 
15
 Al-waliy (governor) is the singular of al-wulÉt, was an office appointed by the Prophet to be his representative 
to the people in one of the provinces under the Prophet‟s administration in al-MadÊnah. Arabia was then divided 
into provinces of al-MadÊnah, Tayma, al-Janad, the region of Banu Kindah, Makkah, Najran, al-Yaman, 
hadramawt, ÑUmmÉn, and Bahrain. The wulÉt then were responsible in educating the people in the provinces as 
well as establishing law and order, and in charge of the some simple administration and governance affairs; 
While Al-ÑÉmil (tax collector) the singular of al-ÑÉmilÊn, was an appointed agent to assist the governor in 
collecting zakat (fiscal tax) and Îadaqah (voluntary alms) from the Muslims and jizyah (capitation tax) from the 
non-Muslims of any region specified to him. This position was very crucial to the revenue of the Islamic state 
during the period of the Prophet and after his reign, hence the accountability and transparency process were very 
apparent in most of the traditions due to its importance; Al-qÉÌi (judge), on the other hand, is the singular of al-
quÌÉh, was another office appointed by the Prophet to each province to dispense justice. The quÌÉh are 
independent from the wulÉt (governors), and reported directly to the Prophet as the Chief justice of the Islamic 
State. Amongst the prominent quÌÉh during the Prophet‟s period were Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth pious 
Calpih, and Muadh bin Jabal. (Majdalawi, 2002)  
16
 Narrated by al-BukhÉrÊ (1985: 2/917, 6/2559, 2624, 2631) and Muslim (no date: 3/1463). 
17
 Narrated by Abu Daud (al-Tarifi, 2005: 2/683), and al-Dhahabi (2001: 5/2533) recommended the hadith as 
authentic. 
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Tawhidic reality. It was this type of amanah upon rulers to deliver by preserving public 
interest or maÎlaÍah upon which fuqahÉ´ (jurists) established the maxim: “taÎarrufÉt al-
rÉÑiyy manËÏun ÑalÉ maÎlaÍah al-raÑiyyah” (rulers‟ acts of conducts to be determined by the 
interest of the ruled) (Zaydan, 2004: 120)
18
. 
6.2.2.2 Implications of amÉnah to governance 
In commenting on amÉnah (trust or responsibility) of leadership and governance, Ibn 
Taimiyyah (2005: 9-14 and 21), asserts two major themes reflecting its true meaning: first 
strict selection and appointment of officials, based on merit and qualification, and then the 
fair distribution of wealth in the community. These two factors are important in establishing 
justice in society. Conversely, due to the reality of the contemporary world, despite their 
pivotal role in governance the two mentioned elements alone are not sufficient to ensure 
efficiency of the public service. Complexity of the contemporary post-industrial world 
requires further exploration of Islamic epistemological sources to produce new ijtihÉd to act 
in response to existing needs and necessities. In reply to this challenge, the „amÉnah‟ axiom 
articulates three major functions of an effective „governance‟ process: individual 
empowerment, accountability and freedom that will be elaborated further in the following 
paragraphs.  
6.2.2.2.1. AmÉnah and tawÍÊd lead to individuals’ empowerment through the shËrÉ 
mechanism 
Responsibility to deliver amÉnah in Muslim society demands „individual empowerment‟ by 
a significant number of active people participating in governance. Tawhidic reality implies 
that the vertical relation between God and human beings leads to equality amongst the 
latter‟s horizontal relation. Such a worldview indicates equality amongst citizens; hence, 
their collective rights to participate in governance as stakeholders. Rationally, by referring to 
the tawhidic ontology, it could be explained that absolute, cosmic sovereignty belongs to 
God; nevertheless, he endowed the administration and sovereignty on earth to the people, 
through the mandate of istikhlÉf (vicegerency). The verse “O ye who believe! Obey Allah, 
and obey the messenger, and ulÊ al-amr (literally translated as those who possess the order) 
among you” (Qur’an, 4:59) best describes the individual empowerment ideals in Islam 
                                                 
18
 Or in another wording, “al-TaÎarruf ÑalÉ al-RaÑiyyÉt ManËÏ bi al-MaÎlaÍah” (Any decision for the people 
determined by the public interest) (Zaydan, 2004: 120). The people, in this manner, are the “cestui qui trust” or 
intended beneficiaries of powers given in trust. 
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(Imarah, 2005: 44). 
This verse clearly indicates that every individual is required to obey Allah and the 
Messenger to establish and maintain order within the community. Order and harmony in the 
community can only be achieved by conformity to ulÊ al-amr, from amongst you (minkum), 
or being chosen by you from within you (min anfusikum). The connotation of minkum (being 
chosen from amongst yourself or amongst you) implies that individuals are responsible for 
electing their leader as part of the command to „obey Allah and the Messenger‟ (al-
Ghannoushi, 1993: 110-11). However, conformity is stipulated by the authority‟s compliance 
to the teaching of Allah and the Messenger, which in this case refers to their execution of the 
trust and responsibilities given to them as „ulÊ al-amr‟ in the community or society. Should 
they fail to execute their responsibilities, they will also have failed to obey Allah and the 
Messenger. In such a situation, there will be no obedience towards them (Imarah, 2005: 44-
45). With this understanding of the verse, individuals are considered as part of the authority 
in their society through their decision and choice, which is excellently articulated through the 
„open shËrÉ‟ tradition that will be explained further later in this chapter.  
„Open shËrÉ‟ consists of both shËrÉ (individual empowerment) and accountability, which 
have been promoted in Islam through al-Qur´Én, the Prophet‟s traditions and the 
administrations of the four-guided Caliphs (Imarah, 2005: 38-62). On the other hand, it can 
also be concluded that Muslims as individuals and citizens in the community are empowered 
to have their say and to determine their own destiny and not be dictated to or planned by the 
elites at the top under the banner of „state‟ or „authority‟19. A shËrÉ ideal reflects the concept 
of empowered civil society centred on the concept of amÉnah, and can be clearly articulated 
within the healthy environment of democracy (al-Turabi, 1987: 17-18; 1987b: 20, 73, 132-
33). ShËrÉ, as one of the major principals of Islam is the most vital mechanism for delivering 
amÉnah through the concept of individual empowerment in a larger inclusive and collective 
manner, which in our case is the field of governance.  
Etymologically, the term shËrÉ is derived from the root word Sha Wa Ra, which denotes an 
action of extracting honey from a beehive. From the same semantic meaning come the words 
sharaÍ and shËraÍ, which mean good or fine appearance, and often refer to a fine costume or 
garment. The word „shaw wara‟ on the other hand bears the meaning of „pointing‟, and the 
term shËrÉ, meaning of advice, mutual consultation, and in its widest scope a collective 
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 Imarah (2005: 44) thus coins an Islamic political culture as siyasah ra’iyyah (civil politics). 
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deliberation in which all parties exchange counsel (Ibn Manzur, 1956, 4: 434-37). Another 
term that might have a similar meaning to shËrÉ is the term istishÉrah, which means one side 
seeking counsel from another and the term tashÉwur, which in its general usage means 
mutual consultation. In its technical meaning, shËrÉ is strongly associated with the meaning 
of participatory political exercise (Ghannoushi, 1993: 108). In relation to the trustee 
typology of governance, shËrÉ semantically means „the extraction of the most quality 
decision (just like the honey), through the pointing of opinions to seek mutual agreement‟ 
(Ibn Manzur, 1956, 4: 434-37). In conclusion, „shËrÉ‟ connotes the appreciation of every 
individual opinion and choice, thus the indispensable nature of individual empowerment in 
governance process as stakeholders. 
ShËrÉ (mutual consultation) has been mentioned as a virtue of a just Muslim leader
20
 in 
Qur‟anic verses (3: 159): “It is part of the Mercy of God that thou dost deal gently with 
them. Were thou severe or harsh-hearted, they would have broken away from about thee: so 
pass over (their faults), and ask for (God's) forgiveness for them; and consult them in affairs 
(of moment). Then, when thou hast taken a decision put thy trust in God. For God loves 
those who put their trust (in Him).” In line with the previous verse, Allah also praises the 
believers who practice shËrÉ in their daily life in another verse: “Those who hearken to their 
Lord, and establish regular Prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation; who 
spend out of what We bestow on them for Sustenance” (Qur´Én, 42: 38). All these evidences 
that a just leader from an Islamic point of view is the one who actively practises and lives 
with the spirit of Shura through the enhancement of individual empowerment. 
It is from this Qur‟anic context that shËrÉ (consultation), is based on equality among those 
consulting in order to arrive at a collective decision (Ghannoushi, 1993: 108). The 
commentary goes on to note that this principle was applied to its fullest extent by the Prophet 
Muhammad in his public and private life, and was fully acted upon by the early rulers of 
Islamic society. The shËrÉ or Consultative Council had its origins in pre-Islamic times where 
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 Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (1990: 1: 152) points out that the philosophical foundation of the concept of shËrÉ was 
established in chapter al-Baqarah concerning God‟s dialogue with the angels during the pre-creation stage of 
Adam. Al-Razi argues that God did not need to consult the angels on His decision (on the creation of Adam and 
his role to be given), however God deliberately mentioned the dialogue in the Qur’an as a pretext for certain 
purpose, which according to them, to guide the human being (the virtue and the sense) of consultation. Ibn 
ÑÓshËr (1984: 1/ 395) furthermore points out that God‟s consultation with the angels on the creation of the first 
human being, Adam aims to establish a norm and law instilled in the psyche of Adam‟s offspring. 
Consequently, shËrÉ as another name for such consultation which constitutes one of the essential dimensions or 
aspects of man‟s God-given nature (fiÏrah). In other words, shËrÉ is not a mere political notion in Islam, but first 
and foremost, it is an essential quality of man that God instils in human beings to empower and dignify every 
human being with reason and choice (el-Mesawi, 2005: 100).  
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it comprised a council of tribal elders. Originally, it constituted an informal forum of 
deliberation where decisions were arrived at when discussing new problems. During these 
deliberations, the problems in question were thrown open for general discussion. Members 
of the council were invited to express their considered personal opinions; Islam introduced 
improvements in accordance with the moral principles enunciated by the Qur’an (Strok, 
1999). 
Thus, the basic message of chapter al-ShËrÉ in the Qur’an is: “to live true in mutual 
consultation and forbearance, and rely on Allah”21, contains the essence of governance from 
the Islamic perspective. Those who wish to serve Allah must ensure that their conduct in life 
is open and determined by mutual consultation between those entitled to a voice, as well as 
in the state affairs between rulers and their subjects. Since the Qur’an clearly mandates that 
any decision involving more than one party require mutual consultation inspired by the 
doctrine of shËrÉ, Islam encourages the participants to reach their resolution based on 
consensus (Shaikh, 1988:115-28). In addition, the Prophet himself espoused it as a regular 
practice in his leadership, and the Pious Caliphs followed the same precedent after him. This 
would make shËrÉ a part of the normative precedent (Imarah, 2005:38-62). 
The institution of shËrÉ explains how decision-making in business and other activities can 
meet Islamic moral values. As an important trust from God, Islam demands of those holding 
this trust to engender truthfulness, justice, consultation and a spirit of consensus-seeking 
among participants during group decision-making. Appropriately, according to the spirit of 
shËrÉ, leaders must allow a degree of freedom through empowerment and reasonable 
mechanisms to enable others to participate in decision-making
22
. Contained by such an 
atmosphere, all individuals would be expected to contribute their knowledge to the 
formulation and implementation of the tawhidic mission to collectively accomplish falÉÍ, 
and appropriately, consultative procedures should be applied to all affected within the 
community (Mohammad and Mohrnaud, 1999: 52-79). Consequently, shËrÉ will keep proper 
                                                 
21
 Even on occasions when divine command is to be carried out, the shËrÉ process must take place to bring 
about consensus. This is illustrated by the story of Abraham and his son, where he was commanded to slaughter 
his son. Despite the nature of the command, Abraham still consulted his son for the boy‟s view (Qur’an, 37: 
102). 
22
 Ibn Atiyyah, the famous Andalusian exegete insists that there is no disagreement amongst the Muslim 
scholars that any ruler who does not consult with people of knowledge and expertise must be removed from 
office. This opinion strongly invoked by Ibn ÑÓshËr, due to the role of the ruler as the trustee who has the 
interest and welfare of the ummah upon his shoulders (Ibn ÑÓshËr, 1984: 3/ 148). Accordingly, „Ibn ÑÓshËr 
proposes that the ideal way for Muslims to govern the country is through the representative democratic system, 
which represent people‟s will to preserve their own interest (Ibn ÑÓshËr, 2001: 333).  
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balance in the free will and free-activities of human beings in the political sphere (Khan, 
2002: 38). 
ShËrÉ requires the active participation of citizens directly in the political, administrative and 
governance related-realms. Governance as a collective trust upon every empowered Muslim 
individual is a sphere in which they must collectively decide their future in the light of 
tawhidic worldview. This collective obligation can be properly fulfilled through what is 
known today as representative governance, to enable consensus-oriented actions and policies 
(Ridha, 1988: 9). Consequently, democratic political mechanisms such as fair elections, 
freedom of campaign, wider spaces for consultation through media, online and other 
administration means are part of the prerequisites of this shËrÉ-inspired representative 
governance. Likewise, any autocratic and elitist practices of governance are rejected 
according to this realm. 
To articulate the spirit of shËrÉ in the political realm, which turns the Islamic system of rule 
to be entirely civilian where every citizen is empowered through the spirit of shËrÉ, Abduh 
(1956: 58-59; 1973: 5) explains that revelation provides guidance and principles that prepare 
the foundations of governance to establish and organise governments by commanding the 
formation of an elective and consultative government that manages the temporal affairs of 
the society and takes steps to realise the  benefits for the people. Consequently, people are 
responsible for electing a government to manage public affairs through consultation and for 
remaining accountable to them. Thus, a government‟s legitimacy is solely based on the 
decision of the people, as the government is but the reflection of the people itself
23
.  
6.2.2.2.2. AmÉnah along with tawÍÊd and al-Ñadl wa al-ihsÉn require accountability 
AmÉnah as a political concept suggests that God has given the trust to human beings to 
deliver and promote His guidance through justice and fairness in their lives. In the same 
spirit – as part of their trust - they are also responsible for eradicating evil and mischief.   
Everyone becomes a recipient of such a trust and consequently has to stand in awe-filled 
reverence before his people towards whom and for whose sake he will be called upon to 
exercise his duty.  This enshrines what has been mentioned in the Qur’an: “Let there arise 
out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and 
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 In the line of such argument, Iqbal ([1974] 2008: 155) asserts that Islam from the very beginning a civil 
society, thus differentiates it from notion of medieval state-church relation. 
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forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.” (Qur’an, 3:104)24, and in 
another verse, “Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, 
forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah. If only the People of the Book had faith it 
were best for them; among them are some who have faith, but most of them are perverted 
transgressors” (Qur’an, 3: 110). 
In conjunction with such spirit, the Prophet was reported as saying: “Whoever amongst you 
sees anything objectionable, let him change it with his hand, if he is not able, then with his 
tongue, and if he is not even able to do so, then with his heart, and the latter is the weakest 
form of faith”25. Similarly, there are other analogous records which denote the Prophet‟s 
position towards the concept in the political life of the believers, amongst others his praise 
and recognition to anybody who stood against tyranny with the words of justice: “The master 
of the martyrs is Hamza, and whoever is killed speaking truth in the court of a tyrant ruler”26. 
Equally, on another occasion he justifies an act of accountability performed by an individual 
by associating it to jihad: “The best Jihad is the word of truth to an unjust ruler”27.  
The quoted traditions and many others indicate that „accountability‟ is rather pivotal in 
articulating the purity of the spirit of amÉnah in political life. In the same line of argument, 
the accountability process empowers individuals, hence crystallising the true meaning of 
equality and allowing individuals to act as a benchmark for the community of believers. 
These inter-dependent and inter-relating concepts reveal a clear picture of how amÉnah 
works within a tawhidic worldview based society. Furthermore, in preserving and instilling 
the concept of accountability, the Prophet himself allowed himself to be accountable and 
                                                 
24
 This verse and those like it are the best evidence that Islam promotes the active citizenship through 
participation in governance. The spirit of al-amr bi al-maÑrËf wa nahy Ñan al-munkar (enjoinment of good and 
forbidding of evil) must be expanded from the exclusivity of spiritual-ritual dimension towards a broader 
horizon of moral, ethical and social responsibilities. From the contemporary „governance‟ paradigm, this 
concept is utterly crucial as it is part of the individual empowerment, which is the important part of a democratic 
process. Not only does the concept lead to the active role of the people in political activity, furthermore it will 
mobilise the civil society and the third sector industry. With the spirit al-amr bi al-maÑrËf wa nahy Ñan al-
munkar instigating all those elements, an „Islamic governance‟ which aims for human well-being can easily be 
attained. 
25
 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 1/69), this ÍadÊth was also transmitted in another form on the authority of 
ÑAbdullah bin MasÑËd who narrated that the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said: Never before me has a Prophet 
been sent by Allah to his nation who had not among his people disciples and companions who followed his 
ways and obeyed his command. Then there came after them their successors who said whatever they did not 
practise, and practised whatever they were not commanded to do. He who strove against them with his hand was 
a believer; he who strove against them with his tongue was a believer; and he who strove against them with his 
heart was a believer; and beyond that there is no faith, not even as minute as a mustard seed.” (Muslim, no date: 
1/69) 
26
 Narrated by al-Hakim (1991: 3/215). 
27
 Narrated by al-Tarmidhi (no date: 4/471), Abu Daud (1982: 2/965), Ibn Majah (no date: 2/1329). 
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criticised by his companions on many occasions. The Prophet was criticised by the 
companions on his decision regarding the positioning of the army during the battle of Badr. 
He was also pushed to accept the companions‟ proposal to fight the Makkan army outside 
Madinah when the Makkan troops were approaching Madinah during the battle of UËud. 
Another occasion, which might clarify the implementation of the principle of accountability, 
was the treaty of ×udaybiyah
28. Despite his companions‟ disagreement and Omar calling 
him to account, the Prophet Muhammad did not condemn Omar for questioning him and 
explained to him that the decision was made according to the revelation he received from 
Allah.  
The distinction between what is revelation from among the Prophets‟ actions, and what is his 
personal ijtihÉd in the administration, as mentioned in the chapter about epistemological 
sources of governance is needed in order to understand this event. Compared to his other 
decisions during the battle of Badr and UÍud, the Prophet was not able to retreat from the 
decision made about the treaty. It was merely a revelation to be implemented. At this point, 
Abu Bakr who understood the issue earlier managed to convince Omar. However, the most 
prevailing lesson to be learned from this and other events is the accountability concept being 
upheld and not being denied, other than in the case of revelation. Reasonably, as a statesman, 
the Prophet was held accountable and he accepted that, likewise as the Prophet, he explained 
to Omar why the action was taken
29
.  
                                                 
28
 The treaty was against the choice and the favour of the companions. Two points in the treaty made it 
distasteful to them, namely the prohibition from accessing the Holy Sanctuary that year, and the seemingly 
degrading attitude as regards reconciliation with the pagans of Quraish. The feeling of humiliation and distress 
made Omar, who was present at the place hold the Prophet to account. Omar asked the Prophet: “Aren‟t you the 
true Messenger of Allah?” The Prophet replied calmly. “Why?” Omar again spoke and asked, “Aren‟t we on the 
path of righteousness and our enemies in the wrong?” Without showing any resentment , the Prophet replied that 
it was so. On getting this reply he further urged, “Then we should not suffer any humiliation in the matter of 
Faith”. The Prophet was firm and with perfect confidence said, “I am the true messenger of Allah, I never 
disobey Him, He shall help me.” Omar replied: “Did you not tell us that we shall perform pilgrimage?”, “But I 
have never told you that we shall do so this very year”, the Prophet replied. He went to Abu Bakr and expressed 
his feelings before him. Abu Bakr who had never been in doubt as regards the Prophet‟s truthfulness and 
sincerity, confirmed what the Prophet had told him. In due course, the Chapter of Victory (48
th
) was revealed 
saying: “Verily, We have given you (O Muhammad) a manifest victory.” (al-Qur‟an, 48:1). The Prophet 
summoned Omar and conveyed him the happy tidings. Omar was overjoyed, and greatly regretted his former 
attitude. He used to spend in charity, observe fasting and prayer and free as many slaves as possible in expiation 
for that thoughtless attitude he had assumed. (For details of the incidents see: al-Mubarakfuri, 2002: 305-306)  
29
 A myriad of evidence explains the virtue and the vital role of accountability in Muslim political life, or in 
governance. It is rather suprising when some Muslims, especially the despots and the co-opted scholars, tend to 
dismiss the role of oppositions in their country. Unfortunately many of them tend to abuse the interpretation of 
the Qur‟anic verse 4:59 (O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with 
authority among you) to negate the myriad of aforementioned evidence on accountability in Muslim political 
life. 
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The practice of accountability in early Islamic political life could also be found during the 
period of Abu Bakr. He stressed the importance of accountability and the nature of 
individuals with authority in the community in his very first speech to the Muslim 
community after being elected as the Caliph by saying: “Cooperate with me when I am right, 
but correct me when I commit error; obey me so long as I follow the commandments of 
Allah and His Prophet; but turn away from me when I deviate.”30 In fact, other companions 
often held him to account for his decisions and state administration. Furthermore, this was 
also the position of Omar when he was elected as the successor of Abu Bakr: in his very first 
speech after being appointed as caliph, he stressed the need for accountability in his 
administration, and the rights of every empowered citizen (Ibn al-Jawzi, 2001: 170-71). 
In another event, while Omar was giving the Friday sermon, an ordinary person rose and 
interrupted saying, “O the leader of the believers, I won‟t listen to your sermon until you 
explain how you came up with your long dress (Arabian robe)”. Apparently, there was some 
distribution of fabric to the people and given the measure of distribution and the height of 
Omar; he could not have made a dress out of his share. So, a vigilant voice of egalitarianism 
unhesitatingly challenged Omar, the leader of a vast caliphate. Omar‟s son stood up, 
explaining that he gave his share to his father, so that a dress could be made to fit Omar. The 
vigilant voice then expressed his approval and sat down, and Omar resumed his sermon (Ibn 
Qutaybah, 2002: 1/55)
31
. 
Omar‟s policy on accountability did not end with the primitive style of verbal complaints 
and condemnations from the public. As for the public offices, he established a specific office 
to deal with the public administrators‟ accountability. The office was designed for the 
investigation of complaints that reached the Caliph against the officers of the State. When it 
was first established, Omar appointed MuÍammad ibn Maslamah to take the responsibility of 
this ombudsman-like department. In important cases MuÍammad ibn Maslamah was deputed 
                                                 
30
 Narrated by al-Hindi (1989: 5/835) and Ibn Kathir (no date: 6/301), and both categorised the narration as 
authentic (ÎaÍÊÍ). 
31
 Once while delivering a sermon, Omar said: “My rights over public funds (the Baitul MÉl) are similar to those 
of the guardians of an orphan. If well placed in life, I will not claim anything from it. In case of need, I shall 
draw only as much as it constitutionally allowed for providing food. You have every right to question me 
anything about, any improper accumulation of the revenue and bounty collections, improper utilization of the 
treasury money, provision of the daily bread to all, border-security arrangements and harassment caused to any 
citizen.” (Ibn Saad, no date: 3: 215-19) Omar presents the practice of transparency where a ruler, as well as the 
state officers, should have nothing to hide from the public and open to scrutiny of their usage of public wealth. 
In the same account he was recorded by historians to have issued a certificate witness by the a group of elders to 
all duly appointed governors stipulating that the governor should not ride an expensive horse, or eat white bread, 
or wear any fine cloth, or prevent the people‟s needs (from being satisfied) (al-Tabari, 1994: XIV/ 113). 
Chapter Six: Architectonics of Islamic Governance: Locating the Axioms, Foundational 
Principles and Working Mechanism 
 212 
by Omar to proceed to the location, investigate the charge and take action. Sometimes an 
Inquiry Commission was constituted to investigate the charge. Whenever the officers raised 
complaints against him, they were summoned to Madinah, and the case was brought before 
the Caliph himself. The caliph also dismissed governors when the people complained against 
them; amongst them was the Prophet‟s companion, SaÑd Ibnu AbÊ WaqqÉs due the people‟s 
complaints against him (Majdalawi, 2000: 86 and 90). The same function was conducted in a 
later phase of Muslim history by a specially-designed office known as DÊwÉn al-MaÐÉlim, 
which can be understood as the classical version of the contemporary ombudsman. 
Another example of accountability practiced during the period of the rightly-guided Caliphs 
can be found in the famous letter written by the fourth Caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib to his 
governor of Egypt, Malik al-Ashtar. In his advice to the governor, he asserts that: “Out of 
your hours of work, fix a time for the complainants and for those who want to approach you 
with their grievances. During this time, you should do no other work but hear them and pay 
attention to their complaints and grievances. For this purpose you must arrange public 
audience for them; during this audience, for the sake of Allah, treat them with kindness, 
courtesy and respect. Do not let your army and police be in the audience hall at such times so 
that those who have grievances against your regime may speak to you freely, unreservedly 
and without fear” (al-Musawi, 2007: 2/ 459). 
In articulating accountability as a manifestation of amÉnah, the principle is to be crystallized 
in a mechanism that will guarantee that no party will avoid being answerable for their ex-
ante and ex-post responsibilities. The procedure should comprise a comprehensive system, 
institutions and culture within the society. As for an effectual macro accountability system, it 
would only prevail within the tangible and real division of powers in any state. Without a 
real separation of power, as can be seen in many contemporary Muslim countries, a culture 
of accountability could never prevail. In the absence of a palpable and salient atmosphere of 
accountability, ideal governance will unlikely be achieved, leading to arbitrary ascendancy.  
Equally, political pluralism, which enables political parties to compete for power to represent 
the people, should also prevail to enshrine the practice of accountability in establishing 
Islamic norm-based governance. Likewise, freedom and more room for opposition in making 
the executives and the ruling party accountable is another prerequisite (Imarah, 2005: 100-
09). Perhaps the establishment of a multi-party political system might be another efficient 
way of ensuring a process of constant accountability under such an axiom. Under such a 
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structure, all parties engaged in the legislative and governance process must be treated 
equally without any discrimination regarding their political affiliation. The executive or the 
ruling party will be accountable before the opposition as the shadow government in order to 
improve their performance in delivering people‟s rights.  
Similarly, in reflecting on the modern world developments and requirements, within the 
spirit of amÉnah-inspired accountability, all administrative bodies, including bureaucratic 
institutions and other public offices, must be transparent and monitored by the public 
through freedom of information and scrutinising committees in order to achieve Islamic 
governance. In the same vein, accountability bodies for the executive and legislative 
agencies such as the ombudsman, the parliamentary accountability commission, and the anti-
corruption agency, are vital to achieve the aims of amÉnah in governance. Independent and 
non-biased judicial systems with sound legal codes on the other hand are another necessity, 
of course with serious enforcement. More room for the civil society and media as watchdogs 
in monitoring the governance process and also as part of the decision-making process would 
enhance the ideals of accountability. Neither systems nor institutions could function in a 
culture that does not welcome such an ideal.  
Correspondingly, the behavioural norms of the community should allow the spirit of 
individual consciousness of trustee typology to enable an accountability culture to flourish as 
a sustainable convention in the society‟s social, economic and political life. While in order to 
allow the practice of accountability to be part of progressive governance system in the life of 
the people, the Islamic ethos of iÎlÉÍ (constant striving for betterment) in providing a 
productive basis for accountability, freedom or Íurriyyah within the framework of ikhtiyÉr 
(both restricted and voluntary notions) is indispensable. Likewise, the atmosphere of rule of 
law inspired from al-Ñadl wa al-iÍÍsÉn are vital, since both elements are included in the 
major principles of Islam itself, thus they represent another important axiom for ideal 
governance.  
6.2.3. al-ÑAdl wa al-IÍsÉn (Justice and Benevolence) 
One of the major themes of Islamic teaching is justice (ÑadÉlah or Ñadl). It is stated in the 
Qur´Én: “Allah commands you to deliver the trusts (amÉnah) to those to whom they are due; 
and whenever you judge between people, judge with justice…” (Qur’an, 4: 58). According 
to the Qur’an, justice along with tawÍÊd was the most prevailing message and the mission of 
all the Prophets (57: 25). In addition, justice has also been equated to piety (Qur’an, 5: 8). 
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The Qur’an also abhors injustice and despotism through the stories of the despots and tyrants 
whom the prophets stood before to convey God‟s message of justice and truth. Abraham was 
sent to Nemrod (2: 258), Moses and Aaron were sent to Pharaoh, Qarun and Haman to 
remind them of their deviations from justice and God-given order (28:38; 29: 39; 40:23-24; 
79:24). Due to the significance and vitality of this concept, it is important that it is included 
in the axioms of governance. This concept will be defined to understand its philosophical 
and semantic meanings before its implications are further elaborated in the following 
paragraphs: 
6.2.3.1. Definition 
The term justice can be defined clearly as the absence of injustice (Ðulm). ÑAdl or ÑadÉlah or 
justice and fairness are the centre of Muslim actions. Although it is hard to set a parameter to 
give accurate specifications of justice, acts of injustice can easily be recognised. 
Accordingly, the semantic definition of Ñadl, which is derived from the root word ÑA Da La, 
is the antonym of injustice or tyranny (Ðulm and jawr). ÑAdl or ÑadÉlah denotes straightness 
and uprightness, which are the state of the absence of tyranny, corruption, waywardness and 
deviation; Ñadl also means balance and proportion, which are contrast to imbalance and 
asymmetry; it is also used for equality, equity and fairness, which are opposite to inequality 
and discrimination, inequity and oppression (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 11/430-31; al-Jawhari, 
1956: 5/1760-61).  
In such an understanding, Ñadl encompasses vast and comprehensive meanings exceeding the 
current limited notion of justice. ÑAdl represents the most vital position of Islam and 
exemplifies the highest objective of the SharÊÑah itself (Imarah, 2005: 62-64) ÑAdl is also 
defined as „putting things in their right place‟. In this usage, being Ñadl is also delivering the 
amÉnah (trust), and delivering both ‘adl and amÉnah is the fruit of ÊmÉn, thus crystallising 
the meaning of tawÍÊd according to the trustee paradigm. However, Ñadl (justice) alone is not 
sufficient in delivering the rights of the community. Islam promotes Ñadl along with iÍsÉn 
(benevolence) in ensuring fairness prevails in human life. Such a principle is reflected in the 
Qur‟anic message that orders both Ñadl and iÍsÉn to be executed in parallel to enshrine the 
tawhidic ideal of „justice and fairness‟ in all aspect of human life32 (Naqvi, 2003: 151). Al-
Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn has been promoted in Islamic epistemology by encouraging Muslims to 
deliver fairness and justice in every domain of their life. Hence, al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn has been 
                                                 
32
 Al-Qur’an (16: 90) 
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an important feature of human life as khalÊfah in following the guidance of Allah in their life. 
It is a trust upon every single individual to deliver and promote al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn as a 
paramount value of their mission as vicegerent. 
Complementary to the axiom Ñadl (justice), iÍsÉn, which originates from the word Íasan 
(right or good) defines the nature of an environment needed to prepare the fertile ground for 
justice to be implemented. Semantically, Íasan (right and good), as the origin of the term 
iÍsÉn factually envisages the meaning of ikhlÉÎ or sincerity, and also alludes to the 
significance of beneficence, performance of good conduct and the act of mercy (Ibn ManÐËr, 
1956: 13/117; Hans Wehr, 1979: 209) and the antonym of ‘isÉ´ah‟ (to misbehave, to abuse 
or to do unfair). Implementing iÍsÉn is articulating the denotation of both Ñadl and amÉnah, 
which are fruits of tawhidic worldview
33
. Similar to Ñadl, iÍsÉn is a comprehensive concept 
that encompasses all human affairs including man‟s relationship with God, and his 
relationship with other creatures, especially in fulfilling social obligations. The state of iÍsÉn 
epitomizes „excellence in servitude to God‟34. The consciousness of one being observed by 
God will stimulate him or her to perform his deed with utmost sincerity and inclusive 
excellence just as people perform better, when their superior is watching them.  
Additionally, being a muÍsin (implementer of iÍsÉn) is the manifestation of equity and 
humbleness according to tawhidic reality. Being a khalÊfah, a Muslim person should have 
mercy not only on himself and other human being around him, but also on other creatures 
and the environment, as well as on future generations (intra-generation)
35
. By not 
implementing iÍsÉn, one is subjected to commit injustice (Ðulm). However, the usage of the 
word in the governance term according to the tawhidic episteme can be expanded to its wider 
                                                 
33
 In  al-Qur’an, the term iÍsÉn was used to exemplify different deeds, which refer to its central semantical 
meaning of beneficence, performance of good deeds, the act of mercy and striving to reach the best standards of 
performance, such as: To forgive the faults of others (5:13, 3:134); To spend wealth for the welfare of 
humankind (2:195, 3:134); To be kind to the parents (46: 15); To strive against evil in the way of God (29:69, 
9:120); To be generous (2:236); To be humble (2:58, 9:91, 5:82-85, 7:56); To be righteous, to fear God and be 
patient (12:90); To establish ØalÉh and pay ZakÉh (31:3, 11:114-115). 
34
 As mentioned in „ÍadÊth JibrÊl‟ narrated by al-Bukhari when the Prophet was asked by the Archangel Gabriel 
about the meaning of iÍsÉn, he replied: “so that a person performs his servitude to Allah as if he is seeing Allah, 
and if he is not capable of having such quality, he must feel that Allah is right in front of him keenly observing 
his performance.” 
35
 It is mentioned in the Qur‟an that those who practise iÍsÉn (the MuÍsin) will be rewarded by God with 
different rewards: To be loved by Him (al-Qur´Én, 2:195; 3:134, 148; 5:13, 93); They will be granted the best 
reward (10: 26, 53: 31, 55: 60); They will be showered by His mercy (7: 56, 16: 128); They shall have no fear 
nor grieve (2:112); They will be considered the best person in God‟s system (4:125); They have the most 
trustworthy support (31:22); Their deed of iÍsÉn can never go waste (9:120, 11:115, 12:56, 12:90, 18: 30, 
46:112, 51:16, 77:44); God will impart knowledge of truth into their heart (12:22); They will join their 
predecessors in Paradise (9:100); They will enter Paradise, (10:26); They will be praised by Allah and His 
slaves (37:119-120, 16:30). 
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meaning based on the semantic usage of the term. The term illuminates the pure meaning of 
„the act of benevolence towards another creature‟, and also connotes the meaning of striving 
to reach the best standards of performance in any circumstances or situations. It represents 
excellence, graciousness and benevolence, „comprehensive excellence‟ and „perfection‟, 
which are interconnected with Ñadl. 
6.2.3.2. Implications of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn for governance 
This comprehensive coverage of the term al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn also connotes the inter-
connected application of tawhidic worldview in metaphysical, theological, ethical, judicial, 
social, education, psychological, economical and political dimensions in which justice is the 
major aim to be achieved and crystallised in all those fields. This multifaceted nature of al-
Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn constitutes the articulation of tawhidic reality to establish an Islamic ethos 
in many fields of human endeavour. Accordingly, al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn primarily insists on 
just order to prevail in a Muslim community through value-based development by ensuring 
social justice along with fair distribution of wealth based on needs for a „just‟ development 
and economic growth, which consequently “denote a state of social equilibrium” (Naqvi 
1994: 267).  
Furthermore, in ensuring the state of social equilibrium, this concept comprehensively 
articulates the crucial components in the governance process to be practised to achieve the 
ideal of Islamic governance, amongst them: 
6.2.3.2.1. Al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn, tawÍÊd, amÉnah and tazkiyah require establishment of the 
rule of law 
Al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn along with the notion of equality and purification from tawÍÊd, amÉnah 
and tazkiyah axioms demand the establishment of a just and fair society through the 
domination of „rule of law‟ in the legal discourse of the community. Justice as the prime 
objective of Islamic governance is to be manifested through the attainment of maqÉÎid al-
SharÊÑah, and by upholding it in its more inclusive interpretation. In the light of such 
aspiration, the concept of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn along with the other axioms must ensure that 
all rules and laws promulgated and enacted must be respected by the people and 
subsequently every single individual will enjoy the feeling of security under the laws. Rule 
of law from a tawhidic worldview paradigm can be concluded in five major fundamentals: 
the equality of individuals, the innocence of individuals until proven guilty by fair 
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judgement, the prohibition of imposing a penalty without a firm judgement sentence, the 
prohibition of torture by any parties upon the others and the separation of powers. Scores of 
evidence from Islamic epistemological sources entail explicitly and inexplicitly the 
formulation of certain principles and maxims on such concept, which can be further detailed 
as follows: 
(i) All individuals are equal before the law: 
Amongst the essential feature of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn is „equality of human beings before the 
law‟ regardless of class differences, race or even religion. Being treated differently by the 
law due to social status or class, opposes the conception of justice, fairness and 
comprehensive excellence and rightness. Furthermore, the unity of mankind before God, as 
part of tawhidic worldview, necessitates that men should be equal before the law for it to be 
a just and fair law. The most compelling tradition in regards to such a principle is what is 
popularly known as „ÍadÊth FÉÏimah‟, in which the Prophet Muhammad refused to entertain 
the noble Quraish tribe, Bani Makhzum who appealed to the Prophet to lift the punishment 
of one of their women who was convicted of theft. He was quoted as saying the cardinal 
precept: “By Allah, if Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut 
off her hand”.36 
The tradition became a principal underpinning for Islamic jurists who later formulated the 
theory of individuals‟ equality before the law. According to the intrinsic and explicit 
meaning of the tradition, all citizens, regardless of background or social level are subjected 
to the law equally: no person is above the law, and everybody is obliged to obey the same 
law. A qÉÌÊ (Islamic judge) is always conscious that he is not permitted to distinguish 
between people based on religion, race, colour, kinship or prejudice. In fact, there have been 
numerous cases in Muslim history where Caliphs had to appear before judges for litigation.  
Amongst the incidents was the case of „Ubay, a prominent companion of the Prophet and a 
common citizen who charged Omar, who was then Caliph. Ubay took Omar to the court of 
                                                 
36
 It was recorded by al-BukhÉrÊ, (1985: 3/1282, 4/1566) and Muslim (no date: 3/1311) that a lady from BanÊ 
MakhzËm who had committed theft. The people of Quraish worried about her. They asked, “Who will intercede 
for her with Allah‟s Messenger?” Finally they decided to approach Usama bin Zaid who was known as the 
beloved one to the Prophet. When Usama spoke about that to the Prophet, the Prophet said: “Do you try to 
intercede for somebody in a case connected with Allah‟s Prescribed Punishments (×udËd)?” Then he angrily, 
stood up and delivered a sermon saying, “What destroyed the nations preceding you, was that if a noble amongst 
them stole, they would forgive him, and if a poor person amongst them stole, they would inflict Allah 's Legal 
punishment on him. By Allah, if FÉÏimah, the daughter of MuÍammad (my daughter) stole, I would cut off her 
hand.” 
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qÉÌÊ Zaid bin Thabit. When the Caliph appeared before the qÉÌÊ, the qÉÌÊ  paid his respects 
to him. There, „Ubay reprimanded him, saying, “This is your first act of injustice.” And he 
settled himself by the side of „Ubay. „Ubay had no proof for his claim and Caliph Omar 
rejected the claims. „Ubay demanded that the Caliph take the normal oath as was the 
practice. The qÉÌÊ disagreed and preferred that the Caliph should be exempted from such 
formality. However, Omar himself disapproved this and asserted, “Unless „Ubay and Omar 
are equal in your court, you do not deserve to hold the high office of the qÉÌÊ (Sallabi, 
2007:1/ 507)”. Caliph Omar proved through his words and deeds that every person is born 
free and even the lowest of the low should not be abashed or humiliated.
37
 
Another clear example is the famous story of Ali, the fourth of the rightly-guided caliphs, 
who once had his armour stolen and he found it with a Christian. Ali confronted him about 
the armour. However, from the earliest days of Caliphate, Islam separated the judiciary from 
the executive and therefore, even though he was the caliph, his only recourse was to take the 
accused to the QÉÌÊ (judge). In the hearing, it was the words of Ali and his servant, a 
witness, against the accused. Having no independent witness, the QÉÌÊ dismissed the case 
and Ali was denied the opportunity to get his favourite armour back. There was a 
serendipitous outcome, however.
38
 
(ii) Individuals are innocent until being proven guilty through a fair judgement: 
Under the shade of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn, every person in a society is innocent until proven 
guilty in a fair trial. The conviction of innocent people is obviously unjust and against the 
notion of perfection of human action (Sherif, 2003; Hussein, 2003). The principle of 
„karÉmah al-insÉn‟ (the honour of individual), which implies that God has honoured and 
dignified man and must be fully respected and observed by every other human being, applies 
to every citizen within Islamic jurisdiction (Hussein, 2003: 49). Based upon this concept, 
Muslim jurists (fuqahÉ´) established a maxim (qÉÑidah fiqhiyyah) that every person is 
„innocent‟ (barÉ´ah al-dhimmah) until he is proven guilty (Zaydan, 2004: 43). Under these 
precepts, Islamic theory of governance ensures that every individual‟s rights will be 
respected and no arbitrary or unjust laws will be enacted and promulgated against them. In 
                                                 
37
 On another occasion, in another incident, the son of Amar bin al-ÑÓÎ, the governor of Egypt was reported to 
Omar for his misbehaviour towards a non-Muslim native of Egypt. The victim brought the case to the Caliph 
himself in Madinah. Caliph Omar reprimanded the father and his son and put the verdict upon the governor son 
saying his famous quotation, “Since when have you taken men as slaves? All are born free, you should know!” 
(see: al-QaraÌÉdawÊ,1993: 119) 
38
 Narrated by al-BaihaqÊ (1994: 10/136). 
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the same way, people are also duly protected from being accused based on mere doubtful 
information.  
Many evidences can be found in both the Qur’an and Sunnah pointing to this. The Prophet 
Muhammad himself resorted to this principle in solving disputes between his companions. 
Amongst them, a well-known incident reported by Wa‟il Ibn Hujr of the dispute between a 
companion from Hadramawt and a Bedouin from Kindah about a piece of land which 
belonged to the Hadramawt‟s father being taken by the Bedouin. Unfortunately, the 
companion from Hadramawt had no proof of ownership. Despite the notorious attributes of 
the Kindah‟s Bedoiun, the Prophet MuÍammad instructed the plaintiff to provide proof and 
insisted that he could not pass any judgement without evidence showing that the land indeed 
belonged to the Hadramawti companion. The judgement was given in favour of the Bedouin 
due to the principle of evidence.
39
 The tradition implies that individuals remain innocent 
until proven guilty with solid evidence and convictions by fair trial.  
In another tradition, Ibn ÑAbbÉs was reported as saying: “The Messenger of Allah has 
decreed that the onus of the oath lies with the defendant.”40 This tradition suggests that the 
plaintiff to secure the rights of innocent people against false accusations should provide 
proof. This serves as evidence that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Likewise, 
perhaps Omar‟s letter to his newly appointed qÉÌÊ, Abu Musa al-Ash‟ari illustrates the very 
implication of this tenet. In this letter, he enlightens Abu Musa on how a qÉÌÊ should 
conduct his trial and how to deliver a fair verdict (Imarah, 2005: 195-200).
41
 This maxim 
reflects the rule of law and need to avoid arbitrary situations in the community. 
 
                                                 
39
 Narrated by Abu Daud (1982: 2/140-41) and al-Tarmidhi (no date: 3/625), and he recommended it as 
authentic (×asan ØaÍÊÍ). 
40
 Narrated by Al-Tarmidhi (no date: 3/626), and he recommended it as authentic (×asan ØaÍÊÍ). 
41
 Omar says: “Glory to Allah! Verily Justice is an important obligation to Allah and to man. You have been 
charged with this responsibility. Discharge this responsibility so that you may win the approbation of Allah and 
the good will of the people. Treat the people equally in your presence, and in your decisions, so that the weak 
despair not of justice and the high-placed harbor no hope of favoritism. The onus of proof lies on the plaintiff, 
while the party who denies must do so on oath. Compromise is permissible, provided that it does not turn the 
unlawful into something lawful, and the lawful into something unlawful. Let nothing prevent you from changing 
your previous decision if after consideration you feel that the previous decision was incorrect. When you are in 
doubt about a question and find nothing concerning it in the Qur‟an or the Sunnah of the Prophet, ponder the 
question over and over again. Ponder over the precedents and analogous cases, and then decide by analogy. A 
term should be fixed for the person who wants to produce witnesses. If he proves his case, discharge for him his 
right. Otherwise the suit should be dismissed. All Muslims are trustworthy, except those who have been 
punished with flogging, those who have borne false witness, or those of doubtful integrity” (Imarah, 2005: 195-
200). 
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(iii) Penalty should not be imposed on any individual without fair judgement: 
According to the previous principles, any penalty is meaningless without a fair trial 
(Hussein, 2003). A fair trial is crucial to the concept of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn in order to ensure 
that nobody will be treated unjustly. Islamic theory of governance ensures that the entire 
society is safe from unjust treatment. In the similar meaning, any draconian acts and rules 
that allow the opposite situation will be contradicting with the higher objectives of SharÊÑah 
(maqÉÎid).
42
  
Various examples from the Sunnah signify how pivotal this principle is. On one occasion 
before his demise, the Prophet Muhammad went to the Muslim community in Madinah and 
asked them: “He whose back I have lashed, here is my back, let him lash it. He whom I have 
ever insulted his honour, here I am offering my honour so that he may avenge himself” (al-
Mubarakfuri, 2002: 410).
43
 His action in the tradition shows the meaning of equality of all 
individuals to benefit from justice and fairness before the law regardless of their social 
status.  It also denotes that he who has been wrongly punished can ask for his rights to be 
claimed even from the Prophet as the prime leader of the state; this also serves as evidence 
prohibiting rulers from punishing any of their subjects without establishing the charge for 
which he deserves such punishment. The Prophet also advocated that Muslims should evade 
punishment in the case of uncertainty. 
This principle was also clarified through the Prophet‟s judgment on another event. It was 
reported that the Prophet abstained from convicting an anonymous woman for the crime she 
committed due to lack of proof. He was recorded as saying: “If I were to stone anyone 
without proof I would stone such and such a woman (of adultery). For doubts have been 
raised over the way she speaks, the way she dresses and over the people who go to her.”44 
This means that the Messenger of Allah (saw) desisted from punishing her because there was 
a lack of proof in spite of the concerns raised over her conduct and his knowledge of the 
                                                 
42
 Widespread usage of detention without trial and the use of torture in contemporary Muslim countries are 
strongly contradicting such virtue, which are not only unjust and merciless, but also against the very worldview 
of tawÍÊd. 
43
 While in some narration, it was mention also: “He whose wealth I have taken, here is my wealth, let him take 
from it” (al-Mubarakfuri, 2002). 
44
 Narrated by Ibnu Majah (no date: 2/855) and al-Asqalani (1960: 12/181) in FatÍ al-BÉrÊ recommends the 
narration as authentic (ØaÍÊÍ). 
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hidden truth as a Prophet.
45
 This indicates clearly that in Islam, nobody deserves punishment 
until he or she is found guilty through a fair trial.  
(iv) Torture is prohibited in Islam: 
Juxtaposing both the aforementioned principles of innocence of the individual and 
prohibition of penalty without fair trial, al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn also entails that no punishment 
or torture should be inflicted upon accused individuals before any clear verdict resulting 
from a fair trial is delivered. Another unequivocal implication of (al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn) is 
respect for people‟s honour and rights. The persistent use of torture to ensure the people 
obey their ruler is a medieval or jÉhiliyyah (ignorance) culture that been denounced not only 
by Islam, but also by reason. Despite divergent opinions amongst classical Muslim scholars 
on the permissibility of beating the accused, the majority are against such practise. Kamali 
(2003: 82) points out that some scholars permitted the usage of beating only of those accused 
of dangerous and notorious crimes that refuse to confess despite clear evidence against him 
that he will bring harm to the community. 
However, many modern international conventions regarding human rights prohibit the use of 
such methods by civilised nations. Instead, thorough advanced methods of law enforcement 
agencies and various methods of judicial proceedings with fair trials the pursuit of justice in 
more civilised and fair means are sufficient (Kamali, 2003: 88). We can see from this that 
the torture of prisoners that has been widely practised in some Muslim countries in recent 
times are in fact against the very principle of tawÍÊd, betray the amÉnah and contradict the 
understanding of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn. The function of Islamic governance then, is to make 
certain that those crimes are absent from society, and to put all measures in place to prevent 
them from happening.   
                                                 
45
 This understanding is confirmed by Ahmed report in his Masnad quoting that Ibnu Abbas was saying: “The 
Messenger of Allah ordered a „MulÉÑanÉ‟ i.e. a sworn allegation of adultery between Al-Ajlani and his wife. He 
said: “and she was pregnant. Al-Ajlani said: “By Allah I did not approach her since we made Afr (i.e.sprinkled 
the soil with dust), an Afr means that the palm trees are watered two months after pollination. He said that her 
husband had thin legs and arms and had red hair; the one she was accused to have committed adultery with was 
Ibnul Samha‟. She gave birth to a black boy who had frizzy hair and chubby arms. So Ibnu Shaddad said to Ibnu 
Abbas: “Is she the woman about whom the Messenger of Allah (saw) said: “If I were to stone anyone without 
proof I would stone such and such woman?” He said: “No, that was a woman who used to display vice after 
Islam.” Meaning that she used to be indiscreet but it was not proven either through evidence, or through 
admission (narrated by Ahmad (2000: 5/218), and al-Arnaut recommends it as authentic (ØaÍÊÍ) according to al-
BukhÉrÊ and Muslim‟s prerequisites (AÍmad, 2000: 5/218)). 
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Much evidence in the Qur’an and ×adÊth condemns such action, amongst them the 
aforementioned tradition in which the Prophet refrained from punishing a women for 
adultery, despite the fact that she was known to be an adulteress amongst the community of 
Madinah. Nevertheless, she was not detained and interrogated with the use of torture to 
obtain a confession from her. If it were fitting to inflict punishment upon the accused in 
order to cause them to confess, the Prophet would have punished the woman for her 
confession, due to her behaviour. Islamic teaching, however, as presented by the Prophet‟s 
action forbids any type of punishment of the accused before the charge has been established. 
In another incident, the Prophet also refused to impose a penalty on an accused drunken 
person due to a lack of evidence, despite his knowledge and that of others about the man.
46
 It 
can be understood from this tradition that it would be wrong to inflict any punishment on the 
accused prior to the establishment of the charge before a fair trial in a court of law.  
(v) The separation between the judicial and the executive: 
In order for a law to be implemented justly and fairly, the law must work within a just and 
fair system. Accordingly, to have a just system, a state of arbitration must be avoided by 
separating the judicial system from the executive. Separation of powers enshrines the 
meaning of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn, in reflecting the effort to attain the perfection of justice 
through a comprehensive mechanism. This concept might not have been explicitly 
mentioned in the Qur’an nor practised by the Prophet Muhammad, since he was both the 
divinely appointed lawmaker and the state leader. It was Omar, the second Caliph who was 
the first to separate the judiciary from the executive due to his clear understanding of the 
needs for such a system. He established most of the administrative structure for the young 
Muslim empire, including the judicial administration (Wasil, 1977: 65). Other Caliphs 
without any type of basic amendments then followed his administration innovations.  
Omar‟s establishment of a judicial administration department functioned to provide adequate 
and prompt justice for the people. Judges or quÌÉh (sing. qÉÌÊ) in the Arabic and Islamic 
term - were appointed at all administrative levels for the administration of justice.
47
 Judges 
                                                 
46
It was reported that Ibnu ÑAbbas said that a man consumed alcohol and got intoxicated; he was spotted 
staggering in a mountain pass so he was taken to the Prophet. As he neared the house of Abbas, he gave his 
escort the slip, entered Abbas‟s house, and hid behind him. They mentioned this to the Prophet, so he laughed 
and said: “He did it”, but did not order them with anything regarding him.” (Narrated by Ahmad (2000: 5/116). 
47
 It was reported that during Omar‟s reign that the QuÌÉh were appointed for their integrity and learning in 
Islamic law, and in most cases the wealthy men and those of high social status, so that they might not be 
tempted to take bribes, or be influenced by the social position of anybody. QuÌÉh were paid with high salaries 
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were appointed in ample numbers, to all districts across the Islamic empire throughout 
Islamic history. In any legal litigation, the quÌÉh’s power exceeded the Caliph‟s in that if the 
Caliphs engaged in any proceedings he had to submit to the verdict of the quÌÉh. The 
example might be rather classical and primitive, but the spirit of good practice by Omar and 
the Caliphs across the centuries suggests that the separation of power is crucial, as is the 
empowerment of the judicial system and mechanisms. Islamic governance, therefore, must 
ensure that the separation of power not only exists but also is felt by the people to be seen 
and prevalent.  
However, the rule of law principle itself is not the end to be achieved in the field of 
governance. It serves as a means to obtain falÉÍ, which is the ramification of the 
comprehensive preservation of the maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. Rule of law is needed to warrant 
that religion, life in its comprehensive meanings, which include the quality of life and the 
means to life, and the other essentials (ÌarËriyyÉt) will be safe and protected. The absence of 
rule of law will inevitably lead to the obliteration of human well-being through the loss of 
the ÌarËriyyÉt in their worldly life and the hereafter. Such a concept is also necessary to 
secure the rights of the individual, which is intertwined with the responsibility of a khalÊfah 
within the realm of Tawhidic reality. Rule of law also reflects the ideal of far-reaching 
understanding of „iÍsÉn‟ in both its meanings as „the act of benevolence towards other 
creatures‟, and „comprehensive excellence‟ and „perfection‟. The implementation of just law 
through a just legal system by Muslims was purely inspired by these meanings.  
6.2.3.2.2. IÍsÉn, amÉnah, rubËbiyyah and tazkiyah necessitate sustainability: 
Together with the instrumental meaning of justice and fairness of al-Ñadl, iÍsÉn as the 
completion of Islamic understanding of comprehensive justice, fairness and benevolence 
reflects the very meaning of tawÍÊd. The repercussion of iÍsÉn resembles tawhidic-inspired 
belief that all creatures are one nation before God and certainly equal to each other. It is 
indicated in the Qur‟an (6: 38): “There is not an animal on earth nor being that flies on its 
wings, but forms part of communities like you...” This verse shows that creatures were 
created by God with different shapes, natures and roles, but are inter-related to each other as 
part of the law of nature. However, the human being as khalÊfah has the greater role in 
preserving and safeguarding (riÑÉyah) of the earth and all other creatures that dwell on it and 
                                                                                                                                                        
and given many facilities to avoid them from the temptation of bribery and were not allowed to engage in trade 
to avoid any personal interest in their judgements (Majdalawi, 2002: 97-103). 
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will be accountable before God for the duty. The holistic denotation of this „iÍsÉnÊ‟ paradigm 
connotes that the human race has to maintain harmonious and equilibrium relations not only 
amongst themselves, but also between them and nature,
48
 not only for the present generation 
but also for future generations. This responsibility is an amÉnah upon them to be delivered 
as the khalÊfah chosen by God. 
In accordance with this argument, the Islamic theory of governance encompasses the issue of 
sustainability policies in social life. IÍsÉn along with tazkiyah and rubËbiyyah require that all 
policies and developmental models take into account the well-being of the environment and 
future generations. This assertion is not distinct from Schumacher‟s (1993), who taught that 
nature is not to be dealt as a commodity but as part of the human being in their survival on 
this planet. Any model of development that fails to include the aspect of sustainability is 
morally intolerable in Islam. It might not be prohibited explicitly from a deontological fiqhÊ 
legal positivistic approach, but it violates the very consequentialistic concept of iÍsÉn, which 
is greatly encouraged by Islam.    
In the same way, the virtue of iÍsÉn within the radius of amÉnah inspires individuals to be 
functioning active citizens in making themselves beneficial towards others. A muÍsin or a 
person who has a proclivity of inner self-consciousness of iÍsÉn is a person who does not 
live on the basis of individualistic egocentricity. A further contemplation of verses (al- 
Qur’an, 2: 177; 107: 1-7) reveals the urgency of social responsibility in community life. The 
verses imply that working for the sake of Allah to assist those who are less fortunate and in 
need of help to promote spiritual, physical, emotional, intellectual and social well-being 
among the members of the community is a core responsibility of the muÍsin. With such a 
standard, the improvement of a society and nation towards a better future could be achieved 
if every „muÍsin‟ (pl. muÍsinËn) played their part to contribute in various social concerns 
that exist.  
                                                 
48
 Al-Qur´Én guides the human race not to bring destruction to the universe: “Do no make mischief on the earth, 
after it hath been set in order, (al-Qur’an, 7:56); “And make not your own hands contribute to your destruction; 
but do good; for God loveth those who do good” (2:195). There are many evidence in the ×adÊth also 
emphasizes on the importance of implementing „iÍsÉn‟ to the other creatures. In a tradition of the Prophet 
narrated by al-Bukhari, it was mentioned that a prostitute went to heaven just because of her act in saving a dog 
from dying of thirst (narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1761)), while in another tradition narrated by Muslim, it 
was told that a lady went to hellfire because of her cruel treatment pf a cat (narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 2/834, 
3/1205, 3/1284) and Muslim (no date: 4/ 1760)). In another hadith, Prophet MuÍammad was quoted as saying 
that: “No Human kills a sparrow or something larger, without right, except God will ask him about it on the day 
of judgement” (narrated by al-Nasaa‟i (1984: 7/206, 239). While on another occasion, he was recorded as 
saying: “No Muslim, who plants a shoot, except that whatever is eaten or stolen from it, or anyone obtains the 
least from it, is considered like paying charity on his behalf until the day of judgement” (al-Tarmidhi (no date: 
3/666) and he categorised it as authentic (Íasan ÎaÍÊÍ)). 
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Thus this axiom provides for the horizontal dimension of equality “of all the virtues of the 
basic set of social institutions – legal, political and economic” (Naqvi 1994: 27).  “In this 
intra-and inter-generational equality, human beings and societies are expected to establish a 
balance between the needs of present and future generations, develop policies to fulfil the 
needs of individuals, enable them to earn a respectable source of living, develop policies for 
an equitable distribution of wealth and provide for growth and stability-oriented policies” 
(Asutay, 2007a: 7). Nevertheless, the overriding notion of equality promoted through this 
axiom must never be separated from the unique but important characteristic of SharÊÑah, 
ukhuwwah, or universal solidarity. The spirit of ukhuwwah as emphasized in many places in 
Qur’an and Sunnah ensures the efficacy of implementing many Islamic principles at the 
society level on a voluntary basis rather than by enforcement as will be seen in the following 
paragraphs. 
6.2.4. Ukhuwwah (Universal Solidarity) 
Through a tawhidic worldview, Islam sets its own paradigm in defining the social nature of 
individuals and society. Unlike any other material incentives towards the issue, the relation 
between individuals in Islam is firmly fused by the spirit of „ukhuwwah‟, which 
philosophically connotes the expanded meaning of the term „universal solidarity‟. This 
axiom comprises many essential elements which explain the socio-economic and political 
nature of Islamic governance that make it a unique concept compared with other ideologies 
or theories explaining the nature of the individuals-society relationship. Despite its emphasis 
on individuals‟ sphere and ownership, it differs from the liberal individualistic paradigm of 
social obligation that in part causes individuals to pursue their own interests as will be seen 
in the following paragraphs. The discussion will commence with the definition of ukhuwwah 
as „universal solidarity‟, and will be followed by further discussions on its implications for 
the governance process. 
6.2.4.1. Definition 
In Arabic, ukhuwwah was associated with brotherhood or filial relation in the pre-Islamic 
period. During the early Islamic period, the term reflected the fraternity and camaraderie 
between believers. “The Believers are but a single Brotherhood” (Qur’an, 49:10), and in the 
Prophet‟s traditions, it is mentioned that: “a Muslim is a brother to another Muslim”.49 Ibn 
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 Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 1/14) and Muslim (no date: 1/67). 
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ManÐËr (1956, 14: 22) says, “Islamic and belief-inspired ukhuwwah such as the fraternity 
established by the Prophet between the muhÉjirËn (Muslims from Makkah) with the ansar 
(Muslims living in Madinah). Accordingly, the semantic meaning of ukhuwwah, which has 
evolved since then thus, provides another dimension of brotherhood in which the affiliation 
to Islamic faith becomes the bond. When Muslim society entered a new phase in Madinah, 
the realm of ukhuwwah transcended the exclusive bond amongst the believers towards the 
universal sense of solidarity. Accordingly, the Qur’an emphasizes ukhuwwah in many verses 
as filial loyalty and solidarity (2:83; 4: 36; 6:151; 17: 22; 29:8; 31: 14; 46: 15).  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that ukhuwwah as universal filial solidarity varies from 
the constricted version of communism that repudiates private ownership under the banner of 
solidarity. Ukhuwwah does not eradicate the individual‟s choice in favour of the community 
as depicted by al-Qur‟an and articulated through the Prophet‟s life as well as his 
companions‟. The unique characteristic of ukhuwwah is its ability to include the very 
concept of individualism, ownership and gain of profit with the balance of certain elements 
of collectivism, social justice and solidarity through wide-ranging maqasidic rules of interest 
(wazn al-maÎÉliÍ or the fiqh of maÎÉliÍ) by introducing a moral filter as part of Islamic 
moral economy. To grasp the holistic implication of ukhuwwah, one should have a broad 
view of what the word ukhuwwah really signifies and implies. To appreciate the nature of 
social fairness of Islamic governance is to recognise the concept of ukhuwwah, which lies as 
the foundation of its political economic philosophy.  The spirit of „ukhuwwah‟ interprets the 
very meaning of most functional and institutional concepts of the subject. Failing to be 
acquainted with this principle will impede one from comprehending the unique characteristic 
of an ideal Islamic „governance‟. 
6.2.4.2. Implications of Ukhuwwah on Governance 
 6.2.4.2.1. Ukhuwwah requires the unity of ummah: 
As an imperative element of Islamic governance, ukhuwwah affirms, amongst other things, 
the unity of the ummah (community). Throughout the Qur‟anic verses and the Prophet‟s 
traditions, enormous emphasis has been placed on it. The unity of the ummah, which 
encompasses both the Muslim and non-Muslim community, is de rigueur to advocating the 
order to sustain justice, fairness, mercy and the higher objectives of SharÊÑah. Unity of 
ummah in Islam has its central position in determining the landscape of Islamic political and 
economic doctrine and is therefore significant to the world of governance. Moreover, unity is 
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intensified by the bond of ukhuwwah that embraces the rudiments of brotherhood, solidarity 
and equality (al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 1993: 145). In conjunction this, Qur’an notes: “And hold fast, all 
together, by the rope which God (stretches out for you), and be not divided among 
yourselves; and remember with gratitude God‟s favour on you; for ye were enemies and He 
joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the 
brink of the pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus doth God make His Signs clear to 
you: That ye may be guided” (Qur’an, 3:103). 
With such proliferation of the concept of unity, ideal Islamic governance should be workable 
not only to enable mechanisms and room for unifying factors, but must also function to deter 
any possible threats to the ukhuwwah, which would polarise the ummah,
50
 while the key to 
maintaining unity and ukhuwwah is the spirit of brotherhood, solidarity and altruism. Allah 
praises the anÎÉr (Muslim community in Madinah) during the event of hijrah due to the 
altruistic spirit shown by their sacrifices for the welfare of the muhÉjirËn,
51
 as an important 
landmark of the pivotal role of unity in Islamic tradition was the establishment of 
brotherhood between the anÎÉr and muhÉjirËn. When the muhÉjirËn were compelled to 
migrate to Yathrib (thence known as Madinah) due to persecution in Makkah, they were 
immediately reconciled to the people of Madinah on the basis of what was then a unique 
concept: ukhuwwah (fraternity). In an unprecedented act of magnanimity, the Madinah 
Muslims (who came to be collectively known as the ansar or helpers) agreed to share their 
wealth and property with the muhÉjirËn. The anÎÉr gave a portion of their homes to the 
muhÉjirËn families for their use, and allowed them to farm on their lands under a system of 
sharecropping. This event from the recent post-developmentalist paradigm reflects a classic 
method of poverty alleviation and qualifies as the first instance of sustainable development 
in Islamic history.  
Through the instrument of ukhuwwah, both muhÉjirËn and anÎÉr successfully established the 
first ummah (faith community) in Madinah. Despite the fact that it consisted of divergent 
elements with a long history of animosity and antagonism, those feelings were to a large 
measure tempered by the willingness of the anÎÉr to give of their possessions to those in 
need at the time (Haykal, 1976: 153). In reflecting on all these meanings, al-Aqqad (1971: 
                                                 
50
 “The Believers are but a single Brotherhood: So make peace and reconciliation between your two 
(contending) brothers; and fear God, that ye may receive Mercy.” (Qur’an, 49:10). 
51
 “But those who before them, had homes (in Madinah) and had adopted the Faith,- show their affection to such 
as came to them for refuge, and entertain no desire in their hearts for things given to the (latter), but give them 
preference over themselves, even though poverty was their (own lot). And those saved from the covetousness of 
their own souls, they are the ones that achieve prosperity.” (Qur’an, 59:9). 
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79) insists that „love‟ was one of the pillars of the Prophet‟s governance for an ideal Islamic 
community. In the same spirit, Prophet MuÍammad was reported as saying that: “You will 
not enter Paradise until you have faith, and you will not have faith until you love each other. 
Shall I direct you to something, which if you fulfil it you will love one another? Spread 
peace among yourselves”.52  While in another tradition he said: “Each of you cannot be a 
believer until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself”53; and he also stated that: 
“A Muslim is the brother of another Muslim. He does not oppress him, nor does he leave 
him at the mercy of others”.54    
A proper deconstruction of the aforementioned verses and traditions leads us to understand 
the main theme of ukhuwwah in Islam, which is maÍabbah (mutual love) and ithÉr (mutual 
altruism)
55
. These two elements have been essential for the hearts of Muslims to feel that 
their individual life, which entails the right to private ownership and the right to accumulate 
wealth and profit must not be separated from their responsibility towards the society 
(Mannan, 1989: 41). These two elements manifest a high level of trust, which is the most 
important element in social capital, and at the same time exemplifies the meaning of 
benevolence in a Muslim‟s life as part of their social and individual obligation. With the 
cultivation of these two elements, the Muslim community will shape their governance based 
on the tawhidic framework, which will enhance the spirit of social justice. This spirit 
provides the major framework for principles of governance for a nation‟s policies and 
institutions, through which the individual will be self-actualised but with takÉful (mutual co-
operation) based economy. In consequence, individuals will be empowered thus avoiding 
them from fully depending on the state.  
Finally, in Islam, the process of governance at the community level is not to pursue the sole 
interest of the individual, nevertheless it is a mould based on the spirit of ukhuwwah to 
achieve or enhance maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah virtues. This condition will generate homo-
Islamicus individuals with high spirit of volunteerism, which is the most crucial heartbeat for 
the efficiency of any third sector industry and civil society activities. Furthermore, mutual 
loving and altruism also necessitate sustainable development for the greater benefit of future 
                                                 
52
 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 1/74). 
53
 Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 1/14); and Muslim (no date: 1/67). 
54
 Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1986). 
55
 Qur‟an praised the Ansar for their practice of IthÉr (altruism) in the following verse: “And they prefer (their 
brothers) over themselves even if they are hungry.”(Qur’an, 59:9). 
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generations.
56
 With sustainable policies in governance of Muslim community, individuals‟ 
rights, public benefit and environment will be esteemed and preserved. 
6.2.4.2.2. Ukhuwwah requires takÉful ijtimÉÑiyy (Social solidarity or mutual co-
operation): 
In an effort to understand the wider dimension of ukhuwwah implications to the field of 
governance, a very inseparable concept exemplifying its social gist should be highlighted, 
which in this case, is the concept of takaful ijtimÉÑiyy (social solidarity or social mutual co-
operation).   TakÉful, the very core concept of social solidarity originates from the Arabic 
root word Ka fa La, which connotes the meaning of guarantee (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 11/ 590). 
However, in its usage, takÉful closely translates to taÑÉwun, which means mutual or joint 
responsibility solidarity based on mutual agreement (Hans Wehr, 1979: 976). In delivering 
the virtue of mutual co-operation as part of the faith manifestation, al-Qur´Én states: “And 
cooperate with one another in all that is good and pious and do not cooperate in sin and 
aggression.” (Qur’an, 5: 2). It is through takÉful that ukhuwwah can be profoundly 
articulated where all individuals in the community are regarded as one nation or one body, 
and in turn they must mutually serve and cooperate with each other in decency and virtue. 
Al-takÉful al-ijtimÉÑiyy inspires the value of solidarity and empathy amongst believers, as 
well as other members of society. Many Qur‟anic verses57 and traditions of the Prophet58 
encourage Muslims to act in this way through the virtues of caring, empathizing towards 
others especially the less fortunate, being kind and honouring their neighbours, relatives and 
guests, and through stressing the importance of altruism (al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 1993: 148-150; 226). 
In the field of governance, the concept acts as a useful element in providing a fertile ground 
                                                 
56
 TakÉful is also a basic mechanism of natural economic growth in according to Ibn Khaldun, he was quoted 
explaining the needs of such in his „Muqaddimah‟: “The power of the individual human being is not sufficient 
for him to obtain (the food) he needs, and does not provide him with as much food as he requires to live… but 
through cooperation, the needs of a number of persons, many times greater that their own can be satisfied” (Ibn 
Khaldun, 2005 [1967]: 45).   
57
 (2:177); (90:11-16); (107:1-3); (70:24-25); (3:91); (76:8-9) etc.  
58
 Amongst them: “Each person's every joint must perform a charity every day the sun comes up: to act justly 
between two people is a charity; to help a man with his mount, lifting him onto it or hoisting up his belongings 
onto it is a charity: a good word is a charity, every step you take to prayers is a charity and removing a harmful 
thing from the road is a charity.” (Narrated by al-BukhÉrÊ (1985: 3/1090) and Muslim (no date: 2/699)); “You 
will see the believers in their having mercy for one another, and in their love for one another, and in their 
kindness towards one another, like the human body: when one limb is ailing, the whole body feels it, one part 
calling out the other with sleeplessness and fever.” (Narrated by Muslim (no date: 4/1999)); “None of you 
[truly] believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself.” (Narrated by Muslim (no date: 
1/74)); “A man is not a believer who fills his stomach while his neighbour is hungry.” (Narrated by al-Haythami 
(1992: 8/306), and he categorised the narration as almost authentic (×asan)). 
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for a community based on care and benevolence. HomoIslamicus with such criteria live with 
an innate feeling of an obligation to mutually co-operate with other members of society even 
though it is not legally compulsory
59
. This innate inclination is derived from a Tawhidic 
worldview that encourages individuals to live with such spirit and enjoy it as part of their act 
of worship (ÑibÉdah), which will subsequently make them born philanthropists. This innate 
ramification would contribute towards the active role of third sector (voluntary sector or 
social enterprise) for economic development as has been seen throughout Muslim history 
through various takÉful-inspired institutions, amongst them „waqf‟ (endowment). An 
effective state according to such governance encourages the prosperity of waqf institutions to 
shape the socio-economics of the society, hence building a massive culture of trust-based 
economy and the micro dynamics (Mannan, 1989).  
In the same way, the virtue of philanthropy as the main foundation of waqf was praised by 
many verses and intensely associated with ÊmÉn (faith). This inter-relation between 
ukhuwwah and ÊmÉn illustrates the manifestation of amÉnah and Ñadl wa iÍsÉn in the life of a 
community. In view of that, these principles suggest a comprehensive and holistic ideal of 
„Islamic‟ governance that entails social justice in the life of society. In accordance with the 
stated practice, takÉful also inspires fairness in the distribution of wealth, in which it must 
not be manipulated by self-interest and monopolized by certain groups of people
60
 (al-
QaraÌÉwÊ, 1993: 212). In the same way, takÉful inspires fairness of wealth distribution. This 
fair distribution indicates that private ownership is acknowledged and promoted in Islam, but 
with responsibilities and obligations towards less-fortunate members of the community. 
Ontologically, possession of wealth is not a definite or total control of an individual over his 
belongings but rather an act of trust regarding the wealth that in reality belongs to God (al-
QaraÌÉwÊ, 1993: 190-233). Accordingly, wealth is endowed to individual as „a bounty of 
Allah‟ as a test by which they will be accountable before God concerning those worldly 
                                                 
59
 QuÏb (1980: 55) commented on such concept: “Islam sets the principle of individual responsibility over 
against that of individual freedom; and beside them both it sets the principle of social responsibility, which 
makes demands alike on the individual and on society. In it one finds the responsibilities which exist 'between a 
man and his soul, between a man and his immediate family, between the individual and society, between one 
community and other communities, and between one nation and the various other nations”. 
60
 Such principal has been mentioned in the Qur’an: “What Allah has bestowed on His Messenger (and taken 
away) from the people of the townships,- belongs to Allah,- to His Messenger and to kindred and orphans, the 
needy and the wayfarer; In order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between the wealthy among you. So 
take what the Messenger assigns to you, and deny yourselves that which he withholds from you. And fear Allah. 
For Allah is strict in Punishment.” (Qur’an, 59: 7) 
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possessions
61
. In sum, ownership of wealth is strongly linked with the moral and social 
obligations that come with it
62
 (Imarah, 2005: 76).  
However, inner motivation could not solely function voluntarily to fulfil the ideal of takÉful.  
Thus, some degree of practical enforcement is essential to ensure the concept will function 
smoothly. Historically, both ukhuwwah and iÍsÉn (benevolence) were displayed in the 
Muslim community through the successful system of zakÉh, which manifests the concept of 
takÉful (mutual co-operation) through compulsory benevolence. Due to the significance of 
zakÉh in upholding justice and fairness (al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn) in Muslim community life, it is 
frequently mentioned together with ÎalÉh (prayer) in the Qur´Én
63
. As an important revenue 
for the state to create balance in the society‟s wealth, zakÉh is owned and managed by the 
state and acts as a compulsory fiscal tax imposed upon those who are qualified to pay. The 
Qur‟anic message on the matter implies that ÎalÉh is regarded as the firm connection for the 
vertical relation between God and the individual, while zakÉh connects between the 
individual and his fellow human being. In depicting this pivotal role of zakÉh in relation to 
the governance process, Mannan (1989: 53 & 92-92) asserts that zakÉh and its institution is a 
sine qua none for establishing a just Islamic social order.  
Al-QaraÌÉwÊ (1999) concludes in his thesis that the main objective of zakÉh is to bring 
stability and peace to a society through the fair distribution of wealth based on justice and 
benevolence. As mentioned earlier, ukhuwwah is pertinent to conserving the stability of the 
community. For this, zakÉh implicitly contributes towards stability through the social welfare 
mechanism by establishing a just society or a society of „caring‟. Through the spirit of 
ukhuwwah (brotherhood and solidarity), individuals never feel oppressed or forced to pay 
zakÉh, as they see the action of paying zakÉh as part of their worship to Almighty God. In a 
way, zakÉh is seen as a voluntarily action, rather than an enforcement upon individuals, as 
individuals are expected to return the share of the society to the society, which makes zakÉh 
not a charitable giving by definition. Within this meaning, Rahman (2009: 62) asserts that: 
                                                 
61
 Prophet MuÍammad was quoted saying that every person will be questioned before God during the judgement 
day on “his wealth, from where he earned them and how did he spend them” (narrated by al-Tarmidhi (no date: 
4/612)). 
62
 Mannan (1989: 41) presents nine criteria of Islamic social framework, of which we may include the Islamic 
governance as a part of them: “a) a fair balance between worship and work; b) human equality; c) mutual 
responsibilities and cooperation in a society; d) distributive justice; e) family, intra-family and collective 
obligations carrying individual responsibilities and accountability; f) a balanced and beneficent use of the 
„bounty of Allah‟; g) the limited sovereignty of people in society; h) the principle of co-existence; and i) 
freedom of action and conscience.”  
63
 ZakÉh is mentioned 35 times in the Qur’an in which 27 times it was mentioned along the ÎalÉh.  
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“There is no doubt that the Qur’an wants Muslims to establish a political order on earth for 
the sake of creating an egalitarian and just moral-social order”.  
6.2.4.2.3. Ukhuwwah requires political conformation  
The impact of ukhuwwah in classical Muslim governance institutions can be seen clearly in 
the relation between rulers and their subjects. The nature of this relation is exemplified in the 
exchange of mutual-trust (thiqah) between the two parties akin to the notion of social 
contract explained by Locke and Rousseau. However, what separates the thiqah (exchange 
of mutual-trust) from the social contract is the ontological articulation and underlying 
objective of this relation. When Muslim Caliphs were elected and duly appointed as the head 
of the ummah, the oath of allegiance (bayÑah) given by the people indicated the 
responsibilities involved in being leader of the society (both Muslims and non-Muslims). In 
exchange, the repercussion of the given trust obliges the people, and each individual in the 
society to make the leader accountable in the delivery of his duties. The unambiguous 
rationale of this mutual relation is to sustain order and to preserve community benefit 
(maÎlaÍah ÑÉmmah) according to the highest objectives of SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid). 
Consequently, people are required to obey to their rulers to maintain stability in the society. 
However, if the ruler departs from the rules of SharÊ´ah and neglects his responsibilities as a 
ruler, he no longer deserves people obedience, thus the bayÑah is no longer binding for them 
(Bennabi, 1994: 104). 
The Qur’an insists on the need for such conformity in many verses including: “O ye who 
believe! Obey God, and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you. If ye 
differ in anything among yourselves, refer it to God and His Apostle, if ye do believe in God 
and the Last Day: That is best and most suitable for final determination” (Al-Qur’an: 4/59). 
Numerous traditions of the Prophet also point towards the virtue of conformity to the ruler as 
long as the ruler does not enjoin the ruled to do sinful things. The Prophet was reported as 
saying: “The best of your rulers are those whom you love and who love you in return, whom 
you supplicate for and who supplicate for you in return. The worst of your rulers are those 
whom you hate and who hate you in return and whom you curse and who curse you in 
return”.64 This nature of ukhuwwah as the raison d'être for conformity was also articulated 
                                                 
64 In the similar description, Ibn Omar reported that the Prophet said, “It is obligatory upon a Muslim to listen 
(to the ruler) and obey whether he likes it or not, except when he is ordered to do maÑÎiyyah (a sinful thing); in 
such case, there is no obligation to listen or to obey.” (Narrated by Al-Bukhari (1985: 6/2612)); In another 
occasion, Ibn Omar also recorded that the Prophet said, “One who withdraws his hand from obedience (to the 
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by Caliph AbË Bakr in his first sermon after his election as Caliph: “Cooperate with me 
when I am right, but correct me when I commit error; obey me so long as I follow the 
commandments of Allah and His Prophet; but turn away from me when I deviate”.65 The 
attitude of equality, and the example shown by the succeeding Caliphs that leadership is an 
act of wikalah (representation), derives from the very spirit of ukhuwwah. As a wakÊl 
(representative) who has received the trust (amÉnah) and responsibility to lead the ummah, a 
caliph should be obeyed to create order and maintain harmony and stability.  
6.2.4.2.4. Ukhuwwah implies egalitarianism and equality  
Egalitarianism and equality are cardinal and non-negotiable principles in the theory of ideal 
Islamic governance as has been argued so far. Both qualities represent a bigger picture of 
what the spirit of ukhuwwah aims to obtain. As a result, solidarity, brotherhood and fraternity 
summarize the core understanding of ukhuwwah and always include humility and love. 
Consequently, the spirit of universal solidarity also transforms an outward appearance of 
egalitarian and equality to ukhuwwah in governance. The principle of individuals‟ equality 
was highlighted in Prophet Muhammad‟s final sermon during his farewell pilgrimage 
(khuÏbah al-widÉÑ): “All mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a 
non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority 
over black nor a black has any superiority over white except by piety and good action.”66 
In this sermon, his address to mankind carried an ardent universal tone. Instead of directing 
his message exclusively to the Muslim community, he preceded with a universal appeal to 
mankind by asserting the principle of equality. This important principle and guidance implies 
that he is not supposed to be self-centred or concerned only about the Muslim community‟s 
interest and affairs, but rather he has been created as “the mercy for all mankind” as stated in 
the Qur’an (3: 110). Islam has nothing to do with social strife or hatred between the classes, 
unlike the condition of some other medieval civilisations where the population was divided 
into classes, which followed a particular social hierarchy (Thani, 2001: 95). It was this 
                                                                                                                                                        
leader) will find no argument (in his defence) when he stands before Allah on the Day of Resurrection; and one 
who dies without having sworn allegiance will die the death of one belonging to the Days of Ignorance.” 
(Narrated by Muslim (no date: 3/1478)); While Anas bin Malik, a prominent companion reported that the 
Prophet also said, “Hear and obey even if an Abyssinian slave whose head is like a raisin is placed in authority 
over you.” (Narrated by al-Bukhari (1985: 2/2612)); The Prophet also mentions:  “He who swears allegiance to 
an Imam, he should give him the pledge in ratification and the sincerity of his heart. He should obey him to the 
best of his capacity” (Narrated by Muslim (no date: 3/1472)). 
65
 Narrated by AbË Daud (no date: 4/132). 
66
 Narrated by AÍmad (2000: 38/474), al-Arnaut recommends this harration as authentic (ØaÍÊÍ). 
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principle that Toynbee (1948: 205) regarded as “one of the outstanding achievements of 
Islam” saying that “in the contemporary world there is, as it happens, a crying need for the 
propagation of this Islamic virtue”. In the same vein, Gibb (1932: 379) notes that:  
Islam has a still further service to render to the cause of humanity. It stands after 
all nearer to the real East than Europe does, and it possesses a magnificent 
tradition of inter-racial understanding and cooperation.  No other society has 
such a record of success uniting in an equality of status, of opportunity, and of 
endeavours so many and so various races of mankind. 
Gibb also points out that Islam still has the power to reconcile apparently irreconcilable 
elements of race and tradition; hence, if ever the opposition of the great societies of East and 
West is to be replaced by cooperation, the mediation of Islam is an indispensable condition 
(Gibb, 1932: 379).  
Consequently, this foundation compels Muslims to promulgate and adopt equality and 
egalitarian-based policies in all areas of governance. Thus, any patronage or policies of 
inequality based on race, colour, clan, class, ownership or wealth is not Islamic. 
Consequently, the egalitarian nature of governance inspired by ukhuwwah can be understood 
from the Qur‟anic verse (59:7) “That which Allah giveth as spoil unto His messenger from 
the people of the townships, it is for Allah and His messenger and for the near of kin and the 
orphans and the needy and the wayfarer, that it become not a commodity between the rich 
among you.” The verse articulates the basic principle of how fair circulation of wealth is 
vital for the community and should be operated through various aforementioned compulsory 
and voluntary means (Thani, 2001: 96). In such a way, social cooperation or takÉful 
ijtimÉÑiyy spirit would automatically translate the ideal of equality and an egalitarian 
economic system into an ideal governance paradigm. 
In spite of the rules of equality, some temporary affirmative action and positive 
discrimination might be considered under the provision of al-siyÉsah al-SharÑiyyah (general 
policies) to ensure social justice and fairness in certain circumstances, since equality is 
meaningless if the very concept of justice is neglected. Certain biological, geographical and 
cultural factors might cause a certain state of vulnerability to a few groups of people who 
require special treatment compared the others for the sake of fairness. In this case, the 
Islamic approach to those situations would be very dynamic and reasonable based on social 
justice and fairness. In addition, both social justice and fairness themselves are indications of 
the true spirit of ukhuwwah within the holistic understanding of governance. 
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6.2.4.2.5. Ukhuwwah entails tasÉmuÍ (mutual respect) and tafahum (mutual recognition): 
As mentioned previously, ukhuwwah is not an exclusive concept but rather a universal 
inclusive concept. The concept encompasses comprehensive solidarity not only amongst 
Muslims, but also toward other fellow humans, who Islam considers as brethrens in 
humanity (al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 2008: 51). Furthermore, it also exceeds humankind to include other 
creatures. Tawhidic ontology demands from Muslims an understanding that the need to 
respect and acknowledge other believers within their radius of solidarity is pivotal and divine 
(al-QaraÌÉwÊ, 2008: 51-53). In regards to this inclusive solidarity of ukhuwwah, the Qur´Én 
(47: 13) states that: “O mankind!  We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a 
female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (li taÑÉrafË)”.  
The above verse composes a constructive constitution of Islamic universal brotherhood. Not 
only does it address human beings as a whole without any exclusivity, it is also a 
promulgation of mutual respect and mutual acknowledgement. This inclusivity is 
semantically epitomized in the verse by the term „li taÑÉrafË‟ which literally means „that ye 
may know each other‟. „TaÑÉruf‟ (knowing each other) as the main discourse of the verse, is 
etymologically derived from the root word „Ña Ra Fa‟, which means „to know‟, and also the 
root word for „maÑrifah‟ (knowledge), the acronym of which is Ñilm (knowledge in depth) 
(al-Maidani, 1993). Thus, knowledge (both maÑrifah and Ñilm) requires the action of taÑlim, 
or „the process of learning‟, which in this case also carries the meaning of „li taÑÉlamË‟ or 
„that ye may learn from each other‟. The process of this mutual learning brings people 
together for mutual acknowledgement and mutual respect. This will negate the state of 
ignorance, which often brings about conflicts, misconceptions and misjudgements of others 
based on pre-conceived ideas and suspicions. 
The concept of mutual respect and co-existence between Muslims has always been an 
essential formula for universal solidarity in Islamic teaching. Moreover, much evidence from 
al-Qur´Én and Prophetic traditions supports this explicit universality of Islamic teaching 
(Rahman, 2009: 164-65). Likewise, the cohesion between Muslims and non-Muslims could 
be seen during the Prophet‟s period in Madinah. This concept was also unambiguously 
addressed in ÎaÍÊfah MadÊnah or the Treaty of Madinah. As the pioneer social contract 
document in Muslim history (Imarah, 2005: 173; Hamidullah, 2006: 42-64), ÎaÍÊfah 
MadÊnah indicates unequivocal acknowledgement of the Jewish tribes in Madinah as part of 
the ummah alongside the Muslims (al-Wa‟iy, 1996: 49; Imarah, 2005: 176-77). The treaty 
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was promulgated as the major reference to govern an architectural design for social structure 
and social contract for the people of Madinah, clearly indicating that the Jews of Madinah 
should be given aid and equality, should not be oppressed, nor should aid be given to others 
against them
67
 as recorded by Ibn Ishaq (Guillaume, 2007: 233)
68
. 
The co-existence and cohesion are not, hence, a new phenomenon in Muslims‟ life, but was 
rather part of their history. The most colourful and pertinent model for this ideal was the La 
Convivencia in the Andalusia (Islamic Spain) period. The spirit of mutual respect and 
recognition did not only help the Islamic intellectual realm to flourish, but the Christian and 
Jewish intellectual and cultural environment also progressed (Pagden, 2008: 153-54). 
Historical evidence has recorded in abundance that coexistence was always visible within the 
abode of Islam (DÉr al-IslÉm). Despite numerous factual confirmations recorded regarding 
some abuses and bitter incidents concerning such relations in various periods due to certain 
disputes and discontent, nevertheless the very foundation of mutual acknowledgement and 
mutual co-existence remains as the undisputed precepts of SharÊÑah (RamaÌÉn, 2001: 104-
18). Furthermore, these principles were not mere responses to the situation, but they are 
rather a reflection and articulation of Islamic worldview. Therefore, mutual respect 
(tasÉmuÍ) and recognition (tafÉhum) of other believers and their beliefs are sacred and sine 
qua none for the governance of any Muslim community.    
 
                                                 
67
 The Prophet also stresses in the same document (as recorded by Ibn IsÍÉq) that the Jews will share the cost 
with the Believers as long as they fight a common foe; the Jews are one community with the Believers -(but 
they have their own religion as the Believers have theirs). As with the Jews, so with their adherents, except for 
him who commits a crime? None shall depart to war except by the permission of Muhammad, (but none shall be 
hindered from avenging an injury). There shall be mutual aid between Believers and Jews, in face of any who 
war against those who subscribe to this document, and mutual consultations and advice. No man shall injure his 
ally, and aid shall be granted to the oppressed. The Jews, when fighting alongside the Muslims, will bear their 
own expenses. Madinah shall be sacred territory to those who agree to this covenant. If there should be any 
differences of opinion concerning this covenant and its meaning, they must be placed before Allah and 
Muhammad the apostle of Allah. The document also insists that the Muslims and Jews will give mutual aid 
against who may attack Madinah. (Guillaume, 2007: 232-33) 
68
 There was a huge debate on the authenticity of the report from Ibn Ishaq in regards the section of the Jewish 
rights in the constitution. Beside Ibn Ishaq, none of the sÊrah authors, nor the hadith narrators of his 
contemporary ever mentioned about such section in their reports on the document (Omari, 1991: 1/272). Despite 
being the only person narrating the complete articles of the document (including the section on Jews), Ibn 
Ishaq‟s narration was quoted by other Muslim historians who came after him like Ibn Hisyam, Ibn Kathir, Ibn 
sayyid al-Naas, and etc. Hence it became the most popular narration for the document. However, Ibn Abu 
Khaythamah and Abu „Ubayd who came after Ibn Ishaq also managed to bring their own chain of narration 
mentioning the same articles of Ibn Ishaq‟s. Unlike Ibn Ishaq‟s, their narrations was not famously quoted by 
others. Several critics of those narrations concluded that all of them consist of weak chain of narrators due to 
one or two doubtful narrators. However, al-„Ali (1995:143) asserts that the reports of the document were 
authentic according to the method of yataqawwa‟ (strenghtening of narrations due to its amount) in upgrading 
the status of the hadith. Whie in the same vein, Omari (1991: 1/275) proves that the some of the details in those 
reports were also narrated scatteredly in many ×adÊth and history books with authentic chains of narration.  
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6.2.5. IÎlÉÍ  
Tendency to cause destruction and corruption is in the nature of human beings due to the 
desire given to them by God. The Qur’an explains this nature explicitly in the verse (2: 30), 
in which the angels refer to man‟s role of khilÉfah (vicegerency) on earth by stating that men 
would “spread corruption thereon and shed blood”69. The fact that God did not reject their 
claim but merely said that, “verily, I know that which you do not know” shows that man by 
nature is prone to cause disorder (fasÉd) (Rahman, 1999: 17-18). However, as the vicegerent, 
al-Qur’an also emphasizes the role of Muslims to reform, which is also a part of human 
nature that has always been neglected. Muslims are born reformers, with a mission to bring 
goodness in the community‟s worldly life for their benefit in both this world and the life 
hereafter. The act of reforming is mentioned in many places in the Qur´Én by the term 
„iÎlÉÍ‟70 (al-Zamili, 2009). 
6.2.5.1 Definition 
Semantically, the term iÎlÉÍ is derived from the root word „Øa La ×a‟, which means „good‟ 
or righteous and antonym to the term „Fa Sa Da‟ (mischief or destruction) (Ibn ManÐËr, 
1955: 3/ 335). The word „iÎlÉÍ‟ is used in contrast with the act of „fasÉd‟ or „ifsÉd‟ 
(destruction) in many Qur‟anic verses and Prophet‟s traditions,. From the word „sa la ha‟, 
comes the verb ÎalaÍa, which means „to act with piety‟, and „aÎlaÍa‟, which means „to 
reform‟ and „taÎÉlaÍa‟ which means to „reconcile mutually‟. It is also the foundation of the 
term „ÎÉliÍ‟ (pious), muÎliÍ (reformer), and ÎulÍ (reconciliation) and ÎÉliÍ (benefit) that is 
also known as „maÎlaÍah‟ (Ibn al-ManzËr, 1955: 2/ 516-17). The use of ÎÉliÍ to mean 
maÎlaÍah is to identify that only good and pious element should be acknowledged as 
„benefit‟ for the human being. However, in its contemporary denotation, the term „iÎlÉÍ‟ is 
associated closely with the word „tajdÊd‟ (reform) and taghyÊr (change in its positive 
meaning) (al-Zamili, 2009). 
                                                 
69
 Muslim commentators have advanced different arguments as to the source of angels‟ knowledge about these 
two destructive qualities of man. There are arguments that the angels‟ knowledge was based on inference which 
they came to by comparing Adam (as) with the jinn who had inhabited the earth prior to man and caused 
corruption and shed blood thereon. There are also arguments that the angels were informed by Allah (swt) and 
that the Qur‟an, while discussing the events of the creation, because of brevity, did not mention this part of the 
conversation between Allah (swt) and the angels. See al-Tabari (no date: I / 157-60); al-Razi (no date: 1/ 169-
70); Shawkani (1973: 1/ 63).  
70
 The term IÎlÉÍ and its associates from the root word Øa La ×a, such as Salaha and Aslaha were mentioned 44 
times in the Qur’an, in 38 verses and 16 chapters. Islah was used to coin the quality of individual personality in 
2:182, 220, 4: 114, 5: 39, 6: 48, 6: 54, 7: 35, 11:8, 42: 40; and for family ethics in 4: 16, 35, 128; and for the 
ethical quality posses by the community in 2:11, 160, 224, 228, 3: 89, 4: 129, 146, 7: 56, 170, 8: 1, 11: 117, 16: 
119, 24: 5, 26: 152, 28: 19, 49:9.  
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Due to its original meaning of piety and good, iÎlÉÍ represents the permanent behaviour of 
moving towards betterment and perfection. Similarly, iÎlÉÍ also means the transformation 
from the state of bad to good, from good to better and from better to perfection. Therefore, 
its use to mean „mutual reconciliation‟ or muÎÉlaÍah involves mutually agreed consideration 
towards enhancement and to bring an end to fasÉd (destruction or mischief) (Ibn al-ManzËr, 
1955: 2/ 516-17). IÎlÉÍ could be defined as “a state of constant endeavour towards 
comprehensive excellence (iÍsÉn) within the frameworks of innovation, construction and 
reconstruction to attain falÉÍ according to maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah”. This definition is explicitly 
illustrated in al-Qur‟an (3: 104): “And there may spring from you a nation who invite to 
goodness (khayr), and enjoin right conduct (maÑruf) and forbid indecency (munkar). Such 
are they who are successful”. 
The term khayr (goodness) from the verse refers to the attribution understood as good and 
certified by the revelation (sharÑ). Hence, the invitation to khayr as the first element of iÎlÉÍ 
compels the strong characteristic of initiating a culture or atmosphere of goodness that varies 
from one context to another. Equally, maÑrËf (good conduct) as the second element of iÎlÉÍ, 
literally translated as „known good conduct‟, refers to the qualities that are explicitly 
identified and promoted by the revelation. Thus, „enjoining‟ the maÑrËf requires constructive 
actions to bring people towards established or known „good conducts‟. While forbidding 
munkar (indecency or abhorred), requires reconstructive elements to prevent people from 
committing the munkar to preserve the Shariatic environment or bring the corrupt situation 
to its intended state of natural goodness (khayr and maÑrËf). 
6.2.5.2. Implications of iÎlÉÍ on governance 
Such a comprehensive understanding of iÎlÉÍ could be accurately described as an act of 
„reform‟ for good governance through micro dynamics, although reform might not 
accurately describe the extensive nature of the word. This is due to the fact that iÎlÉÍ is not 
exclusively restrained within the basic parameter, but expands to reach a wider area, which 
implies all kinds of reform, i.e. mental, spiritual, and material (al-Zamili, 2009).  
It should be mentioned that iÎlÉÍ was the raison d’être of the Prophets who were sent to 
bring justice and peace to the world and to prevent destruction and mischief. Ergo, as stated 
in al-Qur‟an, Muslims were endowed with this mission of reform to uphold the well-being of 
man to the state of „ÎÉliÍ‟ (good and piety) in both their worldly life and the life hereafter 
(Ghannoushi, 2001: 110) 
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To present iÎlÉÍ in the realm of governance, it must be viewed from the abovementioned 
broad scope. Islamic governance is a paradigm that allows the spirit of iÎlÉÍ to shape the 
system of governance, as well its practices. IÎlÉÍ should be presented in the life of the 
community through the culture of comprehensive excellence (iÍsÉnÊ) that engulfs every 
dimension of community life. In this way, iÎlÉÍ reflects the collective responsibility taken by 
every individual with tawhidic consciousness in delivering their amÉnah, to create a 
community based on Ñadl wa iÍsÉn with the spirit of ukhuwwah. Without a constant effort of 
iÎlÉÍ those preliminary elements could hardly be put into place in any community, and vice 
versa. Within this spirit, development as viewed by the Qur’an71 must never neglect the iÎlÉÍ 
aspect in achieving the highest goal of SharÊÑah (Omar, 1992: 45,56).   
6.2.5.2.1. IÎlÉÍ requires a conscious accountability and reform process through naÎÊÍah 
and amr maÑrËf nahy munkar (enjoinment of good and the forbidding of indecency/evil) 
The concept of equity has best been articulated through the mechanism of „enjoinment of 
good and the forbidding of evil‟ throughout Muslim history. As mentioned previously, every 
single individual in the Islamic community is empowered to preserve justice and peace for 
the public interest according to this concept, which is the main objective of SharÊÑah. The 
Qur’an emphasizes the need for this mechanism in various verses (Qur’an: 3: 110; 9:71; 
22:41; 4:114; 5:2; 7:165; 5:78-79). Similarly, countless Prophetic traditions have been 
recorded which point out the need for importance of this concept to enhance general justice 
within a community. In the same way, the experiences of the four rightly-guided Caliphs 
shows that they received advice, complaints, oppositions and also rejections of their policy 
by the people, which reflects the level of success of the concept in creating empowered 
citizens during those periods.  
It is through the spirit of naÎÊÍah and amr maÑrËf nahy munkar that the intrinsic meaning of 
iÎlÉÍ is articulated to guide Muslims in their continuous striving to attain „falÉÍ‟ in both 
worlds. In the same way, iÎlÉÍ as a landmark theme in individuals‟ lives will transform the 
society into self-actualised people striving to achieve iÍsÉn (comprehensive excellent) in 
their daily life, leading to falÉÍ. Consequently, these concepts become pivotal in community 
life, in that they determine the consistency of the justice, benevolence, religiosity, good 
governance and development of the ummah.  As an imperative, this concept allows for 
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 The need of continuous effort of reform has been mentioned in several verses of the Qur’an, (2: 220; 2: 228; 
4: 35; 4: 114; 7: 57; 7: 85; 11: 88.) 
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vertical accountability of peer assessment to be implemented within the larger governance 
process to ensure the trust is delivered effectively. At the same time, both top-down, and 
bottom-up evaluations as part of iÎlÉÍ in all level of governance and community life will 
enable accountability to be exercised soundly.  
NaÎÊÍah and amr maÑrËf nahy munkar also contribute towards the production of functioning 
and responsible individuals who live with the awareness of their responsibility to enjoin and 
promote virtue and at the same time to eradicate indecency and evil their community. Evil is 
not only perceived as the sinful acts of individuals, in the realm of governance evil can be 
anything that will bring destruction to the community such as corruption, bribery, 
dictatorship, violation of rights, discrimination, misuse of power, and non-performance of 
leaders and administrators (Abdul Tawwab, 1983: 372-73). It is only through collectively 
practising the obligation of amr maÑrËf nahy munkar, that the ummah will progress, 
achieving unprecedented heights in development, hence „good governance‟. Taleqani (1986: 
63) insists that any effort to eradicate those kinds of evils in community life and for the 
benefit of people reflects the true meaning of faith and religiosity as it proliferates the 
exercise of justice, and epitomizes the wider implication of jihad according to the Qur‟anic 
verse (9: 111-112). 
In the same way, effective implementation of amr maÑruf and nahy munkar, stipulates 
greater participation in governance activities (Zamili, 2009: 335-37). To ensure the existence 
of this ideal, an adequate degree of freedom is vital. Consequently, ideal Islamic governance 
should permit the people freedom of expression, as well as freedom of associations, politics, 
and access to information and media. Without such freedom, it would be difficult to 
implement this ideal. However, with freedom must come responsibility and that freedom 
must not exceed the moral obligations and ethics of SharÊÑah (Ghraybeh, 2000). In contrast 
to the Western liberal notion of freedom, SharÊÑah-based freedom is adherent to moral 
values, the feeling of respect towards others and the level of professionalism. Any acts that 
will lead to destruction or towards the infringement of moral issues are condemned and have 
no place in tawhidic reality-based life. 
In the same way, amr maÑruf and nahy munkar has been institutionalised throughout history 
as a state-based mechanism of governance through the establishment of Íisbah. Initially, the 
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institution of Íisbah
72
 was established to prevent hindrances to the natural functioning of the 
market, but later on, the duty of the muÍtasib (Íisbah officer) was expanded to the field of 
moral policing and to preserve the stability of the society. To summarise, the muÍtasib‟s 
major responsibilities were to supervise the markets and common morals. They were also 
responsible for checking irregularities and ensuring that market players were on the right 
path and did not indulge in malpractices. The Íisbah institution, hence, served as an efficient 
tool for regulating the market in the history of Muslims‟ governance (ÑAbdullÉh, 2000). This 
subject is explained in detail in the following chapter. 
On the other hand, iÎlÉÍ, as a foundational framework, also implies the very concept of civil 
and democratic governance where people are empowered to choose the government they 
consider close to themselves and to remove anyone who fails to deliver public 
responsibilities. Al-MÉwardÊ (2006: 17) confirms that people‟s conformation and support for 
the elected rulers depend on justice and effectiveness in conformity with the SharÊÑah laws. 
However, in the case of the unjust or severely ineffective, then the Caliph or ruler must be 
impeached through the majlis al-shËrÉ. Similarly Al-BaghdÉdÊ, Ibn ×azm al-ÚÉhirÊ, al-
GhazÉlÊ, Ibn ×ajar al-ÑAsqalÉnÊ (Wa‟iy, 1996: 289-90) and many others believe that 
impeachment is justified due to any ineffectiveness of a ruler, with some disagreements on 
the details.
 
The iÎlÉÍ-inspired thoughts concerning the impeachment issue are just another 
dimension of how the Classical Muslim scholars view the necessity of good governance in 
preserving public interest. The major ratio legist for the idea was that the trust given by the 
people is to be delivered by those in power by maintaining public order and maqÉÎid, but 
once it has failed, an iÎlÉÍ action is needed. In sum, apart from the ex ante role of iÎlÉÍ in the 
empowerment of individuals as part of a governance ideals, it is also crucial as a remedy 
should any failure occur in the ex post level of the governance process as part of the tazkiyah 
ideal.   
The element of iÎlÉÍ with the consideration of amÉnah, ikhtiyÉr and ukhuwwah will motivate 
towards the cultivation of a pro-active role of civil society with the spirit of individual 
empowerment from shËrÉ. Every single individual, in achieving the „khayr ummah‟ status, 
will be working towards the enhancement of the governance ideal through their participation 
to ensure the other elements of Islamic governance will be crystallised, hence the 
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 The history of the institution of Íisbah goes back to the time of the Prophet MuÍammad. It remained in 
existence throughout the greater part of the Muslim world until the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
officer in charge of the Íisbah was called muÍtasib. For a discussion see Islahi (1988: 186-91).  
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„functioning individual‟. The consciousness of iÎlÉÍ within society members will cultivate a 
culture of self-governance and active citizenship that is another essential element in 
maintaining the mechanisms and institutions of governance through the essence of tazkiyah 
(continuous purification.) In the same way, a culture of iÎlÉÍ aims towards major philosophy 
of Islamic governance, and its major goal, the maqasid al-SharÊÑah (higher objective of 
SharÊÑah). 
Therefore, the concept of iÎlÉÍ which is supported by concepts such as ikhtiyÉr, tazkiyah, 
rubËbiyah, will reflect the ideals of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn, thus, indicating the comprehensive 
nature of the origin of Islamic governance. The role of these complementary axioms will be 
highlighted in the coming paragraphs, starting with a discussion on ikhtiyÉr (free-will) as the 
enabling factor for most of them (i.e. amÉnah, iÎlÉÍ, ukhuwwah, etc.) to be fully articulated 
for the governance process. 
6.2.6. IkhtiyÉr (Free-will) 
IkhtiyÉr (free-will) is essential in developing the Islamic axioms for governance. Free-will or 
freedom might have a specific notion in the contemporary usage. However, Islam has its 
own unique concept of free-will. This can be clearly seen from the semantic meaning of the 
term as follows: 
6.2.6.1. Definition: 
Semantically, the term ikhtiyÉr originates from the root word Kha ya ra (to choose), which is 
also derived from the same root word as khayr (goodness) (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 4/266; al-
Jawhari, 1966: 2/ 651-52). Consequently, the term ikhtiyÉr or free-will in Islam, therefore, 
implies free choice of what is good (khayr) or the choice for the better, which in this case is 
synonymous with the term iÎÏifÉ´ (selecting the preferred best choice) (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 
4/266). Hence, from the semantic argument, it is denoted that the choice to be taken from the 
freedom granted to the individuals is the one that benefits the individuals themselves. It is 
from this semantic meaning that the term khayr, which means liberty with generosity and 
kind-heartedness, comes. 
According to this understanding too, ikhtiyÉr in Islam always comes with responsibility and 
accountability. Similarly, the same concept also applies to the notion of freedom from the 
Islamic point of view, in the sense that the freedom to choose must always be done for the 
right, true, just and correct reason (Alatas, 2003). In contrast, any choice for something bad 
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is not the real freedom in accordance to Islamic understanding of free-will or ikhtiyÉr, but it 
is an act of Ðulm (injustice). A choice for better is therefore an act of freedom, and is also an 
act of al-Ñadl and al-iÍsÉn in delivering the amÉnah. Thus, ikhtiyÉr “presupposes knowledge 
of good and evil, of virtues and vices; whereas a choice for the worse is not a choice as it is 
grounded upon ignorance urged on by the instigation of the soul that inclines toward the 
blameworthy aspects of the animal powers; it is then also not an exercise of freedom because 
freedom means precisely being free of domination by the powers of the soul that incites to 
evil” (Alatas, 2003). According to this understanding, the Islamic definition of freedom 
differs from the conventional or secular interpretation of freedom (Ghraybeh, 2000; 
Ghannoushi, 1993). 
From the Islamic economic systemic understanding, ikhtiyÉr connotes that individuals are 
believed to be endowed with “both unrestricted and voluntary” free-will (Naqvi 1994: 29), 
which is guided by broad guidelines in order “to interpret-reinterpret that freedom within 
specific societal contexts, and to suit the needs of changing times” (Naqvi 1994: 31) 
(emphasis is original). Therefore, this constitutes functional norms of economic activity in an 
Islamic economic system. A similar impact can be seen in the process of the role of ikhtiyÉr 
as a foundational concept within the framework of governance. This can be seen clearly in 
the implications ikhtiyÉr brings to the governance process as will be explained in the 
following section. 
6.2.6.2 Implication of ikhtiyÉr to governance 
With reference to governance, ikhtiyÉr denotes that individuals are empowered with 
decision-making choices for themselves in affairs relating to governance without any 
enforcement or restriction. IkhtiyÉr also explains the sufficient space needed for individuals 
to make their choices through freedom of speech, freedom of politics and freedom of 
expression that will enable them to exercise their rights in political and economical issues.  
However, freedom and choice from an ikhtiyÉrÊ perspective are those within the radius of 
tawhidic worldview, and those that confirm maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah.  
The implication of ikhtiyÉr can also be seen in the duty of the state to enable the right choice 
to be made by individuals and society with the freedom available in the governance system, 
hence the realisation of al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn. The enabling space in the governance process is 
needed to guarantee the functioning of all those who participate in governance to deliver 
their amÉnah through a wide spectrum of participations in the governance process.  
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6.2.6.2.2. IkhtiyÉr requires freedom (Íurriyyah) 
In order to execute amÉnah and develop a life within the tawhidic framework individuals 
should have the political freedom to exercise their respective responsibilities and enjoy their 
rights. Without political freedom, it is hard to believe that all the Islamic ideals on 
governance issue could be implemented. Nevertheless, only freedom that is guided by broad 
guidelines in order to interpret/reinterpret within specific societal contexts, and suits the 
needs of changing times (Naqvi, 1994: 31) is essential for such an aspiration. Moreover, this 
type of freedom, which is part of human nature, is the fruit of „free-will‟ (ikhtiyÉr) 
theological doctrine in Islamic doctrine (al-KawÉkibÊ, 1953: 8-9). Due to the freedom, 
individuals will be responsible to whatever he/she chooses. In substantiating this, Sen (1999) 
argues that „Without the substance and capability to do something, a person cannot be 
responsible for doing it‟. However, the notion of freedom, which is understood within the 
Islamic worldview, and mentioned in the texts, is not the same as the contemporary Western 
understanding. Freedom in the framework of Islamic tawhidic ontology is bound with 
responsibilities and denotes the sense of „free from‟ rather than the explicit „free to‟. 
Freedom or Íurriyyah in Islam is the opposite of slavery in the human race (al-Khar‟an, 
2002: 309). This can be clearly seen from the statement of Rib‟i bin „Amir: “Allah revived 
us so that we liberate whoever He wishes from being slaves to others towards total 
submission to Allah, from the cruelty of other religions towards Islamic justice, from the 
narrow world to the vastness of this world and the Hereafter (Ibn KathÊr, no date: 7/48)”. 
Slavery in its widest definition encompasses the act of tyranny, autocracy and other 
infringements of individuals‟ freedom to make their own choices. It also connotes the state 
of autocracy and occupation of others‟ sovereignty.   
According to Islam, deprivation of any individual from delivering his duties and rights by 
another human being is not acceptable unless it is due to God‟s ruling which aims to 
preserve the interest of the individuals themselves, either in their worldly life or the 
hereafter, and it is therefore considered as against the fiÏrah. The Islamic doctrine of freedom 
connotes that it should go hand in hand with his responsibility as a social being (Ghraybeh, 
2000; Ghannoushi, 1993). Thus, within the tawhidic framework, the individual‟s duties in 
exercising his rights are not confined to the claim on what is his, but also in delivering what 
is God‟s and what is others‟. In a more specific term, a man is not only accountable for 
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himself, but also accountable before God, and also as a member of a society, he is also 
accountable before the members of society.  
According to such relations, individual rights and freedom are bound with a degree of social 
control outlined by the SharÊÑah to enable the individual to perform his duties as 
commanded. Freedom is also important to instil the altruistic behaviour of individuals to 
create a mutual cooperating community. In this case, freedom and control do not contradict 
but rather complement each other (Mannan, 1989: 40). Control is needed to protect freedom 
and vice versa. Saying all that, Íurriyyah or freedom as it should prevail without the degree 
of freedom to ensure amÉnah to be executed.  This notion of Íurriyyah should not be 
confused with the current infringement of rights by dictators under the banner of religion or 
public interest, which is a mere pretext to preserve the elites or the despot‟s interest.  
However, the concept of ikhtiyÉr must also be directed towards the sustainability of 
development to maintain social equilibrium.  Sustainability as part of the major themes in 
Islamic governance has been mentioned in brief in under the axiom iÍsÉn, however due to its 
importance to development and governance, the nature of sustainability should be explained 
more specifically. This concern will be included in the following discussion of another 
important axiom of Islamic governance, „rubËbiyyah‟. 
6.2.7. RubËbiyyah (Divine Arrangement for Nourishment) 
Literally, the term rubËbiyyah is derived from the root word „rabb‟, which denotes „owner‟, 
„obedience‟ and „nourisher‟. However, semantically, the word rabb by itself solely refers to 
God the Creator or Allah (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 1/399; al-Jawhari, 1965: 1/130; Salmone, 
1890: 1/257). Technically, the term rubËbiyyah is strongly associated with the theologian 
discourse on the subject of tawhid. TawÍÊd al-rubËbiyyah as defined in the previous chapter 
on ontology connotes the sole Lordship of Allah as the only Creator, Owner and Nourisher 
of the universe. This type of tawÍÊd determines the purity of the Muslim creed and faith. 
Thus, Muslim is the one who firmly profess the Lordship and Ownership of Allah, thus His 
Oneness, without associating Him with other deities or gods (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 399-400). 
However, in the Islamic economics usage, the term rubËbiyah refers to “divine arrangements 
for nourishment, sustenance and directing things towards their perfection” (AÍmad 1979: 
12). This implies the necessity of sustainable economic growth and development in terms of 
having harmony between various components of economic and social life.  It is expected that 
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within this balanced and sustainable environment as defined by Qur‟anic principles human 
efforts take place (Asutay, 2007a: 7). Such a definition of rubËbiyyah as a philosophical 
foundation for Islamic economics reflects the continuation or extension of the axiom amÉnah 
axiom, which implies that individuals are the trustees, thus responsible for the sustainability 
of their life and the environment.  
RubËbiyyah within the governance framework denotes the administration of continuous 
sustainable development of individuals, society, natural environment, and the state through 
an ex ante policy-making process and ex post governance mechanisms.  Development and 
growth through rubËbiyyah demands the preservation of moral and environmental integrity, 
cultural strength and the advocating of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah as the cornerstone of governance 
to attain the holistic well-being of the society, as everything on earth is created with its own 
optimality or equilibrium, which has to be nourished and sustained. Within such a 
framework too, the rubËbiyyah-oriented development aims to create an infrastructure to meet 
the basic needs of a society (with the acknowledgement of the balance between individuals 
and community). Nevertheless, once such an infrastructure is created, the concept of 
rubËbiyyah implies the importance of maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between the 
infrastructure and the society. In preserving the development under the light of rubËbiyyah, 
which is an imperative factor in Islamic governance, the purification of means, actors and 
mechanisms involved in the process is essential. According to this, rubËbiyyah as a concept 
is related strongly with the concept of tazkiyah, which denotes „purification‟ of attitudes and 
relationships towards economic and social development as will be explained in the coming 
paragraphs.  
6.2.8. Tazkiyah (Purification) 
Alongside rubËbiyah, Islamic economists have also highlighted tazkiyah as another cardinal 
principle for the formulation of an Islamic economic system (Asutay, 2007a: 7). Similarly, it 
is also to be considered as another important axiom in Islamic governance aimed to be 
developed in this thesis, as it, as a concept, directly relates to the nature of development and 
governance. 
6.2.8.1. Definition 
Literally, the term tazkiyah is derived from the root word „zaka‟, which connotes growth, 
thriving, increased, just, good, pious, chosen as an adjective; and as a verb it suggests an „act 
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of purification‟ in both the physical and spiritual state (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 14/358-59; 
Salmone, 1890: 1/324). It is also used as an act of purifying wealth through the imbursement 
of a certain portion to be distributed to those entitled to receive it, which is known also as the 
act of „zakÉh‟ (almsgiving) (Ibn ManÐËr, 1956: 14/359; al-JawharÊ, 1965: 6/2368). 
Technically, tazkiyah denotes the act of spiritual and conceptual purification of the 
individual heart, and of society from impure elements and undesirable growth through a 
spiritual-moral struggle (Ansari, 1976: 1/299-315; Siddiqui, 2004).  
The importance of tazkiyah in its technical usage has been elaborated by al-Qur´Én
73
 and 
Sunnah in many ways involving various level of human life. Islam, as a creed, through the 
concept of tawÍÊd is an act of purification from the state of shirk (association) and kufr 
(disobedience). At the individual level, tazkiyah is an important process to ensure the purity 
of a believer from any non-Islamic elements that will nullify his conviction and submission 
to God. At the society level, tazkiyah is important to purify the community as a whole from 
jÉhiliyyah (the state of inner instability) and other non-Islamic elements such as kufr 
(disobedience), nifÉq (hypocrisy), maÑÎiyah (sinful), Ðulm (injustice) etc (Ansari, 1976: 
1/299-315). This technical usage of tazkiyah brings it closer to the concept of iÎlÉÍ as 
discussed previously. 
6.2.8.2 Implications of tazkiyah in governance 
In the field of Islamic moral economy, the concept of tazkiyah has been used as a subject that 
“concerned with growth towards perfection through purification of attitudes and 
relationships” (AÍmad 1994: 20). It has been used to explain the natural consequence of 
tawÍÊd, Ñadl, and rubËbiyyah in an integrated manner, as it directs the individual towards 
self-development, which leads to economic and social development in harmony with growth 
that requires purification (Asutay, 2007a: 7).  In other words, this principle refers to growing 
in harmony in every aspect of life, which in this way is connected to the meaning of iÍsÉn 
(as a comprehensive excellence) and iÎlÉÍ (continuous process to achieve iÍsÉn), which is 
also refers to its semantic meanings of just (Ñadl) and good (khayr).  
According to Ahmad (1994: 20) “the result of tazkiyah is [therefore] falÉÍ, prosperity in this 
world and the hereafter”, hence its dual roles in determining the efficacy of economic 
activities according to Islamic standards. Accordingly, in explaining the role of tazkiyah as a 
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foundational principal for economic growth and development from Islamic viewpoint, Sardar 
(1999: 58) maintains that “tazkiyah dictates that growth policies at the national level consist 
of four basic components: self-reliance, self-sufficiency, social justice and cultural 
authenticity.”  
Correspondingly, with reference to the discourse of governance, tazkiyah illustrates the all-
inclusive meaning of the governance process in attaining development, which is to purify 
individuals at the micro-level, and both the society and the state at the macro-level (Sardar, 
1997: 48-51). As it is important in determining the way economic and social development 
should be directed, tazkiyah also plays an important role in determining the way governance 
development should be directed along with other axioms that can be clearly indicated in the 
section on the implication of axioms in the field of governance. Furthermore, tazkiyah is not 
a static state of purification, but a dynamic concept that seeks to motivate individuals and 
societies to grow by a constant process of purification (Sardar, 1997: 50).  
It is worth noting that the culmination of tazkiyah in governance is the highest aim of 
SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid) in attaining human well-being according to the worldview of tawÍÊd. 
This will be further explored in the ensuing paragraphs. 
6.2.9. MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah 
Despite the significance of the aforementioned axioms of Islamic governance, the main 
axiom of ideal governance after tawÍÊd, is maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah, which is a comprehensive 
and holistic paradigm. In other words, it is this operational dimension that can help to put 
into place the mentioned foundational concepts to achieve the Islamic nature of good 
governance.   
6.2.9.1. Definition 
MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah as the highest aim of SharÊÑah provides the magnitude of the aims to be 
achieved from governance process itself. It is in these aims that Islamic governance differs 
from other versions of governance. Deep rooted from the ontological based epistemology of 
tawÍÊd, maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah lays down the foundation of Islamic governance encompassing 
all the meanings and objectives of the previous axioms. In other words, all aforementioned 
axioms reflect the very meaning of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah in their articulation of SharÊÑah 
spirit, in attaining falÉÍ. „FalÉÍ‟ in the worldly life can be achieved through comprehensive 
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well-being in one‟s life as a result of obedience to the guidance (see: Qur´Én, 2:189; 3:130; 
3:200; 5:35; 5:100; 24:31; 28:67; 24:51).  
This final principle aims to interpret the text and restore the principles of Islamic governance 
in relation to the highest objectives of SharÊÑah.  Thus, it implies that the principles of 
Islamic economics must lead to „human well-being‟. In sum, the objectives of SharÊÑah, 
namely the Islamic way of life and code of conduct as discussed in the chapter on 
epistemology, are „the promotion of the well-being of all humankind, which lies in 
comprehensive preservation and safeguarding their faith, their human self (nafs), their 
intellect (Ñaql), their progeny (nasl) and their wealth (mÉl)‟ (Chapra, 2008b).  In other words, 
as can be seen, maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah provides the motivation through which governance 
process should be conducted.  
6.2.9.2. Implication of MaqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah to governance 
However, to incorporate maqÉÎid into the field of governance a new more inclusive and 
comprehensive approach is essential in order to present it in a non-legalistic fiqhÊ manner. 
Recent re-interpretation of the maqÉÎid by Siddiqi (2004) provides a more dynamic 
understanding to these foundational axioms, thereby providing the legal-rationale framework 
within which ideal governance should be formulated. MaqÉÎid according to this re-
interpretation exceeds the al-Ghazalian‟s protection (ÍifÐ) of benefit (maÎlaÍah) paradigm, 
and al-ShÉÏibÊ‟s preservation and promotion (riÑÉyah). This dynamic understanding of 
maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah includes broader measures ensuring welfare as asserted by Ibn al-
Qayyim (n.d, 4: 309-11) who emphasized justice and equity according to which the means to 
achieve such objectives could never be captured by a finite list as articulated by Ghazalian 
maqÉÎid.  
Furthermore, Siddiqi (2004) argues that reason will guide human beings on how to ensure 
justice and equity in changing circumstances. This dynamic understanding of the maqÉÎid 
offers a better conceptualisation in the field of governance in our contemporary reality. 
MaqÉÎid in this sense refers to goals of Islam as a way of life rather than with reference to 
the legal positivistic goals of fiqh. Meanwhile, maqÉÎid as objective of Islam also refer to 
individual as well as societal considerations beyond the narrow definitional boundaries of 
fiqhÊ legal framework. This will enable issues like poverty, inequality, underdevelopment, 
and corruption to be tackled through certain significant governance policies (Siddiqi 2004). 
This comprehensive well-being can only be obtained through the integrated and ostensible 
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articulation of the axioms through the extensive implementation of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah in 
the field of governance.  
The endeavour to achieve this „human well-being‟ causes the axioms to become visible in 
society life. In this way, maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah as a holistic theme of Islamic governance must 
prevail and become the sine qua none in every detail of the governance process. Governance 
within this spirit thus becomes part of the act of servitude (ÑubËdiyyah), which is the main 
purpose of human creation as the trustee (amÊn) or vicegerent (khalÊfah) under the shade of 
the tawhidic Weltanschauung. The new interpretation of the maqÉÎid, according to the 
inclusive definition by Ibn al-Qayyim, is thus indispensable in making Islamic governance 
possible. Limited maqÉÎid as prescribed through the classical fiqhÊ orientation is insufficient; 
therefore, from legal aspect there is a need for infinite list based policy dimension. 
Appropriately according to this new look into maqÉÎid, a maqasidic-oriented governance, 
needs to constantly move towards the achievement of the greater benefit for the community 
or maÎlaÍah ÑÉmmah in its political, economic and religious life through the articulation of 
all the aforementioned axioms. With this understanding prevailing in the governance 
process, all policies relating to governance at all levels must aim to attain human well-being 
as reflected by the revisited notion of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. This kind of policy-making 
method is equal to what Ibn al-Qayyim (1995: 10-19) coined „al-siyÉsah al-sharÑiyyah‟ 
(Shariatic policy-making).  
A number of examples shown by the pious Caliphs during their time in administration reflect 
this principle. Abu Bakr‟s decision to compile the Qur‟an in one book during his period to 
preserve it from extinction is one of the decisions or policies taken according to this 
principle. The battle he waged upon those who refused to pay zakÉh was another decision 
taken according to it in order to establish order and to maintain the social and economic 
stability of the society. Likewise Omar, the second Caliph was also known for his many 
decisions taken under the al-siyÉsah al-sharÑiyyah calculation, rooted firmly in realisation of 
maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. Amongst them was his decision to suspend the implementation of 
punishment for poor thieves in times of famine, simply because the punishment would have 
run against the higher objective of justice since poor thieves would have been victimised 
twice (RamaÌÉn, 2009: 75).  
If the maqÉÎid is to be perceived as the aim through the articulation of falÉÍ, hence it is no 
longer a mechanistic element to the governance process: it is a means and goal by itself. 
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Therefore, good governance from the Islamic view is a governance process that consists of 
the maqasidic elements to fulfil the maqasidic end. According to this understanding, the 
governance process is not just a consequence of independent deontological activity just for 
the discharge of responsibilities for the sake of delivering the vicegerency tasks. In fact, it is 
to be viewed from a virtue-based consequentialistic paradigm, as it is a process to attain a 
holistic end for the benefits of individuals through its tawhidic paradigm, which goes beyond 
the instrumental value meaning. This paradigm imposes multi dimensions of benefits, which 
encompass both individuals and community benefits, in this world and the hereafter. The 
whole process of governance within such framework is not only a mere process as 
mentioned, and not only for the pursuit of happiness of individuals, but also for the 
community, although not at the expense of other individuals
74
. This can be clearly seen 
through the axiomatic concepts of ukhuwwah, rubËbiyyah and tazkiyah that summarise the 
comprehensive meaning of solidarity-inspired mutual kindness and multiple-happiness for 
individuals.  
All the axioms mentioned must be understood and operate according to the theory of the 
revisited notion of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. Consequently, the maqÉÎid exemplifies the 
conclusion of the interconnected relations between the axioms and reflects the fruit of 
governance according to those axioms. In sum, all the implications derived from the 
formulated axioms, from social equilibrium, social justice, sustainable development, rule of 
law, efficiency, empowerment etc., en masse lead to the attainment of human well-being, 
which can be summarised within the framework of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah and should be a 
major flagship in the policy-making process for development. To conclude, maqÉÎid al-
SharÊÑah crystallises the worldly picture of tawhidic reality and functions as an 
amalgamation to tie the axioms together and brings the very ideal of Islam in governance 
through the ShariÑatic policy-making process as previously mentioned.  
6.2.10. Conclusion of the section 
To conclude, each of the aforementioned axioms through their semantic and technical 
connotations constitutes the micro-foundations or the foundational principles for the 
proposed model of Islamic governance in this thesis. Through a universal ethical system 
those axioms produce, and (therefore) are believed to produce policies aimed at enhancing 
                                                 
74
 This goal is close to what coined by Confucius in his „Spring and Autumn Period‟ as “Good government is 
attained when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far away are attracted”(Clements, 2000: 
44). 
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motivation to seek knowledge and work, enhance efficiency, through accountability, and 
transparency in governance process.  They should also enhance intra- and inter-generational 
equity, which will eventually lead to development.  Consequently, the existence and efficacy 
of these axioms provide the rationale for Islamic governance.  
Lastly, having presented the above-mentioned foundational concepts, it is also important to 
establish how these can work together to deliver the Islamic notion of good governance. In 
addition, the interconnectedness of these axioms and their implication to the process of 
governance should be highlighted. Thus, the subsequent chapter will explain the details of 
how the axioms would come together to develop a fresh new model of governance rooted in 
the ontological-based Islamic epistemology. However, the articulation of those axioms as the 
philosophical foundation of a more realistic picture within the current framework of policy-
making and development needs to be dealt with separately; which is the main focus of the 
following chapter.  
6.3. CONCLUSION 
From the discussions presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that Islamic governance 
aims to guarantee individual liberty, freedom of choice, rule of law accountability, 
transparency, efficiency, sustainability, and other governance goals in order to achieve 
development. However, at the same time it must ensure moral, ethical and value-laden 
elements as its core foundations.  Moreover, it establishes its own distinct institutions 
according to the reality in order to fulfil the highest objectives of SharÊÑah exemplified by 
human well-being, development and social justice in society. 
However, unlike the conventional approach to governance that emphasizes the value-free 
mechanistic institutions, which implicitly are not value free, and outcomes through certain 
indicators, Islamic theory of governance aims to develop an integrated and dynamic model 
by indigenising the behavioural norms of the actors and values involved in the governance 
process. Based on „tawhidic reality‟ as its ontology, the exploration of Islamic governance 
derives its foundation from specific epistemological sources, namely al-Qur’an, Sunnah 
(Prophet‟s traditions), experiences of the pious Caliphs and maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. It is from 
these sources that the axioms of Islamic governance are formulated to provide a new 
perspective for the governance process based on revelation and virtue. These axioms 
summarise some core and important Islamic principals relating to the theory and the process 
of governance. 
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The axiomatic approach to Islamic governance is inspired by maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah, which 
emphasizes the attainment of „falÉÍ‟ through iÍsÉnÊ social capital by the development of 
homo-Islamicus. While the conventional notion of good governance insists on the promotion 
of „fairness‟, justice, liberty, an independent judiciary, respect for human rights, and an 
efficient and corruption-free bureaucracy‟ as basic requirements for a modern state (Shihata, 
1991:85), Islamic governance as articulated by the axioms aims for a holistic moral-laden 
philosophy that will eventually lead to „human well-being‟ with the emphasis on unity, peace 
and cohesion. Thus, Islamic governance rather than making reference to the creation of 
institutions, aims at developing „aware‟ individuals or homoIslamicus that can then shape the 
institutions.  Hence, the difference is also in the methodology of how good governance can 
be achieved in this process: the distinctions establish whether institutions will bring good 
governance (conventional) or aware individuals will develop individuals for good 
governance (Islamic). In other words, the distinction lies in whether institutions are ends and 
human beings are means (conventional functionalism) or human beings are ends and the 
institutions are means (the Islamic worldview). 
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Table 6.1: Summarising the Axioms of Islamic Governance and Its Implications 
Axioms Linguistic origin of 
the word 
Its governance implications 
TawÍÊd Oneness of God  Equality 
Rule of law 
AmÉnah Trust to be delivered by 
individuals 
Individuals Empowerment via ShËrÉ 
Sustainable Development 
Rule of law 
Freedom 
Accountability 
Transparency 
Al-ÑAdl wa 
al-IÍsÉn 
Justice and 
Benevolence 
Rule of Law 
Sustainable development 
Benevolent society 
Freedom 
Ukhuwwah Universal solidarity for 
balance between 
individual and society 
Unity 
TakÉful IjtimÉÑiyy (Social Mutual co-operation) 
Political conformity 
Egalitarian and equality 
Social justice 
TasÉmuÍ (mutual recognition) TafÉhum (mutual respect) 
ShËrÉ 
IÎlÉÍ Constant struggle for 
comprehensive 
excellent 
Amr maÑrËf nahy munkar 
NaÎÊÍah 
Accountability 
Transparency 
Open-ShËrÉ 
IkhtiyÉr Free-will for a freedom 
to make a better choice 
Freedom 
Sustainable development 
Shura 
RubËbiyyah Divine arrangements 
for nourishment, 
sustenance and 
directing things towards 
their perfection 
Sustainable development 
Social equilibrium 
Accountability 
Tazkiyah Purification in all level 
for a better 
development 
Sustainable development 
Rule of law 
Accountability 
MaqÉÎid al-
SharÊÑah 
Human well-being 
policy-making 
Human well-being 
ShariÑatic policy-making 
 
As the discussion in the preceding section indicates, the axioms are inter-connected and 
neglecting any of the axioms may lead to an incomplete bigger picture of the aforementioned 
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„Islamic governance‟.  In other words, the axioms mentioned are interconnected to fulfil the 
whole idea of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah itself. Each axiom aims to preserve and promote essential 
needs to establish the human well-being. Hence, policies, systems, institutions and all the 
mechanisms formulated and promulgated must be within this parameter to ensure that 
Islamic governance is not mere rhetoric or a label put to some kind of governance approach 
due to its form, and not for its comprehensive and solid substance. As can be seen in Table 1, 
each of the identified axioms semantically refer to governance related issues; and hence it 
can be claimed that „good governance‟ is a natural consequence Islamic paradigm. 
Clearly, each component of real life activity concerning governance is taken into 
consideration in the course of the axioms in an integrated manner. Therefore, the emergence 
of the homo-Islamicus, with a heart and mind shaped by Islamic values, is expected to work 
towards the (extended) maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah understood as human well-being within the 
framework of governance. In contrast to the conventional projection of good governance that 
emphasizes structural adjustment and mechanistic elements, the Islamic governance model 
formulated in this thesis is strongly founded on the consideration that political, societal and 
economic developments are attached firmly to the very basic element of the community, the 
individuals who participate in the governance process in both an individual and collective 
capacity.  It is through the vicegerency (khalÊfah) role given to individuals who, with their 
free will (ikhtiyÉr), are perceived to be active participants in social change (Asutay, 2007a). 
According to this supposition, all activities relating to the field of governance akin to 
economic activity result from the individual‟s decision making constructed by the social 
reality surrounding them. Hence, through the axioms and their implication to the field of 
governance, it could be concluded that Islam provides a framework for the functioning of 
ideal governance through its value-laden doctrine, value-judgements and where the usual 
governance choices are made. 
However, this does not imply that in the conflict between individual and society, and hence 
self-interest and social interest, Islam takes the stance of liberal individualism. In contrast, 
through its ethical foundation and propositions (i.e. the axioms), Islamic governance 
suggests that not only should individuals‟ interests protected, but social interest should also 
be preserved in a harmonious and voluntary way. This is the condition for the falÉÍ journey 
and iÍsÉnÊ social capital. Thus, the framework provided by the axioms, denies any conflict 
between self-interest and social interest, thus, preventing either of them from superseding the 
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other for efficiency, but suggests an optimisation between the two in a two-dimensional 
utility function. 
Perhaps in summarizing the interconnected nature of the axioms and how they can be 
articulated, Ibn Khaldun‟s (15th century) framework provides an interdisciplinary picture of 
the dynamic model of Islamic governance as an alternative systemic model (Chapra 2000: 
147-8):  
The strength of the sovereign (al-mulk) does not become consumed except by 
implementation of the SharÊÑah; the SharÊÑah cannot be implemented except by a 
sovereign (al-mulk); the sovereign cannot gain strength except through the 
people (al-rijÉl); the people cannot be sustained except by wealth (al-mÉl); 
wealth cannot be acquired except through development (al-ÑimÉrah); 
development cannot be attained except through justice (al-Ñadl); justice is the 
criterion (al-mÊzÉn) by which God will evaluate mankind; and the sovereign is 
charged with the responsibility of actualising justice.  
Notwithstanding such a fact, it should be noted that despite the extensive discussions on the 
axioms formulated for ideal governance, Islam does not prescribe any particular system to be 
known as „the‟ Islamic governance due to the dynamic nature of its teaching and principles. 
However, as a comprehensive guidance for mankind (as believed by Muslims), Islam does 
provide the core elements and principles, which form the basic philosophy of a system for 
governance that engulfs change in its structure and mechanisms according to the reality 
through the process of ijtihÉd. For this reason the following chapter will deal with the 
articulation of these axioms, which will be formulated into a specific typology to bring 
Islamic ideals of governance into reality.  
The articulation of the axioms must, therefore, involve the holistic and comprehensive role 
of governance actors according to the tawhidic reality. Furthermore, the axioms will 
accumulate and create the iÍsÉnÊ culture in the interaction of all the elements involved in 
keeping it alive and constantly functioning to achieve falÉÍ. 
The elements required for such articulation amongst others ought to include individuals as 
the most basic instrument, as their role in governance is undoubtedly crucial. Active 
participants from the functioning individuals in their individual capacity and a collective 
societal level with certain qualities will ensure a level of success for the axioms to operate in 
the field of governance. Accordingly, the functioning individuals require effective 
institutions to enable them to be collectively active based on both actorgenic and factorgenic 
elements of the individuals, hence the efficiency of the governance system. By the same 
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token, the combination of individuals, societies and institutions could never epitomize the 
perfect meaning of the aforesaid axioms without apposite space to enable and allow it to 
work in the current paradigm of state. In sum, an enabling state is but another prerequisite to 
ensure the capability of the other elements of the ideal governance actors to function. The 
combination of these elements necessitates distinctive typology to be supported by discrete 
culture to achieve explicit aims derived from the very ontology of tawhidic reality. All these 
building blocks will be examined thoroughly in the subsequent chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  
ARTICULATION OF ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE  
In his famous piece „Don Quixote‟, Miguel de 
Cervantes describes the novel‟s protagonist Quixote‟s 
growing obsession with knight-errantry, saying, “he so 
immersed himself in those romances that he spent 
whole days and nights over his books; and thus with 
little sleeping and much reading his brain dried up to 
such a degree that he lost the use of his reason”. 
(Cervantes, 1992: 1/1) 
Quixote‟s obsession with knight-errantry led him 
towards his sleepless journey in fighting what he 
perceived as giants, king‟s enemies and others. The 
journey took him away from his family and not only 
nearly caused him his life, but also led him in some 
cases into humiliation. However, after spending days 
and nights on his mission of knighthood he finally found 
his way back and returned to consciousness. On his 
deathbed, „the knight‟, after rejecting his stories of 
chivalry, tells his family, shamefully, “My judgement is 
now clear and unfettered, and that dark cloud of 
ignorance has disappeared, which the continual 
reading of those detestable books of knight-errantry 
had cast over my understanding”.  
(Cervantes, 1992: 2/16) 
 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Establishing a new model of governance from certain metaphysics-oriented ontology 
and epistemology may be viewed by some people as a construction of just another 
dream. Therefore, some might perceive that the axioms developed and the way the 
ideal of Islamic governance is articulated in this research is another imagined reality 
akin to Don Quixorte‟s. It has been found through experience that the normal 
consequences of such imagined reality is but another failure in the reality of the 
physical worldly. In order to moderate the „ideal‟ of the proposition made in this 
study, this chapter aims to articulate the axioms in real life, specifically in the realm 
of contemporary governance operation.  
The axioms require a certain specific paradigm to ensure their articulation into the 
reality of the contemporary ideals of governance. For this reason, a comprehensive 
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and holistic paradigm as a means of articulation and mechanism to translate 
potentially operational realm is needed. After extensive scrutiny into the deep Islamic 
spirit of Shari‟ah rulings through the literature and the practices of Muslims 
throughout the history, the reader will see that the very foundation of efficiency of 
any Islamic ideals and teachings that derive from the ontology and epistemology are 
expected to operate only within the paradigm of tawÍÊd. Such paradigm views that 
the human being is but the khalÊfah (vicegerent) to deliver the mission assigned to 
him/her in the worldly life.  
However, contemporary usage of the term „governance‟ connotes the exercise of 
power or authority (political, economic, administration, etc.) to manage a country‟s 
resources and affairs. The practice of governance, thus, comprises the mechanism, 
processes and institutions, through which people from all groups and social strata 
within the society can articulate their interest, exercise their legal rights, meet their 
obligations and mediate their differences. Accordingly, good governance would 
imply the sets of rules (system) governing the actions of individuals and 
organizations (society) and the relations, transactions and negotiations of differences 
between them that could only be established and resolved through proper institutions 
(Van Dok, 1999). In the same spirit, the formulated axioms of Islamic governance 
cannot be relegated to work only through the individuals; instead they must be 
articulated through the comprehensive interconnection of all four main elements of 
governance: individuals, society, institutions and state. These four elements are 
expected to work as the articulator of Islamic governance through the typology of 
khalÊfah within the environment and atmosphere (culture) of iÍsÉnÊ social capital, the 
expansion of which determines the nature of governance in terms of its quality. 
7.2. KHALÔFAH TYPOLOGY 
Exploring the field of governance through the lens of the Islamic or tawhidic 
worldview requires a fresh approach be presented due to the specific framework of 
its epistemology. At the same time, such effort demands certain room for ijtihÉd for 
the development of this new subject. Current reality and context inspire this subject 
to be more dynamic in responding to them. For such reason, khalÊfah typology in the 
sense of homoIslamicus is proposed as an ideal framework for the proposed Islamic 
governance axioms. According to this understanding, the notion of khalÊfah is to be 
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expanded from its classical exclusive political meaning, which connotes an 
individual position as the highest political and administrative rank in the Muslim 
community. Unlike the conventional stereotyping of the meaning of khalÊfah in 
Islamic political doctrine, the term has to be brought back to its original and general 
meaning of Allah‟s vicegerent. This initial definition of the term indicates that every 
human being is God‟s vicegerent on earth and been created to fulfil the mission of 
istikhlÉf (vicegerency), in which they will be individually accountable before Him in 
the hereafter.  
This tawhidic worldview shapes Muslims‟ lifestyle and vision of life that implies that 
Allah is the sole creator and the only omnipotent God to be worshiped, and human 
beings as a whole are the „makhlËq‟ (creature) or more specifically „the servants‟ of 
Allah the Creator. These servants are created with a mission (istikhlÉf) which is to be 
accomplished in this world and they will be questioned on it during the life hereafter. 
The human being in this sense, hence, is the vicegerent (khalÊfah) of the Creator in 
this world (Faruqi, 1989)
1
.  
This tawhidic reality worldview also denotes that the human race has been created 
with a special quality over other creatures to be God‟s representative or khalÊfah or 
vicegerent. Thus, everything else in the universe is subservient to human beings, and 
if man utilizes them positively, he will participate in God‟s continuous process of 
creation (Omar, 1992: 43; Ahsan, 2007: 1). According to this worldview, the 
individual as khalÊfah will only succeed in both this world and the hereafter by 
executing God‟s order through delivering justice, fairness, prosperity, development 
and harmony according to the will or guidance from the God as the fulfilment of his 
role as „trustee‟ or vicegerent of Allah. Failing to deliver this responsibility or trust 
might lead the human to descend to a position that is less than that of asfala sÉfilÊn or 
animals
2
.  
This vicegerency, hence, defines the position of man in this universe, to populate and 
civilize the earth, free, chosen, commissioned and responsible. On the other hand, his 
freedom was governed by the terms of the contract and covenant of vicegerency, 
                                                 
1
 Qur’an (2:30; 51:56). 
2
 These are the ones who al-Qur’an mentions as: “Have hearts [minds] wherewith they understand not, 
eyes wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they hear not. They are like cattle, nay more 
misguided; for they are heedless (of warning).” (Qur’an, 7:179) 
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which is the Divine Law.
3
 This worldview also demands from Muslims to further the 
„daÑwah mission‟ (propagation) by calling people to the iÍsÉnÊ world for falÉÍ, which 
has been asserted in many Qur‟anic verses4. It is through this mission that Allah has 
given to the Muslims the title of „ummatan wasaÏan‟ (justly balanced or moderate) to 
be the witness (shuhadÉ´) to the human being: 
Thus, have We made of you an ummah justly balanced (ummatan wasaÏan), 
that ye might be witnesses (shuhadÉ´) over the nations, and the Apostle a 
witness over yourselves; and We appointed the Qiblah to which thou wast 
used, only to test those who followed the Apostle from those who would 
turn on their heels (From the Faith). Indeed, it was (a change) momentous, 
except to those guided by God. And never would God Make your faith of no 
effect. For God is to all people, most surely full of kindness, Most Merciful. 
(Qur‟an, 2:143) 
As implied, achieving development and bringing harmony and stability to the 
community (through the axioms of Islamic governance) are amongst those 
„righteous‟ deeds and are part of the duty of the khalÊfah. Muslims as the ummatan 
wasaÏan should have an active role in such a field, since it is part of what are to be 
considered as the accomplishment of their mission as the khalÊfah. Furthermore, as 
khalÊfah, Muslims aim to attain the status of iÍsÉn in their life. As mentioned in the 
discussion on the axioms, iÍsÉn connotes the holistic idea of „comprehensive 
excellence‟, which is the level above of mere Islam (knowing) and ÊmÉn (believing) 
as mentioned in the popular tradition of the Prophet Muhammad known as ÍadÊth 
JibrÊl (The tradition of the archangel Gabriel)
5
. IÍsÉn as a culmination of values and 
                                                 
3
 “It is who hath created for you all things that are on earth” (Qur’an, 2: 29); “Say: My Lord hath 
commanded justice.” (Qur’an, 7: 29); “O David! We did indeed make thee a vicegerent on earth: so 
judge thou between men in truth (and justice): nor follow thou the lusts (of thy heart), for they will 
mislead thee from the Path of God.” (Qur’an, 38: 26); “God commands justice, the doing of good and 
liberality to kith and kin, and He forbids all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion: He instructs 
you that ye may receive admonition.” (Al-Qur’an, 16: 90); “Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for 
mankind; enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in God.” (Qur’an, 3: 110); 
“Those who have faith and do righteous deeds, they are the best of creatures; their reward is with God: 
Gardens of Eternity, beneath which rivers flow; they will dwell therein forever.” (Qur’an, 98: 7-8; also 
see 22: 14; 4: 57, 122, 124, 96: 6; 30: 14-15). 
4
 “Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, 
and believing in God. If only the People of the Book had faith, it was best for them: among them are 
some who have faith, but most of them are perverted transgressors.” (Qur’an, 3: 110); “(They are) 
those who, if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the 
right and forbid wrong: with God rests the end (and decision) of (all) affairs.” (Qur’an, 22:41); “Let 
there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and 
forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.” (Qur’an, 3:104). 
5
 Narrated by al-BukhÉrÊ: One day when we were sitting with the Messenger of God there came unto us 
a man whose clothes were of exceeding whiteness and whose hair was of exceeding blackness; nor 
were there any signs of travel upon him, although none of us knew him. He sat down knee unto knee 
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actions of Muslims life requires them to live with the quality of above par excellence 
in all their worldly, intellectual, spiritual and social life. The attainment of iÍsÉn is 
but the essential of ensuring falÉÍ in the life of the community, which is still subject 
to the fact that those aiming to achieve iÍsÉn must also extend their support to others 
to follow the path for iÍsÉnÊ development. 
KhalÊfah typology, thus, in this manner gives Islamic Governance a sui generis that 
distinguishes it from the others, the rationale which was discussed previously. The 
main difference is not only in the principles, structures and institutions, but also in its 
spirit and values within the individuals as the major actors of governance. It is from 
the tawhidic worldview that individuals under khalÊfah typology will emerge as God-
centred individuals, as their actions are strongly attached not only to the ritual-
spiritual teaching of Islam, but also the action based consciousness of articulating the 
requirements of being khalÊfah on earth, such as philanthropic elements in its socio-
political and economical doctrines. Such ideals imply that the administration of such 
God-centred individuals entails the God-centred environment that brings the highly 
moral spirit in the realm of governance (Hudson, 1982: 9), and hence fulfils the 
notion of iÍsÉn. This will result in „functioning individuals‟ who not only believe and 
functioning according to what they believe, but also continuously impart what they 
believe and what they practise to others to form a culture or environment conducive 
to „Islamic governance‟ according to the axioms. Thus, ideal governance or „good‟ 
governance within such a paradigm can only be attained or established by the 
community which lives according to the spirit of this system of khalÊfah. This implies 
                                                                                                                                           
opposite the Prophet, upon whose thighs he placed the palms of his hands saying: “O Muhammad, tell 
me what is the surrender (IslÉm).”  The Messenger answered him saying: “the surrender is to testify 
that there is no god but God and that MuÍammad is God‟s Messenger, to perform the prayer, bestow 
the alms, fast Ramadan and make if though canst, the pilgrimage to the Holy House.” He said: “thou 
hast spoken truly,” and we were amazed that, having questioned him, he should corroborate him.  Then 
he said: “Tell me what is faith (ÊmÉn).” He answered: “To believe in God and His Angels and His 
books and His Messengers and the Last Day, and to believe that no good or evil cometh but by his 
Providence.”  “Thou hast spoken truly,” he said, and then: “Tell me what is excellence (iÍsÉn).”  He 
answered: “To worship God as if thou sawest him, for if thou seest Him not, yet seeth He thee.”  “Thou 
hast spoken truly,” he said, and then: “tell me of the Hour.” He answered: “The questioned thereof 
knoweth no better than the questioner.”  He said: “Then tell me of its signs.” He answered: “That the 
slave-girl shall give birth to her mistress; and that those who were but barefoot naked needy herdsmen 
shall build buildings ever higher and higher.”  Then the stranger went away, and I stayed a while after 
he had gone; and the Prophet said to me: “O Omar, knowest though the questioner, who was he?” I 
said: “God and His Messenger know best.”  He said: “It was Gabriel. He came unto teach you your 
religion.”  (al-BukhÉrÊ (1985: 1/27; 4/1793); Muslim (n.d.: 2/715).  
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that khalÊfah requires certain characteristics within the community to shape its 
development according to the tawhidic worldview.  
However, in formulating the means of articulation for Islamic governance, khalÊfah 
typology implies comprehensive and interrelated components of mechanisms to bring 
all the axioms into day-to-day practice. Thus, as mentioned previously, four major 
elements, or four dimensions are identified as crucial in order to deliver those ideals: 
individual, society, institutions and state. The Islamic governance ideals through the 
established axioms can best be articulated through these four interdependent elements 
in order to be operationalized. KhalÊfah, therefore, requires that good governance is 
practised on the individual level by „functioning individuals‟; then on the level of 
society through „benevolent society‟; and at the state level through „enabling state 
systems‟, which is ideally „effective‟ and „minimal‟ in nature; while at the 
institutional level the axioms must be interpreted through effective institutions. It 
should be noted that effectiveness in this paradigm should not only be understood in 
the limited conceptualization of the neo-classical worldview but rather it implies 
achieving the expected outcome, that is the maximization of iÍsÉnÊ social capital with 
the objective of reaching falÉÍ. 
Based on the khalÊfah typology, it can be concluded that the aim of governance in 
Islam, unlike the conventional versions of governance is to achieve comprehensive 
human well-being (falÉÍ) through the articulation of tawÍÊd, amÉnah, Ñadl wa iÍsÉn, 
ukhuwwah, iÎlÉh, ikhtiyÉr, rubËbiyyah, tazkiyah and maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah‟ through 
the mechanism of khilÉfah (vicegerency). Furthermore, „Islamic governance‟ is part 
of the means to achieve iÍsÉn as the culmination of human life for a better life for the 
community. 
It is upon such a definition that this research has been structured and organised and 
the articulation of the afore-mentioned axioms within the „khalÊfah typology‟ 
elements will be expounded extensively in the following sections. 
7.2.1. Functioning Individuals 
Accordingly, khalÊfah requires harmony and interrelated stability of three major 
components in human life: the physical, intellectual and spiritual. These elements in 
human existence are not regarded as three different compartments but neither are 
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they necessarily irreconcilable due to their unique mutually exclusive nature. As 
khalÊfah, the human being is neither a fallen angel nor an ascending animal, but 
rather, a responsible being with the potential to ascend to a position that is higher 
than that of the angels, or to descend to a position that is lower than that of an animal 
(see Qur’an (2:30; 51:56; 95:4-6). (Badawi, 2002: 5). The interdependence and the 
balance of the corporeal elements of human life (represented by the physical and 
intellectual) and the spiritual, in shaping the haÌÉrah (civilisation) of human life is 
explained in depth by Bennabi (1979: 21): “HaÌÉrah (civilisation) can be defined in 
fact as a set of spiritual and material elements that allow a society to ensure all social 
guarantees to every single individual”.  
Upon this foundation, Bennabi (1979) points out the essentials of the consciousness 
of both material and spiritual elements for the progress of the society, which must be 
articulated into a policy and a project according to the Islamic ideals. In this sense, 
haÌÉrah emerges within the world of ideas and then it is transformed into a social 
regulation and a governing power within that society, framing itself with a spiritual 
control to ensure its safe and right steering. Hudson (1982) highlighted such 
uniqueness of Islamic society‟s political orientations by acknowledging the 
transcendental matter and therefore „God centred‟ as opposed to the human centred 
Western ideals.  
Within such typology, an individual is a person who preserves his vertical relation 
with his God and his horizontal relation with his fellow humans and his environment 
by articulating the aforementioned axioms of Islamic governance. His tawhidic 
reality worldview guides him towards living according to God‟s guidance in the 
terrestrial life, to achieve falÉÍ through the culture of iÍsÉn. Consequently, falÉÍ can 
be achieved through comprehensive wellbeing in one‟s life as a result of the 
continuous obedience to the guidance with the quality of iÍsÉn (see: Qur’an, 2:189; 
3:130; 3:200; 5:35; 5:100; 24:31; 28:67; 24:51). This comprehensive well-being is 
obtained through the preservation of the highest objectives of SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid) 
when the guidance is followed and implemented in one‟s life.  
As far as khalÊfah is concerned, all his life is dedicated to fulfilling this responsibility 
of being the vicegerent of Allah on earth, as all actions are considered as acts of 
worship (ÑibÉdah) or submission towards the Creator (Omar, 1992: 40). Arif (1989) 
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names such an individual as tab‟ay (obedient) human being,6 while Al-Buraey (1985: 
237; 316) defines such a character as the „God-fearing‟ individual. Such a person 
then is a responsible individual with a tawhidic mindset, which becomes the precious 
social capital for the community or the Muslim nation as a whole. This ideal makes 
„Islamic‟ approach to governance different from the „materialistic‟ and 
„individualistic‟ liberal proposal of good governance. It also leads to the political 
economic idea of „two-dimensional utility function‟ (present and the hereafter), 
which leads to a homoIslamicus being unlike the conventional economic system 
which is based on a one-dimensional utility function, which leads to 
homoeconomicus or homopoliticus (Asutay, 2007b). 
In substantiating the position taken here, it should be stated that the importance of 
„functioning individuals‟ is thoroughly discussed by Bennabi (Berghout, 2005: 167-
68) who strongly asserts that any social change or civilising process should depart 
from the very tiny cell of the ummah, which is the individual himself. In this way, it 
is understood that civilisation should never be confined to the formulation of objects 
and wealth per se or what (relates to what he terms the realm of objects or ÑÉlam al-
ashyÉ´) as perceived by many, but it must rather be generated from the realm of 
persons and ideas or ÑÉlam al-afkÉr (which he calls the social investment). By 
quoting the example of the Germans who rose up after World War Two, he declares 
that the driving force behind that was not its destroyed world of objects and things, 
but its human resources (individuals) and will of such individuals for reconstruction. 
The Qur’an (21:107) mentions this (functioning) individual‟s mission as the 
continuation of the Prophet MuÍammad‟s mission as an agent of mercy to the 
universe: “For I [Allah] have created you [MuÍammad] to be nothing but a blessing 
for all creation”.  
This type of homoIslamicus as a functioning individual is essential to the articulation 
of the axioms of Islamic governance according to the tawhidic worldview. They 
become sustainable people, conscious of their role of being the agents for iÍsÉn, they 
are able to earn a living and to have a quality of life acceptable to themselves as they 
continue to learn about themselves and their communities and to strive to improve 
                                                 
6
 Where according to him, “to be a Muslim is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to be tab’ay” 
(Arif, 1989). 
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their life as well as the community by maximising iÍsÉnÊ social capital
7
. Functioning 
individuals are also those who live with self-integrity under the banner of amÉnah, 
which entails the inner attitude of self-accountability and due to this self-
consciousness, they are always transparent in delivering the trust rendered to them. 
As part of the delivery of the amÉnah, functioning individuals do actively participate 
in the governance activities of the community as active not passive citizens due to the 
principle of individual empowerment through shËrÉ and amr maÑrËf nahy munkar 
within the concept of iÎlÉÍ.  
In addition, according to the tawhidic worldview, functioning individuals, as part of 
the „moderate nation‟ (ummatan wasaÏan), and also as part of the community, in 
which they live, should explore the field of participation to achieve good in the 
worldly life and to attain falÉÍ. RamaÌÉn (2005:134) suggests that the participation 
of Muslims in the political and social life of the society is but a reflection of their 
good faith and spirituality. Furthermore, their participation is but a fertile ground for 
those individuals to perform their „al-amr bi al-maÑrËf wa nahy Ñan al-munkar‟. This 
is in agreement with the current theory of people‟s empowerment in governance, in 
which individuals should have the right to participate in the activities of a political 
community and in effective decision-making about the shared future through their 
personal capacity or the group‟s collective action (Cornwall, 2002: 1; Saward, 2005: 
179-194; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing, 2005).  
Furthermore, in the prevailing theories of Islamic governance, the sphere of 
participation should be expanded towards every person in the community to enhance 
their direct-participation opportunities, which must aim at strengthening the lower 
echelons of public administration through various means such as plebiscite, civic-
based policy-making efforts, public debate, polling etc. (Boyte, 2005; Kim, et al., 
2005: 650). It is through participation that individuals exercise their culture of iÍsÉn 
to ensure falÉÍ. It is their effort to fulfil this mission that is valued as „Islamic‟ 
governance. Thus, participation should not only be limited to the political realm, but 
as a radical democratic position electors should claims their right in policy making 
beyond the elected.  The importance of such active and functioning individuals in the 
realm of governance is mentioned by Havel (1997: 146), who firmly maintained that: 
                                                 
7
 This social-concern characteristic of functioning individuals is similar to the socio-tropic individuals 
coined by Asutay (2007b: 4). 
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“A modern state cannot consist merely of civil service, political parties, and private 
enterprise. It must offer citizens a colourful array of ways to become involved, both 
privately and publicly, and must develop very different types of civic coexistence, 
solidarity and participation”. It should be mentioned that Islamic moral economy‟s 
concept of participation can respond to such calls, as instead of mere 
competitiveness, Islamic moral economy aims at the coherence of both cooperation 
and competitiveness. The financing participatory nature of the economy and finance 
is strongly argued, as the aim is the formation of khalÊfah typology through 
functioning and active individuals. 
Participation, hence, according to this also contributes towards the broadening of 
responsibilities for the decisions adapted to each and every citizen and their 
commitments towards society, thereby fostering political competences, enhancing the 
quality of collective decision-making and activating the market by not solely 
depending on the state to plan for their micro-economic life.  
As can be seen, participation related theories are but another face of the expansion of 
the shËrÉ concept by widening the scope of consultation to every „empowered‟ 
functioning individual. This ideal will lead to the active role of civil society, an 
independent community and less dependence on the authority. 
In the same manner, a functioning individual lives within the spirit of the rule of law 
as part of their amÉnah.  Similarly, the spirit of Ñadl wa aÍsÉn requires permanent 
guidance in the life of the functioning individual for them to not only respect the rule 
of law for the well being of the community but also to act as an agent to promote the 
concept. While at the same time, the principal of iÍsÉn drives a functioning 
individual to keep striving towards comprehensive excellence to attain falÉÍ in his 
life in line with maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. Such an individual also lives with the high 
spirit of universal solidarity and benevolence through the concept of ukhuwwah. The 
ukhuwwah spirit also ensures mutual respect and mutual acknowledging between 
individuals with sufficient room for freedom for everybody to practise their rights 
and obligations. 
Having said all this, homoIslamicus, as functioning individuals are not merely an 
imaginary, utopian society based purely on theory without consideration for the 
reality. Islamic governance as another means of achieving society‟s „well-being‟ 
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directly contributes towards the development of „social capital‟, or iÍsÉnÊ capital, 
which is currently accepted by many as an effective element for the promotion of 
economic development, equality, participation, and democracy.
8
 Moreover, these 
„material‟ objectives are not the ultimate aims of the Islamic governance. They 
emerge as a result of collective individuals exercising the axioms, motivated by an 
„inner‟ foundation within the hearts of those individuals on their journey to attain 
falÉÍ through the culture of iÍsÉn. Those individuals are not living individually in the 
pursue of their aims, but rather acting collectively with the spirit of solidarity and 
sharing their ideals with others.
9
 The struggle of the functioning individual to pursue 
his own well-being and that of the community not only manifests the ritual-
spirituality of the individual, but also represents the true meaning of jihÉd fÊ sabÊl 
Allah (striving in the way of Allah). JihÉd in its broader term encompasses the 
struggle for individual development, justice, humanity and well-being, which are the 
results of Islamic governance through khalÊfah. Thus, this „inner‟ element 
differentiates between mere worldly „good governance‟ and Islamic governance.  
The functioning individuals, however, could not function in vacuum within the 
minimal state. The previously mentioned iÍsÉn characteristic of Muslim Ummah 
requires the establishment of benevolent society comprise of the functioning 
individuals. With the spirit of universal solidarity amongst its individuals, the 
benevolent society will maximize the potential of its member to be independent and 
to self-actualise their falÉÍ. This ideal benevolent society will lead to the creation of 
„independent society‟ or „virtuous society‟ that will articulate the axioms of Islamic 
governance within the larger sphere of individuals. The ensuing section will elaborate 
further on how the benevolent society as an element of khalÊfah typology is essential 
in constructing the big picture of ideal governance in this thesis. 
7.2.2. Benevolent Society 
As mentioned above the khalÊfah typology of functioning individuals does not work 
in a vacuum. The functioning element of individuals only becomes workable within 
the sphere of a society that enables them to be functioning. Upon this premise, a „big 
                                                 
8
 Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and 
for development to be sustainable (see: The World Bank 1999).  
9
 This is due to the understanding of the „shuhadÉ´‟ (witnesses) mission, where the conscious 
individuals will strive to impart their consciousness to the others.   
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society‟ in which the individuals are politically and economically less-dependent on 
the state, but rather interdependent on each other based on the concept of social 
justice and universal solidarity, and hence the virtuous society. This paradigm, 
nevertheless does not deny the individualism and ownership, but the individualistic 
nature of the individuals are rather interdependent on each other not solely to pursuit 
everybody‟s respective personal interest, but rather to collectively assisting each 
other to pursue their own personal falÉÍ but also to help each other in reaching falÉÍ 
through the expansion of the iÍsÉnÊ social capital. Such a big society in Islamic 
governance is essential in order to articulate its philosophical foundations and it is 
best to be known as a „benevolent society‟.  
In the same token, this benevolent society itself is the result of the 
intercommunicating and interrelated networking of the functioning individuals within 
the culture of iÍsÉn, which demands from every single individual not only to achieve 
his personal well being by creating a „falÉÍ‟ of his own, but also to cultivating an 
environment which can facilitate the falÉÍ of others due to the tawhidic reality 
worldview. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, functioning individuals strive 
not only towards their own happiness through participation and self-determination, 
but also to assist others to attain total self-actualization (falÉÍ). This collective 
mutual interdependent nature of the functioning individual is the gist of the 
aforementioned axioms. 
Tawhidic principal which acts as the imago mundi of the society framework of 
governance within the hearts of individuals leads to the realization of their amÉnah 
(trust), by preserving their rights and also enables them to execute their obligations in 
a just and benevolent manner as indicated by the Ñadl wa iÍsÉn axiom. The just and 
benevolence principal requires the individuals, as part of the notion of iÍsÉn, to live 
and pursue their lives not only for their own personal interest, but also as agents of 
mercy to mankind and the environment. Furthermore, the effectiveness of benevolent 
society that would mutually connect the individuals is strongly founded on the spirit 
of universal solidarity or ukhuwwah axioms through takÉful (mutual cooperation), 
tafÉhum (mutual respect). The articulation of these concepts will lead towards social 
cohesion in achieving their well-being (maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah). 
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Such a tawhidic ontology based society of individuals exemplifies „social capital‟ 
through the empowerment of each single cell of the society‟s members. A social 
capital of this type comprises all three types of social capital as proposed by 
Woolcock (2001): bonding, bridging and linking
10
. If the contemporary notion of 
social capital arises from the horizontal material needs and is structured by the 
vertical framework of the state, Islamic social capital is to be shaped by moral-based 
and faith-inspired iÍsÉn culture to produce the „IÍsÉnÊ Social Capital‟, which implies 
that the horizontal relation amongst the people or individuals is established by the 
concept of ukhuwwah (universal solidarity), which is derived from the vertical 
Tawhidic worldview relation between the individuals and God. It is the quality of 
their inter-connectedness with each other (horizontal) that determine the quality of 
their vertical relation (with Allah) in attaining falÉÍ. Active, functioning, empowered 
individuals are thus expected to articulate their governance rights and responsibilities 
within the sphere of this iÍsÉnÊ social capital realm. 
Furthermore, a continuous process of tarbiyyah and ta´dÊb (education and virtuous 
impartment process) as part of the shuhadÉ´ characteristics must prevail within the 
benevolent society, the nature and the magnitude of which will determine the 
magnitude and the quality of iÍsÉnÊ social capital and therefore the nature of good 
governance in a dynamic and integrated manner with causal relationship is expected 
to be yielded.  
This process can only constantly and naturally be carried out on the very basic branch 
of society, the family institution. Islamic moral and teachings place crucial emphasis 
on the value of the family. Without a proper virtuous family institution that enables 
individuals to function, and Islamic values to prevail, it is hard to produce benevolent 
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 The central thesis of social capital theory is that „social networks based relationships are a valuable 
asset‟. People‟s interaction amongst themselves within the realm of social relation and networking 
enables them to build communities with each other, through the well-knitted social fabric. As argued 
by many, this trust-based relation within the community will bring great material benefits to people for 
the development and economic growth (Mehmet, 1999, 139; Kliksberg, 2000; John Field, 2003: 1-2). 
In expanding the discussion of this type of capital, Woolcock (2001) divides the relations of the social 
capital into three major types: „The bonding‟ type of social capital is the relation of community which 
based on enduring, multi-faceted relationships between similar people with strong mutual 
commitments such as friends, family and other close-knit groups; while the „bridging type‟ of social 
capital is formed from the connections between people who have less in common, but may have 
overlapping interests, for example, between neighbours, colleagues, or between different groups within 
community; and finally the „linking type‟ of social capital derived from the links between people or 
organisations beyond peer boundaries, cutting across status and similarity and enabling people to exert 
influence and reach resources outside their normal circles. Gilchrist (2004: 6) asserts that these types of 
social capital must come together interrelated to produce the well-connected community.  
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elements in the society. Strong family institutions with Islamic values will ensure 
social networking amongst society members to establish the iÍsÉnÊ social capital. The 
effective role of families and social networking with the influence of culture, virtue 
and religious value is acknowledged by many researchers of development and social 
capital as another factor towards the holistic and comprehensive development 
(Chang, 1997; Kenneth Newton, 1997; Teachman, et al., 1997; Kliksberg, 2000). 
Universal solidarity within this benevolent society expands beyond political economy 
issues and the ownership and rights discourse. It encompasses the comprehensive 
elements of family, social, education, and ethos, ritual-spiritual, moral, values and 
responsibilities aspects of human life. It is through this process that virtue and values 
are kept alive in the lives of individuals and families. Such a realm of iÍsÉnÊ social 
capital enshrines the very meaning of ukhuwwah through the practice of naÎÊÍah 
(mutual reminding) amongst its members. These qualities will sustain in both 
actorgenic and factorgenic factors
11
 within the society due to the establishment of the 
support system of effective institutions working in the maximum space left by the 
minimal enabling state as discussed in the following paragraphs. This ideal practice 
of benevolence will lead towards balance, harmony and mutual respect within the 
society. Compared to the benefits of the contemporary notion of social capital,
12
 the 
ihsani social capital through benevolent society would bring about the well-being 
(maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah) of the community through the ideals of Islamic governance. 
However, iÍsÉnÊ social capital through the benevolent society can only be articulated 
within the framework of effective minimal state where more room for the society‟s 
dynamism can be fully exercised through active state and non-state institutions, as 
iÍsÉnÊ social capital requires opportunity to flourish and nourish without the 
hindrance and interference of the state. Within such a framework, a society must be 
substantially autonomous to self-determine its way forward. Not only should the state 
with its system and mechanism allow a benevolent society to nourish, it should also 
allow non-state institutions as part of the realm where the individuals and the society 
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 Actorgenic means those matters, which are found within the individual or the group; and factorgenic: 
implies those matters, which are the results of human action, external to man and able to survive longer 
than an individual or the group (Alatas, 1972: 22). 
12
 Putnam (2001: 296-333) points out that what he coined as the social capital is useful for education, 
social stability, lower crime rate, well being of society, socioeconomic growth, health and others. The 
World Bank (1999) has also brought together a range of statistics to make the case for the social and 
economic benefits of social capital. 
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with its limited autonomy can be actively involved in the centre along with the 
state‟s. In the same spirit, the state itself must be interdependent with the society in 
which it operates in creating the atmosphere of iÍsÉn to attain falÉÍ. This nature of 
interdependency between the state and the society (represented by its individuals) in 
governance is exemplified through the effective institutions in civil society and the 
state.  
7.2.3. Effective Institutions 
While determining the role of individuals and state in articulating the Islamic ideals 
of governance through the axioms, it should be noted that both elements as part of the 
khalÊfah typology could not effectively function without proper institutions 
connecting the two. This implies that the critical dual role of institutions can 
obviously be determined firstly by facilitating the articulation of any system or 
ideological objectives and aspirations and then by translating them into actions. Thus, 
the existence and capabilities of institutions for crystallizing and guiding collective 
efforts are most critical in the realm of governance, whether it is for strategic 
visioning and long-term policy-making or for actual implementation or evaluation 
and control. The significance of institutions also lies in their role in accomplishing 
the mandates, missions and objectives derived from the axioms, as well as in 
structuring and organising groups and individuals within the community according to 
their roles and responsibilities due to the degree of authority vested in each groups.  
In explaining the significant role of institutions, North (1990: 3) develops a theory 
that defines institutions as “humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction”. His theory explains that institutions are essential in exercising two 
fundamental roles: as „rules of the game‟ and as a „system of incentive distribution‟. 
As the rules of the game, institutions regulate actors‟ (individuals‟) behaviour, in 
determining the conduct of the individuals, in a particular way, institutions will 
promote cooperative behaviour.  While as the system of incentive distributions, 
institutions have a duty to provide individuals with a fair and equal opportunity to 
apply sustainable strategies to pursue their interests collectively (North, 1990: 6-9).  
Institutions are also important for regulating the system of rules to crystallize and 
maintain the philosophy, ideology, culture and „traditions‟ that underpin or 
rationalize the operation system of the institutions and its constituent parts. 
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Governance institutions, thus, embody several elements: formal and informal rules of 
behaviour, ways and means of enforcing these rules, procedures for mediation of 
conflicts, sanctions in the case of breach of the rules, and organizations supporting 
market transactions (North, 1994; World Bank, 2002). Institutions are more or less 
developed depending on how well these different features operate. They can create or 
destroy incentives for individuals to engage in governance.  
As an act of steering a people‟s socio-politico-economic development, governance is 
a multifaceted compound situation of institutions, systems, structures, processes, 
procedures, practices, relationships and leadership behaviour in the exercise of social, 
political, economic and managerial/administrative authority in the running of public 
or private affairs (Leftwich, 1993; Williams and Young, 1994; Van Dok, 1999; 
Rhodes, 2003). Good governance, in this context, is the exercise of this authority 
with the participation, interest and livelihood of the governed as the driving force. 
Hence, institutions that deal with the issue of governance must facilitate 
collaboration, involvement, consultation and participation of all stakeholders in all 
sectors (public sector, private sector and civil society) in the act of governance. At 
the same time, due to the nature of the social constructs of governance institutions, 
they encompass not only temporal structurally-conditioned behaviour but also 
tendencies that are products of the socio-politico-economic and historical conditions 
of the context in which they operate. 
Attention should be paid not only to central government institutions and processes 
under the notion of Islamic governance, but also to the attributes and capacities of 
sub-national and local government authorities as mentioned in the discussion of the 
enabling state. In addition, the current trend in worldwide governance assigns a more 
active role to civil society institutions due to the gap between states or governments 
and their citizens becoming wider
13
. The term itself became so popular with the 
emerging non-state social actors in governing society interests either in education, the 
market or the socio-political field. Therefore, the civil society became an important 
institution for establishing good governance across the globe. The nature of such 
                                                 
13
 In the mean time, the „New Institutional Economics‟ model, which started to emerge as a new fad of 
global contemporary macro-economic theory promotes that the basic institutional framework 
encouraged the development of economic and political organisations such as NGOs, political parties, 
other civil society actors, business networks, market actors, etc.  The self-interest maximising activities 
by the institutions may have directly and indirectly promote investment in variety of sectors, which will 
eventually contribute towards the independency of the people from the state. (North, 1991a: 51). 
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institutions can be described as “The realm of organized social life that is voluntary, 
self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a 
legal order or a set of shared rules” (Pasha, 2004: 1-2).  
Unlike current civil society models that are derived from the framework of post-
Enlightenment discourses of the West, the Islamic notion of civil society emerges 
from the „inner‟ foundation of the functioning individual.14 The realization of the 
axioms motivates individuals to act and react to the reality by forming the society 
according to tawhidic ideals. The very dynamo of such civil society is not personal 
interest or the mere protection of individual rights against the state, but it was part of 
the articulation of the individuals‟ conviction in achieving falÉÍ through the culture 
of iÍsÉn with the continuous spirit of iÎlÉÍ. In sum, civil society under the tawhidic 
paradigm reflects the degree of religiosity of the individuals in maintaining their 
vertical relation with God and their horizontal relation with their fellow humans as 
well as the environment.  
Historically, several state and non-state institutions actively operated the governance 
of Muslim political economic affairs based on such motivation. From the time of the 
Prophet MuÍammad up to the days of the Ottoman Empire, different institutions 
were formulated and functioned in Muslim society to articulate the ideals of Islamic-
inspired governance alongside other institutions adopted from the occupied lands. As 
a matter of ijtihÉd and the ongoing process of development, the institutions 
flourished while contributing towards the aim of attainment of falÉÍ of the 
community. Hence, it is worth mentioning some of those institutions to see how the 
Islamic ideals of governance contributed to shaping the governance process of the 
past through institutions contributing to the micro dynamics of the governance. Some 
of the institutions‟ functions may be worth reconsidering under the proposed 
paradigm of Islamic governance in this research. 
 
                                                 
14
 Keane (2009:133-36) asserts that the emergence of civil society could be traced in Islamic history 
through the flourishing social institutions within Muslim society in the past. The civil society (jamÉÑÊ 
madanÊ) that emerged was mainly motivated by economic factors, which amongst others was to protect 
ownership and welfare purposes. Waqf was identified as the early civil society institutions developed 
by early Muslim societies in enabling people to resist vigorously any attempts by the state over 
individuals‟ wealth. Waqf as an important actor of governance will be discussed in the topic effective 
institutions as part of khalÊfah typology. 
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ÑUlamÉ´  
ÑUlamÉ´, or scholars and experts of the science of Islam have a special place in the 
heart of Muslims and within the social strata of the community. As people who 
possess the knowledge of revelation and the guardians of the religion through the 
preservation of the Qur´Én and its traditions, the Qur´Én and the Prophets glorify the 
status of ÑUlamÉ´.
15
 With such a status they sanction the greater role they have to 
perform and the massive responsibilities they have to deliver in all social, religious 
and political milieu (Ghannoushi, 2001; Imarah, 2005:84-92). It is rather interesting 
to view that throughout Muslim history, ÑulamÉ´
16
 were not at the monolithic position 
as the Christian clerics during the pre-Enlightenment and the so-called „dark ages‟ of 
the Medieval Europe. ÑUlamÉ´, on the other hand, post al-ShÉfiÑÊ‟s magnum opus, al-
RisÉlah emerged as an institution separate from the state, and as a product but at the 
same time an essential part of Muslim civil society, to become the guardians of 
religion on behalf of the society from any interference of the Caliph or the state. In 
this, the role of ijtihÉd, which is the prerequisite for any individuals to issue any 
decree on religious issues managed to safeguard the religion from becoming another 
tool for the despots. Since then, history has witnessed the rival of ÑulamÉ´ as an 
institution to challenge the state on behalf of the society (Hofmann, 2001: 4).  
However, „ÑulamÉ´ have also acted as a buffer zone between the society and the state 
(Ghannoushi, 2001). ÑUlamÉ´, as the representatives of the civil society, according to 
Ibn Taimiyyah have the role of mediator between the ruler and the ruled, as Ibn 
Taimiyyah suggests the collaboration between the leadership and the ÑUlamÉ´ is 
essential in maintaining the order and the ideal of a just and virtuous state. It should 
therefore be noted that within the classical set-up of Muslim society, the two groups 
were the most central pillars in the governance process (Zubaida, 2005: 100). The 
ÑulamÉ´ sustained their living and the continuity of their position through the 
nourishment of waqf, which was separate from the state. In fact, it was the ÑulamÉ´, 
for instance, who safeguarded the institution of waqf for the benefit of the people 
from any infringement by the state by making waqf an independent and separate 
entity from the state (Nafi‟, 2010: 276).  The historical accounts also show the active 
role of the ÑulamÉ´ in protecting the religious, social and civil life of individuals 
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 Amongst other verses: al-Qur’an (41:3; 29:43; 30:22; 2:230; 6:97; 6:105; 7:32; 39:9). 
16
 I am reluctant to translate them here as „clerics‟ for its Eurocentric connotation. 
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against the overwhelming and infringing nature of the state.  Therefore, the historical 
account also testifies the struggle given by the ÑulamÉ´ against the state in fulfilling 
such roles. 
Unfortunately, the ÑulamÉ´ institution due to its informality is not a monolithic 
institution. History has proven that there are proportionate numbers of ÑulamÉ´ who 
also agreed to be in subservience of the state and rulers. Those who subjugated 
themselves under the power of the palace or working under the influence of the state 
were known throughout history as ÑulamÉ´ al-SulÏÉn, which literally means the 
scholars of the castle or the co-opted scholars (Imarah, 2005). During these periods, 
the judiciary (qaÌÉ´), religious education and the waqf became the bureaucratic state 
institutions administrated by or assigned to the ÑulamÉ´ (Lapidus, 1996; Ghannoushi, 
2001). The number of these scholars increased after the closure of the door of ijtihÉd 
which resulted in the shift of the ÑulamÉ´ institution from civil society to the state, 
namely under the Sultanate state, which was the object of the Sultanate state which 
aimed to protect its power which was open to question in terms of Islamic legitimacy. 
The condition deteriorated especially during the Ottoman period when the institution 
of ÑulamÉ´ was officially put under the supervision of the state (Lapidus, 1996), 
leading to the control of the religion for the interest of the state, as Ottoman political 
culture is summarized by the concept of „din vu devlet‟, namely religion exists to 
serve the state, unlike the Islamic notion that everything in the universe is aimed at 
nourishing the state. 
However, the survival of independent ÑulamÉ´ as unofficial institutions within civil 
society remains separate from the body of Muslim societies around the globe, which 
has become a reality under the global forces within the Muslim nation states 
Moreover, the independent ÑulamÉ´ institutions have proven their leading role in the 
society of many Muslim countries during the period of colonialisation. Historical 
literature has abundantly recorded the spearheading role of the ÑulamÉ´ in 
challenging the colonials (Zaman, 2002). However, the post-independent Muslim 
nations, under the framework of the modern nation-state have managed to put the 
ÑulamÉ´ institution again under the control of the state by minimising their role under 
the waqf, which turned has become just another ministry under state control in many 
Muslim states. Despite the global condition of the ÑulamÉ´ institution, many ÑulamÉ´ 
tried to revive the initial and viable role of their predecessors through what are 
Chapter Seven: Articulation of Islamic Governance Axioms 
 277 
nowadays known as Islamic movements or political Islamism (Butterworth, 1992; 
Lapidus, 1992; Ghannoushi, 2001; el-Affendi, 2003, Nafi‟, 2010).  
Waqf institution 
Zarqa (1988) points out that there are various institutions and structures that Islam 
has instilled to redistribute income and wealth for the fulfilment of the basic needs of 
all in society. The institutions include, among others, zakÉh and waqf. Nevertheless, 
Waqf is the most vital institution in enshrining the Islamic ethos by balancing 
between the private ownership and communal obligation. The fundamental idea of 
waqf was to bring the profound ideal of philanthropic and benevolent attitudes within 
the society into reality through institutionalizing. As an act of volunteerism and third 
sector of the economic structure, waqf overlaid a concrete foundation for the wealthy 
individuals of the society to share their wealth with the unfortunate as part of their 
social contribution. In modern jargon, waqf as endowment reflects a strong 
motivation for the development of social capital in a society due to the fact that the 
policy of modern economic development puts emphasis on the micro-dynamics of 
the society.  
Since the dawn of its practice, the idea of waqf was very inclusive in that it expanded 
not only within the territory of religious endowment, but also for social and welfare 
activities (al-Salih, 2001: 165-170). Keane (2009: 136-38) implies that waqf was 
amongst the earlier vehicles, which have represented civil society since the dawn of 
Muslim history. It was a mechanism for Muslims in those periods to gain endless 
rewards for the ongoing benefits of charity from the waqf system (Gil, 1998). Waqf 
along with zakÉh (alms) as part of the voluntary sector has contributed toward the 
economic well-being of Muslim societies for centuries (Lewis, 1990; Hoexter, 1998; 
Baskan, 2002: 13) by creating an opportunity space for the development of iÍsÉnÊ 
social capital. 
Waqf acted as the source of the individual‟s or the society‟s sources for independency 
from the state. The waqf system contributed to the flourishing of mosques, 
orphanages, motels, schools (madrasah), Sufi lodges (zÉwiyÉt), water wells, food 
distribution, debt relief and other social welfare means (Baer, 1997; al-Salih, 2001; 
Hasan, 2006) as part of the people‟s independency from the state.  
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In time, the third sector of social life deteriorated and the waqf system became an 
official institution, which was centralized under the state separate from private waqf 
(waqf ahliy or family waqf) (Lewis, 1990). However, it was al-ShafiÑÊ through his al-
RisÉlah who managed to prevent the waqf from becoming another state institution 
and returned it back to the society to be administrated by the ÑulamÉ´. Since then that 
the waqf institution has performed an important role in Muslim societies throughout 
history in establishing and sustaining educational institutions including prominent 
higher education institutions like the al-Qurawiyun University in Tunisia, al-Azhar in 
Cairo and other early universities in Islamic Andalusia long before Oxford and 
Cambridge (Baer, 1997). It was also the source of building hospitals and clinics 
throughout Muslim lands, which were known as bimaristan
17
 thus contributing 
towards the enhancement of medical science and discoveries by Muslim scientists 
(Baer, 1997).  
Unfortunately, after the colonialisation period, when waqf became part of the state as 
an official institution or organ of the state, it became a separate ministry, the waqf 
failed to have a dynamic role in the society any more (al-Salih, 2001: 209-10). The 
official role of waqf was relegated to being strongly associated with religious matters 
(mosques, cemeteries, orphanages, madrasah, maintenance of religious authorities, 
etc.) with a little emphasis in some Muslim countries on the non-mundane charity 
and welfare issues (Lewis, 1990; Baer, 1997). Non-official waqf, like family waqf 
was also affected by this distorted image of waqf involved in the religious related 
matters per se. However, the emergence of Islamic movements, organisations and the 
daÑwah and other progressive groups in the forms of NGOs, qua-NGOs and 
foundations have established a new revival of the dynamic waqf as part of the citizen-
based charity and welfare institution (Lapidus, 1992; Clark, 1995; Hasan, 2006; 
Harrigan & El-Said, 2009; Nafi‟, 2010). The current studies and implementation of 
official zakÉh throughout the globe have been influenced by the new trend and have 
begun to expand beyond the traditional official exclusive religious function of waqf 
(Hasan, 2006).  
In conjunction with the Islamic governance proposal the waqf institution, as it was 
functioning in the past, remains an important institution for ideal governance. With 
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 Córdoba, Spain alone was reported to have had as many as 50 hospitals at the time of AbË al-QÉsim 
al-ZahrawÊ (Abulcasis) (Francoise, 1996: 999-1001) 
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its constructive role in providing endless revenue for the civil society, waqf will 
continuously fuel the sense of empowerment of the individuals and accordingly 
constantly cultivate an atmosphere of benevolence in the society, hence detaching the 
society from the state. Historically, waqf was institutionalized as the rich wanted to 
keep away money from „non-good governance of the state‟ as waqf gave them an 
opportunity to keep their wealth away from arbitrary confiscation by the state 
(Kuran, 2001). 
Accordingly, Cizakca (2004) suggests a model in which the concept of cash waqf can 
be used in contemporary times to serve the social objectives of the society by 
referring to the experience of Muslims in Turkey during the Ottoman period in 
micro-financing. This self-micro-financing practised by the members of the society 
further minimized the role of the state and at the same time enhanced the element of 
benevolence within the community, hence leading to the nourishment of the 
aforementioned iÍsÉnÊ culture. Within the iÍsÉnÊ culture, both elements of khalÊfah 
typology depend proportionately on effective waqf leading to the lesser size of the 
state, which is an essential element in ensuring the viability of the khalÊfah typology 
for Islamic governance.   
Ahl al-×il wa al-ÑAqd (shura council) 
In medieval political theory, the term refers to a group of honest, wise, experienced 
and righteous people who possess the right to elect or remove a ruler. It could be 
depicted as council of experts, or elites or wise men to whom the Caliph or the ruler 
referred when making any decision (Ghraybeh, 2000: 306-07). Often it is associated 
with the important duty of electing caliphs based on extensive consultations to reach 
consensus as well as the ability to impeach them (al-Mawardi, 2005: 6-7). However, 
in practice, most rulers designated their successors so the task was generally a mere 
formality. In much of the literature, this institution has also been identified as „shËrÉ 
council‟ or shËrÉ assembly in the modern term used by some contemporary Muslim 
countries. Some modern thinkers have tried to accommodate this task to that of a 
parliament (al-Sulami, 2003). 
As part of governance, with a central role in Muslim history, the institution deserves 
to be discussed to understand the functions it has performed throughout history. 
Derived from the practice of Omar when he appointed some companions to elect his 
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successor after his demise, the institution became a landmark for the legitimate 
succession of leaders (Imarah, 2005: 59-60). Due to its ijtihÉdÊ nature, the structure, 
the size and the mechanism for selecting the members of the council varied at 
different times. A deep inquiry into the historical root of Omar‟s idea would trace it a 
long way back to the practice of pre-Islamic Quraishite-Meccan tribal leaders at DÉr 
al-Nadwah in Mecca (al-Sulami, 2003: 38).  Nonetheless, it is common sense for any 
leaders in any part of the world at any time to have such a council to assist them.
18
  
Having said all about the ahl al-Íil wa al-Ñaqd, to take it to its minimum end and for 
its dynamic nature to appear in any structure of governance, it could be viewed as a 
useful tool in governance. As both a system and institution that reflect decision 
making in governance, the council could be developed into a wider paradigm to align 
with the Tawhidic worldview. In modern times, the size of the council should be 
expanded to include larger community representatives and actors including all 
individuals towards what should be known as „open-shËrÉ‟. It is through the 
mechanism of representatives of the people at every layer of society that every single 
individual will have their part and say in making decisions, which directly involve 
them (Hofmann, 2001: 9). Thus, individuals would be detached from dependency on 
certain elites representing the state to determine their life in the name of good 
governance. Every person‟s decision is valued through this open-shËrÉ process that 
will be articulated in representative councils at local, national and also society level. 
Only through such expansion can the shËrÉ council be another means to articulate the 
axioms in accordance with the iÍsÉn culture in the interest of people according to the 
Tawhidic worldview attaining falÉÍ for all, and not only a mere rubber stamp that 
works in the interest of the rulers as happened in the past.  
×isbah (Regulation and enforcement body) 
The institution of Íisbah initially emerged as a body to regulate and monitor the 
market. The main aim of the enforcement of Íisbah was to maintain the ethical 
norms within the marketplace based on honesty, propriety and hygiene (Ibn 
Taimiyyah, 1985). ×isbah in its original form was not only an institution of the 
spiritual order per se, but also part of the state mechanism to enable a total Islamic 
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 Keane (2009: 148-55) implies that the practice of consultation (shËrÉ, mishwÉrah, mashwÉrah, etc.) 
across Muslim history led to the emergence of representative democracy in the West through the 
Islamic Andalusian civilisation. 
Chapter Seven: Articulation of Islamic Governance Axioms 
 281 
environment which to manifest both the mundane and material aspects of the society 
(Husayni, 1969: 30-36) by directly engaging with the consequences of the market to 
prevent any excesses or deviations. The muÍtasib, (officer in-charge of Íisbah) also 
known as ÎÉÍib al-sËq (market inspector) was responsible for enforcing the 
regulations imposed on the market and supervising the day to day business affairs of 
the actors involved in the marketplace (al-MÉwardÊ, 2005: 260). His function was to 
detect and punish immorality in terms of the consequences of the state amongst 
traders and customers alike, including the use of false weights and measures, the 
adulteration of wares and other offences. 
Later, the Íisbah evolved and expanded beyond the marketplace into ethical issues to 
enforce moral and Islamic rulings in the public arena of the community. This can be 
seen in al-MÉwardÊ‟s al-AÍkÉm al-SulÏÉniyyah (2005: 337-362) in which he 
expounded in detail the role, duties and rules relating to Íisbah and the muÍtasib 
(Íisbah officer). Since then it has become an office of the state and the muÍtasib has 
been appointed officially as a government officer. Ali (1975: 28) insists that the 
major responsibility of the Íisbah then became to ensure that community life was not 
contaminated with immoral and un-Islamic practices and also to execute other 
administrative duties, which were not directly connected with religion. 
Being the most sustainable institution in Muslim experience of governance, the 
Íisbah continued to exist as the major player in ensuring the preservation of moral 
issues in the community and marketplace until the middle of the nineteenth century 
(al-Soliman, 1988). Later the Ottomans replaced the institution with country councils 
(Mardin, 1969). In other Muslim states, unfortunately, today, nothing is left of the 
Íisbah apart from the name and its single and distorted function. While in some 
countries the Íisbah is only known strictly as the moral police and spiritual enforcer 
and separate from its political economical and governance function. In the study of 
Islamic governance, Íisbah reflects how the state acts as the market regulator and 
how a state institution could contribute to establishing the relation between the state 
and the market.  
Furthermore, good governance also requires checks and balances which the Íisbah as 
an institution is capable of providing. While referring to the axioms developed for 
Islamic governance, the Íisbah implies the spirit of amÉnah, iÎlÉÍ and maqÉÎid al-
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SharÊÑah through the continuous checks and balances mechanisms in the society, as 
well as in the state instruments represented by the accountability process and 
empowerment, hence good governance. Thus, it is not only an institution aiming at 
spiritual development, but also functions to overcome the excesses and deviations 
generated by the market system (Oran, 2010).  This will be elucidated more in the 
coming sections discussing how these institutions could become a useful concept in 
the modern day notion of governance. 
DÊwÉn (Chancery or Bureaucratic offices)  
DÊwÉn has been an important aspect of administrative institution since the days of the 
second Caliph, Omar bin al-Khattab. It has long been used in the Islamic 
administrative machinery as a name for a tool for government organisation of the 
administrative branch of state (Bureay, 1985: 278). Initially it was known as DÊwÉn 
al-jund, emulating the Persian administration, and it was responsible for collecting 
revenues from taxation, managing the royal income and expenditure, and acting as 
the paymaster of soldiery (al-MÉwardÊ, 2005: 217-18). It served the state as the 
contemporary department of financial operations and taxation. DÊwÉn was also 
operated as the payment system institution responsible amongst other things for 
distribution or payments to the state officers and the army. DÊwÉn emerged as the 
first bureaucratic institution in Muslim history and continue to work as such 
throughout Muslim history under the administration of various caliphs. As an 
important element in the governance of Islamic state, the function of dÊwÉn expanded 
due to the expansion of the state and the bureaucracy.  
Apart from dÊwÉn al-jund, Omar also established another important bureaucratic 
institution namely, dÊwÉn al-inshÉ´ (chancellery) to keep all official documents of the 
state (Majdalawi, 2002: 40) which can be considered in contemporary terms as 
articulating transparency and accountability. In the later years of Islamic 
administration, specifically during the Umayyad and the Abbasid periods, dÊwÉn al-
inshÉ´ became the most crucial and sophisticated organ for state diplomatic affairs. 
The chief of dÊwÉn al-inshÉ´ or the dÊwÉn al-rasÉ´il, known as „al-kÉtib‟ (secretary) 
was a very important rank in the state bureaucracy (Bosworth, 1964). He was the 
equivalent of today‟s Secretary of State, with his pen acting as the voice of the state‟s 
foreign policies. Also in this period, dÊwÉn shifted from its initial notion to the more 
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progressive and comprehensive idea of bureaucratic institutions comprising offices, 
secretariats, boards, ministries and departments. Various other departments or 
ministries were established during the Umayyad period and continued to exist during 
the Abbasid period under the name of dÊwÉn, such as dÊwÉn al-kharaj (treasury 
department), dÊwÉn al-jund (department for military affairs), dÊwÉn al-khatm (office 
of the seal), dÊwÉn al-mustaghallasat (department for land administration), dÊwÉn al-
barÊd (post office), and dÊwÉn al-rasÉ´il (department of correspondence) (Hitti, 1964: 
321-325). 
The institution was developed during the Abbasid reign (al-Mawardi, 2005: 282-
308), when more dÊwÉns were established to facilitate the viziers and their officers 
such as dÊwÉn al-muÎÉdarah (department to look after the confiscated properties of 
political enemies), dÊwÉn al-ÑAzimmah (department to control and monitor the 
accounts of other dÊwÉns and supervise them), dÊwÉn al-Hash (department to look 
after the people in royal service), dÊwÉn al-RiqÉ´ (department responsible for public 
complaints), dÊwÉn al-MaÐÉlim (ombudsman for complaints against the officials of 
the state), dÊwÉn al-SawÉd (department for tax only in Iraq), dÊwÉn al-NafaqÉt 
(department of public officers payment and welfare), and other dÊwÉns (Buraey, 
1985: 259-261). Unfortunately, this archaic bureaucratic institution did not contribute 
much to empowering individuals and the society but rather gave excessive power to 
the state and hence resulted in producing results for the „non-realisation of good 
governance in Islamic norms‟. However, the emergence of the dÊwÉns implies that 
Muslim politicians and leaders widely and wisely used the mechanism of ijtihÉd in 
the past to attain efficiency in state governance. DÊwÉn was an example of how 
Muslims in the past articulated their ideals of governance through bureaucratic 
mechanism by developing an integrated system of administration, which aimed at 
maximizing the iÍsÉnÊ social capital through the activities and functions of the state. 
Islamic Guild (Ahi system) 
Ahi or Ahilik „union‟ organisation is another civil society institution that emerged in 
Muslim history in the area of Turkish Anatolia that is worth studying. As a fraternity, 
the Sufi-oriented organisation, the „Ahi‟ or „Ahilik‟ in Turkish was actually a union of 
merchants and traders working together to achieve certain goals. Members of Ahi 
acted in accordance with rules because of their spiritual progress, which took place 
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during the highly disciplined promotion procedure along the levels of organisation 
hierarchy. It was established in Anatolia, and then spread all over towns and villages 
across the region during the Seljuk‟s and contributed profoundly to the establishment 
of the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 1937; Kuran, 2000). 
The members of Ahi adhered strictly to Islamic codes of conduct and their 
articulation in their daily business and personal life. Not only was their life dedicated 
to the spiritual ethos, but they were also heavily involved in charitable works and 
ethical ways of trading. However, one might conclude that the main functions of this 
fraternity were religious and moral, military, political, cultural and social.  
The word „Ahi‟, which means „my brother‟ explains deeply the very philosophy of 
this group. Furthermore, the members believed and upheld the four core principles: 
(i) Social responsibility of the organisation; (ii) Excellence in service; (iii) Honesty 
and integrity; (iv) Living together. The structure of the union was very regimentation 
and recruitment oriented. A certain period of training or apprenticeship under the 
supervision of a „master‟ was a prerequisite for one to become „ahi‟ (brother). At the 
end of the training, the new „ahi‟ was given a hard task to be accomplished before he 
could be responsible for his own business or become another „master‟ (Lewis, 1937).  
The moral principles of Ahi organisation were primarily for the well-being of the 
society, and to protect individuals‟ rights in the society. However, at the same time it 
aimed to maintain the spirit of solidarity in the community. These elements made a 
strong bond within the organisation and resulted to resilience amid all the formal 
rules and laws imposed by the state (Ottoman) on them and on the market. During the 
Ottoman period, Ahi became an organisation of pure craftsmanship akin to what is 
known in the west as a guild.  
Despite the authoritarian nature of the Ottoman state and its interference in market 
life, the Ahi managed to survive and build their own benevolent society within their 
own territory, which was the marketplace (Mardin, 1969). They had the final say on 
the regulation of the market without any legal positivistic approach but rather by 
maintaining their culture and practice amongst their members. Apart from their 
success in turning the market atmosphere to the value of moral and ethics, Ahi were 
also able to bring the market back to the society, instead of separating itself from 
them. For the Ahi, as well as realising his economic activities and his personal 
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interests in society, the public interest was also important for him (Lewis, 1937). 
The „Ahilik kulturi‟ or the „Ahi culture‟ lasted for centuries, shaping the market 
economy according to their moral and virtue ideals in the Turkish Ottoman land. 
What is interesting about the Ahi culture was their ability to harmonise between the 
private ownership of market economy and the ideals of charity, solidarity, welfare 
and communality. In sum, the Ahi culture reflected the independency of individuals 
in the social capital environment. It also implied the workable example of the 
benevolent society within the framework of market economy through the mechanism 
of internal-Íisbah. The internal-Íisbah mechanism through Ahi culture detached the 
market totally from the state (as it was structured within the classical Íisbah) by 
empowering the market actors to inter-regulate and mutually monitor amongst 
themselves. Furthermore the Ahilik also resembled the comprehensive 
interdependency of the axioms to be articulated into a social capital means thus 
empowering the civil society as part of an important element in ideal governance. 
Reflecting on the aforementioned institutions and their importance in governance 
throughout history, on the other hand there were also a few informal and cluster civil 
societies that emerged in the form of informal but efficient institutions within Muslim 
communities such as guilds, majlis (informal assembly), brotherhoods, and religious 
networks (i.e. hawzah, zÉwiyah, katÉtib) and flourished greatly throughout Muslim 
history. These multi-functional institutions sometimes acted as intermediaries for the 
public to approach their leaders for help and assistance, and sometimes as their voice 
against the injustice committed by the state, and on many occasions as a means to 
community welfare. These traditional forms of organizations remain functioning, as 
they were in some places, as a result in the present day in active modern modes of 
participation.
19
  
The shift of the tectonic plate of governance in post-modern societies, however, 
demands a new paradigm for the classical governance institutions in Muslim history 
to re-emerge in a new form. The classical structure, which reflects the result of 
Islamic dynamism by responding to the political economic situation of the time, 
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 But unlikely perceived by some Western Liberals as a hindering factor of political development. As 
described by James Bill and Robert Springborg, “the culture and experience of the Middle East have 
combated the fires of political development through the use of traditional development crossfire” (Bill 
& Springborg, 2000: 12-13). 
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could never give any justice to the current situation. By referring to the khalÊfah 
typology, larger governance related institutions should shift towards civil society 
(due to necessity and not because it is imposed by the state), thus the iÍsÉnÊ social 
capital could be enabled. As mentioned in the discussion on the classical model, new 
non-state institutions akin to the earlier model/institutions should be developed with 
proportionate adjustment to make the khalÊfah typology workable. 
As an example, the role of the ÑulamÉ´ in enhancing iÍsÉnÊ social capital through 
their advisory roles in civil society consciousness of the tawhidic paradigm is vital. 
Apart from the non-state involvement, the ÑulamÉ´ along with intellectuals and 
professional bodies (as interest groups) within the community in the modern time 
within the expanded shËrÉ notion and under the spirit of the iÎlÉÍ axiom will enhance 
the governance process through their representation in some of the state bureaucratic 
institutions. At the same time waqf, along with zakÉh, by providing revenue for the 
society themselves should re-emerge as independent endowment foundations as part 
of the third sector (within small government existence based economy) within the 
society to fund welfare and other civil society activisms by separating individuals 
from the state. This pro-active role of waqf and zakÉh will strengthen the third sector 
to stimulate the governance process hence empowering the iÍsÉnÊ social capital in 
terms of creating an opportunity for the emergence of both functioning individuals 
and benevolent society with the objective of ensuring the minimal role of the state. 
Accordingly, in achieving such aim, the notion of waqf has to be separated from the 
state and be expanded to its larger dynamic far from the current exclusive ritual-
spiritual paradigm.  In other words, waqf must be essentialised as part of the civil 
society away from the parameters of the nation state. 
The open shËrÉ concept on the other hand, is essential to expand the classical 
framework of ahl al-Íil wa al-Ñaqd functions from its elitist exclusivity to effectively 
functioning for individuals within the khalÊfah typology. Thus, it is to be expanded to 
encompass all the stakeholders to represent every member of the society. Ahl al-Íil 
wa al-Ñaqd, within such a framework of ideal governance, becomes an inclusive 
mechanism not to be monopolized by the centre, but to empower individuals with the 
spirit of iÎlÉÍ and ukhuwwah. In the same manner, the intertwined nature of open-
shËrÉ with Íisbah spirit is essential for iÍsÉnÊ culture in the governance process for 
both state and civil society institutions. The very practice of Íisbah spirit within 
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benevolent society will enable the axioms amÉnah, Ñadl wa iÍsÉn, iÎlÉÍ and 
ukhuwwah to interact thus strengthening iÍsÉnÊ social capital. Open shËrÉ itself is a 
major theme for civil society to interact with state and its institutions to provide 
active participation ideals within the islÉÍ spirit to attain the maximised iÍsÉnÊ level 
leading to falÉÍ. The functioning open shËrÉ institutions in both state and non-state 
institutions will serve political accountability and stability. 
Finally, a historical institution, namely ahi of the Ottomans, exemplifies an excellent 
model on how iÍsÉnÊ social capital could operate within its own public sphere with 
iÍsÉnÊ culture to establish ideal governance at the level of institutions for individuals 
and society. An inclusive ahi culture within benevolent society represented by the 
networking of small entrepreneurs and other civil society and market actors will 
complement the bigger picture of governance at micro level, hence crystallising the 
khalÊfah typology. Ahi manifests the iÍsÉnÊ social capital network practicality 
articulating and realising all the axioms to work together on a smaller scale. The 
more ahi clusters within benevolent society could be developed, the more khalÊfah 
typology would emerge in the governance process, hence the ideal governance would 
be achieved and falÉÍ would be obtained.  
While the ideal Íisbah concept and spirit as part of the proposed khalÊfah typology 
expands from a merely top-down process in which the people are morally policed or 
monitored by the state per se to a holistic process in the whole community involving 
all the elements functioning for the ideal governance within the iÍsÉnÊ culture. The 
very spirit of iÎlÉÍ to exemplify the concepts of tawÍÊd, amÉnah and ukhuwwah, 
which is the raison d‟être of Íisbah encompasses the all-vertical hierarchical social 
and political economical dimensions of top-down, bottom-up and horizontal at the 
high and lower level will ensure the workable nature of the institutions instead of a 
Íisbah institution delivering the iÍsÉnÊ governance function. As Lewis (2006:7) 
mentions: 
The institution of Íisba offers a framework of social ethics, relevant to 
monitor the corporation, with the objective to obligate the correct ethical 
behaviour in the wider social context. It also empowers individual Muslims 
to act as „private prosecutors‟ in the cause of better governance by giving 
them a platform for social action.  
The effective Íisbah institutions, which represent the whole governance mutually 
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functioning and interacting axioms within the khalÊfah typology in the current 
framework of governance, should prevail in the kind of anti-corruption agency, 
ombudsman, public inquiry, consumer watch, scrutiny committee for 
parliamentarians and bureaucratic offices, citizen bureau, and other civil society 
watchdog societies and organisations. Functioning Íisbah institutions in both state 
and non-state institutions enable collective political accountability and sustainable 
economic stability. This new function of Íisbah enables individuals to actively 
perform their functions in governance, thus ensuring the process encompasses the 
whole networking of the social capital and the bureaucrats. However, the efficiency 
of any Íisbah-inspired institutions is heavily dependent on the level of freedom 
which exists in the state, which implies a minimal state. 
In achieving all these, the ideal governance demands the minimal but effective role of 
the state and the state system so that the room for opportunity should be left to other 
elements of the civil society. Effective minimal state enables benevolent society to 
develop more independent social institutions to create a public sphere for the 
individuals to be empowered for functioning as mentioned. A larger state with a non-
effective or autocratic system will not only disable the khalÊfah typology of 
functioning but will also deprive the iÍsÉnÊ culture through the dysfunction of the 
individuals‟ dynamic, as the large state implies large rents to be extracted and 
distributed in the society in a patronage system leading to client-patron relationship. 
Rationally, in the case of individuals who are heavily dependent on the state, those 
individuals will be „least functioning‟, and will never develop a benevolent society 
since the state will hold all the philanthropic means and leave nothing to the people 
except an imagined version of solidarity which is actually state-enforced. The nature 
and the function of the minimal state functions, as part of the khalÊfah typology 
element will be expounded furthermore in the following section.  
7.2.4. Effective Minimal State  
In their proposal for the Islamic economy system to operate efficiently, El-Ashker 
and Wilson (2006) maintain that a politically strong Islamic state is amongst the 
essentials for the establishment of Islamic moral economy based order. In the same 
vein, Chapra (1992: 240) accepts that the political factor is one of the most important 
factors responsible for the failure of Muslim countries to implement the Islamic 
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strategy for development with justice. Hence, for an Islamically-optimum and 
efficient functioning of an Islamic moral economy based integrated system for „good 
governance‟ to be deeply rooted in any society requires political will and power. The 
same logic applies also to the field of development and governance, which are part of 
the political economy issues. 
It should be noted that Zaman and Asutay (2009: 92-93) warn that what is meant by 
politics or the political establishment is not always synonymous with the state or 
government-led establishment. They highlight the role of civil society as another 
important factor in the political structure. Furthermore, they argue that the state is a 
modern post-enlightenment western concept and hence is not inherently an Islamic 
organization of the politics of society. The nature of modern states is also highlighted 
by the Virginia School of political economics by arguing that, “the state should not 
be perceived in a romantic sense to serve the society and maximize a romantically 
constructed social welfare function, as new political economics evidences such a 
social welfare function does not exist at all, nor does there exist „benevolent despotic‟ 
politicians to maximize such a welfare function.” (as cited by Nazim and Asutay, 
2009: 93). 
In the light of such discussion, a reflection on how Islamic governance based on 
khalÊfah typology could be articulated in certain systems should be discussed. Unlike 
the mainstream assumption that Islamic systems could only work within the 
paradigm of larger state with planned economics through its welfare system, the 
Islamic governance theory proposed in this study espouses an effective minimal state.  
Such a state within such a paradigm is to be complemented by the mentioned 
functional individuals, benevolent society (or iÍsÉnÊ social capital) and effective 
institutions, which also make up the civil society. The active culminant interaction 
and interdependence of these three major elements within the minimal enabling state 
will ensure the effectiveness of the axioms operating in the realm of the 
contemporary society and responding to the „public choices‟ without the hegemonic 
nature of the large and string state which does not provide much opportunity for any 
other institutional form. 
In searching for evidence for the impact of an enabling state on development, the 
World Development Report 1997 shows that an effective enabling state is vital for 
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development (World Bank 1997c). Using data from 94 countries over three decades, 
the study shows that it is not just economic policies and human capital but the quality 
of a country's institutions that determine economic outcomes. Those institutions in 
effect determine the environment within which markets operate. A weak institutional 
environment allows greater arbitrariness on the part of state agencies and public 
officials. Along this line, the importance of an effective and enabling state with 
effective institutions is also echoed by Fukuyama (2004: 19), who insists that the role 
of state institutions is more crucial than state functions. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. 
(2004) asserts that political and economic institutions play an enormous role in 
development and growth. 
State, as a new topic within Islamic literature and as part of an ongoing debate of 
ijtihÉd, in the realm of the proposed Islamic governance ideals should be minimal 
and limited in nature
20
 to allow the other factors of governance to have their share in 
the power exercise and in decision-making. The nature of Islamic governance of an 
(ideal) state will not dominate the centre but rather empower the peripheries as a 
caveat to enable individuals to function thus have greater involvement in the public 
sphere. Apart from its limited nature, the state also plays an important role as 
regulator and enforcer in creating a just order and harmonious society through the 
implementation of the rule of law and its mechanisms
21
 according to the concept of 
Ñadl wa iÍsÉn.  
It should be noted that an enabling state should match its role to its capability. What 
the government does, and how it does it, should reflect the capabilities of the 
government-and those of the private sector. The performance of states based on their 
capabilities can be developed through the reinvigoration of the aforementioned 
khalÊfah typology institutions with the crystallization of the „moral essence‟ of 
                                                 
20
 State in Islam was exemplified by the Prophet during his reign in Madinah and the Caliphs, 
functioned as the protector of people security and their freedom, councilors, maintainer of the law and 
order, regulator of the market and public goods without interfering in its process through planned or 
restricted economy, and guardian for the conditions in which the individuals could fulfill their belief 
and function according to the belief. However, under the succeeding dynasties and sultanate regimes, 
the state became too large and was expected to undertake public works, guarding the religion and 
determining the life of the people in exchange with the obedience from the people (Kahf, 1991; 
Lambton, 1981: 308-9; an-Naim, 2008; el-Affendi, 2008). 
21
 As mentioned earlier, rule of law demands the viable separation of powers, which entails the 
independent of judiciary, institutional checks and balances, and effective watchdogs, can all restrain 
arbitrary state action and corruption. 
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Islamic governance through the promulgation of rules and norms according to the 
axioms, in particular the concept of tawÍÊd.  
An enabling state, on the other hand, as a means to articulate the concept of tawÍÊd 
and amÉnah ensures that the spirit of accountability appears in and involves the 
efficiently-structured administrative and technical capacity in its institutions and 
systems. This can be achieved by ensuring the efficiency of a minimal state‟s ideals 
through the feasible separation of powers to empower the legislative and the 
judiciary; viable checks and balances mechanisms through more room for 
accountability by the media, legislative members, political parties, civil society and 
other third sector actors; and decentralization of administration through the 
empowerment of individuals, local government administration and making greater 
use of non-governmental organisations through the networking framework (Williams 
and Young, 1994: 87). Enabling minimal state could also refer to „open accountable 
and audited public service‟ with greater political and social accountability and 
transparency contributing to the realization of more efficient government and 
efficient service delivery mechanisms‟ (Smith, 2003: 202-47; Sutton, 2003: 12). 
Such a governance system will encourage the state to provide accountable and 
responsible public administrators and officials with moral and spiritual incentives to 
act in the collective interest while restraining arbitrary action and corruption as 
complementary elements of the khalÊfah typology. The effective state of Islamic 
governance should enable individuals, society and social institutions to be 
functioning and independently self-governing. With this enabling function, a state 
under such „enabling minimal‟ typology will translate the culture of iÍsÉn into the 
life of the individuals and society not only as something that lives within the heart of 
the individuals but is also embedded in mechanisms, institutions and the social 
consciousness by allowing the governance axioms to appear in the daily life of 
active, functioning individuals within the iÍsÉnÊ social capital framework. 
On the other hand, an effective minimal state, according to Islamic governance, must 
also work as the regulator to secure property rights through the establishment of a 
just legal framework and the feasible practice of the rule of law. Such effort requires 
political and judicial institutions that effectively and impartially regulate the market 
to secure property rights under the concept of Íisbah and through the establishment 
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of both state- and society-based (internal) Íisbah institutions. Without a secure 
environment for such rights, the possibility for any parties, in particular, the state to 
infringe private property rights is inevitable. If this occurs, the market, which consists 
of mainly private sectors, will shun it and this would lead to the destruction of 
economic activity in the society.  
Unlike the individualist society, the benevolent society, as part of the khalÊfah 
typology elements, will bring a meaningful solidarity concept of mutual wealth-
sharing from the zakÉh and waqf mechanism despite property rights and individual 
ownership. Both institutions ensure the social economic independency of individuals 
and society through the maintenance of sustainable philanthropic welfare which will 
contribute towards strengthening the third sector thereby shrinking the burden on the 
state‟s social economic duties (Zarqa, 1988; Hasan, 2006). Consequently, with 
effective endless funding from both institutions, and within the framework of an 
enabling minimal state, participants in the civil society will be able to assume 
responsibility for some aspects of social and economic development, such as the 
provision of essential services in education, public health, and so forth.  
Equally, within the minimal state sphere, a creation of social banking as an 
investment institution for the civil society should be considered in order to achieve 
the building of social capacity and individual functioning as defined by Sen (1999). 
Such an institutional solution is aimed at the development of individual lives by 
“focusing on micro dynamics of the society rather than aiming at affecting the 
financial equilibrium.  This also fits into the new development paradigm; which has 
shifted the focus from macroeconomic development to micro dynamics. This will 
imply maximization of welfare of the society by extending the financial involvement 
of the larger society in the dynamic economic involvement” (Asutay, 2007b: 15).  
Such sentiments might share some degree of similarity pointed out by North (1990a, 
121) in expounding the role of the enabling minimal state in securing the property 
rights for the stability of economy. He (1990a, 121) asserts that:  
The next (advanced) stage, the creation of capital markets and the 
development of manufacturing firms with large amounts of capital, entails 
some form of coercive political order (emphasize by thesis author), because 
as more complex and impersonal forms of interchange evolve, personal ties, 
voluntaristic constraints and ostracism are no longer effective…International 
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specialization and division of labour requires institutions and organisations 
to safeguard property rights across international boundaries so that capital 
markets as well as other kinds of exchanges can take place with credible 
commitment on the part of the players. 
While in the political dimension, an effective and enabling minimal state should 
enshrine governance through representation by enabling greater opportunity for 
participation, which is the expanding notion of the classical shËrÉ institution to an 
open-shËrÉ mechanism. Thus, an enabling minimal state also emphasizes the 
implementation of sufficient public policies to promote more inclusive and 
significant political participation, economic development and fair distribution of 
resources and provision of essential services for all segments of the population. The 
interactive combination of all the above-mentioned elements, are essential for the 
substantive and sustainable realization of the underlying principle of empowerment 
and self-determination for the individuals and societies, equally and without 
discrimination (an-Na‟im and Abdel Halim, 2006). 
Accordingly, functioning individuals could be fully and effectively empowered in 
governance within a sufficient space of freedom for political competencies and 
participations for decision-making and accountability. All the stakeholders, including 
men and women, all races and community members should have a voice in decision 
making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent 
their intention. Such broad participation is built on freedom of association and 
speech, as well as the capacity to participate constructively. The institutionalization 
of participation by all people without any discrimination is a cornerstone of ideal 
governance. 
Thus, individuals must be acknowledged as part of the decision makers, problem 
solvers and co-creators of public goods. They can no longer be perceived only as 
voters, volunteers, clients, or consumers within economic but also polity market 
(Boyte, 2005:537). Hence participatory governance is one which provides the close 
involvement of people in economic, political, cultural, and social processes that 
affect them and facilitates the access of individuals and groups to a wide range of 
opportunities that, in turn, promote responsiveness of governance actors towards 
people-centred development (Kim, et al., 2005: 650). With this approach, individuals 
will move from their traditional role in voting and political rights to a more 
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participatory approach to determining the country‟s future through a wider, all-
encompassing process of governance. 
In sum, the enabling minimal state would intensively increase the functioning of 
iÍsÉnÊ individuals in the political sphere through the representative government at all 
levels. Such a framework would enhance the active participation of individuals in the 
governance process. The creation of the formal structures of representative 
government must include different levels of community, from the basic 
neighbourhood community hall to the municipalities and the acknowledgement of the 
pressure group in the policy making process. In this sphere, the representatives are 
required to engage in participatory planning, management and auditing, management 
and auditing with local institutions such as peasant communities, indigenous groups, 
neighbourhood councils and vigilance committees.  
Another elected representation that would enable the individuals to actively 
functioning could be put into practice in the „local government‟ system, which is 
pointed out by Smith (2004:156) as the strongest form of participation. Through this 
„local representative government‟, people can make their needs known and ensure 
that the benefits of plans and projects go to the deserving target groups. Thus, the 
citizens of a locality will have full decision-making powers in some trivial areas of 
public policy. The participants will also have the right to be consulted on major 
issues that directly affect their lives, such as important development projects (Smith, 
2004: 157). Such a structure of government would also create a small accountability 
mechanism amongst the local community, in which the members live with the spirit 
of comprehensive Islamic governance axioms along with the iÍsÉnÊ culture. Such a 
social capital ideal would make the governance process more efficient and effective, 
hence the Islamic governance axioms could clearly be articulated and implemented.
22
 
In addition, the spirit of ukhuwwah would be clearly established to unite the 
community in preserving their mutual interests. 
Apart from the mentioned mechanisms of enabling state, the moral spirit of the 
axioms of Islamic governance also lead to the upholding of an impartial system of 
law, criminal justice and public order which guarantees fundamental civil and 
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 This society-state relation social capital has been coin by Woolcock & Narayan (2000: 239) as the 
synergy form of social capital.  
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political rights according to the prerequisites of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. The needs for 
those laws and order are to protect personal security and provide a context of 
consistent, transparent rules for transactions that are necessary to modern economic 
and social development in achieving the well being of the society. Preceding that, the 
proposed Islamic governance will also promote an open political system of law 
inspired by the shËrÉ, amÉnah and iÎlÉÍ spirits, which encourage an active and 
vigilant civil society (as explained in the previous section on effective institutions) 
whose interests are represented within accountable government structures and which 
ensures that public offices are based on law and consent. 
However, it should be noted that the concept of effective enabling minimal state as 
part of the Islamic governance system does not work alone in a vacuum. As far as 
khalÊfah typology is concerned, it works interactively with functioning individuals 
and effective institutions. An enabling minimal state is a state that provides and 
preserves the scaffold that enables individuals to function, and impart their 
knowledge to others. As part of the khalÊfah typology, the state should act as part of 
the „iÍsÉnÊ‟ concept in which the articulation of the axioms could work not only in 
their mechanistic part but also within their spirit and philosophy. It should also 
manage to articulate the ethical worldview into the life of the people thus creating the 
social capital that works for it.  
Having mentioned all four elements, it can be summarised that the level of success of 
ideal governance within the framework of this research is to be measured on their 
ability to make the khalÊfah typology workable. „Islamic governance‟ is the 
governance system that enables these four major elements to interconnect and 
interdependently complement each other to achieve the goal of articulating the 
axioms into real life. The state must be able to enable individuals to function and 
institutions to flourish and be self-dependent within the realm of the benevolent 
society. In the same way, both the individuals and the society are major players in 
state and civil society institutions in leading the way for citizens to exercise their 
rights and responsibilities. 
It should also be noted that such governance would require a decentralized state with 
power rested in local communities.  The historical experience shows that when the 
Muslim empires pursued decentralized administration; it provided a very large 
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opportunity space for civil society and social institutions to actively functioning and 
contributing to the governance process. Such a decentralized state will ensure the 
separation of power, thereby leading towards an independent and effective judiciary 
to ensure the rule of law. Besides, due to the detachment of the state from dominating 
every aspect of the individual‟s life, the decentralized state will motivate and enable a 
more efficient and strong role of civil society to self-administrate the social, 
economic and political lives of the people. The aforementioned civil society 
institutions in the past, such as ÑulamÉ´, ahi and waqf were nourished due to the 
nature of the decentralized state in some periods of Muslim history. Thus in 
achieving the iÍsÉnÊ culture, hence the falÉÍ, decentralization is essential to enable 
large civil society, and checks and balances and therefore an enabling and effective 
minimal state. 
In reflecting on the historical experience, it is obvious that decentralized nature of 
administration in every sphere of life brought about strong society with flourishing 
civil society including the ÑulamÉ´.  However, modernity‟s imposed centralized 
nation state withered away the civil society by imposing official identities in the 
Muslim world; and hence removed the dynamics of development.  This resulted in 
„bad governance‟ and „underdevelopment‟ in the Muslim societies.  Thus, the 
alternative paradigm in this study also suggests that since all the foundational 
principles are related to the micro dynamics of development and governance, it 
requires that the nature of administration must be decentralized so that a large 
opportunity space should be available for the iÍsÉnÊ social capital to develop. 
7.3. METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONING IN BRINGING THE IDEAL INTO 
REALITY  
To understand the proposed framework for governance in this study, there is a need 
to conduct a comparison with the conventional governance framework. Despite the 
vast diversity between the two in referring to the ontological and epistemological 
foundation, methods, applications, principals and modes of articulations and even 
goals and aims, a comparison of both structures will divulge the similarities that also 
subsist but articulated in asymmetric patterns or means. It is hard to imagine how 
Islamic governance that rooted from Islamic ontology and epistemology could be 
wholly contradicted with the universal or common ideal of fairness, justice and 
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humanity (with slightly different way of articulation). In explaining the nature of the 
possibility of having an alternative governance system from Islamic ideals, which is 
complying to the ideals of common justice and fairness, Ibrahim (1996) points out 
that humane governance that based its root from the preservation of the dignity of 
man, the inviolability of life, and the responsible freedom has been the focal point in 
Islamic tenets.  
It should be noted that this novel attempt should not be confused with the „patching 
up‟ method adopted by many apologists in proving that Islam is compatible with the 
West or vice versa. El-Messiri (2006: 50) terms this approach as a process of 
retroactive Westernisation, since it leads to the wholesale adoption of Western 
epistemological paradigms, through the alteration of terminologies and rationale. 
This was also the method adopted by the Islamization of knowledge movement.  
However, through this „patching up‟ method, Euro-centrism remains eminent as 
natural, universal and ultimate, and accordingly all that is needed is to embellish it, or 
perhaps rearrange some of its components.  This, in turn, will disallow the alternative 
means from emerging as a unique ideal-type and becoming a distinctive 
phenomenon. In spite of this, in contemplating the articulation of the axioms and the 
operational part of khalÊfah typology, one would conclude this to be an ideal model 
of governance, which is still workable within the sphere of contemporary 
governance.  
To begin with, a closer look into the mentioned axioms (which summarizes the whole 
wide-reaching nature of Islamic values, spirituality and the horizontal-vertical moral 
precepts) will reveal how it indirectly contributes towards the moral and material 
uplifting of individuals, which is the central factor behind the rise or fall of any 
civilisation or country. Similarly, tawhidic reality provides a life-long meaning to the 
individual‟s life, thereby motivating them to achieve the noble goals taught by the 
religion, which accordingly provide development-friendly institutions or moral 
values to provide a proper climate for their observance.  
Equally, the articulation of the aforementioned khalÊfah typology would also 
cultivate all the social, human, cultural and natural capitals towards the achievement 
of development, through an inclusive meaning of capital and a wider definition of 
development. The inclusive definition of capital, which encompasses the wide-
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spreading interactions of humanistic elements (education, health, skills, ownership 
and lifestyle), social factors (networking, rules of society, solidarity, welfare) and 
cultural aspects (social relations, customs and structures, environment, sustainable 
development, natural resources)(Cochrane, 2006: 319-20), has been acknowledged as 
an active contributor to economic development,
23
 which ensures technical progress, 
competitiveness, sustained growth, good governance and stable democracies 
(Kliksberg, 1999).    
In the same manner, at the macro level, it will lead to the maximization of the 
economic wellbeing of individuals along with the promotion of social wellbeing and 
human life without neglecting the promotion of environmental sustainability. 
Meanwhile, at the micro level, the interrelated elements of khalÊfah typology 
cultivates the norms of human rights and the principle of self determination, 
including respect for life, self-respect, justice and equity, mutual respect, caring, 
sharing and integrity. Nevertheless, all this is derived together with the telos aim to 
be achieved and fuelled by the inner satisfaction of delivering the job of khalÊfah in 
this worldly life.  
Furthermore, the coherence of this model with the western notion of democracy, 
social justice and equality prevails by evaluating the conventional characteristics of 
„good‟ governance with the implication of the previously-established axioms. The 
preference for such a claim could refer to the concept of shËrÉ and its interrelated 
components exemplified by the axioms, articulated through all levels of khalÊfah 
typology (individual, society, institutions and state). ShËrÉ, as part of Islamic moral 
doctrine, enables a morally-oriented political system where people are empowered to 
select their leader and also to stand before them for accountability and the check and 
balance process through the doctrine of Amr bi al-maÑrËf wa nahy Ñan al-munkar‟.  
Moreover, the previously-discussed iÍsÉnÊ culture resembles the constant struggle 
towards comprehensive excellence (iÎlÉÍ for iÍsÉn) in achieving falÉÍ through the 
accomplishment of the higher objectives of SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah). The 
continuously-mentioned iÍsÉnÊ process to be adapted into governance life of the 
community enables the khalÊfah typology to facilitate the ideal Islamic governance to 
                                                 
23
 Of course with consideration of the refutation by mainstream methodological individualist 
economists that believes the social cannot be identified separately of individual interactions (Cochrane, 
2006: 320). 
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emerge as a progress paradigm of governance for Muslims as well for non-Muslims. 
Within such a paradigm, the whole process of good governance, which encompasses 
all political, economic, social and legislative spheres, will allow healthy and fair 
interconnection of individual, institution, value and system to develop a meaningful 
life for the human being according to Islamic worldview or the tawhidic reality. The 
whole process of this ideal governance, which will remove the obstacles to the 
nourishment of a truthful human life in which all members of the society are able to 
develop their human capacity in order to obtain personal and social well being, is but 
another version of „jihÉd fÊ sabÊl Allah‟ (strive in the way of Allah).24. 
In pursuing such a struggle „fÊ sabÊl Allah‟, a multi-modernity approach works best as 
a framework for change. The current discourse of democratic processes and 
institutions, which fits the articulation of certain principles of good governance such 
as accountability, transparency, efficient public service, human rights, civil society 
and individual liberty, with certain modifications to align it with the spirit of ideal 
governance should be incorporated into the bigger picture of khalÊfah typology. As 
far as Islamic epistemology is concerned, much could be benefited from current 
experience but with caution regarding its Eurocentric values and philosophy within; 
as it is the aim of this attempt to avoid any kind of eclectic and pragmatic approach. 
Conversely, it should always be noted that those principles are not meant to be the 
aim of what is perceived as Islamic governance, but they are rather the outcome of 
the continuous process of the khalÊfah typology, as the main goal of the ideal 
governance is to achieve falÉÍ by expansion of the iÍsÉnÊ social capital within the 
Tawhidic reality. This is where the true meaning of „fÊ sabÊl Allah‟ lies. In a similar 
light, at the practical level, it is hard to imagine that khalÊfah could be easily 
implemented and practised as it involves construction of thought and action in line 
with the aspirational dimensions. Unless substantial room for democracy and 
freedom exists, the ideals of governance as targeted in this research will continue as a 
„utopia‟.  
 
                                                 
24
 As Taleqani (1986: 54-56) points out that jihad should be expanded beyond its conventional narrow 
understanding of merely war to protect people from enemy‟s transgression to the struggle for the sake 
of humanity, freedom and the very path of the well being and betterment of human society. 
Furthermore, Taleqani emphasizes that this broaden and comprehensive understanding of „fÊ sabÊl 
Allah‟ derives from the very nature of Islam as a religion that aims at reforming humanity and saving 
them from falling into the valley of animalistic passion. 
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7.4. ACTUALISATION OF THE ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE 
The discussion in this research in general and in Chapter 6 and in this chapter in 
particular aimed so far to provide the architectonic of the Islamic governance by 
formulating the building blocks of this new paradigm.  The model developed based 
on this paradigm is depicted in Figure 7.1. This section, thus, provides a short 
exposition on the working of this model as illustrated in Figure 7.1.  However, this is 
a very brief summary or visual expression of the entire discussion presented in this 
research with the objective of demonstrating the actualisation of the Islamic 
paradigm of good governance. 
As previously discussed, the process of Islamic governance starts with individual as 
the most important element in the governance process, which is the case in Figure 
7.1., as the khalÊfah typology constitutes the heart of the entire model.  As discussed, 
khalÊfah individual aims to articulate and actualize the objective of maqÉÎid to get the 
acceptance from God. 
The very foundation of this new model, which is the Islamic ontological and 
epistemological principals are both represented through the axioms as the 
philosophical value of governance. The articulation of the axioms into the reality, 
which is to crystallise the Islamic ideals, start with the aforementioned smallest but 
rather crucial element of the governance process, namely the individual or the 
khalÊfah individual. Based on the inspiration of the foundations (ontology and 
epistemology articulated through the axioms), the individuals that are to bring the 
ideals into reality must be functioning and dynamically self-actualised according to 
the characteristic of khalÊfah typology.  The „self-actualising‟ nature of the individual 
stems from the Islamic notion of knowledge process, according to which Islam 
represents knowledge (hence, „knowing‟), iman represents „doing‟, and ihsan 
represents „becoming‟ in the sense of ongoing change and growth of individual 
within the tazkiyah and rubËbiyyah axioms.  Such an individual endowed with such 
qualities is expected to be an active agent of change and therefore respond to the 
development of other individuals, society, natural environment and the state 
according to the ontology of Islam as articulated in axioms. 
The khalÊfah typology individuals, however, require an enabling minimal state along 
with the benevolent society and effective institutions to deliver the vicegerency 
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duties as explained by the khalÊfah typology. In other words, these elements 
constitute the „contents‟ of the „Islamic governance paradigm‟ in the sense that the 
change is expected in these elements for Islamic governance to be actualised. Within 
this understanding of the khalÊfah or vicegerent mission, all the four elements inter-
reacted and inter-connected to enable the individuals to attain falÉÍ for every and 
each person according to the iÍsÉnÊ culture.  
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Figure 7.1. Actualisation of Islamic Governance as a Model 
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With the motivation and actualisation of khalÊfah typology, contents need to be 
subjected to a process to result in Islamic governance as an outcome.  The centre role 
in the process, as can be seen in Figure 7.1., is again individual who have gone 
through the process of development to become enabled and functioning individual as 
discussed so far.  This is an expected outcome, as the objective function of the 
individuals in this paradigm is to achieve falÉÍ in this world and in the hereafter and 
also achieving iÍsÉn as social capital. In other words, the result of the workability of 
the khalÊfah typology could be seen from the production of iÍsÉnÊ social capital. 
Thus, the khalÊfah individual should be able to shape the „contents‟ by subjecting 
them to the process of development as articulated by axioms and defined by the 
Islamic ontology and epistemology; and hence khalÊfah typology based individual 
should be able to produce iÍsÉn as social capital, as a natural process.  In other 
words, iÍsÉnÊ social capital through falÉÍ is the natural expected result of having 
khalÊfah typology. 
It can be noticed from Figure 7.1 that iÍsÉnÊ social capital identified different in the 
schematic exposition, which implies that it can expand and contract.  The nature of 
enabled and functioning individual in the initial part of the process will determine the 
quality of iÍsÉnÊ social capital.  While iÍsÉnÊ social capital is considered as the 
natural consequence of the khalÊfah typology, the nature of the impact it can have on 
the contents and the initial process will determine the quality of iÍsÉnÊ social capital.  
In other words, the nature and the quality of the four elements functioning will 
determine if the iÍsÉnÊ social capital expanding or contracting.  
In the last part of the model, as depicted in Figure 7.1., the process of developing 
iÍsÉnÊ social capital will determine the achievement of the ideal governance.  
However, again referring to the dynamic nature of the process, Islamic governance, 
as the ideal governance, is represented with dotted lines indicating that there could be 
degrees of governance, from „ideal‟ or „good governance‟ to „bad governance‟.  The 
quality of governance will be determined by the nature of the iÍsÉnÊ social capital, as 
the expanding iÍsÉn will result in expanding governance getting closer to the ideal.  
The working mechanism being dynamic system with check and balances helps the 
model to overcome the contraction in the iÍsÉnÊ social capital and hence in the 
quality of the good governance.  As can be seen within the feedback system in Figure 
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7.1, any contraction (see –ve) will inform the model through the khalÊfah typology to 
check the nature of functioning individual in the sense whether the individual is 
functioning as expected by the Islamic axioms.  By correcting the functioning 
individual (see +ve from articulation of axioms) through imani self-actualisation, the 
process continues to enhance the quality of iÍsÉnÊ social capital and hence the 
Islamic good governance.  Since this is an iÍsÉnÊ-based paradigm, by nature it 
represents a „becoming‟ process implying an ongoing and sustainable development 
with iÍsÉn being expanded continuously, as opposed to „be‟ or „being‟, as the latter 
two represents the completion of a process. 
7.5. CONCLUSION 
Within the proposal of Islamic governance in this research, an enabling minimal state 
with its system, structure and philosophy is expected to yield functioning individuals 
and to render the benevolent society workable. Active functioning individuals, 
derived from Tawhidic reality worldview and total self-actualization, will lead to 
iÍsÉnÊ social capital which will operate in effective majorly non-state institutions (the 
civil society). It is through this sphere, that the axioms that act as the philosophical 
foundation will determine continuous individual and collective actions of individuals 
through a conducive institutional mechanism framework. The axioms will 
accumulate and create the iÍsÉnÊ culture in the functions of all the elements hence 
keeping it alive and constantly functioning in achieving the falÉÍ. 
Accordingly, active and effective institutions, which are naturally the result of 
functioning individuals and a benevolent society, will determine the nature of 
khalÊfah typology vis-à-vis the iÍsÉnÊ culture continuously regenerating the 
effectiveness of the individual‟s role. Integrated and comprehensive interdependent 
functioning of iÍsÉnÊ culture in achieving falÉÍ will increase the achievement of the 
ideal governance and vice versa. This functioning element will indicate the real 
benchmark of „good governance‟ from Islamic ontology based epistemology rather 
than the evaluation of mere institution or economic growth.  
In the same vein, the workable nature of such a system of governance within this 
paradigm will prevail in the effort and the continuous projections to form khalÊfah in 
the life of every individual to function within the realm of a benevolent society and 
the system that enables it through significant institutions. In the same vein, the four 
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elements will be interconnected and work parallel with each other. Without the 
elements integrating comprehensively to articulate the ‘Islamic governance’ axioms, 
none of the element discretely will be able to present the ideal fairly. The interactions 
of the elements, especially the (iÍsÉnÊ) social capital represented through the 
benevolent society and the institutions enabling it, will be connected to the ideal 
notion of governance depending on their ability to appear and prevail by the 
functioning individuals.  
The achievement or failure to achieve the ideal (Islamic) governance will heavily 
depend on the realisation of this function. However, the interdependent structure of 
the elements will allow the process to correct itself by returning to the same 
continuous flow should any failure occur in the process. The example of the first and 
second Caliphs of Islam asking the people to correct them, even with a sword, 
indicates how the governance process from the Islamic perspective is not free from 
mistakes, and how a proper, self-correcting mechanism was provided and necessary 
in the process. Only through such continuous and comprehensive process will the 
effort to reach the Islamicness of the governance be valued. 
To conclude, it can be summarised that the achievement of governance according to 
Tawhidic ontology and epistemological worldview, unlike the Bretton Woods’ 
(despite some similarities in terms of the outcomes) must not only be measured by 
the increases in GDP and human rights alone, as this not only limits the idea of ‘well 
being’ to economic growth and certain liberal values per se, but also inaccurately 
reflects the condition of the society. A ‘good’ and ideal governance, according to 
Islamic ontological reality, is also not only a set of instrumental or institutional tools 
that work to tackle certain issues such as poverty, corruption and inefficiency of the 
market, but rather it represents the holistic and comprehensive effort involved in 
producing certain quality based on faith, morals and values in individuals and 
society; the continuous establishment of a system that enables such efforts and the 
mechanisms that facilitate the individuals and the society to achieve falÉÍ through the 
culture of iÍsÉn; and finally the institutions to facilitate and enable the individuals 
and the society within the minimal state environment to mutually function by 
implementing the aforementioned maqÉÎid (higher objectives of SharÊÑah) with the 
objective of achieving well-being, both in this world and in the hereafter, hence 
falÉÍ.  
Chapter Eight: Islamic Governance…What‟s Next? Instead of a Conclusion 
 306 
CHAPTER 8 
ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE: WHAT’S NEXT? INSTEAD 
OF A CONCLUSION 
The Prophet said:   “There are seven whom Allah will 
shade in His Shade on the Day when there is no shade 
except His Shade: a just ruler; a youth who grew up in 
the worship of Allah, the Mighty and Majestic; a man 
whose heart is attached to the mosques; two people who 
love each other for Allah‟s sake, meeting for that and 
parting upon that; a man who is called by a woman of 
beauty and position (for illegal intercourse), but be 
says: “I fear Allah”, a man who gives in charity and 
hides it, such that his left hand does not know what his 
right hand gives in charity; and a man who 
remembered Allah in private and so his eyes shed 
tears.”1 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
Epistemologically, the above ÍadÊth implies that it was the tawhidic ontology that 
acted as the motivating factor for those seven people to perform whatever they did in 
pursuing falÉÍ for their affairs, both in this world and the Hereafter. The promised 
„shade‟ is but another tawhidic inner motivation that triggers individuals to live in 
virtue and forbearance to their value and faith. From the governance point of view, 
the examples mentioned in the ÍadÊth identify how various individuals can work 
within the iÍsÉnÊ culture to develop a fair and moral society for better governance. 
The intrinsic values indicated in the ÍadÊth reflect implicitly the substantial ideals 
bearing the spirit of Islamic governance theories, which will pave the way for 
developing the previously-discussed khalÊfah typology. 
This ÍadÊth is amongst many other evidences from Islamic epistemological sources 
expounding the nature of values and virtue that could be extracted to contribute 
towards the establishment of an ideal governance system. In other words, religious 
values, in this case Islamic values, become a reference for the formulation of 
                                                 
1
 Narrated in al-BukhÉrÊ (1985: 1/234) and Muslim (n.d.; 2/715). 
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governance precepts in a value-defined manner.  However, incorporating religion, 
religious values and culture into political economic issues in the current modernity-
dominated paradigmatic understanding requires a new dimension and approach as 
previously argued in the discussion on modernity and Eurocentrism. The entire focus 
of this research is on proving this presumption within the contemporary Eurocentric 
mainstream governance discourse. 
To bring values, and in particular religious ethos, back into the realm of knowledge 
to socially construct a new paradigm is rather challenging, due to the paradigm of 
modernity which excludes religion as a source of knowledge. Thus, dealing with a 
subject which is against the predominant ideology of the contemporary positivistic 
world, and applying it to a modern problem, requires careful tailoring as governance, 
according to its current understanding, would be viewed as non-compatible with the 
inviolability of religion and faith inspiration or vice versa. Despite the empirical case 
studies and experiences which indicate, the probability of harmonizing religious 
ethos with activities related to the governance process, it is still viewed with 
prejudice and scepticism. In the same way, some religious essentialists would view 
the „incorporation‟ of values as another act of digression. However, any attempt to 
unearth alternative means to the status quo should always ensure that every detail of 
the reality is presented instead of the enforcement of a single meta-narrative on every 
community in the world. 
The above discussions and arguments regarding developing an ideal model of 
governance, as illustrated in Figure 7.1., based on Islamic ontology and epistemology 
are another painstaking effort to respond to the aforesaid challenge. As discussed 
previously, it has been proved by many current researchers that religions, as part of 
culture, could benefit human endeavour towards development with their unique 
approach. Furthermore, religions also give inner meaning to human life and cultivate 
the necessary good virtues that have been lost amid the materialistic domination in 
the contemporary world. Therefore, this research aims to produce or establish a new 
paradigm of governance based on Islamic ontology and epistemology different from 
the secular ontology. 
This study, as summarised in Figure 7.1., should be viewed and evaluated as an 
attempt to produce the building parameters of a model of Islamic governance theory, 
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but is not offered in any way as the only model. Moreover, it has been developed as 
an alternative means for culturally-inspired or faith-inspired philosophical grounds 
for ideal governance. The lack of such an approach in the current governance 
discourse has been discussed in the body of this study. Various factors have led to 
this situation, mainly the Eurocentric mentality which dominates the discourse 
regarding political economy as well as governance. As the discussion in the previous 
chapters indicates, an Islamic model of governance, as proposed by this study, differs 
from other models in that it is based on ontological and epistemological foundations 
in response to the spiritual-psychological sociological needs of human beings. The 
core uniqueness of the model stems from the fact that it is based on faith, values and 
ethical standards to include the practical life of human being without neglecting the 
elements of (limited) rationality.  
8.2. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
The phenomenon of „governance‟ has emerged in the past decade as an aspect of 
structural adjustment policies. The term was first introduced as a Washington 
Consensus-based panacea for underdevelopment and poverty after the World Bank‟s 
report on Sub Saharan Africa in 1989, and provided a new dimension which was 
suggested as a remedy for many other problems and challenges. Generally, „good 
governance‟, as initially introduced by the Bretton Woods Institutions and later 
emulated by many international aid and financial agencies, views developmental 
issues from a comprehensive political, economic, social and legal approach. In this 
regard, good governance implies a set of rules (system) governing the actions of 
individuals and organizations (society) and the negotiations of differences between 
them that could only be crystallized through proper institutions in order to achieve 
development (Van Dok, 1999). 
A great deal of criticism has been made of this agenda from various technical, 
methodological, operational, economic, political and philosophical dimensions. 
However, since this research is not an empirical-based research aiming to expose the 
failures or shortcomings of the agenda, it has only focused on the philosophical 
issues concerning the subject. The treatment of the subject in this research has 
focused on the deconstruction of the concept of good governance, with a specific 
reference to its bias toward Eurocentric modernity. The result of this approach has 
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revealed that this current concept missed an important building block of development 
in its discourse, which is the role of culture and religion. In the chapter on the role of 
culture in governance, therefore, literature was produced by culturalists, as well other 
post-modernists (and post-structuralists), post developmentalists and post-colonialists 
who have bravely challenged the Eurocentric conception of the definition of 
development.  
As suggested by this study, culture, faiths and other transcendental values that are 
often neglected in the modern world should be revisited and reinterpreted from their 
functional dimension. A great deal of empirical research has pointed to the fact that 
these values have their role in the life of modern society, as well as in the field of 
governance. The wide-ranging contributions of faith-based and faith-inspired 
organisations and movements in the field of development, civil society, educational, 
economics, politics and other areas in recent times has opened the eyes of many as to 
how mitos has its pivotal place in human life. Religions and faiths are undoubtedly 
important in giving the telos and nomos to individuals‟ lives. As Nasr (1989) points 
out, human beings cannot neglect the inner spiritual dimension of their lives and how 
the parameters of inner development have consequences for their external 
development such as the case of governance. Countless efforts by the faith-based and 
faith-inspired organisations which have contributed towards tackling 
underdevelopment problems and other socio-political issues were mainly driven from 
such a motivation. In this respect, it should be noted that faith and religious belief 
works efficiently to stimulate the elements of good governance in a similar way. 
According to this rationale, this research develops a direct and exclusive analytical 
discursive study on how Islam as one of the major religions in the contemporary 
world could contribute towards development and governance by establishing a unique 
model of governance from its explicit ontological worldview and dynamic 
epistemology. As mentioned in the Introduction, this exploration aims to identify the 
possibility of an Islamic model of governance and ways to build the parameters for 
such a model as an alternative means of governance in replying to the need for a 
separate and unique paradigm for good governance for Muslim societies needs. This 
aim as explicitly spelled in chapter four has been the central working hypothesis of 
this research. 
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Islamic epistemology is derived directly from its ontological-based worldview, which 
acts as a beacon for Muslims in conducting their lives and provides the knowledge to 
assist them in the worldly life. This worldview is derived from tawÍÊd which is the 
axis mundi of homo-Islamicus in determining the „truth‟ and the „reality‟. This 
tawhidic reality concept is clearly articulated through the status of man as vicegerent 
(khalÊfah) in the world, which is deliberately elucidated in the Qur‟an through the 
story of human creation, and accepted as a priori in Muslims‟ faith.  
Such an ontological premise provides the vertical relation between humans as 
khalÊfah with the Creator and, in a similar manner; the epistemology (which is 
derived from the ontology) articulates the ontology into real life, hence establishing 
the horizontal relation between human beings and the world. In sum, it is only 
through the epistemology that tawhidic reality can be articulated and work within the 
construction, perception and articulation of social reality. This tawhidic reality 
implies that only by obeying God‟s guidance in the terrestrial life, will the human 
being attain falÉÍ or prosperity in the worldly life and in the Hereafter, as the 
objective of each individual is considered to be falÉÍ. God‟s guidance for human 
beings can be exemplified by revelation and Ñaql (rationality) in interpreting the 
revelation. Revelation is represented by al-Qur‟an and Sunnah, while the Ñaql‟s role 
is to interpret the revelation according to the consequentialistic „moral and value‟ 
perspective, since the resulting hermeneutic of legal rulings is based not so much on 
specific rules spelled out by the text as it is on the ethical principles revealed as 
God‟s purposes behind the text. 
The articulation of the revelation to the practice as in the case of governance could be 
done through the theoretization of the relevant knowledge and experience of the four 
pious Caliphs. In order to understand the spirit and underlying concepts hidden in the 
revelation, maqasidic approach has been pursued in this study. For that reason, 
through Ibn al-Qayyim‟s inclusive and extensive maqasidic approach, the attainment 
of falÉÍ could be achieved. According to this more dynamic interpretation of 
maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah, the achievement of falÉÍ is not solely confined to the 
attainment of the highest objectives of SharÊÑah (maqÉÎid) by preserving the al-
Ghazalian five ÌarËriyyÉt and al-ShÉÏibÊ‟s addition of ÍÉjiyyat and taÍsÊniyyÉt, but 
must also include broader measures to ensure welfare (as) asserted by Ibn al-Qayyim 
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(n.d, 4: 309-11) who emphasized justice and equity, the means to which could never 
be captured by a finite list.  
The comprehensive treatment of the mentioned maqÉÎid elements would ensure 
human well-being in their worldly life and a state of salvation in the Hereafter 
(falÉÍ). Furthermore, tawhidic reality that shapes the individual‟s worldview will 
enable him to secure and promote the maqÉÎid to ensure „falÉÍ‟ not only for himself 
but also for the community and the human species in the universe. While falÉÍ in the 
life hereafter is reflected by the life in the heaven for eternity, this maqasidic 
approach will assist the quest to develop an ideal Islamic governance model theory. 
Consequently, the accomplishment of all the tiers of maqÉÎid (ÌarËriyyÉt, ÍÉjiyyÉt 
and taÍsÊniyyÉt) in the governance process will be a benchmark of an 
accomplishment of „good‟ in the proposed governance model. However, 
accomplishment is only the end, and the end does not justify the means from the 
Islamic point of view. Similarly, the means must not be independent from the end; 
and hence internal consistency should be sought. As a consequence, the means to 
achieve the maqÉÎid is part and parcel of Islamic governance itself.  
In explaining internal consistency in relation to consequentialist expectations, 
according to the mentioned paradigm, and as prescribed in the literature related to the 
topic (Khan, 1984; Ahmad, 1992, 2003; Chapra, 2000; Naqvi 1981, 1994; 
Choudhury, 1995), a four-tier system prevails in Islam:  
“internal and external consistency and third one, which is consistent with both 
of them that is moral and behaviour norms of the society, i.e., harmonizing 
consistency. Whereas, fourth tier is unique in Islamic system that highlights 
consistency in between the action in this world and the hereafter so behaviour of 
Muslim individual should be examined, studied and analyzed in this context, 
structural and textural change within men and society” (Asutay, 2010: 18).  
Thus, this model of Islamic governance is completely different from current „good 
governance‟ because of its distinct features: the third and fourth tiers are not part of 
the conventional model. In Islamic governance, every governance activity moves 
around a specified nucleus, i.e., falÉÍ in this world and the life hereafter.   
As an articulation of this process, as the primary aim of life for humans as described 
by Islam is to attain falÉÍ (ultimate success) in both this world and the Hereafter, as 
khalÊfah (God‟s vicegerents) they are urged to use the resources of this world to 
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achieve success in both lives. Islamic governance, therefore, aims to achieve falÉÍ 
(salvation) by aiming at iÍsÉn (benevolence) through the framework of khalÊfah 
(individuals as God‟s vicegerent on earth). According to this notion, the individuals‟ 
success in this role depends, among many other things, on the acquisition, allocation 
and disposition of the resources, which are amÉnah or trust, according to the consent 
of Allah. In the case of Islamic governance, SharÊÑah is the paradigm.   
Moreover, based on the preceding epistemological paradigm within the value-laden 
ontological-determined epistemological system, this research has avoided the 
adaptation of any literal emulation of the classical governance model and structures 
without deconstructing the context and underlying philosophy which led to their 
emergence. Instead, it utilizes a non-conventional way of constructing a new 
alternative model of ideal Islamic theory of governance. A „consequentially-aimed 
social realization process based ethical approach‟ was chosen as the bedrock for this 
study instead of the classical deontological legalistic discourse in dealing with 
Islamic epistemological sources. Unlike the conventional Washington consensus 
approach to the subject, this new approach transcends the current (nature-matter) 
materialistic monism of governance by replacing the ends of its process with 
transcendental values, and by making humans as the starting point of the subject and 
not as mere commodities. In this model, the human being and his/her well-being is 
considered as the end and not the means. 
Furthermore, it fits into the framework of governance from ontologically determined 
Islamic epistemology through the deductive method. In formulating this, all-Islamic 
principal values in relation to material, spiritual and ethical issues related to the 
subject were articulated in the form of mathematical axioms. As far as the term 
epistemology is concerned, the exploration also involves Islamic traditions and 
classical contributions on the subject, but without literal transcriptions; rather it 
denotes the ongoing, creative attempt to apprehend the paradigm implicit in different 
Islamic texts and phenomena. The axioms that are soundly derived from the 
epistemological sources (al-Qur‟an and sunnah, the practice of the four pious caliphs 
and maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah) elucidate the proposed governance model‟s philosophy and 
fundamentals of its philosophy. Consequently, the proposed model does not deal only 
with mere means and forms of governance through mere discussions regarding its 
mechanisms and institutions, but also includes the transcendental means and goals of 
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governance from Islamic ontology and epistemology as its foundation being 
emphasized in its formulation.  
This generative (non-cumulative) paradigm of looking into the governance issue is to 
be viewed as an incomplete certainty and a production of the continuous ijtihÉd 
progression, and is not aimed at an imperialist control of reality as the modernities 
project claimed. Furthermore, this emerging comprehensive theory does not try to 
relegate reality to its materialist components or dimensions, nor does it try to 
eradicate dualities. It does not stress the whole at the expense of the part or the 
reverse; similarly, it does not stress continuity at the expense of discontinuity or vice 
versa. In contrast, it relates the particulars to the general without necessarily reducing 
the part to the whole or the particular to the general and it attempts to reach the 
pivotal point where one phenomenon is related to another, yet remains distinct from 
it. In applying it to the discourse of governance, the individual and small social units 
cannot be eradicated in the interest of the state, and the human cannot be disregarded 
in pursuit of the natural. Hence, the deliberation on the governance issue in this 
research does not focus on the materialistic components such as institutions or 
mechanisms or growth per se, but it encompasses the holistic nature of human life in 
accordance with the Islamic worldview.  
In the development of the related paradigm, the formulated axioms are: tawÍÊd 
(unity), which indicates the vertical dimension of the Islamic ethical system; amÉnah 
(trust), al-Ñadl wa al-iÍsÉn (justice equilibrium) to provide the horizontal dimension 
of equity; ukhuwwah (universal solidarity); iÎlÉh (constant striving for 
comprehensive excellence with ethical and moral considerations); ikhtiyÉr (free-
will); tazkiyah (concerned with growth towards perfection through purification of 
attitudes and relationships); rubËbiyyah (divine arrangements for nourishment, 
sustenance and directing things towards their perfection) and finally, the maqÉÎid al-
SharÊÑah (objectives of the SharÊÑah), which are used to summarise the whole spirit of 
Islamic governance by providing the socio-legal framework within which this new 
governance model is located. These axioms are interconnected to create an 
environment for the attainment of falÉÍ through the process of governance. It should 
be noted that these axioms proliferate the normative theory of guiding Muslims by 
ensuring the parameter of their governance process is in conformity with the tawhidic 
worldview. Policies, systems, institutions and all mechanisms formulated and 
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promulgated must be within this parameter to ensure that the Islamic governance 
model is constructed in a comprehensive and robust manner.  
However, these inter-reliant and interrelated axioms could only be articulated 
through holistic and comprehensive role of governance factors within the „khalÊfah 
typology‟, which as a new aspirational human entity implies a comprehensive and 
interrelated component being shaped by the Islamic notions and the axioms in 
coming into the reality. In this way, four major elements, or four dimensions are 
identified as crucial in delivering such ideals: individual, societal, systemic and 
institutional. At the individual level, khalÊfah typology enshrines that good 
governance is to be practised by „functioning individuals‟ through the articulation of 
the formulated axioms in their daily life; then at the larger radius of society through 
„benevolent society‟, where the individuals could mutually and collectively exercise 
their governance rights and obligations; while at the institutional level the axioms 
must be interpreted through „effective institutions‟ that enable both individuals and 
society to function at the macro level; and at the state level through „effective 
minimal state systems‟, which provide mechanisms and an atmosphere that enables 
the previous three elements to be effectively workable. Based on this typology, we 
can conclude that the aim of governance in Islam, unlike any other version of 
governance, is to „achieve human wellbeing through the distribution of trust and the 
organisation of resources on the basis of tawÍÊd, amÉnah, Ñadl wa iÍsÉn, ukhuwwah, 
iÎlÉÍ, ikhtiyÉr, tazkiyah, rubËbiyyah, and maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah‟ through the 
articulation of khilÉfah (vicegerency). Furthermore, „Islamic governance‟ is part of 
the means to achieve „iÍsÉn‟ as the culmination of human life for a better life for the 
community; and hence Islamic governance aims at maximising or enhancing the 
iÍsÉnÊ social capital through the consciousness of its participants, namely khalÊfah 
individuals. 
Within the proposal of Islamic governance in this research, a minimal enabling state 
with its system, structure and philosophy is proposed as the nature of political 
culture, which must provide the opportunity to enable functioning individuals and the 
benevolent society to fulfil their aim, which is to achieve falÉÍ through the iÍsÉnÊ 
process. The active functioning of individuals in the form of „being‟ and „doing‟ 
individuals derived from the tawhidic reality worldview and total self-actualization is 
expected to lead to iÍsÉnÊ social capital to operate in an effective manner in mostly 
Chapter Eight: Islamic Governance…What‟s Next? Instead of a Conclusion 
 315 
non-state institutions (the civil society). It is through this sphere, that the axioms that 
act as the philosophical foundation of actions, will determine the continuous 
individual and collective actions of individuals through a conducive institutional 
mechanistic framework. The axioms will accumulate and create the iÍsÉnÊ culture in 
the actions of all the elements, hence keeping it alive and constantly functioning in 
helping the participants to achieve falÉÍ. Appropriately, active and effective 
institutions, which are naturally the result of functioning individuals and benevolent 
society, will determine the nature of khalÊfah typology vis-à-vis the iÍsÉnÊ culture, 
which in turn will continuously regenerate the effectiveness of the individual‟s role. 
The integrated and comprehensive interdependent functioning of iÍsÉnÊ culture 
aiming to achieve the falÉÍ will increase the achievement of ideal governance and 
vice versa. The role of iÍsÉnÊ culture is akin to the role of „manners‟ in maintaining 
democracy in America as coined by de Tocqueville (de Tocqueville, 2005: 348-53).
2
 
Thus, the proposed model is a dynamic model in which the system creates checks 
and balances to respond to the change in the iÍsÉnÊ social capital with the objective 
of keeping it at the maximum level possible. 
This functioning element will indicate the real benchmark of „good governance‟ from 
Islamic ontological-based epistemology rather than the evaluation of mere institution 
or economic growth. In the same vein, the feasibility of such a governance system 
within this paradigm is possible, with the effort and the continuous projections in 
forming the khalÊfah milieu in the life of every individual, of functioning within the 
realm of benevolent society, and the system that enables it through its institutions. In 
the same vein, the four elements are interconnected and work parallel with each 
other. Without the elements integrating comprehensively to articulate and fulfil the 
„Islamic governance‟ axioms, none of the elements discretely would be able to 
present the ideal fairly. The interactions of the elements, especially the iÍsÉnÊ social 
capital represented through the benevolent society and the institutions enabling it will 
be contracted to the ideal notion of governance depending on their ability to be 
integrated and internalised by functioning individuals.  
Figure 7.1 in Chapter Seven clearly depicts this entire process by identifying each 
                                                 
2
 Manners in this subject has been defined as “the sum of moral and intellectual dispositions of men in 
society” to be the most important influence in maintaining American political institutions-more 
important than laws of physical circumstances (Mottahedeh, 2001:3). 
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stage of the development process leading to Islamic governance.  The model 
summarises the entire paradigm by linking it to „iÍsÉnÊ social capital‟ and its 
maximisation.  Thus, it provides another way of looking at social reality through 
Islamically-constructed knowledge. 
8.3. CHALLENGES IN COMPREHENDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE 
PROPOSED MODEL 
It should be noted that Islamic governance mediates differing interests to reach a 
broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the society and, where possible, on 
policies and procedures. KhalÊfah typology as a framework also prepares the stage 
for the people to make their contribution towards the development of the society in 
which they live. Every single axiom, which is articulated by khalÊfah typology, can 
only be meaningful through the apprehension and active involvement of all 
individuals within the Islamic governance framework. In the same vein, it is the 
people who eventually act as the dynamo for the mechanisms of governance to move 
and work to achieve the ultimate goal they want to achieve, namely falÉÍ through 
iÍsÉnÊ social culture. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the implementation of 
Islamic governance in the proposed framework will contribute towards what is 
known currently as good governance characteristics represented by accountability, 
the rule of law, transparency, efficiency of the public administration and the active 
role of civil society, hence will lead towards the development of the society.  
Some might question, then, the rationale and the distinguishing nature of Islamic 
governance from the contemporary agenda of good governance, since the outcomes 
may have similarities. Some might also argue that the whole discovery of this 
research simply represents the actual idea of good governance but in a different 
guise. So, what is unique about the proposed „Islamic governance‟? 
It should be noted that despite the similarities in the outcome, the current notion of 
good governance proposed by international institutions and the Islamic governance 
model proposed in this study differ in many fundamental ways. Fundamentally, each 
version of governance is derived from distinct ontological and epistemological 
foundations that lead to the diversity of the ultimate aim. In addition to such 
fundamental differences, the aim or the expected outcome constitute another major 
difference.  As for the conventional, it aims for a mere positivist materialistic goal, 
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which could best be described as the Washington consensus efficiency. The aims are 
also evaluated by a specific barometer for the achievement of growth or, in some 
cases, a purely humanistic measurement. However, Islamic governance considers the 
process and the outcomes as mere means to achieving the bi-dimensional goals 
summarised by the term falÉÍ or human well-being. FalÉÍ as the goal could best be 
exemplified by comprehensive actualization of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah. In this case, the 
process and the outcomes are no longer the main focus of governance, but only 
represent part of the consequences required from the exercise of the governance 
realm.  Thus, in Islamic governance, human beings are ends in themselves rather than 
means. 
Furthermore, due to its ontological spectrum, the proposed governance model in this 
study is close to the heart and life of Muslims in accepting it. Due to its revelation-
inspired nature, and the fact that it addresses both the material and spiritual aspects of 
human life, this model of governance transcends the feeling of being forced to accept 
something foreign amongst Muslims. As per the discussion on the role of religion in 
development, this state of affairs will inspire and motivate the inner elements of 
human beings thus giving a meaning to their lives. This inner meaning will not only 
motivate individuals to pursue their own interest, but will also push them to share 
their happiness with others. As such, the process of development is not a result of 
mere individual persuasion of personal interests, but a fruit of mutually-
interdependent individuals in bringing „meanings‟ to the society and its everyday 
functioning. By the same token, unlike the current good governance agenda, this 
Islamic governance model is not expected or formulated to act as an external solution 
to be imposed or enforced by outsiders upon Muslim countries, as the proposal 
suggests an authentic and indigenous attempt, which can be considered as a revision 
of the inner elements that they have lost and missed to serve their own interests and 
not for other hegemonies. 
However, the changes, which would allow this proposed framework, could only be 
possible if there is political and economic freedom within Muslim communities, 
societies and countries. Without political freedom, the governance process will only 
be an artificial decoration of the authoritarian regimes, and without freedom, 
development is hard to achieve, as freedom is the essential element, through which 
development efforts can be concerted (Sen, 2001).  
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Despite of this new formulation, the divergent Anglo-Saxon and European discourse 
on equity and social justice, which are universally accepted and acknowledged, are 
not to be rejected. In fact, they are relatively incorporated into this model as part of 
the consequences of the axioms developed as its philosophical foundation. 
Furthermore, these two factors are implicitly work as the amalgam of the articulation 
of the axioms through the interconnection of the individuals and the society. Without 
equity and social justice it is hard to imagine how a society could be benevolent, and 
for what purpose the individuals are functioning. Equally, it is the concept of equity 
that the individuals enjoying their sufficient space to be functioning politically and 
economically. This will reflect the ideal of iÍsÉn in enhancing the value of individuals 
within the framework of the aforementioned inclusive falÉÍ definition. Likewise, the 
social justice principal, too, is the main narrative of benevolent society proposed in 
this research. 
Considering the nature of the political culture in the Muslim world, it is difficult to 
imagine that the current situation in Muslims‟ polity in general will allow room for 
the proposed governance model to work. Looking into the comprehensive structure 
of khalÊfah typology as the framework for the established axioms to operate, political 
freedom is not only a condition for them to be enabled, but also primarily a sine qua 
non. The present status quo of polity in Muslim countries, therefore, can hardly allow 
the model to be implemented. The pseudo democratic system, too large state, state-
dependent individuals, wide rent-seeking culture, patronage politics and economy 
and other undemocratic practices that allow corruption, mismanagement, and other 
practices of bad governance are the major impediments for the implementation of the 
model.  
Apart from encouraging a political environment needed to set a limit for the model to 
be exercised, a clear understanding of Islam from Muslims is another prerequisite. A 
narrow view of religion, which perceives it either as a static dogma which lies in the 
private sphere or the strict literal interpretation of it as a stag doctrine against any 
amendment and dynamism, will never help the realisation of the model. Instead, a 
new approach to religion from its functioning dimension is necessary; as without 
development of homoIslamicus, the Islamically-supported and created institutions 
would not be able to deliver the falÉÍ and iÍsÉnÊ social capital. 
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In referring to Islam, the model could also only be workable through a clear 
understanding of SharÊÑah, as an inclusive doctrine providing a fertile ground for this 
aim. SharÊÑah should not be confined within its limited legalistic consequent 
independent deontological parameter, but should be recognised as an ethical, value-
oriented process to be referred to for all new ijtihÉd for its social realisation. In other 
words, SharÊÑah in relation to maqÉÎid should be policy-oriented with the objective 
of interpreting and contextualizing the realities of everyday life within the Islamic 
epistemological and ontological order by also endogenising morals in a dynamic 
manner rather than being confined to legal mechanism in a static fashion.  In other 
words, a consequentialist approach rather than mechanistic SharÊÑah compliancy 
must be adopted to create a dynamic environment for the development of falÉÍÊ and 
iÍsÉnÊ cultures.  
To enable that to happen, continuous educational efforts to broaden the horizon of 
individuals is crucial. Individuals, upon whom the model is to be subjected, must 
develop mentally and spiritually to enable them to think beyond the traditional 
conception (taqlÊdÊ) of Islam. In the meantime, they must also transcend the 
stereotypical mindset of captive mentality; therefore, the self-actualisation of 
Muslims is essential. Individuals should be able to think beyond the imposed 
boundaries of modernity, and to realise reality according to their unadulterated 
ontological worldview. This again necessitates a certain degree of freedom and a 
total reform of religious education.  Individuals should be freed from the current 
modernity-based discourse as well as the traditional dogma in looking into the 
relation between Islam and their life. In the same way, their perceptions of freedom, 
rights, responsibilities and self-determination must also be constructed according to 
the tawhidic reality rather than the priorities of the modernity project. In sum, this 
new model demands a reconstruction of reaffirmed Muslim individuals who are 
iÍsÉnÊ self-actualising rather than taqlÊdÊ individuals before it comes into the 
mechanistic dimension.  
There is no doubt that the individual, as the main factor of any governance model 
should first be contained with the spirit of the axioms before the mechanisms. The 
behavioural norms of the individual will then accumulate the social norms that will 
lead towards the aforesaid culture of iÍsÉn. Individuals remain the major factor of the 
accomplishment of the governance system in this model. As per the discussion of the 
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functioning individuals, Islamic governance should be considered as a process which 
starts and finishes with the individual.  
8.4. QUESTIONING THE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE ISLAMIC 
GOVERNANCE MODEL 
In replying to the global problems and issues by contemporary Muslim societies 
mentioned in the first chapter, this model is to be verified according to its 
compatibility to mitigate or moderate such results. If the Bretton Woods good 
governance was proposed as the panacea for those economic development problems, 
can the Islamic model of governance discussed in this thesis work as its alternative? 
Generally, it is possible to identify four sets of attributes requiring reform for Islamic 
governance to be brought about: constitutional, political, administrative and public 
policy. At the constitutional level, khalÊfah typology requires changes to strengthen 
the accountability of political leaders to the people, as well as to empower the people 
to bring their leaders to account by developing individual and social capacities and 
capabilities. Such changes will cure the problem of the abuse of power and of 
individuals being deprived by many regimes in Muslim countries. As indicated by 
many, less-accountable leadership leads to unaccountable abuse of power that finally 
causes corruption and misadministration. Through such reform, leadership is to be 
understood as a trust (amÉnah) and not a privilege. Functioning individuals in this 
realm not only applies to the people, but also to all governance factors in the 
government and the non-governmental structures of markets and civil society.  
Furthermore, constitution under the framework of khalÊfah typology also requires 
changes to ensure respect for basic human rights and individual freedom, together 
with the strengthening of the rule of law, and decentralization of political authority. 
With such reforms, the abuse of rights and freedom of individuals that is prominent 
in Muslim countries could be overcome. Islamic governance is the about the sphere 
where individuals live freely according to their rights and obligations. In the same 
way, it is the sphere where freedom is present and guaranteed by the law. 
Accordingly, the viable separation of powers is constitutionally essential in ensuring 
that rule of law is respected and implemented. In the absence of this element, we 
have witnessed how Islam has been used as a tool for some people to justify their 
political-economic and social misconduct and policies and human rights related 
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abuses. Therefore, the notion that indicates Islamic rule of law confined to the narrow 
implementation of certain criminal codes should be discarded.  
At the level of political action and organisation, along with the freedom ensured by 
the constitution, Islamic governance entails political pluralism to allow a wider 
sphere for the extensive participation of the people, as accountability, transparency 
and participation can only be attained through political pluralism. In the same way, 
real political participation through a free system will encourage probity and 
incorruptibility in the use of public powers and offices by public servants. In the 
Islamic governance model as proposed by this study, the functioning individuals, 
society and institutions effectively act as stakeholders and as a watchdog for the 
exercise of power. With such an ideal tool, the civil society is empowered with more 
rights in determining the way the country is governed. By implementing this ideal, 
the level of democracy and accountability in Muslim countries is expected to rise. 
This eventually is expected to lead to less corruption and effective governance in 
terms of managing power and the country‟s wealth.   
In terms of administrative issues, the Islamic governance model requires accountable 
and transparent public administration. The smaller but enabling and effective state 
encompasses more accountable public servants through a highly transparent system. 
The separation of power along with the freedom of information and politics will 
allow political parties, pressure groups and other watchdogs to monitor public 
services. Within such dominion, the functioning individuals through effective related 
institutions will have a great role to play. This will lead to effective public 
management, including a capacity to design good policies according to the maqasidic 
parameter and to implement them. With this type of reform, the Islamic governance 
model will be able to improve the performance of public services in Muslim 
countries, which in most cases are known to be the source of corruption and abundant 
inefficiency. 
Finally, at the policy level, policy prescriptions must be developed according to the 
maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah that will enable all the elements of khalÊfah typology to be 
articulated. The attainment of maqÉÎid al-SharÊÑah ensures the human well being of 
the people, thus their human development. Besides, human development in Islam is 
not only indicated through conventional growth indicators or the HDI which includes 
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amongst others, life expectancy, adult literacy rate, educational enrolment, GDP per 
capita, longevity, knowledge and standard of living. The holistic understanding of 
human development within khalÊfah typology and the culture of iÍsÉn goes beyond 
the positivist materialistic barometer. It requires the acknowledgement of culture and 
preservation of values, virtue and benevolent factors, religiosity and piety elements 
and knowledge and wisdom attainment, as expected through axioms such as tazkiyah 
and rubËbiyyah. They may not be able to be quantified and measured by figures, but 
institutions and activities can imply them. Moreover, their causal effects on other 
tangible indicators such as lower crime rate, literacy, educational level, and others 
could illustrate the fruits and outcomes of those intrinsic elements. With such 
effective policies, Muslim societies could improve the present miserable situation of 
human life they experience caused by bad governance. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the key for such reforms must start from the 
individuals through a comprehensive educational reform which aims to change the 
internal and the external; as Islamic governance as a dynamic model aims at 
continuous change in the lives of individuals, societies and institutions. Individuals in 
Muslim countries should not only be empowered, but must be educated to realise 
their rights, responsibilities and functions.
3
 The strong dependency and patronage 
culture in Muslim societies should be eliminated and would be eliminated through 
this new Islamic governance model, as it aims at homoIslamicus. In doing so, 
societies must not only be independent, but also effective within the spirit of iÍsÉn. 
Without the iÍsÉnÊ self-actualisation within the heart of the individuals, Islamic 
governance is far from being achieved. Again, a proper system of education to 
develop individuals is required in order to develop the holistic implementation of 
khalÊfah typology within the sphere of iÍsÉnÊ social capital. In the same way, the 
willingness of Muslims to change themselves, specifically their regimes, is another 
crucial stipulation for Islamic governance to be implemented.  
 
                                                 
3
 As al-KawÉkibÊ concluded his imagined Muslims conference nearly 100 years ago by saying: 
“Muslims all over the world are indeed in a state of deadly lethargy; and the only remedy for the 
sickness then is only through proper education and continuously motivating young people to strive for 
a better status; to be taken in collective efforts by scholars and sages of insight and wisdom” (al-
KawÉkibÊ, 1316H: 91-99). 
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8.5. CAN ISLAMIC GOOD GOVERNANCE WORK IN MULTI-RELIGIOUS 
SOCIETIES? 
Another question that might be raised regarding this model is its compatibility with 
multi-religious societies. As most Muslim countries nowadays are no longer 
homogenous, the new reality demands that Muslims realize and acknowledge the 
existence of non-Muslims as their compatriots who deserve the same rights and 
obligations within the territory of the current nation-state system. In such a situation, 
does this proposed model of governance work equally and fairly for non-Muslim 
subjects? And does the khalÊfah typology with the iÍsÉnÊ culture allow non-Muslim 
stakeholders to be included? 
In responding to this, first it should be noted that fairness and justice do not 
distinguish between colour or faith. Social justice according to the Islamic notion of 
universal solidarity (ukhuwwah) does not discriminate against any group of people. 
As for the whole process of Islamic governance which could be summarised with the 
khalÊfah typology framework and the culture of iÍsÉn, their outcomes and 
consequences are in favour of social good for all. With such a consequence, one has 
to separate between the fiqhÊ legalistic discourses regarding non-Muslims with this 
version of Islamic governance. If the classical jurist designates certain selective 
rulings concerning non-Muslims under Muslims polity, they should be viewed from 
the context of those ijtihÉd being produced. In the absence of the context that leads to 
the rulings, the legal precepts on the issue should also be amended.  
However, on the issue of governance, which is more technical and dynamic in its 
nature, a whole new revision of the field is needed. Non-Muslims, just like Muslims 
are part of the whole picture of khalÊfah typology. As stakeholders they are also the 
actors of governance within the realm of Islamic governance. As the actors of 
governance within the khalÊfah typology, they should also constitute functioning 
individuals of the benevolent society and become part of the effective institutions. 
Accordingly, the culture of iÍsÉn that encompasses the whole process of khalÊfah 
typology in delivering social good bears no faith significance in its functional mode. 
The same applies to the axioms which are articulated by khalÊfah typology and could 
also be perceived according to their universal meaning through their instrumental 
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consequential function. Furthermore, the main spirit of Islamic governance lies in the 
idea of overcoming the boundaries between faiths. 
8.6. FUTURE RESEARCH: THE WAY AHEAD  
Despite the lengthy discursive analysis of the research in this study, it remains a 
purely theoretical discourse with a mixture of descriptivism and critical and 
analytical content analysis. Hence, further research is needed to continue what this 
thesis has started to examine. As part of the struggle to bring religion into the field of 
governance, the result of this thesis deserves empirical analysis in evaluating its 
suitability with the reality. For such, a formulation of new methods to harmonise the 
proposed Islamic governance into the current status quo framework is needed at both 
the macro and micro level.  
Furthermore, similar to the current governance characteristics that could be 
quantified and measured with certain index mechanisms and tools there should also 
be an attempt to put the governance model proposed in this research into a specific 
index model. Dar‟s proposal for the evaluation of ethics in the economic sector, 
through the ethics-augmented human development index (E-HDI) as a new indicator 
of socio-economic change and development, could be considered for this. The E-HDI 
incorporates freedom, faith, environmental concerns and the institution of family to 
the existing model of Human Development Index (HDI). It is expected that ethical 
concerns will be injected more explicitly into policy making in the contexts in which 
the human development reports are used (Dar, 2004: 1071). Similarly, an Islamic 
Governance Index (IGI) could be developed for this purpose by replicating the 
Kauffman and World Bank‟s World Governance Index (WGI). The result of the 
articulation of the axioms and the output of the four elements of khalÊfah typology 
would be essential indicators for measuring the governance performance of any 
Muslim country at the macro level, and any Muslim organisation or institution at the 
micro level. However, the details of such an index should be taken up in further 
research. 
By the same token, the mentioned axioms, established to erect the foundation of ideal 
government, are not to be confined and fixed to a limited number. There might be 
other axioms that have been overlooked in this research that would represent Islamic 
values in dealing with governance issues, either in the current situation or in the 
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future. Contexts and changes would determine the necessity to expand the axioms 
with a proper exploration of Islamic epistemology, as the model proposed is a 
dynamic model and therefore should be able to respond to changes in the context. As 
has been repeatedly mentioned in this research, the field of governance is rather a 
new and fertile field of ijtihÉd. Applying or imposing certain classical or archaic 
structures or concepts on the new reality will not bring about a realistic result due to 
the incompatibility of the two. Instead, a fresh and innovative exploration should be 
initiated to understand the spirit and ethos of SharÊÑah and incorporate it into the new 
reality. The examples from the Prophet MuÍammad‟s administration and also the 
Caliphs‟ reflect this ideal and should thus be emulated. Finally, it is the maqÉÎid al-
SharÊÑah that underlies any attempt to develop any new model or theory of 
governance, hence attaining falÉÍ in both worlds. 
Nevertheless, this research represents an initial step toward conceiving a new theory 
of governance. This work reveals that there are compelling reasons to resist the 
temptation to mechanically impose the growing global concept of good governance 
on peoples of the world without acknowledging their culture, faith and context. The 
failures of governance attempts and policies, therefore, could also be explained by 
them not taking into account such particularities. Significantly, this research 
demonstrates that governance exists in our contemporary world that may deviate 
from the conventional, but that is nevertheless good. Nonetheless, as another attempt 
of ijtihÉd within the shade of tawhidic ontological based epistemology, the model 
proposed in this study will remain as a relative and non-definitive answer and model 
for governance. While it is true that every period has its zeitgeist and context, the 
foundational axioms will continue to guide any future changes in the model but also 
in developing new models, as the maqÉÎid suggests that all the efforts of SharÊÑah are 
for human well-being. 
8.7. EPILOGUE 
It may be concluded, therefore, that Islamic principles of governance, constructed 
within the magnitude of value-laden, ontology-determined epistemology, could be 
presented as an alternative for the current discourse of governance as a tool for 
development. This conclusion is concurrent with the aim of this research as 
mentioned in the Introduction, that is to explore and analyse the Islamic axioms, 
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foundation principles and values underpinning the field of governance in an attempt 
to construct the architectonics of a new systemic and dynamic theory and formulate 
the articulation of „Islamic governance‟, which can be considered as a remedy for the 
„bad governance‟ and underdevelopment cases in Muslim countries through an 
authentic Islamic approach.  It is expected that the failure and the rejection of the 
conventional models can be overcome with this authentic proposal based on the 
values of the participants in the Muslim world.   
As the discussion and presentations in the previous chapters demonstrate, this 
research has fulfilled its aim and established its hypothesis that it is possible to 
establish the building block of a new model of governance based on khalÊfah 
typology and iÍsÉnÊ social capital based on the principles of governance within 
Islamic discourse through the epistemological sources of Islam namely, the Qur´Én, 
the Prophet Muhammad‟s tradition, the pious Caliphs‟ experience and the maqÉÎid 
al-SharÊÑah. This model, as repeatedly asserted in this research, transcends the 
materialistic monism of the current governance paradigm by replacing the ends of its 
process with transcendental values, and by making humans as a starting point of the 
subject and as an end in themselves within the paradigm determined by Islamic 
ontology and epistemology. 
However, the result of this research akin to all the previous studies is not the goal; it 
does not even bring us close to the ultimate end in describing the nature of the 
subject. Similar to the jurists (classical and contemporaries) who produced and are 
still producing their ijtihÉd in formulating the ideal model of „Islamic Governance‟, 
all explorations beyond the parameter of fiqh are also considered as a continuous 
ijtihÉd process to bring people close to the ideals. As human life is constantly 
changing, no definite model could be promulgated as the final result in defining „the‟ 
Islamic model of governance. It is an ongoing journey and the end is not yet in sight. 
Like the saying, “it is better to travel hopefully than to arrive”, or what the old Taoist 
says, “the journey is the reward”. Our quest for discovery fuels our creativity in 
understanding the wisdom beneath the teaching and guidance of Islam. “More 
discoveries will only increase the complexity, if not in depth, and shall always be the 
centre of an expanding horizon of possibilities” (Hawking, 2001: viii).  
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“My Lord, grant me success in struggling during failure, in having patience in 
disappointment, in going alone, in JihÉd without weapons, in working without pay, in 
making sacrifice in silence, in having religious belief in the world, in having ideology 
without popular traditions, in having faith without pretensions, non-conformity 
without immaturity, beauty without physical appearance, loneliness in the crowd, 
and loving without the beloved knowing about it. My Lord, You teach me how to live; 
I shall learn how to die.”4  
 
                                                 
4
 Supplication by Ali Shari‟ati, available at: http://www.shariati.com/pray/pray1.html. 
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